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Education/Educational Institutions: Minority institutions – School run by a linguistic minority – Receiving grant-in-aid – Circular issued by Education Department of Delhi Government in September 1989 to all the schools that appointment of scheduled castes and schedule Tribes candidates was a precondition for all the institution receiving grant-in-aid from Government in terms of r.64 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 – HELD: Rule 64(1)(b) and the Circular of September 1989 are not enforceable against linguistic minority schools in NCT of Delhi – Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 – r.64(1)(b) – Delhi School Education Act, 1973 – ss. 20,21, 28(2). Delhi School Education Rules, 1973: r.64(1)(b) – Undertaking to be given by a school for grant-in-aid to fill in the posts in the school with the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates – HELD: Is not enforceable against linguistic minority schools in NCT of Delhi – The object and purpose of the DSE Act is to improve the standard and management of school education and protection to minority schools – Rules must fall within the ambit and scope of principal legislation – If r.64(1)(b) is enforced against minority schools, it would adversely affect and dilute the protection available to minority school under the Act and the Constitution – Delhi School Education Act, 1973 – s.21- Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 14,15, 16(2), 29 and 30(2) – Interpretation of Statutes – Purposive interpretation – Doctrine of purposive advancement. Delhi School Education Act, 1973: s.2(o) – `Minority school’ – School run by Sindhi Education Society – HELD: Is a linguistic minority school in NCT of Delhi – Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 – r.64(1)(b). Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 14,15, 29 and 30(2) – Minority Institutions – Grant-in-aid – School run by Sindhi Education Society – HELD: The Society enjoys the status of a linguistic minority and the school being a minority institution is entitled to all constitutional benefits and protection under Articles 29 and 30 – To receive grant-in-aid is a legitimate right of a school subject to satisfying the requirement of law – Article 30(2) requires the State not to discriminate the minority institution in relation to matters of grant-in-aid – Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 – r.64(1)(b). Articles 15, 29 and 30 – Linguistic minority – Right to establish and administer school – HELD: Includes right to appoint teachers – To appoint a teacher is part of the regular administration and management of the school – A linguistic minority is entitled to conserve its language and culture by a constitutional mandate – A provision of law or a circular which would be enforced against the general class may not be enforceable with the same rigors against minority institutions, particularly, where it relates to establishment and management of a school – Rule 64(1)(b) of DSE Rules, if enforced, would adversely affect and dilute the right and protection available to minority school under the Constitution – Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 – r.64(1)(b). Articles 14, 15(5), 16, 29 and 30(1) – Reservation policy – Exception in regard to minority institutions – HELD: Although State is entitled to make law and reservations in different fields for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and backward classes in the service under the State, but Article 15(5) carves out an exception for minority educational institutions in regard to which the said power cannot be exercised. Articles 12,14 and 16 – “State” – Reservation in relation to `service under the State’ – Linguistic minority school run by a society registered under Societies Registration Act – Receiving grant-in-aid – HELD: The expression `service under the State’ would include service directly under the State or its instrumentalities which can be termed as State within the meaning of Article 12 – In order to bring a society, organization or body within the expressions `State’ or `other authorities’ appearing in Article 12, financial control, managerial and administrative control and functional control of such institution must be exercised by the State – Merely receiving grant-in-aid per se would not make a minority school or institution `State’ within the meaning of Article 12 – Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 – r.64(1)(b). Administrative Law: Framing of policy – HELD: Is the domain of the Government – It must do so within the framework of the Constitution and the laws – Concept of, reservation has been provided primarily under Article 16 of the Constitution – Minority institutions have been excluded under Article 15(5) from application of reservation policy – State may not be well within its constitutional duty to compel linguistic minority institutions to accept a policy decision, enforcement of which will impinge upon their fundamental right and/or protection – Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 15(5) and 16 – Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 – r. 64(1)(b). Policy decision – Change of – Reasons for – HELD: When Government changes its policy decision, it is expected to give valid reasons – Absence of reasons and apparent non-application of mind would give colour of arbitrariness to State action – Besides, State would not compel a linguistic minority institution to accept a policy decision, enforcement of which will infringe its fundamental rights and/or protection. Judgment – Reasoning – HELD: Reasoning is considered as the soul of the judgment – Various principles involved in the case need to be analised – Educational Institutions. A Senior Secondary School, run by the appellant-Sindhi Education Society and availing the grant-in-aid, received a communication in September 1989, addressed to all the Schools by the Education Directorate that appointment of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates was a pre-condition for all the agencies receiving grant-in-aid from the Government in terms of Rule 64 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973. The appellant-Society filed a writ petition before the High Court contending that the school being a minority institution was outside the purview of the said communication. The single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the case was entirely covered by the decision in Sumanjit Kaur’s case1 rendered by the single Judge, and affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. However, the Division Bench set aside the judgment of the single Judge, and expressing a dissent to the earlier Division Bench decision in Sumanjit Kaur’s case, granted the certificate of leave to appeal. =Allowing the appeal of the Society, the Court HELD:1.1. There is no dispute to the fact that the appellant-Society enjoys the status of a linguistic minority and the institution being a minority institution is entitled to all the constitutional benefits and protection under Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India. The High Court in Sindhi Education Society & Anr. Vs. The Chief Secretary, Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. (Writ petition No. 940 of 1975) has clearly declared that the appellant is a linguistic minority and that judgment has attained finality. Once an institution satisfies the ingredients of s.2(o) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, it has to be given the status of a minority institution. [para 14] [105-g-h; 106-A] 1.2. It is of great significance to notice that the legislature in its wisdom by a specific provision u/s 21 of the DSE Act has kept minority schools outside the ambit and scope of s.20, i.e. the power of control and management vested in the authority. Even any of alleged breach of conditions would not enable the authorities to take over the management of any minority school. Section 21, thus, is an absolute exception to the applicability of s.20. The scheme of the DSE Act, in particular, is to give greater freedom to the aided minority institutions and not to impinge upon their minority status as granted under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. [para 16 and 25] [107-F-H; 113-D] Re.: Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (1959) SCR 995; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 2002 Suppl. 3SCR587=(2002) 8 SCC 481; Kanya Junior High School, Bal Vidya Mandir v. U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad 2006 Suppl. 4 SCR813 = (2006) 11 SCC 92; Secy. Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose 2006 Suppl. 9SCR644 = (2007) 1 SCC 386; Brahmo Samaj Education Society v. State of W.B. 2004 Suppl. 2SCR214 = (2004) 6 SCC 224; Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat 1975 (1) SCR173= AIR 1974 SC 1389; Father Thomas Shingare v. State of Maharashtra 2001 Suppl. 5 SCR636= (2002) 1 SCC 758; T. Devadasan v. Union of India (1964) SCR680= AIR 1964 SC 179; and Lt. Governor of Delhi v. V.K. Sodhi & Ors. 2007 (8) SCR1027= AIR 2007 SC 2885, referred to. 1.3. The DSE Rules specifically contemplate that the State Government will not have any strict control over the management of the minority institutions. Even the members, who are nominated by the Director of Education, would only have a right of limited participation with no right of voting. The limited extent of control exercisable by the authorities is demonstrated in DSE Rules 44, 59 and 96(3A) and (3B). Besides these statutory provisions and the scheme under the DSE Act, various judgments of this Court have also consistently taken the view that the State has no right of interference in the establishment, administration and management of a school run by linguistic minority except the power to regulate as specified. [para 53] [158-A-F] 1.4. The right under clause (1) of Article 30 is not absolute but subject to reasonable restrictions which, inter alia, may be framed having regard to the public interest and national interest of the country. The right to administer does not amount to the right to mal-administer and the right is not free from regulations. The regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration, and can be laid down by the State in the administration of minority institutions. The right of the State is to be exercised primarily to prevent mal-administration and such regulations are permissible regulations. These regulations could relate to guidelines for the efficiency and excellence of educational standards, ensuring the security of the services of the teachers or other employees, framing rules and regulations governing the conditions of service of teachers and employees and their pay and allowances and prescribing course of study or syllabi of the nature of books etc. However, the power to regulate, undisputedly, is not unlimited. It has more restriction than freedom particularly, in relation to the management of linguistic minority institutions. [para 55,56 and 58] [159-E-F; 160-C-F; 163-G-H; 164-A] State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial 1971 (1) SCR734= (1970) 2 SCC 417; All Saints High School v. Govt. of A.P. 1971 (1) SCR734= (1980) 2 SCC 478; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 2002 Suppl. 3SCR 587= (2002) 8 SCC 481; and Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose 2006 Suppl. 9SCR644 = (2007) 1 SCC 386, referred to. 1.5. Minority institutions could even impart education in their own language or in any other language, which choice essentially has to be left to the minority institution. The constitution itself uses the word `choice’ in Article 30(1), which indicates the extent of liberty and freedom, the framers of the Constitution intended to grant to the minority community. Thus, there arises no occasion for the Court to read restrictions into the freedom of the minority schools on the ground of policy. It may amount to intrusion into the very minority character and protection available to the community in law. [para 56] [161-F-H; 162-A] 1.6. The right to establish and administer includes a right to appoint teachers. A linguistic minority has constitution and character of its own and is entitled to conserve its language and culture by a constitutional mandate. Thus, it must select people who satisfy the prescribed criteria, qualification and eligibility and at the same time ensure better cultural and linguistic compatibility to the minority institution. Of course, what should be the qualification or eligibility criteria for a teacher to be appointed can be defined and, in fact, has been defined by the Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and within that specified parameters, the right of the linguistic minority institution to appoint a teacher cannot be interfered with. The paramount feature of the DSE Act was to bring efficiency and excellence in the field of school education and, therefore, it is expected of the minority institutions to select the best teacher to the faculty. Once the teachers possessing the requisite qualifications were selected by the minorities for their educational institutions, the State would have no right to veto the selection of the teachers. To provide and enforce any regulation, which will practically defeat this purpose would have to be avoided. Besides, a provision of law or a Circular, which would be enforced against the general class, may not be enforceable with the same rigors against the minority institution, particularly where it relates to establishment and management of the school. [para 54, 59 and 63] [158-G; 164-C-G; 168-G-H] 2.1. Under s. 28(2) of the DSE Act, 1973, rules can be framed in regard to the condition which every existing school shall be required to comply. It has to be noticed that such Rules can be framed and have only one purpose `make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act”. The framing of Rules does not empower the Administrator to go beyond the purpose or object of the Act and all the Rules so framed should be intended only to further the cause of the Act and bring nothing into existence, which is specifically or by necessary implication impermissible under the provisions of the Act, Even, otherwise, it is a settled principle of law that Rules must fall within the ambit and scope of the principal legislation. Section 21 is sufficiently indicative of the inbuilt restrictions that the framers of the law intended to impose upon the State while exercising its power in relation to a linguistic minority school. DSE Act was enacted primarily for the purpose of better organization and development of school education in the Union Territory of Delhi and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Thus, the very object and propose of this enactment was to improve the standard as well as management of school education. It will be too far fetched to read into this object that the law was intended to make inroads into character and privileges of the minority. [para 17 and 58] [108-B-F; 164-B; 163-D-F] Islamic Academy of Eduation v. State of Karnataka 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR474 = (2003) 6 SCC 697; P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra 2005 (2)Suppl. SCR603 = (2005) 6 SCC 537, referred to. 2.2. In the case of Kanya Junior High School, Bal Vidya Mandir the Court has kept a clear line of distinction between laws made by the State to regulate the administration of educational institutions receiving grant-in- aid but if such regulations interfere with overall administrative control by the management over the staff or abridges or dilutes, in any other manner, the right to establish and administer educational institutions, in that event, to such extent, the regulations will be inapplicable to the minorities. [para 43] [144-H; 147-E-F] Kanya Junior High School, Bal Vidya Mandir v. U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad 2006 Suppl. 4 SCR813 = (2006) 11 SCC 92, relied on. 2.3. Under Rule 60, every aided school, which was receiving aid, will continue to receive such aid, so long as it fulfills the conditions of receiving the aid, in terms of Rule 64. Rule 64 deals with the condition that an undertaking in writing has to be filed by the institution to receive the grant-in-aid allowed by the competent authority under the provisions of the DSE Act. Sub-rule (1)(b) of r.64 deals with the relevant condition that the school shall fill in the posts in the school with the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes candidates in accordance with the instructions issued by the Central Government from time to time and also maintain the roster and other connected returns in this behalf. Second proviso to Rule 10 requires that wherever a linguistic minority school decides to impart education in a language other than the language of such linguistic minority, in that event the Administrator shall not be under any obligation to give grant-in-aid to such schools. [para 22 and 49] [111-C-F; 151-F] 2.4. Article 30(2) requires the State not to discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language, while granting aid to the educational institution. The Government does not enjoy identical control over the management of the schools belonging to the minority and/or majority schools. The logical impact of Article 30(2) read with the provisions of the DSE Act and the Rules framed thereunder is that, to receive grant-in-aid is a legitimate right of a school subject to satisfying the requirements of law. [para 47 and 49] [150-C; 152-B] Unni Krishnan, J.P. V. State of A.P. 1993 (1) SCR594 = (1993) 1 SCC 645, referred to. 2.5. The purpose of granting protection or privilege to the minorities in terms of Article 29, and at the same time, applying negative language in Article 30(2) in relation to State action for releasing grant-in-aid, as well as the provisions of DSE Act, 1973 and the rules framed thereunder is obvious that the constitutional intent is to bring the minorities at parity or equality with the majority as well as give them right to establish, administer and run minority educational institutions. With the primary object of Article 21A of the Constitution in mind, the State was expected to expand its policy as well as methodology for imparting education. [para 58] [163-B-D] 2.6. The concept of equality stated under Article 30(2) has to be read in conjunction with the protection under Article 29 and thus it must then be given effect to achieve excellence in the field of education. Providing of grant-in-aid, which travels from Article 30(2) to the provisions of the DSE Act and Chapter VI of the Rules framed thereunder, is again to be used for the same purpose, subject to regulations which themselves must fall within the permissible legislative competence. The purpose of grant-in-aid cannot be construed so as to destroy, impair or even dilute the very character of the linguistic minority institutions. All these powers must ultimately, stand in comity to the provisions of the Constitution, which is the paramount law. [para 60] [165-D-F] 2.7. Besides, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, the court is also duty bound to advance the cause or the purpose for which the law is enacted. Different laws relating to these fields, thus, must be read harmoniously, construed purposively and implemented to further advancement of the objects, sought to be achieved by such collective implementation of law. While, keeping the rule of purposive interpretation in mind, one has also further to add such substantive or ancillary matters which would advance the purpose of the enactment still further. To sum up, we will term it as `doctrine of purposive advancement’. Courts will have to strike the balance between different facets relating to grant-in-aid, right to education being the fundamental right, protection available to religious or linguistic minorities under the Constitution and the primary object to improve and provide efficiency and excellence in school education. In the considered view of the Court, it will not be permissible to infringe the constitutional protection in exercise of State policy or by a subordinate legislation to frame such rules which will impinge upon the character or in any way substantially dilute the right of the minority to administer and manage affairs of its school. State has the right to frame such regulations which will achieve the object of the Act. Even if it is assumed that there is no complete eclipse of the DSE Act in the Rules in the case of minority institutions, still Rule 64(1)(b), if enforced, would adversely affect and dilute the right and protection available to the minority school under the Constitution. Once the State lacks basic power and jurisdiction to make special provisions for reservations in relation to minority institutions, which do not form part of service under the State, it will be difficult for the Court to hold that Rule 64(1)(b) can be enforced against aided minority institution. [para 54,58 and 60] [159-B; 163-F-G; 165-F-H; 166-C] 3.1. Article 14 of the Constitution commands equality before law or the equal protection of laws. Although, the State is entitled to make law and reservations in different fields for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the persons belonging to backward class in the services under the State, in accordance with law, but the Constitution has itself made out certain exceptions to the general rule of equality in terms of Articles 15 and 16. Article 15(5) of the Constitution excludes the minority educational institutions from the power of the State to make any provision by law for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in relation to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions whether aided or unaided. This Article is capable of very wide interpretation and vests the State with power of wide magnitude to achieve the purpose stated in the Article. But, the framers of the Constitution have specifically excluded minority educational institutions from operation of this clause. [para 45-46 and 50] [148-C; 152-C-D] 3.2. Article 16 which ensures equality of opportunity in matters of public employment prohibits discrimination and, at the same time, vests the State with power to make provisions, laws and reservations in relation to a particular class or classes of persons. This power of the State is in relation to the `service under the State’, which expression would obviously include service directly under the State Government or its instrumentalities and/or even the sectors which can be termed as State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Once an organization or society falls outside the ambit of this circumference, it will be difficult for the Courts to hold that the State has a right to frame such laws or provisions or make reservations in the field of employment of that organization/society. [para 50] [152-E-H; 153-A-B] 3.3. Merely receiving grant-in-aid per se would not make a minority school or institution `State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In order to bring a society, organization or body within the expression `State’ or `other authority’ appearing in Article 12, financial control, managerial and administrative control and functional control of such institution must be exercised by the State. The service in an aided linguistic minority school cannot be construed as `a service under the State’ even with the aid of Article 12 of the Constitution. Resultantly, Rule 64(1)(b) cannot be enforced against the linguistic minority school. Rule 64(1)(b) and the circular of September, 1989, are not enforceable against the linguistic minority school in the NCT of Delhi. [para 51,52,67 and 68] [154-A; 153-D; 172-E-H] Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi 1981 (2) SCR79= (1981) 1 SCC 722; Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Coop. Societies (Urban) 2005 (3) SCR592 = (2005) 5 SCC 632; State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Rai 2009 (4) SCR143 = (2009) 5 SCC 577, referred to. 4.1. To frame policy is the domain of the Government. If, as a matter of policy, the Government has decided to implement the reservation policy for upliftment of the socially or otherwise backward classes, then essentially it must do so within the frame work of the Constitution and the laws. The concept of reservation has been provided, primarily, under Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, it would be the requirement of law that such policies are framed and enforced within the four corners of law and to achieve the laudable cause of upliftment of a particular section of the society. The framework of reservation policy should be such, as to fit in within the constitutional scheme of our democracy. As and when the Government changes its policy decision, it is expected to give valid reasons and act in the larger interest of the entire community rather than a section thereof. [para 65-66] [170-E-F; 171-F] M. Nagaraj v. Union of India 2006 (7 ) Suppl. SCR336 = (2006) 8 SCC 212, referred to. 4.2. In its wisdom and apparently in accordance with law Government had taken a policy decision and issued the circular dated 21st March, 1986 exempting the minority institutions from complying with the requirements of the Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules. Despite this and judgment of the High Court there was a change of mind by the State that resulted in issuance of the subsequent circular of September, 1989. No reasons have been recorded in support of the decision superseding the circular dated 21st March, 1986. It is a settled canon of administrative jurisprudence that State action, must be supported by some valid reasons and should be upon due application of mind. Absence of reasoning and apparent non-application of mind would give colour of arbitrariness to the state action. [para 66] [171-F-H; 172- A-B] 4.3. Besides, State actions should be actio quaelibet et sua via and every discharge of its duties, functions and governance should also be within the constitutional framework. This principle equally applies to the Government while acting in the field of reservation as well. It would not be possible for the Courts to permit the State to impinge upon or violate directly or indirectly the constitutional rights and protections granted to various classes including the minorities. Thus, the State may not be well within its constitutional duty to compel the linguistic minority institution to accept a policy decision, enforcement of which will infringe their fundamental right and/or protection. On the contrary, the minority can validly question such a decision of the State in law. [para 67] [172-C-F] 5.1 This Court does not approve the view expressed by the single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sumanjit Kaur insofar as it held that the regulation would compel appointments to the teaching faculty in the minority schools of the persons, who may be inimical towards the minority community. The Court is of the considered view that the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench erred in law in stating this proposition as it is contra-legam. While deciding a constitutional matter in accordance with law, the Court would not be competent to raise a presumption of inimical attitude of and towards one community or the other. However, to the extent that it may interfere with the choice of medium of instructions as well as minority character of the institution to some extent is a finding recorded in accordance with law. The Division Bench of the High Court, in the instant matter, was right in not accepting the said reason given in Sumarjit Kaur’s case. But, it was expected of the Division Bench to critically analyze other reasons given by the Single Judge in that case. [para 61-62] [167-B-H; 168-A-F] Sumanjit Kaur v. NCT of Delhi 2005 III AD (Delhi) 560 – Disapproved to the extent it observed that regulation would compel appointments to teaching faculty of persons who may be inimical towards minority community. 5.2 Reasoning is considered as the soul of the judgment. The discussion in the impugned judgment does not analyze the various principles enunciated in regard to the protection available to the linguistic minorities under Article 29 and the result of principle of equality introduced by Article 30(2) of the Constitution. Therefore, the view of the Division Bench in the judgment under appeal cannot be accepted. [para 62] [168-D-F] Case Law Reference: 2005 III AD (Delhi) 560 Disapproved para 1 (1959) SCR 995 referred to para 12 2002 Suppl. 3SCR587 referred to para 27 2006 Suppl. 4 SCR813 relied on para 27 2006 Suppl. 9SCR644 referred to para 27 2004 Suppl. 2SCR214 referred to para 27 1975 (1) SCR173 referred to para 28 2001 Suppl. 5 SCR636 referred to para 28 1964 SCR680 referred to para 28 2007 (8) SCR1027 referred to para 28 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR474 referred to para 41 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR603 referred to para 42 1993 (1) SCR594 referred to para 48 1981 (2)SCR79 referred to para 51 2005 (3)SCR592 referred to para 51 2009 (4) SCR143 referred to para 51 1971 (1)SCR 734 referred to para 56 1971 (1) SCR734 referred to para 56 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR336 referred to para 65 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5489 of 2007. From the Judgment & Order dated 30.11.2006 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 41, 42 & 43 of 2006. P.P. Malhotra, ASG, Madhurima Mridul, Rekha Pandey, Chetan Chawla (for Anil Katiyar), D.S. Mahra, Ashok Gurnani (for K.L. Janjani), H.K. Puri for the appearing parties.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
New Delhi is situated in the centre of Delhi

