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HINDU SUCCESSION ACT – Section 23 – Special provision relating to dwelling houses – Omission of by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 – Effect of – Constitution of India, Article 136. Will – Proof of – Concurrent finding that it was validly proved – No reason to differ with the same. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES: Report of the Law Commission may be looked into for the purpose of construction of a statute – But the same would not prevail over a clear and unambiguous provision. In this appeal, the question involved was as to the effect of the amendment made to Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Amending Act, 2005 thereby omitting Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, which was a special provision relating to dwelling houses. -Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD:1. Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act has been omitted so as to remove the disability on female heirs contained in that Section. It sought to achieve a larger public purpose. If even the disability of a female heir to inherit the equal share of the property together with a male heir so far as joint coparacenary property is concerned has been sought to be removed, this Court fails to understand as to how such a disability could be allowed to be retained in the statute book in respect of the property which had devolved upon the female heirs in terms of Section 8 of the Act read with the Schedule appended thereto. Restrictions imposed on a right must be construed strictly. In the context of the restrictive right as contained in Section 23 of the Act, it must be held that such restriction was to be put in operation only at the time of partition of the property by metes and bounds, as grant of a preliminary decree would be dependant on the right of a co-sharer in the joint property. Concededly a preliminary decree could be passed declaring each co-sharer to be entitled to 1/5th share therein in terms of the provisions contained in Section 8 of the Act. 1/5th share in each co-sharer upon death of the predecessor-in-interest of the parties is absolute. They cannot be divested of the said right as the restriction in enjoyment of right by seeking partition by metes and bounds is removed by reason of Section 3 of the 2005 Act. Where a partition has not taken place, Sub-section (5) of Section 3 shall apply. [Para 22] [1019-B-F] `174th Report of the Law Commission’, referred to. 2.1. Neither the 1956 Act nor the 2005 Act seeks to reopen vesting of a right where succession had already been taken place. The operation of the said statute is no doubt prospective in nature. [Paras 22 and 23] [1020-F- G] 2.2. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the question as to whether a statute having prospective operation will affect the pending proceeding would depend upon the nature as also text and context of the statute. Whether a litigant has obtained a vested right as on the date of institution of the suit which is sought to be taken away by operation of a subsequent statute will be a question which must be posed and answered. [Para 24] [1021-A-B] 3. It is trite that although omission of a provision operates as an amendment to the statute but then Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, could have been applied provided it takes away somebody’s vested right. Restrictive right contained in Section 23 of the Act, cannot be held to remain continuing despite the 2005 Act. [Para 25] [1021-C-D] Eramma v. Verrupanna & Ors. (1966) 2 SCR 626; The State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose & ors. AIR 1962 SC 945; S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. (2006) 2 SCC 740; Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni & ors. AIR 1960 SC 794; Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry AIR 1961 SC 29; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Bhajan Kaur & Ors. 2008 (8) SCALE 475; Vishwant Kumar v. Madan Lal Sharma & Anr. (2004) 4 SCC 1; Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah & Anr. 2008 (11) SCALE 42; Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector & Etio & Ors. (2007) 5 SCC 447; Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia (1988) 4 SCC 284 and M/s Kesho Ram & Co. & ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 151, held inapplicable. Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 536, referred to. 4.1. Institution of a suit is not barred. What is barred is actual partition by metes and bounds. [Para 26] [1031-A] 4.2. A right in terms of Section 23 of the Act to obtain a decree for partition of the dwelling house is one whereby the right to claim partition by the family is kept in abeyance. Once, the said right becomes enforceable, the restriction must be held to have been removed. Indisputably, when there are two male heirs, at the option of one, partition of a dwelling house is also permissible. [Para 28] [1033-C-D] 4.3. In terms of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, the female heirs, subject to the statutory rule operating in that field, are required to be treated equally to that of the male heirs. Gender equality is recognized by the world community in general in the human rights regime. [Para 29] [1033-F] Sheela Devi & Ors. v. Lal Chand & Anr. (2006) 8 SCC 581, held inapplicable. Shyam Sunder & Ors. v. Ram Kumar & Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 24; Narashimaha Murthy v. Susheelabai (Smt) and Others (1996) 3 SCC 644 and Anuj Garg & Ors. v. Hotel Association of India & ors. AIR 2008 SC 663, referred to. Bhe & Ors. v. The Magistrate, Khayelisha & Ors. (2004) 18 BHRC 52 (South African Constitutional Court), referred to. 5. It is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as the fact remains that Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act as it stood was to be applicable on the date of the institution of the suit. Respondents may file a new suit and obtain a decree for partition. [Para 29] [1034-E-F] 6. Both the courts below have considered all the essential ingredients of proof of Will, viz., preparation of the Will, attestation thereof as also suspicious circumstances surrounding the same. They have arrived at a concurrent finding that the Will was not validly proved. There is no reason to differ therewith. [Para 31] [1037-C-D] Case Law Reference: (1966) 2 SCR 626 held inapplicable Para 22 AIR 1962 SC 945 held inapplicable Para 25 (2006) 2 SCC 740 held inapplicable Para 25 AIR 1960 SC 794 held inapplicable Para 25 AIR 1961 SC 29 held inapplicable Para 25 2008 (8) SCALE 475 held inapplicable Para 25 (2000) 2 SCC 536 referred to Para 25 (2004) 4 SCC 1 held inapplicable Para 26 2008 (11) SCALE 42 held inapplicable Para 26 (2007) 5 SCC 447 held inapplicable Para 26 (1988) 4 SCC 284 held inapplicable Para 26 (1989) 3 SCC 151 held inapplicable Para 26 (2006) 8 SCC 581 held inapplicable Para 26 (2001) 8 SCC 24 referred to Para 26 (1996) 3 SCC 644 referred to Para 27 (2004) 18 BHRC 52 referred to Para 29 AIR 2008 SC 663 referred to Para 29 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2535 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 29.01.2007 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in O.S.A. Nos.196 and 197 of 2001. K.V. Viswanathan, P.B. Suresh and Vipin Nair (for Temple Law Firm) for the Appellant. K. Kamamoorthy, B.P. Balaji, N. Shoba, Sriram J. Thalapathy and Adhi Venkataraman for the Respondents.

Inge Viermetz

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 REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2535 OF 2009
 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9221 of 2007]

G. Sekar ...Appellant

 Versus

Geetha & Ors. ...Respondents

 JUDGMENT

S.B. SINHA, J :

1. Leave granted.

2. Effect of the amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short

"the Act") by reason of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (for

short "the 2005 Act") insofar as therein Section 23 has been omitted is the

question involved herein.

3. The said question arises in the following factual matrix.
 2

 The property in suit was owned by one Govinda Singh. He purported

to have executed a Will in favour of his son, the appellant herein on

29.11.1995. His wife Sakunthala Bai predeceased him. The said Govinda

Singh died on 9.01.1996 leaving behind the appellant (original defendant

No. 1) and four daughters, viz., Geetha and Vijaya (plaintiffs) and Shanthi

and Uma (original defendant Nos. 2 and 3).

 Indisputably, the parties to the suit were residing in the premises in

suit. Govinda Singh was also a government contractor. He was running a

business of transport. His daughters were also partners in the firm. Inter

alia on the premise that Govinda Singh died intestate and as disputes and

differences arose between the plaintiffs and the defendants as regards

enjoyment of the property, a suit for partition was filed on 11.03.1996

(marked as C.S. No. 153 of 1996) in the High Court of Judicature at

Madras. The suit property inter alia consisted of residential premises being

No. 36, First Cross Street, West C.I.T. Nagar, Madras - 600 035 as also

some movable properties.

4. Defendant No. 4 Ramesh filed an application for impleadment in the

said suit alleging that Govinda Singh had married one `Saroja' who was,

thus, his second wife and through her he had two daughters and one son,
 3

viz., Jothi, Maya and himself. It was on the aforementioned premise,

Ramesh was impleaded as a party in the said suit.

 Appellant in his written statement inter alia contended:

 (i) In terms of the aforementioned Will dated 29.11.1995, the suit

 property, having been bequeathed in his favour, has vested in him

 absolutely.

 (ii) In any event, having regard to the provisions of Section 23 of the

 Act, the suit for partition was not maintainable.

5. Defendant No. 4 also filed a written statement alleging that the Will

was not a genuine one and was prepared subsequent to 10.12.1995.

 In the said suit, the following issues were framed:

 "(1) Whether the deceased Mr. M.K. Govinda
 Singh died intestate?
 (2) Whether the suit for partition by the
 daughters of the deceased M.K. Govinda Singh,
 who died intestate, is maintainable or not?
 (3) Whether the alleged will dated 29.11.1995
 said to have been executed is genuine one and, if
 so, who are the beneficiaries?"
 4

6. On or about 7.01.1999, an additional issue was framed, which reads

as under:

 "Whether the D-4 is entitled to have any share in
 the schedule property? If so what is his share?

7. Indisputably, the appellant also initiated a testamentary proceedings

for grant of Letters of Administration with a copy of the Will annexed

thereto, which was marked as O.P. NO. 329 of 1996. The plaintiffs of the

suit No. 153 of 1996 entered caveat in the said proceeding; it was marked as

T.O.S. No. 4 of 1998.

 The issue framed in the said testamentary proceedings was:

 "(1) Whether the Will of Late M.K. Govinda
 Singh is true, valid and genuine?"

8. The learned Single Judge held that the appellant could not prove due

execution of the Will as several suspicious circumstances surrounded the

same.

 It was furthermore held that having regard to the omission of Section

23 of the Act and in view of the fact that even the Defendant No. 4 in his
 5

written statement asked for partition of the property, Section 23 of the Act

would not stand in the way of plaintiffs' suit for partition. It was directed:

 "28. In the result, T.O.S. No. 4 of 1998 is
 dismissed with cost of the defendants. In C.S. No.
 153 of 1996, there shall be a preliminary decree
 for partition of the suit property into eight equal
 shares and allotment of two shares together to the
 plaintiffs. C.S. No. 153 of 1996 shall stand
 adjourned sine die."

9. Two intra-court appeals were preferred against the said judgment and

decree, which were marked as O.S.A. Nos. 196 and 197 of 2001. By reason

of the impugned judgment, the said appeals have been dismissed.

 As regards the issue of the validity and/ or genuineness of the Will,

the Division Bench held:

 "21. It is no doubt true that P.W.4 belongs to a
 noble profession and ordinarily great weight is to
 be attached to such evidence. However, apart
 from the fact that several contradictions are
 available from the evidence, P.W.4 cannot be
 characterized as an independent witness as it is she
 who had given the reply notice Ex. D-3 on behalf
 of the propounder of the Will. At the time when
 she gave the reply, there is no whisper in such
 reply that in fact she had drafted the will and
 attested the same. These are many of the aspects
 appearing from the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4 which
 create sufficient doubt regarding the due execution
 of the Will. It is of course true that many of the
 contradictions may appear to be innocuous in
 6

 isolation. But, when all these contradictions are
 considered together along with the fact that thumb
 impression was given by the executant, even
 though he was obviously signing the document,
 and the fact that in the typed will line-spacing in
 different pages appear to be irregular, they create
 sufficient doubt regarding the due execution and
 genuineness of the will."

 As regards application of Section 23 of the Act, it was opined:

 "...It is no doubt true that such amendment has
 come into force during pendency of the appeal.
 However, even assuming that there was any
 embargo at the time of filing the suit or passing
 the judgment by the learned Single Judge as
 contemplated under Section 23 of the Act as it
 stood, in view of the amendment and deletion of
 such provision, it is obvious that there is no such
 embargo after 9.9.2005. In other words, after
 9.9.2005 any female heir can seek for partition
 even in respect of a dwelling house. This
 subsequent event arising out of change in law is
 obviously to be applied and, therefore, the
 question of applying bar under Section 23 of the
 Act no longer arises for consideration."

10. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned counsel would, in support of the

appeal, raise the following contentions:

 (i) The High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned

 judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the

 amendment carried out in the Act by reason of the 2005 Act is
 7

 only prospective in nature, as would be evident from the report of

 the Law Commission as also the Statement of Objects and

 Reasons thereof and, thus, the impugned judgment is liable to be

 set aside.

 (ii) The 2005 Act, on a plain reading, cannot be held to have

 retrospective effect and, thus, rights and obligations of the parties

 should have been determined as were obtaining on the date of

 institution of the suit.

 (iii) If Section 23 of the Act is given retrospective effect, Section 6 of

 the Act will also stand amended with retrospective effect.

 (iv) In view of the fact that execution of the said Will had been proved

 and all purported suspicious circumstances had been explained,

 the High Court committed a serious error in opining that the Will

 dated 25.11.1995 had not duly been proved.

11. Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of

the respondents, on the other hand, would support the impugned judgment.

12. Before adverting to the rival contentions raised herein, we may place

on record that the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment has set
 8

aside that part of the order of the learned single judge whereby Govinda

Singh was held to have married Saroja and had begotten Ramesh and two

other daughters, viz., Jothi and Maya. Ramesh has accepted the said finding

as no appeal has been preferred therefrom.

13. The Act brought about revolutionary changes in the old Hindu Law.

It was enacted to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession

amongst Hindus. By reason of the Act, all female heirs were conferred

equal right in the matter of succession and inheritance with that of the male

heirs.

 Section 8 of the Act reads as under:

 "8 - General rules of succession in the case of
 males
 The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall
 devolve according to the provisions of this
 Chapter--
 (a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives
 specified in class I of the Schedule;
 (b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then
 upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in
 class II of the Schedule;
 (c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two
 classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and
 (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the
 cognates of the deceased."
 9

 The Schedule appended to the Act specifies the persons who would

be the relations of Class I, viz.:

 "Class I : Son; daughter; widow; mother; son of a
 pre-deceased son; daughter of a pre-deceased son;
 son of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a pre-
 deceased daughter; widow of a pre-deceased son;
 son of a pre-deceased son of a pre- deceased son;
 daughter of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased
 son; widow of a pre-deceased son of a pre-
 deceased son..."

14. By reason of Section 14 of the Act, a woman who had limited interest

in the property but was possessed of the same was to become absolute

owner. Section 6 of the Act, however, makes an exception to the

aforementioned rule by providing the manner in which the interest in the

coparcenary property shall devolve upon the heirs stating that the rule of

survivorship would operate in respect thereof. The right, title and interest of

an heir, whether male or female, thus, are governed by the provisions of the

Act.

15. The property in the hands of Govinda Singh was not a coparcenary

property. It was his self-acquired property. The parties hereto, therefore,

obtained equal shares being the relatives specified in Class-I of the

Schedule. Plaintiffs - Respondents, therefore, became owners to the extent
 10

of 1/5th share of the said property. The title to the aforementioned extent of

each co-sharer, having devolved upon them by reason of operation of

statute, was absolute.

16. Section 23 of the Act, however, curtails the rights of the daughters to

obtain a decree for partition in respect of dwelling houses, stating:

 "23. Special provision respecting dwelling
 houses.-- Where a Hindu intestate has left
 surviving him or her both male and female heirs
 specified in Class I of the Schedule and his or her
 property includes a dwelling house wholly
 occupied by members of his or her family, then,
 notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,
 the right of any such female heir to claim partition
 of the dwelling house shall not arise until the male
 heirs choose to divide their respective shares
 therein; but the female heir shall be entitled to a
 right of residence therein:
 Provided that where such female heir is a
 daughter, she shall be entitled to a right of
 residence in the dwelling house only if she is
 unmarried or has been deserted by or has separated
 from her husband or is a widow."

 The proviso appended to Section 23 of the Act confers right of the

daughter who is separate from her husband and giving the right to the

widow in spite of the fact that her husband has left a dwelling house. The

right of a female heir to claim partition of the family dwelling house
 11

although restricted so long as the male heirs do not choose to affect partition

of the same but it expressly recognizes her right to reside therein.

17. The said property belonging to Govinda Singh, therefore, having

devolved upon all his heirs in equal share on his death, it would not be

correct to contend that the right, title and interest in the property itself was

subjected to the restrictive right contained in Section 23 of the Act. The

title by reason of Section 8 of the Act devolved absolutely upon the

daughters as well as the sons of Govinda Singh. They had, thus, a right to

maintain a suit for partition.

 Section 23 of the Act, however, carves out an exception in regard to

obtaining a decree for possession inter alia in a case where dwelling house

was possessed by a male heir. Apart therefrom, the right of a female heir in

a property of her father, who has died intestate is equal to her brother.

18. Section 23 of the Act merely restricts the right to a certain extent. It,

however, recognizes the right of residence in respect of the class of females

who come within the purview of proviso thereof. Such a right of residence

does not depend upon the date on which the suit has been instituted but can

also be subsequently enforced by a female, if she comes within the purview

of proviso appended to Section 23 of the Act.
 12

19. We have been taken through the 174th Report of the Law Commission

which recommended omission of Section 23 of the Act in view of

amendment in Section 6 of the Act.

 Report of the Law Commission although may be looked into for the

purpose of construction of a statute but, it is trite that the same would not

prevail over a clear and umambiguous provision contained therein. We

may, however, notice Clause 3.2.9 of the Report of the Law Commission, to

which our attention has been drawn to, reads as under:

 "3.2.9 It is further felt that once a daughter is made
 a coparcener on the same footing as a son then her
 right as a coparcener should be real in spirit and
 content. In that event section 23 of the HSA
 should be deleted. Section 23 provides that on
 the death of a Hindu intestate, in case of a
 dwelling house wholly occupied by members of
 the joint family, a female heir is not entitled to
 demand partition unless the male heirs
 choose to do so; it further curtails the right of
 residence of a daughter unless she is unmarried or
 has been deserted by or has separated from her
 husband or is a widow. Section 23 of HSA
 needs to be deleted altogether and there is great
 support for this from various sections of
 society while replying to the questionnaire."
 13

 The last sentence of the said paragraph clearly shows that it was

thought necessary to delete the said provision as there was a great support

therefor from various sections of the society. Indisputably, the amending

Act was not enacted in total consonance of the recommendations of the Law

Commission.