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 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL No.5489 OF 2007

Sindhi Education Society & Anr. ...Appellants

 Versus

The Chief Secretary, Govt. of
NCT of Delhi & Ors. ...Respondents

 JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. The Bench hearing the letters patent appeal in the High Court of

 Delhi at New Delhi, while setting aside the judgment/order passed

 by the learned Single Judge dated 14th September, 2005 in Writ

 Petition (C) No.2426 of 1992, issued a certificate of leave to

 appeal under Article 133 read with Article 134-A of the

 Constitution of India, 1950 (for short `the Constitution') in its

 judgment dated 30th November, 2006 and considered it
appropriate to frame the following questions to be decided by this

Court :-

 (a) Whether Rule 64(1)(b) of the Delhi School

 Education Rules 1973 and the

 orders/instructions issued thereunder would, if

 made applicable to an aided minority

 educational institution, violate the

 fundamental right guaranteed under Article

 30(1) of the Constitution and are the

 respondents herein entitled to a declaration

 and consequential directions to that effect ?

 (b) Have the judgments of the learned Single

 Judge of the High Court in Sumanjit Kaur v.

 NCT of Delhi [2005 III AD (Delhi) 560], as

 affirmed by the decision dated 1.2.2006 of the

 Division Bench of the High Court in (LPA

 Nos.445-446/2005) Govt. of National Capital

 of Territory of Delhi v. Sumanjit Kaur been

 correctly decided ?

 2
1. It is useful to notice at this juncture itself that the Division Bench

 doubted the correctness of judgment of another Division Bench of

 that Court in the case of Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sumanjit Kaur in

 LPA Nos. 445-446 of 2006 dated 1.2.2006. The Division

 Bench had affirmed the view taken by the Single Judge in

 Sumanjit Kaur (supra). The learned Single Judge had expressed

 the view that such circulars and regulations issued by the

 Directorate of Education, would be unconstitutional since they are

 likely to interfere with the choice of the medium of instruction as

 well as minority character of the institution by compelling the

 appointment to the teaching faculty of persons, who may be

 inimical towards that minority community. The Court further held

 that since the approval in the facts of the case would be deemed

 to have been granted, the Court was not expected to discuss or

 pass further orders in the writ petition. The Division Bench, which

 passed the impugned judgment expressed the view contra to the

 view taken by the learned Single Judge in the Case of Sumanjit

 Kaur (supra), as affirmed by the Division Bench. While noticing

 that the Government of NCT of Delhi had filed the Special Leave

 Petition (C) No. 16374 of 2006 in this Court in that case, the

 3
 Division Bench in the present case thought it fit to grant the

 certificate for leave to appeal to this Court.

1. This is how we have been called upon to examine the

 constitutionality and legality or otherwise of the above questions

 framed by the High Court of Delhi. We are also of the considered

 view that besides the above question, it will have to be examined

 that even if the relevant provisions of the Delhi School Education

 Act, 1973 (for short the `DSE Act') are not unconstitutional, would

 they still apply with their rigors to the linguistic minority schools

 receiving grant-in-aid from the Government. Before we enter upon

 the aspects relating to law on the above issues, reference to the

 basic facts would be necessary.

Facts :-

1. The appellant - Sindhi Education Society (hereinafter referred to

 as `the Society') is a Society established and duly registered under

 the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The

 Society is running, inter alia, a school known as S.E.S. Baba

 Nebhraj Senior Secondary School at Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi.

 4
1. According to the Society, Sindhi language is one of the languages

 included in VIII Schedule of the Constitution and the people

 speaking Sindhi language are scattered in various parts of the

 country. As Sindhi language is not spoken by the majority of

 people in Delhi, therefore, the Sindhi community in Delhi is and

 has been held to be a linguistic minority by virtue of Article 30(1)

 of the Constitution. The Society, therefore, has a constitutional

 right to establish and administer educational institutions of its

 choice. In furtherance of such an object, the school was

 established for preservation of Sindhi language and managing the

 affairs of the school as per its constitution and under the

 provisions of the relevant laws.

1. In the year 1973, the DSE Act came into force with a view to

 provide better organization and development of the school

 education in Union Territory of Delhi and for matters connected

 therewith and incidental thereto. Soon after coming into force of

 the provisions of the DSE Act, 1973, the Society felt that certain

 provisions of the DSE Act infringed the minority character of the

 Society, particularly, in matters related to administration and

 management of the school.

 5
1. It appears that the society filed a writ petition in the High Court of

 Delhi being Writ Petition (C) No. 940 of 1975, titled Sindhi

 Education Society (Regd.) v. Director of Education and others,

 which came to be disposed of by a detailed judgment of the Delhi

 High Court dated 14th July, 1982. In that judgment, the Court

 specifically held that the Society was a linguistic minority and the

 provisions of the DSE Act as specified in the judgment would not

 be applicable to the Society. In order to put the matters with

 clarity, it will be useful to refer to the findings recorded by the

 Court which read as under :-

 "In the present case the Delhi School
 Education Act is applicable only to the Union
 territory of Delhi. It is with reference to this
 Territory that one has to consider as to
 whether Sindhi is a language spoken by the
 majority or minority of the people. On this
 there can be no doubt. Sindhi is not spoken
 by majority of the people in Delhi and,
 therefore, the Sindhi community in Delhi can
 legitimately be regarded as a linguistic
 minority. Just as a religious minority may be
 composed of persons whose mother-tongue
 may not be the same, similarly a linguistic
 minority may not necessarily be composed of
 people who belong to a religious minority of
 the State. As such, every person, who is a
 Sindhi, would be regarded as belonging to a
 linguistic minority irrespective of the fact as to

 6
whether he is a Hindu, or a Muslim or a
Christian to the effect that some of the
provisions of the Act and the Rules would not
apply to minority institutions, while some other
provisions could be made applicable only with
certain modifications or in accordance with
the observations made by the Court. We
may now summarise the decision of this Court
with regard to those provisions of the Act and
the Rules which it held as not being
applicable, or being applicable as per the
directions contained therein, because the
learned counsel for the petitioner states that a
similar direction should be issued in this case
also.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

The aforesaid provisions are not to apply to
the school but the Director of Education, Delhi
should be kept informed of any order of
dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or
termination of service of an employee by the
management. If the Administration receives
information that the disciplinary powers are
being abused by the school then the
Administration will have a right to suspend,
reduce or stop the grant-in-aid to the School
after giving a hearing to the school.

Section 27A and B :- The said provisions are
not to apply to the minority school.

The writ petition is accordingly allowed in the
aforesaid terms and, like in Jain Sabha's case
(supra), it is directed that the aforesaid
provisions of the Delhi School Education Act,
1973 and the Rules framed thereunder will

 7
 not apply to the petitioner or would apply only
 in the manner in which they have been
 interpreted by this Court. The petitioner will
 be entitled to costs. Counsel's fee Rs.550/-."

1. The aforesaid judgment appears to have attained finality and, in

 fact, was not impugned before this Court. The Division Bench,

 while deciding the above case, clearly held that certain Rules

 would not be applicable and it specifically noticed the provisions

 relating to the constitution of the Managing Committee under Rule

 59, Rule 64, different Clauses under Rule 96(3), Rule 98, Rule

 105 and Rule 120 of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (for

 short `DSE Rules') in that behalf. The Court held that Rule 64 of

 the DSE Rules is to be construed in respect of minority schools to

 require compliance only if those provisions of the Act and the

 Rules and instructions thereunder are in consonance with the

 provisions of the Constitution, particularly, with Article 30(1) of the

 Constitution.

1. Rule 64, primarily, deals with the conditions of providing grant-in-

 aid and further states that no aid is to be granted unless suitable

 undertaking is given by the Managing Committee. Rule 64 came

 to be amended by Notification Nos. 1340-2340 dated 23rd

 8
February, 1990. This Rule prescribe certain limitation which the

Competent Authority can impose in exercise of its powers. Even

before amendment of this Rule, on 12th March, 1985, instructions

were issued by the Deputy Director of Education, addressed to the

appellant stating, inter alia, that in accordance with provision of

Rule 64 of the DSE Rules, the Managing Committee of the

Society was required to furnish an undertaking that they would

make reservation in the appointments of teachers for the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The reference was

also made to the instructions issued by the Department of

Personnel, Government of India, wherein reservation for

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the

Institutions/Organisations was ordered. The relevant part of the

said letter reads as under :-

 "4. Since the schools are required to apply for
 grants-in-aid every years on the prescribed
 proforma as provided under the Act, they are
 also required to given undertaking to make
 reservation in the services and posts for
 scheduled castes and scheduled tribes
 accordingly. A specimen of the declaration
 is sent herewith the request that the same be
 sent to this office duly filled in and signed with
 stamp of the Authority signing.

 9
 5. It may be noted that the future grants-in-aid
 shall be released on giving the aforesaid
 undertaking on the enclosed proforma."

 The appellant Society responded to that letter vide reply dated

15th April, 1985, inviting attention of the authorities to the judgment of

the High Court dated 14.7.1982, in Writ Petition No. 940 of 1975,

deciding, inter alia, that the school in question, has been held to be a

minority institution and that Rule 64 of the DSE Rules is to be

accordingly construed in respect of minority school(s) that they

require compliance, only, if the same is in consonance with the

provisions of Article 30(1) of the Constitution.

1. The Secretary (Education), Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Respondent

 No.3, thereafter vide his communication dated 21st March, 1986,

 informed the appellant that the undertaking, which was required to

 be given by all the Government aided schools in the matter of

 compliance with the provisions relating to reservation for

 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the institutions, is not

 applicable to the minority institutions. Thus, they were not

 required to adhere to the same. It will be useful to refer to the

 10
 communication of the Government at this stage itself, which reads

 as follow :-

 "In connection with circular letter issued vide
 even number dated 12.3.85, this is hereby
 clarified that an undertaking in writing which
 was required to be given by all the Govt.
 Aided Schools in the matter of compliance
 with the provisions relating to reservation for
 SC/ST in the institutions is not applicable to
 the minority institutions. As such the
 managements of the institutions are at the
 discretion to adhere or not to adhere to the
 instructions issued by the Govt. of India
 regarding reservation of SC/ST."

1. The aforesaid letter was issued after the judgment of the Court

 had been pronounced, however, according to the appellant, in

 violation of all the principles and the law laid down by that Court,

 they still received another communication from the authorities in

 September, 1989, addressed to all the schools that appointment

 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates is a

 precondition for all the agencies receiving grant-in-aid from the

 Government and while referring to Rule 64 of the DSE Rules and

 its amendment, they were required by the authorities to comply

 with this condition. The correctness of this action of the

 respondent was questioned by appellants by filing a writ petition in

 11
 the High Court, which came to be registered as Writ Petition (C)

 No.2426 of 1992 titled as Sindhi Education Society v. Union of

 India and Others. This writ petition was allowed by the learned

 Single Judge vide his Order dated 14.9.2005. The learned Single

 Judge felt that the case was entirely covered by the judgment of

 that Court in the case of Sumanjit Kaur (supra). That was the

 primary and only reason, stated by the learned Single Judge, for

 allowing the writ petition.

2. Aggrieved from the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the

 NCT of Delhi filed a letter patent appeal being L.P.A. Nos. 33 to

 36 of 2006 and 40-43 of 2006, and the same was not only

 accepted but the Division Bench had felt it proper to grant

 certificate of leave to appeal to this Court, vide judgment dated

 30.11.2006. While setting aside the judgment of the learned

 Single Judge and also expressing a dissent to the Division Bench

 Judgment in the case of Sumanjit Kaur (supra), the Division

 Bench, primarily, recorded the reasons as [a] that Rule 64(1)(b)

 does not infringe any right of the minority institution, [b] Clause 11

 of the Kerala Education Bill, 1957, which was the subject matter of

 consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of In Re.

 12
 Kerala Education Bill, 1957, [(1959) SCR 995], was pari materia to

 Rule 64(1)(b) of DSE Rules, and as such was in conformity with

 law and lastly, implementation of roster of reservation was in

 consonance with the stated principle and the fundamental rights

 are not infringed. For these reasons, the High Court passed the

 order afore-noticed, resulting in filing of the present appeal.

1. We have already noticed the questions of law of general public

 importance, which had been framed by the High Court at the time

 of issuance of certificate. The appellants herein succeeded

 before the learned Single Judge, which order in turn, was set

 aside by the Division Bench of the High Court. The appellants in

 writ petition had raised a specific challenge to the provisions of

 Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules which had been accepted by the

 learned Single Judge as the matter was stated to be covered by

 the judgment of that Court in Sumanjit Kaur's case (supra). The

 respondents vide their letter dated 12th March, 1985, and,

 thereafter, while referring to the Department of Personnel and

 Administration, letter dated 7th October, 1974, pressed upon the

 Managing Committee of the institutions, which were Government

 aided including minority institutions, to furnish an undertaking that

 13
 they would abide by the rule promoting reservation while making

 appointment of teachers in the school. Thus, the question that

 clearly arise for consideration before this Court is whether the

 provisions of Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules is ultra-vires or

 violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution. In the alternative,

 whether the said Rule, as framed, can be enforced against the

 Government aided institutions belonging to linguistic minorities.

 In order to examine this aspect in some elaboration, we would

have to dissect it into two different sections. Firstly, the law in

relation to such minorities, as has been settled by catena of

judgments of this Court, and their correct application to the present

case, secondly, analysis of the scheme of the DSE Act and the Rules

framed there under, in relation to minority institutions. Depending

upon the answer to these two aspects, lastly, whether the Rule is

enforceable against the minority institutions to the extent that the

authorities can deny grant-in-aid for non-compliance.

Scheme under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and the
Rules framed thereunder in relation to the Minority Institutions :-

 14
1. As already noticed, there is no dispute to the fact that appellant is

 a minority institution and the Society is one which enjoys the

 status of a linguistic minority and thus is entitled to all the

 constitutional benefit and protection under Articles 29 and 30 of

 the Constitution. Firstly, one has to examine what is a minority.

 `Minority', would include both religious and linguistic minorities.

 Section 2(o) of the DSE Act defines `minority school' as

follows:-

 "minority school" means a school established
 and administered by a minority having the
 right to do so under clause (1) of Article 30 of
 the Constitution

 Once an institution satisfies the above ingredients, it has to be

given the status of a minority institution. The High Court in its

judgment in Sindhi Education Society (Writ Petition No.940 of 1975)

(supra) had clearly declared that the appellant is a linguistic minority

and that judgment has attained finality.

1. There is hardly any dispute in regard to status of this Society.

 Prior to coming into force of DSE Rules, the Society was obviously

 free to carry on its activity of running the educational institution,

 free from any restriction and in accordance with law. DSE Act

 15
was enacted to provide better organization and development of

school education in Union Territory of Delhi and for matters

connected therewith or incidental thereto. The very object of this

Act was, therefore, to improve the organization and school

education in Delhi. The primary object, thus, was to aid and

develop the education system at the school level. In order to

achieve this purpose, power is vested in the Administrator to

regulate education in all schools in Delhi in accordance with the

provisions of the DSE Act and Rules made there under. Section

3(3) of the DSE Act makes it abundantly clear that on and from

the commencement of DSE Act, and subject to the provisions of

Clause 1 of Article 30 of the Constitution, the establishment of a

new school or opening of a higher class or even closing of existing

classes shall have to be in accordance with the provisions of the

DSE Act, but for such compliance, the recognition shall be denied

to such institution by the appropriate authority. The school is

required to have a scheme of management in terms of Section 5

of the DSE Act, but such scheme insofar as it relates to the

previous approval of the appropriate authority, will not be

applicable to the scheme for an unaided school.

 16
1. Powers of wide dimensions and authority are vested in the

 Administrator under Section 20 of the DSE Act, which forms part

 of Chapter VII relating to taking over of the management of the

 schools under the provisions of the Act. Whenever the

 Administrator is satisfied that the managing committee or the

 manager of the school has failed or neglected to perform their

 duties and carry on the management of the school in accordance

 with the provisions of the Act, the Administrator can take over the

 management of the school whether such school is recognized or

 not. But, such action can be taken only in accordance with the

 prescribed procedure. However, where the Administrator feels

 that it is expedient to take over the management of the school, it

 could pass orders from time to time, outer limit being 3 years

 which again could be extended for further period, if the

 Administrator is of that opinion for valid reasons but, in any case, it

 cannot exceed the period of 5 years in its entirety. These powers

 of the Administrator indicate the legislative intent to ensure that

 the object of the DSE Act is not defeated and every recognized or

 unrecognized institution, without classification on the basis of

 receiving Government aid, should function and be managed in

 17
 accordance with the provisions of the DSE Act and the Rules

 framed thereunder. It is of great significance to notice here that

 the legislature in its wisdom by a specific provision under Section

 21 of the DSE Act has kept minority schools outside the ambit and

 scope of Section 20. In other words, the power of control and

 management vested in the authority even on the basis of alleged

 breach of conditions would not enable the authorities to take over

 the management of any minority school. Section 21, thus, is an

 absolute exception to the applicability of Section 20 of the DSE

 Act. Section 28 of the DSE Act empowers the Administrator to

 frame Rules with the previous approval of the Central

 Government. The Administrator has been empowered under

 Section 28(2), in particular and without prejudice to the generality

 of the stated powers, to frame Rules in relation to the matters

 specified in that sub-section.

1. It will not be necessary for us to notice in detail the purposes for

 which Rules can be framed but reference to few of them would be

 useful. Under Section 28(2)(b), Rules can be framed in regard to

 the condition which every existing school shall be required to

 comply. While, Section 28(2)(g) contemplate framing of minimum

 18
 qualifications for, and method of recruitment, and the terms and

 conditions of service of employees, Section 28(2)(k) empowers

 the Administrator to frame Rules in regard to the conditions under

 which aid may be granted to recognized schools and on violation

 of which, aid may be stopped, reduced or suspended and Section

 28(2)(q) relates to faming of Rules for admission to a recognized

 school and lastly under Section 28(2)(u), Rules can be framed in

 regard to financial and other returns to be filed by the managing

 committee of recognized private school. It has to be noticed that

 all these Rules can be framed and have only one purpose `make

 rules to carry out the provisions of the Act''. In other words, the

 framing of Rules does not empower the Administrator to go

 beyond the purpose of object of the Act and all these Rules so

 framed should be intended only to further the cause of the Act and

 bring nothing into existence, which is specifically or by necessary

 implication impermissible under the provisions of the DSE Act.

1. At this point reference to some of the DSE Rules can be of some

 assistance. Under Chapter-II - Regulation of Education - The

 freedom of minority institutions to establish educational institutions

 for advancement of their own language and culture is a protected

 19
 freedom. Rule 10 of the DSE Rules recognizes such mandate. It

 is provided there that any linguistic minority which intends to set

 up school with the object of imparting education in the mother-

 tongue of such linguistic minority, shall be entitled to do so and

 shall be entitled to receive grant-in-aid, if other conditions for that

 purpose are satisfied. However, second proviso to this rule states

 that linguistic minority can decide to impart education at the school

 in a language other than the language of such linguistic minority.

 In that event, it shall not be obligatory upon the Administrator to

 give grant-in-aid to such schools. In other words, this rule

 recognizes two aspects - firstly, the extent of freedom available to

 the linguistic minority for educational purposes and secondly, an

 obligation on the part of the Administrator to give grant-in-aid

 unless the linguistic minority was covered by the second proviso.

 The indication that such institution would normally be entitled to

 receive grant-in-aid, if they satisfy the conditions, is clear in terms

 of Rule 10.

1. Chapter-III deals with Opening of New Schools or Classes or

 Closure of Existing Schools or Classes. Rule 44 provides that

 every individual, association of individuals, society or trust which

 20
 desires to establish a new school, not being a minority school, is

 required to give intimation in writing to the Administrator of their

 intention to establish such school. The details of the

 intention/intimation required have been stated in Rule 44(2).

 Amongst others, it requires details to be submitted in respect of

 managing committee of the proposed new school and the

 proposed procedure until its recognition under the DSE Act for

 selection of the Head of the School and the teachers as well as

 the non-teaching staff etc. It is noteworthy that this rule is

 applicable to the institutions not being a minority school. The

 minority institution, therefore, has specifically been kept out of the

 application of this rule, the purpose being that the administration

 and management of a minority school will remain outside the

 rigors of compliance of Rule 44.

1. Chapter-IV of the DSE Rules deals with Recognition of Schools.

 Rule 50 states the condition which an institution is required to

 satisfy before it can be granted recognition. Rule 56 empowers

 the competent authority to suspend or withdraw the recognition

 granted.

 21
1. Chapter-V deals with the Scheme of Management of the

 recognized schools. Rule 59 is one other provision which,

 primarily, indicates the limitations of the schools in regard to

 furnishing of scheme of the management of the recognized

 schools. All the recognized schools are expected to submit to the

 authority the scheme of management and comply with the

 requirements of formation of managing committee of the school

 and total number of the members in terms of that rule. The

 managing committee would include two members to be nominated

 by the Director, and other members to be nominated or elected,

 as the case may be, in accordance with the rules and regulations

 of the society in terms of Section 590(1)(iv), (v) and (vi)

 respectively. The members, who are nominated by the Director

 and the persons nominated by the Advisory Board, in the case of

 schools other than the minority schools, have an effective role to

 play in decisions of management as well as they have right of

 voting. However, in regard to minority school the framers of the

 rule have added five provisos to Rule 59(1). They specifically

 provided that in a minority school, the members, instead of being

 elected, would be the one nominated by the society or the trust by

 22
which such unaided minority school is run. The educationist, to be

nominated by the Director, shall be a non-official belonging to the

minority by which the school is established and run, and the

managing committee shall co-opt two senior-most teachers out of

a panel of ten senior-most teachers of the school by rotation and

in case the school works in two shifts, then one senior-most

teacher shall be co-opted from a panel of five senior most

teachers in each shift by rotation. Sub-rule (iv) of Rule 59 which

gives powers to the Advisory Board to nominate two persons will

not apply in the case of the minority school. Furthermore, the

members nominated by the Director, Education in exercise of its

powers under Sub-rule (v) of Rule 59 shall not be entitled to take

part in the management of the minority school and shall function

as advisers and observers to put forward the views of the

Government in the meeting. This reflects the kind of control, the

framers of the rule desired, that the authorities should exercise

over the aided minority schools in comparison to the Government

aided non-minority schools. There is clear line of distinction which

gets more and more prominent with further reference to the

 23
 various provisions of the DSE Act and the Rules framed

 thereunder.

1. Chapter-VI is the basic chapter, with which, we may be concerned

 in the present case, as it deals with grant-in-aid. Under Rule 60,

 every aided school, which was receiving aid, will continue to

 receive such aid, so long as it fulfills the conditions of receiving

 the aid, in terms of Rule 64. Rule 64 deals with the condition that

 an undertaking in writing has to be filed by the institution to

 receive the grant-in-aid allowed by the competent authority under

 the provisions of the DSE Act. The Rule reads as under :

 "(1) No school shall be granted aid unless its
 managing committee gives an undertaking in
 writing that:

 (a) it shall comply with the provisions of the Act
 and these rules;

 (a) it shall fill in the posts in the school with the
 Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
 candidates in accordance with the instructions
 issued by the Central Government from time
 to time and also maintain the roster and other
 connected returns in this behalf;"

 Rule 65 details the conditions which a school, applying for

grant-in-aid, should satisfy. The grant-in-aid is required to be given

 24
only for the qualified staff as Rule 66 imposes no obligation upon the

State to release grant-in-aid in relation to unqualified staff. The

management of the school must employ adequate number of

qualified teachers and other staff which is approved by the Director

under the norms prescribed for such post or which may be

prescribed from time to time.