20. We may in the aforementioned backdrop notice the relevant portion

of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2005 Act, which reads as

under:

 "3. It is proposed to remove the discrimination
 as contained in section 6 of the Hindu Succession
 Act, 1956 by giving equal rights to daughters in
 the Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property as the
 sons have. Section 23 of the Act disentitles a
 female heir to ask for partition in respect of a
 dwelling house wholly occupied by a joint family
 until the male heirs choose to divide their
 respective shares therein. It is also proposed to
 omit the same section so as to remove the
 disability on female heirs contained in that
 section."

21. It is, therefore, evident that the Parliament intended to achieve the

goal of removal of discrimination not only as contained in Section 6 of the

Act but also conferring an absolute right in a female heir to ask for a

partition in a dwelling house wholly occupied by a joint family as provided

for in terms of Section 23 of the Act.
 14

22. Section 23 of the Act has been omitted so as to remove the disability

on female heirs contained in that Section. It sought to achieve a larger

public purpose. If even the disability of a female heir to inherit the equal

share of the property together with a male heir so far as joint coparacenary

property is concerned has been sought to be removed, we fail to understand

as to how such a disability could be allowed to be retained in the statute

book in respect of the property which had devolved upon the female heirs in

terms of Section 8 of the Act read with the Schedule appended thereto.

Restrictions imposed on a right must be construed strictly. In the context of

the restrictive right as contained in Section 23 of the Act, it must be held

that such restriction was to be put in operation only at the time of partition

of the property by metes and bounds, as grant of a preliminary decree would

be dependant on the right of a co-sharer in the joint property. Concededly a

preliminary decree could be passed declaring each co-sharer to be entitled to

1/5th share therein in terms of the provisions contained in Section 8 of the

Act. 1/5th share in each co-sharer upon death of the predecessor-in-interest

of the parties is absolute. They cannot be divested of the said right as the

restriction in enjoyment of right by seeking partition by metes and bounds is

removed by reason of Section 3 of the 2005 Act. We may notice Sub-

section (5) of the 2005 Act, which reads as under:
 15

 "(5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply
 to a partition, which has been effected before the
 20th day of December,2004
 Explanation- For the purposes of this section
 "partition" means any partition made by execution
 of a deed of partition duly registered under the
 Registration Act, 1908 or partition effected by a
 decree of a court."

 Thus, where a partition has not taken place, the said provision shall

apply.

 Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Viswanathan on Eramma v.

Verrupanna & ors. [(1966) 2 SCR 626], wherein it was held:

 "It is clear from the express language of the
 section that it applies only to coparcenary property
 of the male Hindu holder who dies after the
 commencement of the Act. It is manifest that the
 language of s. 8 must be construed in the context
 of s. 6 of the Act. We accordingly hold that the
 provisions of s. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act are
 not retrospective in operation and where a male
 Hindu died before the Act came into force i.e.,
 where succession opened before the Act, s. 8 of
 the Act will have no application."
 16

 In the factual matrix obtaining in Eramma (supra), Section 8 was

construed in the light of Section 6 of the Act, as one of the questions raised

therein was as to whether the property was a coparcenery property or not.

 Neither the 1956 Act nor the 2005 Act seeks to reopen vesting of a

right where succession had already been taken place.

23. The operation of the said statute is no doubt prospective in nature.

 The High Court might have committed a mistake in opining that the

operation of Section 3 of the 2005 Act is retrospective in character, but, for

the reasons aforementioned, it does not make any difference. What should

have been held was that although it is not retrospective in nature, its

application is prospective.

24. It is now a well settled principle of law that the question as to whether

a statute having prospective operation will affect the pending proceeding

would depend upon the nature as also text and context of the statute.

Whether a litigant has obtained a vested right as on the date of institution of

the suit which is sought to be taken away by operation of a subsequent

statute will be a question which must be posed and answered.
 17

25. It is trite that although omission of a provision operates as an

amendment to the statute but then Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,

whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr. Viswanathan, could have been

applied provided it takes away somebody's vested right. Restrictive right

contained in Section 23 of the Act, in view of our aforementioned

discussions, cannot be held to remain continuing despite the 2005 Act.

 Reliance has been placed by Mr. Viswanathan on The State of Orissa

v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose & ors. [AIR 1962 SC 945] wherein the effect of

a lapsing of the ordinance vis-`-vis non applicability of Section 6 of the

General Clauses Act to such a situation was examined by this Court to hold

that even in the case of right created by a temporary statute if the right is of

an enduring character and has vested in the person that right cannot be taken

away because the statute by which it was created has expired. We are not

faced with such a situation.

 We may notice that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kolhapur

Canesugar Works Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [(2000) 2 SCC 536]

considered the effect of omission of the Rules in a subordinate legislation,

holding:
 18

 "34... It is not correct to say that in considering
 the question of maintainability of pending
 proceedings initiated under a particular provision
 of the rule after the said provision was omitted the
 Court is not to look for a provision in the newly
 added rule for continuing the pending
 proceedings. It is also not correct to say that the
 test is whether there is any provision in the rules to
 the effect that pending proceedings will lapse on
 omission of the rule under which the notice was
 issued. It is our considered view that in such a case
 the Court is to look to the provisions in the rule
 which has been introduced after omission of the
 previous rule to determine whether a pending
 proceeding will continue or lapse. If there is a
 provision therein that pending proceeding shall
 continue and be disposed of under the old rule as
 if the rule has not been deleted or omitted then
 such a proceeding will continue. If the case is
 covered by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act
 or there is a pari materia provision in the statute
 under which the rule has been framed in that case
 also the pending proceeding will not be affected
 by omission of the rule. In the absence of any such
 provision in the statute or in the rule the pending
 proceedings would lapse on the rule under which
 the notice was issued or proceeding was initiated
 being deleted/omitted. It is relevant to note here
 that in the present case the question of divesting
 the Revenue of a vested right does not arise since
 no order directing refund of the amount had been
 passed on the date when Rule 10 was omitted."