1. Rule 96 under Chapter VIII relates to the Recruitment and Terms

 and Conditions of Service of the Employees of the Private Schools

 other than the Unaided Minority Schools. This chapter itself will

 not apply to unaided minority schools but would apply to other

 schools. The chapter deals with how a selection committee will be

 constituted and how the employees including the teachers would

 be appointed to the schools. DSE Rules 96(1) to 96(3) deals in

 some detail with reference to appointment, constitution of the

 selection committee, methodology of selection and appointment to

 the post of teacher as well as Group-D employees. Significantly,

 DSE Rules 96(3A) and 96(3B) are exceptions to the earlier part of

 the DSE Rules. The said DSE Rule 96(3A) refers to various

 nominations which makes it clear that in the case of aided minority

 schools, such nominated persons, under different clauses stated

 25
 therein, shall act only as advisers and will not have the power to

 vote or actually control the selection of an employee. Rule 96(3B)

 states that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (3), the

 Selection Committee of a minority school shall not be limited by

 the number specified in the said sub-rule and its managing

 committee may fix such number. Obviously, all these provisions

 have been framed with the emphasis on the fact that authorities

 like the Administrator, Director and other officers do not have a

 direct, and in some cases, even indirect participation in the

 management and administration of the minority school which

 includes the selection and appointment of teachers. It attains a

 greater significance, once these provisions along with restrictions

 stated in the DSE Act are read in conjunction with Articles 29 and

 30 of the Constitution.

1. Chapter-XI of the DSE Rules deal with Unaided Minority School.

 It requires that recruitment of employees of each recognized

 unaided minority school shall be made on the recommendation of

 a Selection Committee to be constituted by the managing

 committee of that school. Rule 128(1) requires the minimum

 qualifications for appointment as a teacher of an unaided minority

 26
 school shall not be less than those as are prescribed by the

 Affiliating Board. In the event, no minimum qualifications have

 been specified by the Affiliating Board, in respect of the post of

 any teacher, the minimum qualifications for recruitment to the

 such post be made by the Administrator after considering such

 recommendations or suggestions as may be made by the

 unaided school in this behalf. In terms of Rule 129, the

 appropriate Authority has been empowered to relax the minimum

 qualification for such period as it may deem fit and proper.

 Chapter XII deals with `Admissions to Recognized

 Schools'.

1. Thus, the scheme of the DSE Act, in particular, is to give greater

 freedom to the aided minority institutions and not to impinge upon

 their minority status as granted under Article 30(1) of the

 Constitution. We shall shortly discuss the constitutional mandate

 and effect thereof with reference to the facts of the present case.

 On the analysis of the above, it is clear that Section 21 of the DSE

 Act has to be given its true meaning and permitted to operate in

 the larger field. The stringent power vested in the appropriate

 Authority in terms of the Section 20 cannot be enforced against a

 27
 minority institution. It is the consequence flowing from the

 violations committed by management of a school that empowers

 the authorities to take over the management of the school within

 the scope of Section 21 of the DSE Act. Minority Institutions

 being an exception to these rules have been given a distinct and

 definite status under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

Discussion on law particularly with reference to the judgments
relied upon by the respective parties.

1. Mr. P.P. Malhotra, the learned Additional Solicitor General of

 India, with great emphasis, argued that by providing and enforcing

 the intent of Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules, the Government is

 not causing any discrimination. The said DSE Rule relating to

 reservation is uniformly applied to all schools. It was fairly stated

 that there is no dispute to the fact that the appellant institution is a

 linguistic minority institution. It is also contended that the

 controversy in the present case is covered by Kerala Education

 Bill, 1957, case (supra) and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

1. The direction issued by the Directorate of Education for furnishing

 of such an undertaking is contemplated under Rule 64(1)(b) and

 28
its implementation is in consonance with the principle of equality

before law and also within the ambit of Article 15 of the

Constitution. The right is vested in the Government to make

reservation, as such the grant-in-aid is to be used for a social

object, namely, upliftment of reserved category, even by providing

employment in minority institutions, like the appellant. This shall

be the true spirit of the preamble of the Constitution, which

requires attainment of the goal, to secure to all citizens, justice,

social, economic and political. These expressions are of wide

magnitude and the authorities are well within their competence to

require minority institutions as well to comply with the rule of

reservation and file undertakings as contemplated under Rule

64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules. The reliance has primarily been

placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Kerala

Education Bill, 1957 (supra); T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of

Karnataka [(2002) 8 SCC 481]; Kanya Junior High School, Bal

Vidya Mandir v. U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad [(2006) 11 SCC 92],

Secy. Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose [(2007) 1 SCC

386] and Brahmo Samaj Education Society v. State of W.B.

[(2004) 6 SCC 224].

 29
1. On the contra, the submission made by Mr. K.L. Janjani, the

 learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is that

 merely because the State is providing grant-in-aid to a minority

 institution, it will not clothe the authority with the power to interfere

 in the administration and management of a minority institution.

 Right to appoint a teacher is a part of the management and, thus,

 is free from any restriction. In terms of Article 30 of the

 Constitution, the right of minority to establish and administer

 educational institutions of their own choice, is incapable of being

 interfered with by the authorities and the language of Rule

 64(1)(b), as well as the directives issued by the respondents

 violates the constitutional protection available to the appellants in

 accordance with law. It is the contention of the appellant that the

 law enunciated in Kerala Education Bill case,1957 (supra) has

 been watered down suitably by this Court in T.M.A. Pai's case

 (supra) and also that the provisions of DSE Act are not pari

 materia, much less, identical to that of Kerala Education Bill, 1957

 case (supra). There are specific provisions in the DSE Act and

 the Rules exempting linguistic minority institutions and, as such,

 the State cannot derive any benefit from the said judgment. The

 30
 purpose of allowing grant-in-aid is to create equality and parity

 with other institutions. But this does not mean that the authorities

 under the pretext of granting to the minority institutions additional

 protections impose conditions which would frustrate the very

 purpose and object of minority institution and for non-compliance

 thereof, deny the grant-in-aid. On the simple interpretation of

 Articles 15, 29 and 30 of the Constitution, it is crystal clear that the

 linguistic minority institution has the right to make appointments,

 free of restriction or reservation, as that alone will be in the

 interest of the linguistic minority. The learned counsel for the

 appellants relied upon the dictum of order in T.M.A. Pai's case

 (supra), in addition to the Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society

 v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1974 SC 1389]; Father Thomas Shingare

 v. State of Maharashtra [(2002) 1 SCC 758]; T. Devadasan v.

 Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 179], Brahmo Samaj Education

 Society (supra) and Lt. Governor of Delhi v. V.K. Sodhi & Ors.

 [AIR 2007 SC 2885] in support of his contentions.

1. In the light of the submissions made before us, it will be pertinent

 for us to examine how the law has travelled for all these years in

 relation to the right of minority to run their institutions and the

 31
extent to which they can be subjected to control by the appropriate

authorities, in accordance with law. The seven-Judge Bench of

this Court in the case of Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra) was

concerned with constitutionality or otherwise of certain clauses of

the Kerala Education Bill, 1957. While, discussing the scope of

rights available to the minority institutions in relation to running of

educational courses, the Court dealt with different aspects of the

matter and discussed the constitutional provisions construed in

light of the Kerala Education Bill. The Bill had provided different

clauses which the institution was required to satisfy to receive the

grant-in-aid. In para 29 of the judgment, the Court noticed

various clauses of the Kerala Education Bill, the validity of which

was challenged before this Court. The argument advanced

before the Court, inter alia, was also with reference to the Anglo

Indian Education Institutions, that they were entitled to receive the

grant under Article 337 of the Constitution and the provisions of

the said Bill, which legitimately come within the provisions which

infringe their right not only under Article 337 of the Constitution,

but also violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution. In that case they

are prevented from effectively exercising its rights. A Bench

 32
 noticed the grievances of the minorities in para 29 of the judgment

 and discussed the same in para 31 before arriving at the final

 conclusion.

1. The Court in that case was dealing with the Presidential

 Reference, in terms of Article 143 of the Constitution. While

 referring to the questions framed for the opinion of the Court, the

 Court noticed that the width of power of control thus sought to be

 assumed by the State evidently appeared to the President to be

 calculated to raise doubts as to the constitutional validity of some

 of the clauses of the said Bill on the ground of prohibited

 infringement of some of the fundamental rights granted to the

 minority communities by the Constitution. The Bench in Para 10

 noticed the questions which are as under :-

 (1) "Does sub-clause 5 of clause 3 of the
 Kerala Education Bill read with clause 36
 thereof or any of the provisions of the said
 sub-clause 36 thereof or any of the
 provisions of the said sub-clause, offend
 article 14 of the Constitution in any
 particulars or to any extent?

 (1) Do sub-clause (5) of clause (3), sub-clause
 (3) of clause 8 and clause 9 to 13 of the
 Kerala Education Bill or any provisions

 33
 thereof, offend clause 91) of article 30 of
 the Constitution in any particulars or to any
 extent?

(1) Does clause 15 of the Kerala Education
 Bill or any provisions thereof, offend article
 14 of the Constitution in any particulars or
 to any extent?

(1) Does clause 33 of the Kerala Education
 Bill, or any provisions thereof, offend
 article 226 of the Constitution in any
 particulars or to any extent?"

 The answers to question Nos. 1 and 3 :

 "That result, therefore, is that the charge of
 invalidity of the several clauses of the Bill
 which fall within the ambit of questions 1 and
 3 on the ground of the infraction of Article 14
 must stand repelled and our answers to both
 the questions 1 and 3 must, therefore, be in
 the negative".

 Answer to question No. 2 :-

 "Yes, so far as Anglo Indian education
 institutions entitled to grant under Article 337
 are concerned. (ii) As regards other minorities
 not entitled to grant as of right under any
 express provision of he constitution but are in
 receipt of aid or desire such aid and also as
 regards Anglo Indian educational institutions
 in so far as they are receiving aid in excess of
 what are due to them under Article 337
 clauses 8(3) and 9 to 13 do not offend Article
 30(1) but clause 3(5) in so far as it makes
 such educational institutions subject to
 clauses 14 and 15 do not offend Article 30(1).

 34
 (iii) Clause 7 (except sub clauses (1) and (3)
 which applies only to aided schools),
 clause10 in so far as they apply to recognized
 schools to be established after the said Bill
 comes into force do not offend Article 30(1)
 but clause 3(5) in so far as it makes the new
 schools established after the commencement
 of the Bill subject to clause 20 does offend
 Article 30(1)."

 In the said case, the Court held that right of the minorities to

some extent was restricted in the sense that general control still

could be exercised by the authorities concerned, but in accordance

with law. That is how Clause 11 of the Bill, which has been very

heavily relied upon by the respondents before us, completely put an

embargo on the appointment of teachers of their choice and the

teachers could only be appointed out of the panel selected by the

Public Service Commission. This clause was held not to be in

violation of the Constitution, but clauses 14 and 15, which related to

taking over of the management of an aided school for the conditions

stipulated therein, were held to be unconstitutional and bad. This

was in view of the law stated under the Bill and its scheme that

weighed with the Court to record findings afore-noticed.

 35
1. Still another Seven Judge Bench of this Court, in the case of the

 Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society (supra) was, primarily,

 concerned with the scope of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution,

 relating to the rights of minorities to impart general education and

 applicability of the concept of affiliation to such institutions. Of

 course, the Court held that there was no fundamental right of a

 minority institution to get affiliation from a University. When a

 minority institution applies to a University to be affiliated, it

 expresses its choice to participate in the system of general

 education and courses of instructions prescribed by that

 University, and it agrees to follow the uniform courses of study.

 Therefore, measures which will regulate the courses of study, the

 qualifications and appointment of teachers, the conditions of

 employment of teachers, the health, hygiene of students and the

 other facilities are germane to affiliation of minority institutions.

 With regard to grant of an appropriate protection of such

 community in terms of Article 30 of the Constitution, the Court

 held as under :-

 "12. The real reason embodied in Article 30
 (1) of the Constitution is the conscience of the
 nation that the minorities, religious as well as

 36
linguistic, are not prohibited from establishing
and administering educational institutions of
their choice for the purpose of giving their
children the best general education to make
them complete men and women of the
country. The minorities are given this
protection under Article 30 in order to
preserve and strengthen the integrity and
unity of the country The sphere of general
secular education is intended to develop the
commonness of the boys and girls of our
country. This is in the true spirit of liberty,
equality and fraternity through the medium of
education. If religious or linguistic minorities
are not given protection under Article 30 to
establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice, they will feel
isolated and separate. General secular
education will open doors of perception and
act as the natural light of mind for our
countrymen to live in the whole.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

30. Educational institutions are temples of
learning. The virtues of human intelligence
are mastered and harmonized by education.
Where there is complete harmony between
the teacher and the taught, where the teacher
imparts and the student receives, where there
is compete dedication of the teacher and the
taught in learning, where there is discipline
between the teacher and the taught, where
both are worshippers of learning, no discord
or challenge will arise. An educational
institution runs smoothly when the teacher
and the taught are engaged in the common
ideal of pursuit of knowledge. It is, therefore,

 37
 manifest that the appointment of teachers is
 an important part in educational institutions.
 The qualifications and the character of the
 teachers are really important. The minority
 institutions have the right to administer
 institutions. This right implies the obligation
 and duty of the minority institutions to render
 the very best to the students. In the right of
 administration, checks and balances in the
 shape of regulatory measure are required to
 ensure the appointment of good teachers and
 their conditions of service. The right to
 administer is to be tempered with regulatory
 measures to facilitate smooth administration.
 The best administration will reveal no trace or
 color of minority. A minority institution should
 shine in exemplary eclectism in the
 administration of the institution. The best
 compliment that can be paid to a minority
 institution is that it does not rest on or
 proclaim its minority character."

 As is evident from the above noticed dictum of the Court the

emphasis had been laid on the right of the minority institutions to

administer institution. Appointment of teacher is an important part of

administration of educational institution and administrative freedom of

the minority in that regard.

1. Now we may refer to a judgment of this Court in the case of

 Managing Committee, Khalsa Middle School v. Mohinder Kaur

 [(1993) Supp. 4 SCC 26]. In this case, the Court was concerned

 38
with the amendments made in the Rules and Regulations of the

Society. The date of passing of the resolution or its registration,

which would be the effective date while dealing with the

termination of service of a teacher without obtaining the approval

of the Director of Education, could not be annulled for violating the

provisions of the DSE Act. While registering the Khalsa

Education Society, which was running a school known as Khalsa

Primary School, belonging to a minority, it lost its status of

minority, which was restored in July, 1979. The action was

initiated during the interregnum period when the Society was

working as non-minority institution, the Court took the view that as

a non-minority institution, it was required to comply with the

conditions of the DSE Act and the Rules framed thereunder, but

once the character of minority institution was restored, the

provisions will not be attracted. In this regard, the Court held as

under :-

 "10...........Here we are concerned with the
 amendment in the Rules and Regulations of
 the Society. In the absence of any
 requirement in the Societies Registration Act
 that the alteration in the Rules and
 Regulations must be registered with the
 Registrar, it cannot be held that registration

 39
of the amendment is a condition precedent for
such an alteration to come into effect. It is,
therefore, not possible to accept the
contention of Shri Mehta that the amendment
which was made in the Rules and Regulations
by resolution dated July 1, 1979 did not come
into effect till March 13, 1980 when the
amended Rules and Regulations were
registered with the Registrar, Firms and
Societies. The said amendment should be
treated to have come into effect from the date
on which the resolution making the said
amendment was passed, i.e. July 1, 1979.
As a result of the said amendment in the
Rules and Regulations of the Society, the
alterations made in the Rules and Regulations
in 1963 were reversed and the position as it
stood prior to the amendment of 1963 was
restored. Consequently, the school which
was a minority institution till the amendment of
the Rules and Regulations in 1963 and had
ceased to be a minority institution as a result
of the amendment in 1963 regained its status
as a minority institution after July 1, 1979,
when the rules and regulations were
amended and the original position was
restored. In view of the restoration of the
minority character of the institution the
provisions of the Education Act and the
Education Rules ceased to be applicable to
the institution after July 1, 1979. The
impugned order of termination order of the
services of the respondent was passed on
December 31, 1979, i.e., after the school had
become a minority institution. The said order
cannot, therefore, be held to be invalid on the
ground that it was passed in contravention of
Section 8 of the Education Act. The order
passed by the Delhi High Court quashing the
said order as well as the disciplinary

 40
 proceedings cannot, therefore, be upheld.
 The respondent was placed under suspension
 on August 11, 1972 and continued under
 suspension till April 9, 1973 on which date
 Education Act came into force. In other
 words she was under suspension at a time
 when the Education Act was not in force.
 The order of suspension cannot be judged on
 the basis of the provisions of the Education
 Act and the Education Rules. We are,
 therefore, unable to uphold the direction of
 the High Court quashing her order of
 suspension."

 The aforesaid judgment states principle of law of far reaching

consequences, i.e. an institution which is run by a minority linguistic

or religious would not be controlled exclusively by the provisions of

the DSE Act and the Rules framed thereunder, as the grant of

approval would tantamount to interfere in the internal management of

a minority institution.

1. Now, we may refer to the case of T.M.A. Pai (supra) which has

 been strongly relied upon by learned counsel appearing from both

 the sides before us. In this judgment, the Court had practically

 discussed the entire case law on the subject and particularly, the

 case of Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra) as well as Ahmedabad

 St. Xavier's case (supra). It may be noticed that the law stated by

 41
 the Seven-Judge Bench in Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case

 (supra), to some extent, has been diluted. Various aspects of this

 case, we shall shortly proceed to discuss, but let us first examine

 what the Court has held and in what context. It is really not

 necessary for us to get into detailed factual matrix and all the

 principles that have been enunciated by the Eleven-Judge Bench.

 It will be better for us to restrict ourselves to the discussion only in

 relation to the question of involvement in the present case. The

 learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon paras 72, 73, 107,

 136, 138, 141, 144 and 450 of the judgment in support of his

 submissions.

1. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted

 that the paragraphs relied upon by the respondents are the

 minority view and not the part of the majority judgment. With this,

 he placed reliance upon paras 89, 116 and 123 of the judgment.

 In order to avoid any ambiguity or confusion, we must clarify at the

 outset that till paragraph 161, it is the majority view of the T.M.A.

 Pai's case (supra) whereafter different Judge/Judges have

 expressed their views and given independent conclusions and

 answers to the questions framed. Thus, it will be expected from

 42
 us and we would only refer to the decision and finding of the

 majority view, which is binding on the Court.

1. The respondents have placed reliance upon the law stated by the

 Bench that any regulation framed in the national interest must

 necessarily apply to all educational institutions, whether run by

 majority or the minority. Such a limitation must be read into

 Article 30. The rule under Article 30(1) cannot be such as to

 override the national interest or to prevent the Government from

 framing regulations in that behalf. It is, of course, true that

 Government regulations cannot destroy the minority character of

 the institution or make a right to establish and administer a mere

 illusion, but the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be

 above the law. The appellant also seek to derive benefit from the

 view that the Courts have also held that the right to administer is

 not absolute and is subject to reasonable regulations for the

 benefit of the institutions as the vehicle of education consistent

 with the national interest. Such general laws of the land would be

 also applicable to the minority institutions as well. There is no

 reason why regulations or conditions concerning generally the

 welfare of the students and teachers should not be made

 43
 applicable in order to provide a proper academic atmosphere. As

 such, the provisions do not, in any way, interfere with the right of

 administration or management under Article 30(1). Any law, rule

 or regulation, that would put the educational institutions run by the

 minorities at a disadvantage, when compared to the institutions

 run by the others, will have to be struck down. At the same time,

 there may not be any reverse discrimination.

1. It was observed in St. Xavier's case (supra), at page 192 of the

 judgment that the whole object of conferring the right on minorities

 under Article 30 is to ensure that there will be equality between

 the majority and the minority. If the minorities do not have such

 special protection, they will be denied equality. The emphasis by

 the appellants is more on paragraphs 88 to 90 to say that Articles

 29 and 30 are a group of articles relating to cultural and

 educational rights. Article 29(1) gives the right to any section of

 the citizens having a distinct language, script or culture of its own,

 to conserve the same. Article 29(2) refers to admission to a

 educational institution established by anyone, but which is

 maintained by the State or receives aid out of State funds. In other

 words, State-maintained or aided educational institutions, whether

 44
 established by the Government or the majority or a minority

 community cannot deny admission to a citizen on the ground of

 religion, race, caste or language. Article 30(1) states the right of

 minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of

 their choice, as provided under that Article. The fundamental

 freedom is to establish and to administer educational institutions.

 It is a right to establish and administer institutions to cater the

 educational needs of the minorities or sections thereof.

1. Before we really analyze the dictum of this Court in its various

 judgments and examine the scope of their application to the facts

 of the present case, it would be necessary for us to refer to certain

 specific paragraphs of the judgment, besides the above portions

 which have been relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for

 the respective parties. The basic questions which would arise for

 consideration with regard to the facts of the present case are the

 extent of the right to establish, administer and management of

 institution by the linguistic minorities, the extent of control or

 restrictions that can be imposed by the State and obviously the

 right of a minority institution to receive grant-in-aid. In the case of

 T.M.A. Pai (supra), the Court was primarily concerned with the

 45
ambit and scope of grant of admission to the students in various

academic courses in the minority institutions aided or unaided. In

that case, the Court was basically not concerned with the

methodology to be adopted by the minority institutions and the

restrictions that can be imposed by the Government with regard to

the recruitment of teachers like Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules.

So to understand, the impact of the dictum in T.M. Pai's case

(supra), we may usefully refer to certain paragraphs of the

judgment itself.

 "123. After referring to the earlier cases in
 relation to the appointment of teachers, it was
 noted by Khanna, J., that the conclusion
 which followed was that a law which interfered
 with a minority's choice of qualified teachers,
 or its disciplinary control over teachers and
 other members of the staff of the institution,
 was void, as it was violative of Article 30(1).
 While it was permissible for the State and its
 educational authorities to prescribe the
 qualifications of teachers, it was held that
 once the teachers possessing the requisite
 qualifications were selected by the minorities
 for their educational institutions, the State
 would have no right to veto the selection of
 those teachers. The selection and
 appointment of teachers for an educational
 institution was regarded as one of the
 essential ingredients under Article 30(1). The
 Court's attention was drawn to the fact that in
 Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case this Court
 had opined that clauses 11 and 12 made it
 obligatory for all aided schools to select
 teachers from a panel selected from each
 district by the Public Service Commission and
 that no teacher of an aided school could be

 46
dismissed, removed or reduced in rank
without the previous sanction of the
authorized officer. At SCR p. 245, Khanna, J.,
observed that in cases subsequent to the
opinion in Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case
this Court had held similar provisions as
clause 11 and clause 12 to be violative of
Article 30(1) of the minority institution. He
then observed as follows: (SCC p.792, para
109)

"The opinion expressed by this Court in Re
Kerala Education Bill, 1957 was of an
advisory character and though great weight
should be attached to it because of its
persuasive value, the said opinion cannot
override the opinion subsequently expressed
by this Court in contested cases. It is the law
declared by this Court in the subsequent
contested cases which would have a binding
effect. The words `as at present advised' as
well as the preceding sentence indicate that
the view expressed by this Court in Re Kerala
Education Bill, 1957 in this respect was
hesitant and tentative and not a final view in
the matter."

124. In Lily Kurian v. Sr. Lewina this Court
struck down the power of the Vice-Chancellor
to veto the decision of the management to
impose a penalty on a teacher. It was held
that the power of the Vice-Chancellor, while
hearing an appeal against the imposition of
the penalty, was uncanalized and unguided.
In Christian Medical College Hospital
Employees' Union v. Christian Medical
College Vellore Assn. this Court upheld the
application of industrial law to minority
colleges, and it was held that providing a
remedy against unfair dismissals would not
infringe Article 30. In Gandhi Faiz-e-am
College v. University of Agra a law which
sought to regulate the working of minority
institutions by providing that a broad-based
management committee could be
reconstituted by including therein the Principal

 47
and the seniormost teacher, was valid and not
violative of the right under Article 30(1) of the
Constitution. In All Saints High School v.
Govt. of A.P. a regulation providing that no
teacher would be dismissed, removed or
reduced in rank, or terminated otherwise
except with the prior approval of the
competent authority, was held to be invalid,
as it sought to confer an unqualified power
upon the competent authority. In Frank
Anthony Public School Employees' Assn. v.
Union of India the regulation providing for
prior approval for dismissal was held to be
invalid, while the provision for an appeal
against the order of dismissal by an employee
to a tribunal was upheld. The regulation
requiring prior approval before suspending an
employee was held to be valid, but the
provision, which exempted unaided minority
schools from the regulation that equated the
pay and other benefits of employees of
recognized schools with those in schools run
by the authority, was held to be invalid and
violative of the equality clause. It was held by
this Court that the regulations regarding pay
and allowances for teachers and staff would
not violate Article 30.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

135. We agree with the contention of the
learned Solicitor-General that the Constitution
in Part III does not contain or give any
absolute right. All rights conferred in Part III of
the Constitution are subject to at least other
provisions of the said Part. It is difficult to
comprehend that the framers of the
Constitution would have given such an
absolute right to the religious or linguistic
minorities, which would enable them to
establish and administer educational
institutions in a manner so as to be in conflict
with the other Parts of the Constitution. We
find it difficult to accept that in the
establishment and administration of

 48
educational institutions by the religious and
linguistic minorities, no law of the land, even
the Constitution, is to apply to them.

136. Decisions of this Court have held that the
right to administer does not include the right
to maladminister. It has also been held that
the right to administer is not absolute, but
must be subject to reasonable regulations for
the benefit of the institutions as the vehicle of
education, consistent with national interest.
General laws of the land applicable to all
persons have been held to be applicable to
the minority institutions also -- for example,
laws relating to taxation, sanitation, social
welfare, economic regulation, public order and
morality.

137. It follows from the aforesaid decisions
that even though the words of Article 30(1)
are unqualified, this Court has held that at
least certain other laws of the land pertaining
to health, morality and standards of education
apply. The right under Article 30(1) has,
therefore, not been held to be absolute or
above other provisions of the law, and we
reiterate the same. By the same analogy,
there is no reason why regulations or
conditions concerning, generally, the welfare
of students and teachers should not be made
applicable in order to provide a proper
academic atmosphere, as such provisions do
not in any way interfere with the right of
administration or management under Article
30(1).

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

141. The grant of aid is not a constitutional
imperative. Article 337 only gives the right to
assistance by way of grant to the Anglo-Indian
community for a specified period of time. If no
aid is granted to anyone, Article 30(1) would
not justify a demand for aid, and it cannot be
said that the absence of aid makes the right

 49
under Article 30(1) illusory. The founding
fathers have not incorporated the right to
grants in Article 30, whereas they have done
so under Article 337; what, then, is the
meaning, scope and effect of Article 30(2)?
Article 30(2) only means what it states viz.
that a minority institution shall not be
discriminated against where aid to
educational institutions is granted. In other
words the State cannot, when it chooses to
grant aid to educational institutions, deny aid
to a religious or linguistic minority institution
only on the ground that the management of
that institution is with the minority. We would,
however, like to clarify that if an abject
surrender of the right to management is made
a condition of aid, the denial of aid would be
violative of Article 30(2). However, conditions
of aid that do not involve a surrender of the
substantial right of management would not be
inconsistent with constitutional guarantees,
even if they indirectly impinge upon some
facet of administration. If, however, aid were
denied on the ground that the educational
institution is under the management of a
minority, then such a denial would be
completely invalid.

142. The implication of Article 30(2) is also
that it recognizes that the minority nature of
the institution should continue,
notwithstanding the grant of aid. In other
words, when a grant is given to all institutions
for imparting secular education, a minority
institution is also entitled to receive it, subject
to the fulfilment of the requisite criteria, and
the State gives the grant knowing that a
linguistic or minority educational institution will
also receive the same. Of course, the State
cannot be compelled to grant aid, but the
receipt of aid cannot be a reason for altering
the nature or character of the recipient
educational institution.

143. This means that the right under Article
30(1) implies that any grant that is given by

 50
the State to the minority institution cannot
have such conditions attached to it, which will
in any way dilute or abridge the rights of the
minority institution to establish and administer
that institution. The conditions that can
normally be permitted to be imposed, on the
educational institutions receiving the grant,
must be related to the proper utilization of the
grant and fulfilment of the objectives of the
grant. Any such secular conditions so laid,
such as a proper audit with regard to the
utilization of the funds and the manner in
which the funds are to be utilized, will be
applicable and would not dilute the minority
status of the educational institutions. Such
conditions would be valid if they are also
imposed on other educational institutions
receiving the grant.

144. It cannot be argued that no conditions
can be imposed while giving aid to a minority
institution. Whether it is an institution run by
the majority or the minority, all conditions that
have relevance to the proper utilization of the
grant-in-aid by an educational institution can
be imposed. All that Article 30(2) states is that
on the ground that an institution is under the
management of a minority, whether based on
religion or language, grant of aid to that
educational institution cannot be discriminated
against, if other educational institutions are
entitled to receive aid. The conditions for
grant or non-grant of aid to educational
institutions have to be uniformly applied,
whether it is a majority-run institution or a
minority-run institution. As in the case of a
majority-run institution, the moment a minority
institution obtains a grant of aid, Article 28 of
the Constitution comes into play. When an
educational institution is maintained out of
State funds, no religious instruction can be
provided therein. Article 28(1) does not state
that it applies only to educational institutions

 51
that are not established or maintained by
religious or linguistic minorities. Furthermore,
upon the receipt of aid, the provisions of
Article 28(3) would apply to all educational
institutions whether run by the minorities or
the non-minorities. Article 28(3) is the right of
a person studying in a State-recognized
institution or in an educational institution
receiving aid from State funds, not to take
part in any religious instruction, if imparted by
such institution, without his/her consent (or
his/her guardian's consent if such a person is
a minor). Just as Articles 28(1) and (3)
become applicable the moment any
educational institution takes aid, likewise,
Article 29(2) would also be attracted and
become applicable to an educational
institution maintained by the State or receiving
aid out of State funds.