 The observations made therein instead of advancing the cause of the

appellant goes against his contentions.
 19

 We are not oblivious of the fact that correctness of the said decision

was doubted in S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India &

Anr. [(2006) 2 SCC 740] wherein omission of Section 16(1)(d) of the

Employees' Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, which

gave infancy protection, was held not to take away the right of parties

existing on that date, opining that the right to infancy protection accrued

prior to that date held continue to survive for the balance infancy period.

 The said decision has no application in the fact of the present case.

 We may, however, notice that in Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate

Ltd. v. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni & ors. [AIR 1960 SC 794], while

dealing with the scope of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, this Court

held:

 "5. Now it has been held by this Court in State
 of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (AIR 1955 SC 84), that
 S. 6 applies even where the repealing Act contains
 fresh legislation on the same subject but in such a
 case one would have to look to the provisions of
 the new Act for the purposes of determining
 whether they indicate a different intention. The
 Act of 1956 not only repeals the Act of 1913 but
 contains other fresh legislation on the matters
 enacted by the Act of 1913. It was further
 observed in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (AIR
 1955 SC 84), that in trying to ascertain whether
 there is a contrary intention in the new legislation,
 "the line of enquiry would be not whether the new
 20

 Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities
 but whether it manifests an intention to destroy
 them.""

It was furthermore observed:

 "9. We are unable to accept these contentions.
 Section 10 of the Act of 1956 deals only with the
 jurisdiction of courts. It shows that the District
 Courts can no longer be empowered to deal with
 applications under the Act of 1956 in respect of
 matters contemplated by s. 153-C of the Act of
 1913. This does not indicate that the rights created
 by s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 were intended to be
 destroyed. As we have earlier pointed out from
 State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (AIR 1955 SC
 84), the contrary intention in the repealing Act
 must show that the rights under the old Act were
 intended to be destroyed in order to prevent the
 application of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. But
 it is said that s. 24 of the General Clauses Act puts
 an end to the notification giving power to the
 District Judge, Poona to hear the application under
 s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 as that notification is
 inconsistent with s. 10 of the Act of 1956 and the
 District Judge cannot, therefore, continue to deal
 with the application. Section 24 does not however
 purport to put an end to any notification. It is not
 intended to terminate any notification; all it does is
 to continue a notification in force in the stated
 circumstances after the Act under which it was
 issued, is repealed. Section 24 therefore does not
 cancel the notification empowering the District
 Judge of Poona to exercise jurisdiction under the
 Act of 1913. It seems to us that since under s. 6 of
 the General Clauses Act the proceeding in respect
 of the application under s. 153-C of the Act of
 1913 may be continued after the repeal of that Act,
 it follows that the District Judge of Poona
 21

 continues to have jurisdiction to entertain it. If it
 were not so, then s. 6 would become infructuous."

 Yet again in Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry [AIR

1961 SC 29] this Court, while interpreting the provisions of Section 645 of

the Companies Act, opined:

 "The effect of this section is clear. If an inspector
 has been appointed under the relevant section of
 the old Act, on repeal of the old Act and on
 coming into force of the new Act, his appointment
 shall have effect as if it was made under or in
 pursuance of the new Act. Indeed it is common
 ground that if s. 645 had stood alone and had not
 been followed by s. 646 there would have been no
 difficulty in holding that the inspector appointed
 under the old Act could exercise his powers and
 authority under the relevant provisions of the new
 Act, and the impugned notices would then be
 perfectly valid. Incidentally we may refer to the
 provisions of s. 652 in this connection. Under this
 section any person appointed to that office under
 or by virtue of any previous company law shall be
 deemed to have been appointed to that office
 under this Act."

 In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Bhajan Kaur & Ors. [2008 (8) SCALE

475], while dealing with the question as to whether the quantum of no fault

liability enhanced from Rs.15,000/- to Rs.50,000/- could be awarded, it was

held:
 22

 "13. No reason has been assigned as to why the
 1988 Act should be held to be retrospective in
 character. The rights and liabilities of the parties
 are determined when cause of action for filing the
 claim petition arises. As indicated hereinbefore,
 the liability under the Act is a statutory liability.
 The liability could, thus, be made retrospective
 only by reason of a statute or statutory rules. It
 was required to be so stated expressly by the
 Parliament.

 Applying the principles of interpretation of
 statute, the 1988 Act cannot be given retrospective
 effect, more particularly, when it came into force
 on or about 1.07.1989.

 14. Reference to Section 6 of the General
 Clauses Act, in our opinion, is misplaced. Section
 217 of the 1988 Act contains the repeal and saving
 clause. Section 140 of the 1988 Act does not find
 place in various clauses contained in Sub-section
 (2) of Section 217 of the 1988 Act. Sub-section (4)
 of Section 217 of the 1988 Act reads, thus:

 "(4) The mention of particular matters
 in this section shall not be held to
 prejudice or affect the general
 application of Section 6 of the
 General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of
 1897) with regard to the effect of
 repeals.""

26. Indisputably, the question as to whether an amendment is prospective

or retrospective in nature, will depend upon its construction.
 23

 It is merely a disabling provision. Such a right could be enforced if a

cause of action therefor arose subsequently. A right of the son to keep the

right of the daughters of the last male owner to seek for partition of a

dwelling house being a right of the male owner to keep the same in

abeyance till the division takes place is not a right of enduring in nature. It

cannot be said to be an accrued right or a vested right. Such a right

indisputably can be taken away by operation of the statute and/or by

removing the disablement clause.