It was strenuously contended that the right to
give admission is one of the essential
ingredients of the right to administer conferred
on the religious or linguistic minority, and that
this right should not be curtailed in any
manner. It is difficult to accept this contention.
If Articles 28(1) and (3) apply to a minority
institution that receives aid out of State funds,
there is nothing in the language of Article 30
that would make the provisions of Article
29(2) inapplicable. Like Article 28(1) and
Article 28(3), Article 29(2) refers to "any
educational institution maintained by the
State or receiving aid out of State funds". A
minority institution would fall within the ambit
of Article 29(2) in the same manner in which
Article 28(1) and Article 28(3) would be
applicable to an aided minority institution. It is
true that one of the rights to administer an
educational institution is to grant admission to

 52
the students. As long as an educational
institution, whether belonging to the minority
or the majority community, does not receive
aid, it would, in our opinion, be its right and
discretion to grant admission to such students
as it chooses or selects subject to what has
been clarified before. Out of the various rights
that the minority institution has in the
administration of the institution, Article 29(2)
curtails the right to grant admission to a
certain extent. By virtue of Article 29(2), no
citizen can be denied admission by an aided
minority institution on the grounds only of
religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
It is no doubt true that Article 29(2) does
curtail one of the powers of the minority
institution, but on receiving aid, some of the
rights that an unaided minority institution has,
are also curtailed by Articles 28(1) and 28(3).
A minority educational institution has a right to
impart religious instruction -- this right is
taken away by Article 28(1), if that minority
institution is maintained wholly out of State
funds. Similarly on receiving aid out of State
funds or on being recognized by the State, the
absolute right of a minority institution requiring
a student to attend religious instruction is
curtailed by Article 28(3). If the curtailment of
the right to administer a minority institution on
receiving aid or being wholly maintained out of
State funds as provided by Article 28 is valid,
there is no reason why Article 29(2) should
not be held to be applicable. There is nothing
in the language of Articles 28(1) and (3),
Article 29(2) and Article 30 to suggest that, on
receiving aid, Articles 28(1) and (3) will apply,
but Article 29(2) will not. Therefore, the
contention that the institutions covered by
Article 30 are outside the injunction of Article
29(2) cannot be accepted."

 53
1. The Court then proceeded to discuss the concept of equality and

 secularism and noticed that for a healthy family, it is important that

 each member is strong and healthy and all members have the

 same constitution, whether physical or mental. For harmonious

 growth and health, it is but natural for the parents to give more

 attention and food to the weaker child, so as to help him or her to

 become stronger. Noticing recognition and preservation of

 different types of people with diverse languages and different

 beliefs is essential, the Court answered the 11 questions framed

 therein . It is not necessary for us to refer to all the questions and

 answers, suffices, it would be to notice the relevant questions and

 answers given by the majority in para 161 of the judgment.

 "Q. 1. What is the meaning and content of the
 expression "minorities" in Article 30 of the
 Constitution of India?

 A. Linguistic and religious minorities are
 covered by the expression "minority" under
 Article 30 of the Constitution. Since
 reorganization of the States in India has been
 on linguistic lines, therefore, for the purpose
 of determining the minority, the unit will be the
 State and not the whole of India. Thus,
 religious and linguistic minorities, who have
 been put on a par in Article 30, have to be
 considered Statewise.

 54
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

Q. 4. Whether the admission of students to
minority educational institution, whether aided
or unaided, can be regulated by the State
Government or by the university to which the
institution is affiliated?

A. Admission of students to unaided minority
educational institutions viz. schools and
undergraduate colleges where the scope for
merit-based selection is practically nil, cannot
be regulated by the State or university
concerned, except for providing the
qualifications and minimum conditions of
eligibility in the interest of academic
standards.

The right to admit students being an essential
facet of the right to administer educational
institutions of their choice, as contemplated
under Article 30 of the Constitution, the State
Government or the university may not be
entitled to interfere with that right, so long as
the admission to the unaided educational
institutions is on a transparent basis and the
merit is adequately taken care of. The right to
administer, not being absolute, there could be
regulatory measures for ensuring educational
standards and maintaining excellence thereof,
and it is more so in the matter of admissions
to professional institutions.

A minority institution does not cease to be so,
the moment grant-in-aid is received by the
institution. An aided minority educational
institution, therefore, would be entitled to have
the right of admission of students belonging to
the minority group and at the same time,
would be required to admit a reasonable
extent of non-minority students, so that the
rights under Article 30(1) are not substantially
impaired and further the citizens' rights under
Article 29(2) are not infringed. What would be
a reasonable extent, would vary from the

 55
types of institution, the courses of education
for which admission is being sought and other
factors like educational needs. The State
Government concerned has to notify the
percentage of the non-minority students to be
admitted in the light of the above
observations. Observance of inter se merit
amongst the applicants belonging to the
minority group could be ensured. In the case
of aided professional institutions, it can also
be stipulated that passing of the common
entrance test held by the State agency is
necessary to seek admission. As regards
non-minority students who are eligible to seek
admission for the remaining seats, admission
should normally be on the basis of the
common entrance test held by the State
agency followed by counselling wherever it
exists.

Q. 5. (a) Whether the minorities' rights to
establish and administer educational
institutions of their choice will include the
procedure and method of admission and
selection of students?

A. A minority institution may have its own
procedure and method of admission as well
as selection of students, but such a procedure
must be fair and transparent, and the
selection of students in professional and
higher education colleges should be on the
basis of merit. The procedure adopted or
selection made should not be tantamount to
maladministration. Even an unaided
minority institution ought not to ignore the
merit of the students for admission, while
exercising its right to admit students to the
colleges aforesaid, as in that event, the
institution will fail to achieve excellence.

Q. 5. (b) Whether the minority institutions'
right of admission of students and to lay down
procedure and method of admission, if any,
would be affected in any way by the receipt of
State aid?

 56
A. While giving aid to professional institutions,
it would be permissible for the authority giving
aid to prescribe bye-rules or regulations, the
conditions on the basis of which admission
will be granted to different aided colleges by
virtue of merit, coupled with the reservation
policy of the State qua non-minority students.
The merit may be determined either through a
common entrance test conducted by the
university or the Government concerned
followed by counselling, or on the basis of an
entrance test conducted by individual
institutions -- the method to be followed is for
the university or the Government to decide.
The authority may also devise other means to
ensure that admission is granted to an aided
professional institution on the basis of merit.
In the case of such institutions, it will be
permissible for the Government or the
university to provide that consideration should
be shown to the weaker sections of the
society.

Q. 5. (c) Whether the statutory provisions
which regulate the facets of administration like
control over educational agencies, control
over governing bodies, conditions of affiliation
including recognition/withdrawal thereof, and
appointment of staff, employees, teachers
and principals including their service
conditions and regulation of fees, etc. would
interfere with the right of administration of
minorities?

A. So far as the statutory provisions
regulating the facets of administration are
concerned, in case of an unaided minority
educational institution, the regulatory measure
of control should be minimal and the
conditions of recognition as well as the
conditions of affiliation to a university or board
have to be complied with, but in the matter of
day-to-day management, like the appointment
of staff, teaching and non-teaching, and
administrative control over them, the

 57
management should have the freedom and
there should not be any external controlling
agency. However, a rational procedure for the
selection of teaching staff and for taking
disciplinary action has to be evolved by the
management itself.

For redressing the grievances of employees
of aided and unaided institutions who are
subjected to punishment or termination from
service, a mechanism will have to be evolved,
and in our opinion, appropriate tribunals could
be constituted, and till then, such tribunals
could be presided over by a judicial officer of
the rank of District Judge.

The State or other controlling authorities,
however, can always prescribe the minimum
qualification, experience and other conditions
bearing on the merit of an individual for being
appointed as a teacher or a principal of any
educational institution.

Regulations can be framed governing service
conditions for teaching and other staff for
whom aid is provided by the State, without
interfering with the overall administrative
control of the management over the staff.

Fees to be charged by unaided institutions
cannot be regulated but no institution should
charge capitation fee.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

Q. 9. Whether the decision of this Court in
Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. (except
where it holds that primary education is a
fundamental right) and the scheme framed
thereunder require reconsideration/
modification and if yes, what?

 58
 A. The scheme framed by this Court in Unni
 Krishnan case and the direction to impose the
 same, except where it holds that primary
 education is a fundamental right, is
 unconstitutional. However, the principle that
 there should not be capitation fee or
 profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to
 meet cost of expansion and augmentation of
 facilities does not, however, amount to
 profiteering."

1. The above paragraphs and the conclusions arrived at by the

 Court, certainly suggest that the Court did not specifically or

 impliedly over ruled or expressed any different view than what was

 taken by the Court in Ahmedabad St. Xavier's case (supra) as

 well as discussed the impact of Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case

 (supra) with reference to Clauses 11 and 12, then the Court held

 that the view expressed in Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case

 (supra) was tentative. The view of the Court is that it is not an

 absolute right of the minority institution, but a right where certain

 conditions could be applied but such conditions should not, in any

 way, destroy or completely diminish the status and constitutional

 direction available to that minority.

1. With the passage of time this Court had the occasion to deal with

 the clarificatory enunciation of law stated in T.M.A. Pai's case

 59
(supra) and dealt with different cases depending on the facts and

circumstances of those cases. In the case of Brahmo Samaj

Education Society (supra), a Bench of this Court was concerned

with the appointment of persons to the post of teachers including

principal under the West Bengal College Teachers (Security of

Services) Act, 1975, the West Bengal College Services

Commission, 1978 and the Regulations framed thereunder. A

particular procedure was stated under these rules for making

these appointments as per the regulations, National Eligibility Test

(NET) is conducted by UGC (University Grants Commission) for

determining teaching eligibility criteria of the candidate, which was

added as an essential qualification for appointment as a teacher

and, even further, restrictions were introduced by adding College

Service Commission and appointments were sought to be made

through this Commission. The Brahmo Samaj Education Society

challenged this procedure and being a religious minority claiming

benefit under Articles 25, 26 and 30 (1) of the Constitution,

questioned the constitutional validity of these provisions. The

Court considered the question whether the appointment of

teachers in an aided institution by the College Service

 60
Commission by restricting the petitioner's right to appointment is a

reasonable restriction. After following the law stated in T.M.A.

Pai's case (supra), the Court held as under :

 "6. The question now before us is to decide
 whether the appointment of teachers in an
 aided institution by the College Service
 Commission by restricting the petitioners' right
 to appointment is a reasonable restriction in
 the interest of general public or not. The
 petitioners have a right to establish and
 administer educational institution. Merely
 because the petitioners are receiving aid, their
 autonomy of administration cannot be totally
 restricted and institutions cannot be treated
 as a government-owned one. Of course the
 State can impose such conditions as are
 necessary for the proper maintenance of
 standards of education and to check
 maladministration.....

 7. But that control cannot extend to the day-
 to-day administration of the institution. It is
 categorically stated in T.M.A. Pai (SCC at
 p. 551, para 72) that the State can regulate
 the method of selection and appointment of
 teachers after prescribing requisite
 qualification for the same. Independence for
 the selection of teachers among the qualified
 candidates is fundamental to the maintenance
 of the academic and administrative autonomy
 of an aided institution. The State can very well
 provide the basic qualification for teachers.
 Under the University Grants Commission Act,
 1956, the University Grants Commission
 (UGC) had laid down qualifications to a
 teaching post in a university by passing
 Regulations. As per these Regulations UGC
 conducts National Eligibility Test (NET) for
 determining teaching eligibility of candidates.
 UGC has also authorised accredited States to
 conduct State-Level Eligibility Test (SLET).
 Only a person who has qualified NET or SLET
 will be eligible for appointment as a teacher in
 an aided institution. This is the required basic

 61
 qualification for a teacher. The petitioners'
 right to administer includes the right to
 appoint teachers of their choice among the
 NET-/SLET- qualified candidates.

 8. Argument on behalf of the State that the
 appointment through the College Service
 Commission is to maintain the equal standard
 of education all throughout the State of West
 Bengal, does not impress us. The equal
 standard of teachers are already maintained
 by NET/SLET. Similarly, receiving aid from
 State coffers can also not be treated as a
 justification for imposition of any restrictions
 that cannot be imposed otherwise."

 In the above case, the Court did not rest with laying down the

above law but even directed the State Government to take due notice

of the declarations made in the T.M.A. Pai's case (supra) and to take

appropriate steps in that regard.

1. Thereafter, a Five-Judge Bench of this Court in Islamic Academy

 of Eduation v. State of Karnataka [(2003) 6 SCC 697], while

 dealing with the right of the minorities, aided as well as unaided

 institutions including professional educational institutions, in

 relation to the process of admission and fee structure, specified

 that the constitution of committees for admission and fee structure

 process was improper in relation to unaided minority institutions

 while certain other specifications were given with regard to the

 minority aided institutions but the Court specifically noted that non-

 62
minority educational institutions, in certain matters, cannot and do

not stand on the same footing as minority educational institutions

which enjoys the protection of Article 30 and the preferential right

to admit students of their own community. Further noticing that

the whole object of conferring the right on minority is that they will

be on equality with the majority, the Court further held as under :

 "9........Undoubtedly, at first blush it does
 appear that these paragraphs equate both
 types of educational institutions. However, on
 a careful reading of these paragraphs it is
 evident that the essence of what has been
 laid down is that the minority educational
 institutions have a guarantee or assurance to
 establish and administer educational
 institutions of their choice. These paragraphs
 merely provide that laws, rules and
 regulations cannot be such that they favour
 majority institutions over minority institutions.
 We do not read these paragraphs to mean
 that non-minority educational institutions
 would have the same rights as those
 conferred on minority educational institutions
 by Article 30 of the Constitution of India. Non-
 minority educational institutions do not have
 the protection of Article 30. Thus, in certain
 matters they cannot and do not stand on a
 similar footing as minority educational
 institutions. Even though the principle behind
 Article 30 is to ensure that the minorities are
 protected and are given an equal treatment
 yet the special right given under Article 30
 does give them certain advantages. Just to
 take a few examples, the Government may
 decide to nationalise education. In that case it
 may be enacted that private educational
 institutions will not be permitted. Non-minority

 63
educational institutions may become bound
by such an enactment. However, the right
given under Article 30 to minorities cannot be
done away with and the minorities will still
have a fundamental right to establish and
administer educational institutions of their
choice. Similarly, even though the
Government may have a right to take over
management of a non-minority educational
institution, the management of a minority
educational institution cannot be taken over
because of the protection given under Article
30. Of course, we must not be understood to
mean that even in national interest a minority
institute cannot be closed down. Further,
minority educational institutions have
preferential right to admit students of their
own community/language. No such rights
exist so far as non-minority educational
institutions are concerned.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

14.......Whilst discussing Article 30 under the
heading "To what extent can the rights of
aided private minority institutions to
administer be regulated" reliance has been
placed, in the majority judgment, on previous
judgments in the cases of Kerala Education
Bill, 1957, Re, Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of
Gujarat, Rev. Father W. Proost v. State of
Bihar, State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother
Provincial and Ahmedabad St. Xavier's
College Society v. State of Gujarat. All these
cases have recognised and upheld the rights
of minorities under Article 30. These cases
have held that in the guise of regulations,
rights under Article 30 cannot be abrogated. It
has been held, even in respect of aided
minority institutions that they must have full
autonomy in administration of that institution.
It has been held that the right to administer
includes the right to admit students of their
own community/ language. Thus an unaided

 64
 minority professional college cannot be in a
 worse position than an aided minority
 professional college. It is for this reason that
 paragraph 68 provides that a different
 percentage can be fixed for unaided minority
 professional colleges. The expression
 "different percentage for minority professional
 institutions" carries a different meaning than
 the expression "certain percentage for
 unaided professional colleges". In fixing the
 percentage for unaided minority professional
 colleges the State must keep in mind, apart
 from local needs, the interest/need of that
 community in the State. The need of that
 community, in the State, would be paramount
 vis-`-vis the local needs."