 In Bhajan Kaur (supra), it was held:

 "16. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
 therefore, inter alia saves a right accrued and/ or a
 liability incurred. It does not create a right. When
 Section 6 applies only an existing right is saved
 thereby. The existing right of a party has to be
 determined on the basis of the statute which was
 applicable and not under the new one. If a new Act
 confers a right, it does so with prospective effect
 when it comes into force, unless expressly stated
 otherwise."

 In Vishwant Kumar v. Madan Lal Sharma & Anr. [(2004) 4 SCC 1], a

three judge Bench of this Court repelled a similar contention that Section 9

of the Delhi Rent Control Act providing for the exclusion of operation

thereof in the following words:
 24

 "...There is a difference between a mere right and
 what is right acquired or accrued. We have to
 examine the question herein with reference to
 Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Act. It is correct that
 under Section 4 of the Rent Act, the tenant is not
 bound to pay rent in excess of the standard rent,
 whereas under Section 9 he has a right to get the
 standard rent fixed. Such a right is the right to take
 advantage of an enactment and it is not an accrued
 right."

 It was furthermore opined:

 "What is unaffected by repeal is a right acquired or
 accrued under the Act. That till the decree is
 passed, there is no accrued right. The mere right
 existing on date of repeal to take advantage of the
 repealed provisions is not a right accrued within
 Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act. Further,
 there is a vast difference between rights of a tenant
 under the Rent Act and the rights of the landlord.
 The right of a statutory tenant to pay rent not
 exceeding standard rent or the right to get standard
 rent fixed are protective rights and not vested
 rights. On the other hand, the landlord has rights
 recognised under the law of Contract and Transfer
 of Property Act which are vested rights and which
 are suspended by the provisions of the Rent Act
 but the day the Rent Act is withdrawn, the
 suspended rights of the land lord revive."

 A similar question came up for consideration recently in Subodh S.

Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah & Anr. [2008 (11) SCALE 42], wherein it

was noticed:
 25

"25. In Madishetti Bala Ramul (Dead) By LRs.
v. Land Acquisition Officer [(2007) 9 SCC 650],
this Court held as under:

 "18. It is not the case of the appellants
 that the total amount of compensation
 stands reduced. If it had not been, we fail
 to understand as to how Section 25 will
 have any application in the instant case.
 Furthermore, Section 25 being a
 substantive provision will have no
 retrospective effect. The original award
 was passed on 8-2-1981: Section 25, as it
 stands now, may, therefore, not have any
 application in the instant case."

 The question is now covered by a judgment
of this Court in Anil Kumar Goel v. Kishan Chand
Kaura [2008 AIR SCW 295] holding:

 "8. All laws that affect substantive
 rights generally operate prospectively
 and there is a presumption against
 their retrospectivity if they affect
 vested rights and obligations, unless
 the legislative intent is clear and
 compulsive. Such retrospective effect
 may be given where there are express
 words giving retrospective effect or
 where the language used necessarily
 implies that such retrospective
 operation is intended. Hence the
 question whether a statutory
 provision has retrospective effect or
 not depends primarily on the
 language in which it is couched. If the
 language is clear and unambiguous,
 effect will have to be given to the
 provision is question in accordance
 26

 with its tenor. If the language is not
 clear then the court has to decide
 whether, in the light of the
 surrounding circumstances,
 retrospective effect should be given
 to it or not. (See: Punjab Tin Supply
 Co., Chandigarh etc. etc. v. Central
 Government and Ors., AIR 1984 SC
 87).

 9. There is nothing in the amendment
 made to Section 142(b) by the Act 55
 of 2002 that the same was intended to
 operate retrospectively. In fact that
 was not even the stand of the
 respondent. Obviously, when the
 complaint was filed on 28.11.1998,
 the respondent could not have
 foreseen that in future any
 amendment providing for extending
 the period of limitation on sufficient
 cause being shown would be
 enacted.""

 In Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector

& Etio & ors. [(2007) 5 SCC 447], it was held:

 "...The expression "privilege" has a wider
 meaning than right. A right may be a vested right
 or an accrued right or an acquired right. Nature of
 such a right would depend upon and also vary
 from statute to statute."
 27

 Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Viswanathan on Atma Ram

Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia [[(1988) 4 SCC 284], wherein it was held:

 "8. It is well-settled that no man should suffer
 because of the fault of the Court or delay in the
 procedure. Broom has stated the maxim "actus
 curiam neminem gravabit"-an act of Court shall
 prejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to
 the time normally consumed for adjudication, the
 10 years exemption or holiday from the
 application of the Rent Act would become
 illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that
 time and be disposed of finally. It is common
 knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon
 after the date of letting it would never be
 disposed of within 10 years and even then within
 that time it may not be disposed of. That will
 make the 10 years holidays from the Rent Act
 illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords
 to build new houses to solve problem of
 shortages of houses. The purpose of legislation
 would thus be defeated. Purposive interpretation
 in a social amelioration legislation is an
 imperative irrespective of anything else."