1. In an attempt to clarify the matters beyond controversy, a Seven-

 Judge Bench of this Court in the case of P.A. Inamdar v. State of

 Maharashtra [(2005) 6 SCC 537], discussed the entire gamut of

 law in relation to minority educational institutions and noticed that

 the right conferred by Article 30 was more in the nature of

 protection for minorities. It protects minority institutions from

 regulatory legislations framed under Article 19 (6), but still they

 were not immune from regulatory control. The Court was primarily

 concerned in that case with admission of the students to different

 institutions where it observed that even within the scope and ambit

 of Article 30(1) there was a need for imposing reasonable

 restrictions even on the minority institutions, and such direction

 65
would not vitiate and hurt the minority status. There are two basic

concepts - one relating to imposition of conditions with regard to

the management of the institutions and secondly the power of the

State to step in where there are questions of national interest.

The Court did approve the permitted operation of the committees

with reference to rationality and reasonableness and the two

significant matters were decided by the Court as follows :

 "103. To establish an educational institution is
 a fundamental right. Several educational
 institutions have come up. In Kerala
 Education Bill6 "minority educational
 institutions" came to be classified into three
 categories, namely, (i) those which do not
 seek either aid or recognition from the State;
 (ii) those which want aid; and (iii) those which
 want only recognition but not aid. It was held
 that the first category protected by Article
 30(1) can "exercise that right to their hearts'
 content" unhampered by restrictions. The
 second category is most significant. Most of
 the educational institutions would fall in that
 category as no educational institution can, in
 modern times, afford to subsist and efficiently
 function without some State aid. So it is with
 the third category. An educational institution
 may survive without aid but would still stand in
 need of recognition because in the absence
 of recognition, education imparted therein
 may not really serve the purpose as for want
 of recognition the students passing out from
 such educational institutions may not be
 entitled to admission in other educational

 66
institutions for higher studies and may also
not be eligible for securing jobs. Once an
educational institution is granted aid or
aspires for recognition, the State may grant
aid or recognition accompanied by certain
restrictions or conditions which must be
followed as essential to the grant of such aid
or recognition. This Court clarified in Kerala
Education Bill that "the right to establish and
administer educational institutions" conferred
by Article 30(1) does not include the right to
maladminister, and that is very obvious.
Merely because an educational institution
belongs to a minority it cannot ask for aid or
recognition though running in unhealthy
surroundings, without any competent teachers
and which does not maintain even a fair
standard of teaching or which teaches matters
subversive to the welfare of the scholars.
Therefore, the State may prescribe
reasonable regulations to ensure the
excellence of the educational institutions to be
granted aid or to be recognised. To wit, it is
open to the State to lay down conditions for
recognition such as, an institution must have
a particular amount of funds or properties or
number of students or standard of education
and so on. The dividing line is that in the
name of laying down conditions for aid or
recognition the State cannot directly or
indirectly defeat the very protection conferred
by Article 30(1) on the minority to establish
and administer educational institutions.
Dealing with the third category of institutions,
which seek only recognition but not aid, Their
Lordships held that "the right to establish and
administer educational institutions of their
choice" must mean the right to establish real
institutions which will effectively serve the
needs of the community and scholars who

 67
resort to these educational institutions. The
dividing line between how far the regulation
would remain within the constitutional limits
and when the regulations would cross the
limits and be vulnerable is fine yet perceptible
and has been demonstrated in several judicial
pronouncements which can be cited as
illustrations. They have been dealt with
meticulous precision coupled with brevity by
S.B. Sinha, J. in his opinion in Islamic
Academy. The considerations for granting
recognition to a minority educational
institution and casting accompanying
regulations would be similar as applicable to a
non-minority institution subject to two
overriding considerations: (i) the recognition is
not denied solely on the ground of the
educational institution being one belonging to
minority, and (ii) the regulation is neither
aimed at nor has the effect of depriving the
institution of its minority status.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

134. However, different considerations would
apply for graduate and postgraduate level of
education, as also for technical and
professional educational institutions. Such
education cannot be imparted by any
institution unless recognised by or affiliated
with any competent authority created by law,
such as a university, Board, Central or State
Government or the like. Excellence in
education and maintenance of high standards
at this level are a must. To fulfil these
objectives, the State can and rather must, in
national interest, step in. The education,
knowledge and learning at this level
possessed by individuals collectively
constitutes national wealth."

 68
 The apparent analysis was that the emphasis has to be on the

need for preserving its minority character so as to enjoy the privilege

of protection under Article 30(1).

1. Still, in the case of Kanya Junior High School, Bal Vidya Mandir v.

 U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad [(2006) 11 SCC 92], this Court

 observed that the law did not contemplate granting of any higher

 rights to the minority as opposed to majority and it only conferred

 additional protection. Referring to P.A. Inamdar's case (supra),

 the Court declared that the object underlying Article 30(1) is to see

 the desire of minorities that their children should be brought up

 properly, efficiently and acquire eligibility for higher university

 education. It further noticed that under the provisions of law, the

 approval of District Basic Education Officer was not necessary

 before terminating the services of a teacher, as the institution was

 recognized as a minority institution. Last of the judgment, which

 has some bearing on the subject in question, is on the principle

 reiterated by a Bench of this Court in the case of Secy. Malankara

 Syrian Catholic College (supra), where the Court again dealt with

 the aided minority educational institutions and terms and

 69
 conditions of services of employees. The Court in para 12 of the

 judgment framed the following two questions :

 "12. The rival contentions give rise to the
 following questions:

 (i) To what extent, the State can regulate the
 right of the minorities to administer their
 educational institutions, when such
 institutions receive aid from the State?

 (ii) Whether the right to choose a Principal is
 part of the right of minorities under Article
 30(1) to establish and administer educational
 institutions of their choice. If so, would
 Section 57(3) of the Act violate Article 30(1) of
 the Constitution of India?"

 The Answer to question no. 1 was provided in para 21 while

question no. 2 was answered in para Nos. 27 and 28 of the judgment

which read as under :

 "21. We may also recapitulate the extent of
 regulation by the State, permissible in respect
 of employees of minority educational
 institutions receiving aid from the State, as
 clarified and crystallised in T.M.A. Pai. The
 State can prescribe:

 (i) the minimum qualifications, experience and
 other criteria bearing on merit, for making
 appointments,

 (ii) the service conditions of employees
 without interfering with the overall
 administrative control by the management
 over the staff,

 70
(iii) a mechanism for redressal of the
grievances of the employees,

(iv) the conditions for the proper utilisation of
the aid by the educational institutions, without
abridging or diluting the right to establish and
administer educational institutions.

In other words, all laws made by the State to
regulate the administration of educational
institutions and grant of aid will apply to
minority educational institutions also. But if
any such regulations interfere with the overall
administrative control by the management
over the staff, or abridges/dilutes, in any other
manner, the right to establish and administer
educational institutions, such regulations, to
that extent, will be inapplicable to minority
institutions.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

27. It is thus clear that the freedom to choose
the person to be appointed as Principal has
always been recognised as a vital facet of the
right to administer the educational institution.
This has not been, in any way, diluted or
altered by T.M.A. Pai. Having regard to the
key role played by the Principal in the
management and administration of the
educational institution, there can be no doubt
that the right to choose the Principal is an
important part of the right of administration
and even if the institution is aided, there can
be no interference with the said right. The fact
that the post of the Principal/Headmaster is
also covered by State aid will make no
difference.

28. The appellant contends that the protection
extended by Article 30(1) cannot be used

 71
 against a member of the teaching staff who
 belongs to the same minority community. It is
 contended that a minority institution cannot
 ignore the rights of eligible lecturers belonging
 to the same community, senior to the person
 proposed to be selected, merely because the
 institution has the right to select a Principal of
 its choice. But this contention ignores the
 position that the right of the minority to select
 a Principal of its choice is with reference to
 the assessment of the person's outlook and
 philosophy and ability to implement its
 objects. The management is entitled to
 appoint the person, who according to them is
 most suited to head the institution, provided
 he possesses the qualifications prescribed for
 the posts. The career advancement prospects
 of the teaching staff, even those belonging to
 the same community, should have to yield to
 the right of the management under Article
 30(1) to establish and administer educational
 institutions."

 The above answers to the questions formulated demonstrates

that the Court has kept a clear line of distinction between laws made

by the State to regulate the administration of educational institutions

receiving grant-in-aid but if such regulations interfere with overall

administrative control by the management over the staff or abridges

or dilutes, in any other manner, the right to establish and administer

educational institutions, in that event, to such extent, the regulations

will be inapplicable to the minorities.

Discussion on constitutional provisions read in conjunction
with the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act,1973 and

 72
the Rules framed thereunder with reference to the legal
principles above enunciated

1. Undoubtedly, the Preamble of our Constitution mandates `to

 secure to all its citizens justice - social, economic and political'.

 The Constitution has been held to be a living and organic thing

 and not a mere law and it is expected to be construed broadly and

 liberally. Thus, these expressions must be given liberal

 construction so as to further the constitutional mandate. The

 social and economic justice would take within its ambit the

 progress and development of the entire nation without reference

 to caste, creed, colour or the section of the society to which they

 belong.

1. Article 14 of the Constitution commands equality before law or the

 equal protection of laws. The concept of equality is wide enough

 to include equality in advantages available to the public at large as

 a result of State action. The Constitution has itself made out

 certain exceptions to the general rule of equality in terms of

 Articles 15 and 16. Article 15 (1) spells out a prohibitory intent

 against the State that it would not discriminate against any citizen

 on the ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or

 73
any of them. In other words, the State cannot deny the equality

on the basis of the aforestated factors. Despite this mandate,

Article 15(3) spells out an exception to Article 15(1) and 15(2) as

well as to the concept of basic equality and empowers the State to

make special provisions for women and children. Similarly, by

Article 15(4), which was introduced by 1st Constitutional

Amendment of 1951, the State is further empowered to make any

special provisions for advancement of any socially and

educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Article 15(5), which was

introduced by 93rd Constitutional Amendment of 2005, made out

another exception to the general rule of equality and this sub-

Article, while giving power to the State to enact special laws, also

carves out an exception in regard to which this power cannot be

exercised, i.e. minority educational institutions referred to in

clause (1) of Article 30. Article 15(5) reads as under :

 "Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of
 Clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the State
 from making any special provision, by law, for
 the advancement of any socially and
 educationally backward classes of citizens or
 for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled
 Tribes insofar as such special provisions
 relate to their admission to the educational
 institutions including private educational
 institutions, whether aided or unaided by the

 74
 State, other than the minority educational
 institutions referred to in Clause (1) of
 Article 30."

1. Article 16 further guarantees to the citizens equality of opportunity

 in matters of public employment. Article 16(2) again prohibits

 discrimination in respect of any employment or office under the

 State on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of

 birth, residence or any of them. These factors cannot render any

 citizen ineligible for appointment for public employment. Clauses

 (3) to (4B) are the provisions which empowers the State to make

 any law in regard to a class or classes of employment or

 appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or

 other authority within, a State or Union Territory, any requirement

 as to a residence within that State or Union Territory, prior to such

 employment or appointment. It also empowers the State from

 making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts

 in favour of any backward class which, in the opinion of the State,

 is not adequately represented in the service under the State. The

 State is also vested with the power of reserving the vacancies in a

 particular year and make reservation in favour of Scheduled

 Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which are not adequately

 75
 represented in service of the State, in matters of promotion with

 consequential seniority. Putting it simply, the State is entitled to

 make law and reservations in different fields for Scheduled Castes

 and Scheduled Tribes and the persons belonging to backward

 class in the services under the State, in accordance with law.

1. While dealing with the cultural and educational rights under the

 Constitution, the framers have devoted specific attention to the

 minorities in our country while enacting Articles 29 and 30. Article

 29 grants complete protection to any section of the citizens

 residing in the territory of India having a distinct language, script or

 culture of its own and freedom to conserve the same. Besides

 granting this freedom, this Article also mandates that no citizen

 shall be denied admission to any educational institution

 maintained by the State or receiving aid out of the State funds on

 the grounds of discrimination stated in Articles 15 and 16 of the

 Constitution. Article 30 gives certain rights to the minorities, i.e.

 all minorities whether religious or linguistic, have the right to

 establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.

 Article 30(2) has to be noticed with some emphasis. It requires

 the State not to discriminate against any educational institution on

 76
 the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether

 based on religion or language, while granting aid to the

 educational institution. The Article reads as under :

 "30. Right of minorities to establish and
 administer educational institutions.--(2) The
 State shall not, in granting aid to educational
 institutions, discriminate against any
 educational institution on the ground that it is
 under the management of a minority, whether
 based on religion or language."

1. The principle of free primary education had been introduced as a

 constitutional right by this Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. V. State of

 A.P. [(1993) 1 SCC 645]. The Court, while dealing with the case

 of T.M.A. Pai (supra), not only reiterated the same with approval

 but made right to receive secondary education as a fundamental

 right. The dictum of this Court then led to 86th constitutional

 amendment by Amendment Act of 2002 wherein Article 21-A was

 introduced placing a clear obligation on the State to provide free

 and compulsory education to all children of the age of 6 to 14

 years in such manner as the State may by law determine. The

 judgments of the Court and the constitutional law introduced a

 new dimension to the right of the children to receive education.

 77
 To achieve this object, the State had to introduce various

 incentives and policies to invite the private sector into the field of

 dispensation of education. This obviously, led to certain

 liberalization in the field of private sector dealing with the different

 levels of education. All the schools, which then came up, had to

 be recognized by the competent authority and they had to work

 under the regulatory measures declared by the State but in

 accordance with law. The private sector could be dissected into

 two sectors - aided and non-aided schools. The aided schools

 could further be divided into two sections - minority institutions

 receiving grant in aid and, non-minority institutions receiving grant-

 in-aid.

1. As is evident from the above narrated principles, the Government

 does not enjoy identical control over the management of the

 schools belonging to the minority and/or majority schools. In view

 of the above ground reality and amendment in law, Article 30(2)

 provides a definite protection to the minority institutions that they

 would not be discriminated against providing of grant-in-aid. This

 aspect is further dealt with some clarity in Chapter VI relating to

 grant-in-aid under the provisions of the DSE Rules, 1973. In

 78
terms of Rule 60, every aided school will continue to get the aid

subject to the provisions of the DSE Rules. Rule 64 of DSE Rules

contemplates that aid to be given upon furnishing of suitable

undertaking by the managing committee. The grant-in-aid, then,

would be given only upon satisfaction of the conditions stipulated

in Rule 65. Second proviso to Rule 10 requires that wherever a

linguistic minority school decides to impart education in a

language other than the language of such linguistic minority, in

that event the Administrator shall not be under any obligation to

give grant-in-aid to such schools. In other words, a school run by

linguistic minority would be entitled to receive grant-in-aid if it is

imparting education in the language of the minority, of course, by

satisfying other stated conditions. The right to receive grant thus

has to be accepted as a legitimate right in contra-distinction or

opposed to legal right to get recognition including the case of a

minority institution. This principle has been reiterated by this

Court in catena of judgments including the judgments referred by

us above. The logical impact of Article 30(2) read with the

provisions of the DSE Act and the Rules framed thereunder is

that, to receive grant-in-aid is a legitimate right of a school subject

 79
 to satisfying the requirements of law. Article 30(2) thus, has been

 worded in a negative language not permitting the State to

 discriminate the minority institution in relation to the matters of

 grant-in-aid.

1. Article 15(5) of the Constitution excludes the minority educational

 institutions from the power of the State to make any provision by

 law for the advancement of any social or backward classes of the

 citizens or for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in relation

 to their admission to educational institutions including private

 educational institutions whether aided or unaided. This Article is

 capable of very wide interpretation and vests the State with power

 of wide magnitude to achieve the purpose stated in the Article.