 Yet again, reliance has been placed on M/s Kesho Ram & Co. & ors.

etc. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1989) 3 SCC 151], wherein it was held:

 "13. Learned Counsel urged that the impugned
 Notification enlarged the period of exemption for
 an indefinite period and it tends to amend Section
 13 of the Act and it is contrary to the object and
 purpose of the Act. Developing the argument it
 28

was submitted that the Notification granted
exemption to newly constructed buildings in the
urban area of Chandigarh for a period of five years
only from the operation of Section 13 of the Act,
therefore, no exemption could be available to
newly constructed buildings after the expiry of
five years. A suit if instituted during the period of
exemption could not be decreed, nor such decree
could be executed after the expiry of five years
period but the last portion of the Notification
which states that Section 13 of the Act shall not
apply to decree of civil courts whether such decree
was passed during the period of exemption or "at
any time thereafter" enlarged the period of
exemption for an indefinite period of time, and it
seeks to amend Section 13 of the Act. We do not
find merit in the submission. As noticed earlier
Section 13(1) imposes a complete ban against the
eviction of a tenant in execution of a decree passed
by a civil court before or after the commencement
of the Act and it further lays down that a tenant in
possession of a building or rented land shall not be
evicted except in accordance with the provisions
of Section 13 or an order made in pursuance of the
provisions of the Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section
13 sets out statutory grounds on which the
Controller, an authority constituted under the Act
has power to pass order of eviction against a
tenant. Section 13 takes away the jurisdiction of
civil court to pass a decree of eviction or
execution thereof against a tenant in respect of a
building which is subject to the provisions of the
Act The impugned Notification grants immunity to
newly constructed buildings from the shackles of
Section 13 of the Act for a period of five years.
While doing so, the Notification has taken care to
make the exemption effective by providing that
the exemption shall be available to the building
even if the decree is passed after the expiry of the
period of five years provided the suit is instituted
 29

 during the period of exemption. The emphasis is
 on the institution of the suit within the period of
 exemption of five years. Once the landlord
 institutes a suit before the expiry of the period of
 exemption, the decree even if passed after the
 period of five years will not be subject to the
 provisions of Section 13 of the Act. This is the
 true meaning of the Notification The Notification
 does not enlarge the period of exemption instead it
 safeguards the rights of the parties which
 crystalise on the date of institution of the suit.

 The aforementioned decisions for the reasons stated supra are not

applicable in the instant case.

 As indicated hereinbefore, the institution of a suit is not barred. What

is barred is actual partition by metes and bounds.

 Reliance has also been placed on Sheela Devi & ors. v. Lal Chand &

Anr. [(2006) 8 SCC 581]. The question which arose therein was vesting of

right of a coparcener of a mitakshra family under the old Hindu Law vis-`-

vis Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The contention raised therein that the

provisions of the Amendment Act, 2005 will have no application as the

succession had opened in 1989 was negatived, holding:

 "21. The Act indisputably would prevail over the
 old Hindu Law. We may notice that the
 Parliament, with a view to confer right upon the
 female heirs, even in relation to the joint family
 30

 property, enacted Hindu Succession Act, 2005.
 Such a provision was enacted as far back in 1987
 by the State of Andhra Pradesh. The succession
 having opened in 1989, evidently, the provisions
 of Amendment Act, 2005 would have no
 application. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act
 governs the law relating to succession on the death
 of a coparcener in the event the heirs are only male
 descendants. But, proviso appended to Sub-section
 (1) of Section 6 of the Act creates an exception.
 First son of Babu Lal, viz., Lal Chand, was, thus, a
 coparcener. Section 6 is exception to the general
 rules. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of
 the Plaintiffs-Respondents to show that apart from
 Lal Chand, Sohan Lal will also derive the benefit
 thereof. So far as the Second son Sohan Lal is
 concerned, no evidence has been brought on
 records to show that he was born prior to coming
 into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Thus, it
 was the half share in the property of Babu Ram,
 which would devolve upon all his heirs and legal
 representatives as at least one of his sons was born
 prior to coming into force of the Act."

 The said decision, thus, cannot be said to have any application

whatsoever in this case.

 Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Viswanathan in Shyam Sunder

& Ors. v. Ram Kumar & Anr. [(2001) 8 SCC 24], wherein it was held that

ordinarily a statute should be construed to have prospective operation. In

that case, a right of pre-emption was sought to be taken away by Section 15
 31

of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 as substituted by Haryana Act 10 of

1995 and it was on that premise, held:

 "28. From the aforesaid decisions the legal
 position that emerges is that when a repeal of an
 enactment is followed by a fresh legislation such
 legislation does not effect the substantive rights of
 the parties on the date of suit or adjudication of
 suit unless such a legislation is retrospective and a
 court of appeal cannot take into consideration a
 new law brought into existence after the judgment
 appealed from has been rendered because the
 rights of the parties in an appeal are determined
 under the law in force on the date of suit.
 However, the position in law would be different in
 the matters which relate to procedural law but so
 far as substantive rights of parties are concerned
 they remain unaffected by the amendment in the
 enactment. We are, therefore, of the view that
 where a repeal of provisions of an enactment is
 followed by fresh legislation by an amending Act
 such legislation is prospective in operation and
 does not effect substantive or vested rights of the
 parties unless made retrospective either expressly
 or by necessary intendment. We are further of the
 view that there is a presumption against the
 retrospective operation of a statue and further a
 statute is not to be construed t have a greater
 retrospective operation than its language renders
 necessary, but an amending act which affects the
 procedure is presumed to be retrospective, unless
 amending act provides otherwise."

27. Mr. Viswanathan also placed strong reliance upon a decision of this

Court in Narashimaha Murthy v. Susheelabai (Smt) and Others [(1996) 3
 32

SCC 644]. The principal question which arose for consideration therein

was as to whether the premises which are tenanted ones would come within

the definition of `dwelling house' so as to attract the rigours of Section 23

of the Act. This Court clearly held that the succession cannot be postponed

and Section 23 has been engrafted "respecting tradition of preserving family

dwelling house to effectuate family unity and prevent its fragmentation or

disintegration by dividing it by metes and bounds". It was furthermore held

that "the prohibition gets lifted when male heirs have chosen to partition it".

28. Thus, a right in terms of Section 23 of the Act to obtain a decree for

partition of the dwelling house is one whereby the right to claim partition by

the family is kept in abeyance. Once, the said right becomes enforceable,

the restriction must be held to have been removed. Indisputably, when there

are two male heirs, at the option of one, partition of a dwelling house is also

permissible.

29. Another aspect of the matter must also be borne in mind.

 In terms of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, the female

heirs, subject to the statutory rule operating in that field, are required to be
 33

treated equally to that of the male heirs. Gender equality is recognized by

the world community in general in the human rights regime.

 It is of some significance to notice that the South African

Constitutional Court in Bhe & Ors. v. The Magistrate, Khayelisha & Ors.

[(2004) 18 BHRC 52] declared the Black Administration Act, 1927 (South

Africa) and the Regulations of the Administration and Distribution of the

Estates of Deceased Blacks (South Africa) ultra vires as in terms whereof

the customary law of succession where principle of male primogeniture was

central to customary law of succession was provided for.

 It was held by the majority that the rule of male primogeniture as it

applied in customary law to the inheritance of property was inconsistent

with the constitution and invalid to the extent that it excluded or hindered

women and extra-marital children from inheriting property. The rules of

succession in customary law had not been given the space to adapt and to

keep pace with changing societal conditions and values. Instead, they had

over time become increasingly out of step with the real values and

circumstances of the societies they were meant to serve. The application of

the customary law rules of succession in circumstances vastly different from

their traditional setting caused much hardship. Thus the official rules of
 34

customary law of succession were no longer universally observed. The

exclusion of women from inheritance on the grounds of gender was a clear

violation of the constitutional prohibition against unfair discrimination.

 The said view of the Constitutional Court of South Africa has been

noticed by this Court in Anuj Garg & Ors. v. Hotel Association of India &

ors. [AIR 2008 SC 663].

 Even otherwise, it is not a fit case where we should exercise our

discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as

the fact remains that Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act as it stood was

to be applicable on the date of the institution of the suit. Respondents may

file a new suit and obtain a decree for partition.

30. The question as to whether the Will was validly executed or not is

essentially a question of fact. Both the learned Single Judge as also the

Division Bench pointed out a large number of prevailing suspicious

circumstances to opine that the same had not been validly executed.

 Let us now briefly consider the question as to whether the execution

of the Will has duly been proved.
 35

 Appellant stated in his evidence that one Ms. Radhai, Advocate (PW-

4) prepared the Will and that the testator gave instructions in the morning of

29.11.1995 therefor. He further stated that at the time his father gave

instructions for preparation of the Will, their neighbour Vishwanathan (PW-

3) and Mrs. Radhai, Advocate were present. He further stated:

 "I do not know where exactly the Will was
 typewritten".

 However, in Ex. D-3, it has not been mentioned that Ms. Radhai

prepared the Will and had attested the same.

 PW-3 Vishwanathan deposed that "at the instance of Govinda Singh,

Radhai brought the typedwritten Will". However, in cross examination, he

stated: "I do now know where the Will was typed". He furthermore stated:

 "I was present when Govinda Singh gave
 instructions to Mrs. Radhai for preparation of the
 Will. None else were present. Govinda Singh
 gave instructions to Mrs. Radhai by 10.00 A.M.
 She brought the typed Will by 2.00 P.M., I was not
 present throughout in the hospital."

 PW-4 Ms. Radhai in her examination in chief stated:
 36

 "On 29.11.1995 at 10.00 a.m. I went to Devaki
 Hospital. I met Govinda Singh, PW-2 and PW-3
 were present in the hospital. PW-2 going here and
 there in the hospital. The testator gave
 instructions to me to draft the Will. I noted the
 instructions in a piece of paper, came to High
 Court and got the Will typed. The Will was typed
 by a typist who was available in the corridors.
 The typist was s. Teresa. At about 2.00 P.M. I
 went to the hospital on the same day, read the
 contents of the Will to the testator, then he affixed
 his left thumb impression...then I signed the Will.
 Thereafter PW-3 signed the Will."

However, in the cross-examination, she stated:

 "On 29.11.95 at about 8.00 a.m. in the morning
 Vishwanathan came to my house and told that the
 testator wanted me to meet him...I do not know
 the mother-tongue of the testator. I did not retain
 the note of instructions given by the testator for
 drafting the Will. Teresa was the regular typist.
 Because the testator used to talk to me in Tamil, I
 drafted the Will in Tamil. The testator had not
 instructed me that the Will should be in Tamil
 only. I was not by the side of Teresa when she
 typed the Will. I only gave instructions to her.
 Teresa had not drafted the Will. I drafted the Will
 in writing and gave it to her for typing. I do not
 have the manuscript. I did not compare the typed
 Will with the manuscript."
 37

 Appellant filed an affidavit in support of his case, which was attested

and drafted by PW-4 Ms. Radhai in English. Appellant did not speak of this

affidavit. PW-3 Vishwanathan in the cross-examination admitted:

 "I do not know whether Govinda Singh signed any
 other paper apart from Ex. P.1".

 PW-4 Ms. Radhai in the cross-examination stated:

 "I have notarized the affidavit of Govinda Singh
 few days after attesting the Will."

 However, she admitted:

 "I do not remember whether the testator signed
 any other affidavit on 29.11.95 apart from the
 Will."

 On further cross-examination, she deposed:

 "Ex. P.2 is an affidavit which I have attested on
 29.11.95. I have attested P-2 in my office. I have
 drafted the affidavit. I supplied the stamp paper
 for drafting the affidavit. Because the attestator
 wanted an affidavit to confirm the Will, Ex. P.2
 was drafted. I purchased the stamp papers for
 drafting the affidavit."

 However, it has been brought to our notice that the stamp paper had

been purchased by PW-4 on 11.10.1995 in the name of M.K. Govinda Singh
 38

from a place called Thiriuviyaru in Thanjore District which is 200 miles

away from Chennai. She further deposed:

 "I do not remember where I purchased the stamp
 papers for drafting Ex. P.2. There is no particular
 reason as to why the affidavit was drafted in
 English".

31. Both the courts below have considered all the essential ingredients of

proof of Will, viz., preparation of the Will, attestation thereof as also

suspicious circumstances surrounding the same. They have arrived at a

concurrent finding that the Will was not validly proved. We do not find any

reason to differ therewith.

32. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed. However, in

the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

 ...............................J.
 [S.B. Sinha] ................................J.
 [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]
New Delhi;
April 15, 2009
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