 But, the framers of the Constitution have specifically excluded

 minority educational institutions from operation of this clause.

 Article 16 which ensures equality of opportunity in matters of

 public employment again has been worded so as to prohibit

 discrimination and, at the same time, vests the State with power to

 make provisions, laws and reservations in relation to a particular

 class or classes of persons. It is of some significance to notice

 that power of the State to exercise such power is in relation to the

 80
 `service under the State'. This expression has been used in all the

 clauses of the Article which relates to providing of employment

 and framing of laws/reservations in those categories. Upon its

 true construction, this expression itself is capable of a wide

 construction and must be construed liberally and cannot be

 restricted to its narrow sense. The expression `service under the

 State' would obviously include service directly under the State

 Government or its instrumentalities and/or even the sectors which

 can be termed as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the

 Constitution. Once an organization or society falls outside the

 ambit of this circumference, in that event, it will be difficult for the

 Courts to hold that the State has a right to frame such laws or

 provisions or make reservations in the field of employment of

 those societies.

1. The interpretation of the word `State' really does not require any

 deliberation as this aspect is no more res-integra and has been

 settled by the law stated in the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib

 Sehravardi [(1981) 1 SCC 722], where this Court spelt out the test

 that would be applicable in determining whether a Corporation or a

 Government Company or a private body is an instrumentality or

 81
agency of the State. Primarily, there are different type of controls,

which can be exercised by the State over any other authority,

society, organization or private body to bring it within the ambit of

the expression `State' or `other authority' appearing in Article 12 of

the Constitution. These are financial control, managerial and

administrative control and functional control. To put it differently,

what is the administrative control that the Government exercises

upon such a body, whether functions of that body are

governmental functions or closely related thereto, quantum of

State control, volume of financial assistances, character and

structure of the body and cumulative effect of these factors etc.

This has been followed consistently in the case of Zoroastrian

Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Coop. Societies

(Urban) [(2005) 5 SCC 632] and in a very recent judgment in the

case of State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Rai [(2009) 5 SCC 577],

wherein this Court held that Uttar Pradesh Ganna Kishan

Sansthan (Sansthan) is a State because these criteria were

satisfied and even the State could take over the functions of the

Sansthan. Unless all these three aspects are established or they

are stated to be satisfied, it will not be permissible to term that

 82
 society, organization or body as a `State'.

1. There is no doubt, that there may be minority institutions which

 are receiving grant-in-aid from the Government. But, merely

 receiving grant-in-aid per se would not make such school or

 institution `State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the

 Constitution of India. Even this aspect we need not discuss in any

 great detail as the question stands settled by the judgment of this

 Court in the case of V.K. Sodhi (supra), wherein this Court has

 dealt with the question whether State Council of Education,

 Research and Training is not State or other authority within the

 meaning of Article 12. The Court returned the finding that though

 the finances were being provided by the State, the State

 Government does not have deep and pervasive control over the

 working of the Council and it was an independent society and

 thus, is not a State. The Court held as under :

 "11. The two elements, one, of a function of
 the State, namely, the coordinating of
 education and the other, of the Council being
 dependant on the funding by the State,
 satisfied two of the tests indicated by the
 decisions of this Court. But, at the same time,
 from that alone it could not be assumed that
 SCERT is a State. It has to be noted that
 though finance is made available by the State,
 in the matter of administration of that finance,

 83
the Council is supreme. The administration is
also completely with the Council. There is no
governmental interference or control either
financially, functionally or administratively, in
the working of the Council. These were the
aspects taken note of in Chander Mohan
Khanna (supra) to come to the conclusion
that NCERT is not a State or other authority
within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India. No doubt, in Chander
Mohan Khanna (supra), the Bench noted that
the fact that education was a State function
could not make any difference. This part of
the reasoning in Chander Mohan Khanna
(supra) case has been specifically
disapproved by the majority in Pradeep
Kumar Biswas (supra). The majority noted
that the objects of forming Indian Institute of
Chemical Biology was with the view of
entrusting it with a function that is
fundamental to the governance of the country
and quoted with approval the following
passage in Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal
[(1967) 3 S.C.R. 377]:
"The State, as defined in Article 12, is thus
comprehended to include bodies created for
the purpose of promoting the educational and
economic interests of the people."
The majority then stated:
"We are in respectful agreement with this
statement of the law. The observations to the
contrary in Chander Mohan Khanna v.
NCERT relied on by the learned Attorney-
General in this context, do not represent the
correct legal position."

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

13. We also find substantial differences in
the two set ups. Sabhajit Tewary (supra),
after referring to the rules of the Council of
Scientific and Industrial Research which was
registered under the Societies Registration
Act, concluded that it was not a State within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.
While overruling the said decision, the
majority in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra)

 84
took the view that the dominant role played by
the Government of India in the governing
body and the ubiquitous control of the
Government in the Council and the complete
subjugation of the Governing Body to the will
of the Central Government, the inability of the
Council to lay down or change the terms and
conditions of service of its employees and the
inability to alter any bye-law without the
approval of the Government of India and the
owning by the Central Government of the
assets and funds of the Council though
normally owned by the society, all indicated
that there was effective and pervasive control
over the functioning of the Council and since it
was also entrusted with a Governmental
function, the justifiable conclusion was that it
was a State within the meaning of Article 12
of the Constitution. The majority also noticed
that on a winding up of that Council, the entire
assets were to vest in the Central
Government and that was also a relevant
indication. Their Lordships in the majority
also specifically overruled as a legal principle
that a Society registered under the Societies
Registration Act or a company incorporated
under the Companies Act, is by that reason
alone excluded from the concept of State
under Article 12 of the Constitution. In the
case of SCERT, in addition to the operational
autonomy of the Executive Committee, it
could also amend its bye-laws subject to the
provisions of the Delhi Societies Registration
Act though with the previous concurrence of
the Government of Delhi and that the
proceedings of the Council are to be made
available by the Secretary for inspection of
the Registrar of Societies as per the
provisions of the Societies Registration Act.
The records and proceedings of the Council
have also to be made available for inspection
by the Registrar of Societies. In the case of
dissolution of SCERT, the liabilities and
assets are to be taken over at book value by
the Government of Delhi which had to appoint
a liquidator for completing the dissolution of
the Body. The creditors' loans and other
liabilities of SCERT shall have preference and
bear a first charge on the assets of the
Council at the time of dissolution. This is not

 85
an unconditional vesting of the assets on
dissolution with the Government. It is also
provided that the provisions of the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 had to be complied
with in the matter of filing list of office-bearers
every year with the Registrar and the carrying
out of the amendments in accordance with the
procedure laid down in the Act of 1860 and
the dissolution being in terms of Sections 13
and 14 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860
and making all the provisions of the Societies
Registration Act applicable to the Society.
These provisions, in our view, indicate that
SCERT is subservient to the provisions of the
Societies Registration Act rather than to the
State Government and that the intention was
to keep SCERT as an independent body and
the role of the State Government cannot be
compared to that of the Central Government
in the case of Council of Scientific and
Industrial Research.

14. As we understand it, even going by
paragraph 40 of the judgment in Pradeep
Kumar Biswas (supra), which we have quoted
above, we have to consider the cumulative
effect of all the facts available in the case. So
considered, we are inclined to hold that
SCERT is not a State or other authority within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
of India. As we see it, the High Court has not
independently discussed the relevant rules
governing the functioning and administration
of SCERT. It has proceeded on the basis that
in the face of Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra)
decision, the decision in Chander Mohan
Khanna (supra) must be taken to be overruled
and no further discussion of the question is
necessary. But, in our view, even going by
Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra), each case
has to be considered with reference to the
facts available for determining whether the
body concerned is a State or other authority
within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India. So considered, we find
that the Government does not have deep and
pervasive control over the working of SCERT.
It does not have financial control in the sense
that once the finances are made available to

 86
 it, the administration of those finances is left
 to SCERT and there is no further
 governmental control. In this situation, we
 accept the submission on behalf of the
 appellants and hold that SCERT is not a State
 or other authority within the meaning of Article
 12 of the Constitution of India. After all, the
 very formation of an independent society
 under the Societies Registration Act would
 also suggest that the intention was not to
 make the body a mere appendage of the
 State. We reverse the finding of the High
 Court on this aspect."

1. The principle above enunciated clearly shows that it is the

 cumulative effect of all the three essential features which would

 finally help in determining whether a society, body or an

 association is `State' or not. We have referred to various

 provisions of the DSE Act, 1973 and particularly, the Rules framed

 thereunder. The DSE Rules specifically contemplate that the

 State Government will not have any strict control over the

 management of these institutions. Even the members, who are

 nominated by the Director of Education, would only have a right of

 limited participation with no right of voting. Rule 59(b)(iv), requires

 two other persons who are or have been teachers of any other

 school or college, to be nominated by the Advisory Board on the

 Managing Committee of a school. However, this clause shall not

 apply to a minority institution in terms of the proviso to the said

 87
 Rule. The limited extent of control exercisable by the authorities is

 demonstrated in DSE Rules 44, 59 and 96(3A) & (3B). Every

 school is required, when it desires to establish a new school, to

 give intimation in writing to the Administrator or its office to

 establish such a school to specifically exempt the minorities'

 institutions from application of this detailed provision. In addition

 to this, the management of a minority school cannot be taken over

 by the authorities in terms of Section 20 of the DSE Act as the

 statute itself prohibits the application of Section 20 to such school

 in terms of Section 21 of the Act. Besides these statutory

 provisions and the scheme under the DSE Act, various judgments

 of this Court have also consistently taken the view that the State

 has no right of interference in the establishment, administration

 and management of a school run by linguistic minority except the

 power to regulate as specified.

1. The right to establish and administer includes a right to appoint

 teachers. Thus, except providing grant-in-aid as per the DSE

 Rules and having no power to discriminate in terms of Article

 30(2) of the Constitution, the Government has a very limited

 regulatory control over the minority institutions and no control

 88
whatsoever on the managing committee, internal management of

the school and, of course, has no power to take over such an

institution. This Court has also expressed the view in some

judgments that in respect of minority or even minority institutions,

steps can be taken even for closure of such institutions in the

national interest which of course may be a rare exception. Once

the State lacks basic power of jurisdiction to make special

provisions and reservations in relation to minority institutions,

which do not form part of service under the State, it will be difficult

for the Court to hold that Rule 64(1)(b) can be enforced against

aided minority institution. There are still other aspects which can

usefully be examined to analyze this issue in a greater detail. In

T.M.A. Pai's case (supra) the right to establish an institution is

provided. The Court held that the right to establish an institution is

provided in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Such right,

however, is subject to reasonable restriction, which may be

brought about in terms of clause (6) thereof. Further, that

minority, whether based on religion or language, however, has a

fundamental right to establish and administer educational

institution of its own choice under Article 30(1).

 89
1. The right under clause (1) of Article 30 is not absolute but subject

 to reasonable restrictions which, inter alia, may be framed having

 regard to the public interest and national interest of the country.

 Regulation can also be framed to prevent mal-administration as

 well as for laying down standards of education, teaching,

 maintenance of discipline, public order, health, morality etc. It is

 also well settled that a minority institution does not cease to be so,

 the moment grant-in-aid is received by the institution. An aided

 minority education institution, therefore, would be entitled to have

 the right of admission of students belonging to the minority group

 and, at the same time, would be required to admit a reasonable

 extent of non-minority students, to the extent, that the right in

 Article 30(1) is not substantially impaired and further, the citizen's

 right under Article 29 (2) is not infringed.

1. A minority institution may have its own procedure and method of

 admission as well as the selection of students but it has to be a

 fair and transparent method. The State has the power to frame

 regulations which are reasonable and do not impinge upon the

 basic character of the minority institutions. This Court, in some of

 90
the decisions, has taken the view that the width of the rights and

limitations thereof of unaided institutions, whether run by a

majority or by a minority, must conform to the maintenance of

excellence and with a view to achieve the said goal indisputably,

the regulations can be made by the State. It is also equally true

that the right to administer does not amount to the right to mal-

administer and the right is not free from regulations. The

regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient

and sound administration. The regulatory measures can be laid

down by the State in the administration of minority institutions.

The right of the State is to be exercised primarily to prevent mal-

administration and such regulations are permissible regulations.

These regulations could relate to guidelines for the efficiency and

excellence of educational standards, ensuring the security of the

services of the teachers or other employees, framing rules and

regulations governing the conditions of service of teachers and

employees and their pay and allowances and prescribing course

of study or syllabi of the nature of books etc. Some of the

impermissible regulations are refusal to affiliation without sufficient

reasons, such conditions as would completely destroy the

 91
autonomous status of the educational institution, by introduction of

outside authority either directly or through its nominees in the

Governing Body or the Managing Committee of minority institution

to conduct its affairs etc. These have been illustrated by this

Court in the Case of State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother

Provincial [1970) 2 SCC 417, All Saints High School v. Govt. of

A.P. [(1980) 2 SCC 478] and T.M.A. Pai's case (supra). Even in

the Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case (supra), referred for opinion

by the President under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, this

Court while answering question No.2 emphasized upon the

freedom and extent of protection available to the minority

institutions. Referring to the fact that Articles 29 and 30 are set

out in Part-III of the Constitution, which guarantees fundamental

rights, the text and margin notes of both the Articles show that

their purpose is to confer those fundamental rights on certain

sections of community, which constitute minority communities.

The Court held that Article 30(1) cannot be limited and should

equally operate in favour of educational institution, whether

established pre or post the commencement of the Constitution.

The Bench repelled the contention that by admission of an

 92
 outsider, the minority institution will loose its character as such,

 and held:

 "To say that an institution which
 receives aid on account of its being a minority
 educational institution must not refuse to
 admit any member of any other community
 only on the grounds therein mentioned and
 then to say that as soon as such institution
 admits such an outsider it will cease to be a
 minority institution is tantamount to saying
 that minority institutions will not, as minority
 institutions, be entitled to any aid".

 While admitting non-members, the institution does not shed its

character or ceases to be a minority institution. The freedom of

minority institutions was further explained by the Bench by saying

that it is the choice of the minority institution, to establish such

educational institutions as well serve both purposes that of

conserving their religion, language or culture and also the purpose of

giving a thorough good general education to their children. So, they

could even impart education in their own language or in any other

language, which choice essentially has to be left to the minority

institution. The constitution itself uses the word `choice' in Article

30(1), which indicates the extent of liberty and freedom, the framers

of the Constitution intended to grant to the minority community.

Thus, there arises no occasion for the Court to read restrictions into

 93
such freedom on the ground of policy. It may amount to intrusion

into the very minority character and protection available to the

community in law. The right to frame regulations, therefore, is not

itself an unregulated right. It has its own limitations and sphere

within which such regulations would be framed and made operative.

1. It is not necessary for us to examine the extent of power to make

 regulations, which can be enforced against linguistic minority

 institutions, as we have already discussed the same in the earlier

 part of the judgment. No doubt, right conferred on minorities

 under Article 30 is only to ensure equality with the majority but, at

 the same time, what protection is available to them and what right

 is granted to them under Article 30 of the Constitution cannot be

 diluted or impaired on the pretext of framing of regulations in

 exercise of its statutory powers by the State. The permissible

 regulations, as afore-indicated, can always be framed and where

 there is a mal-administration or even where a minority linguistic or

 religious school is being run against the public or national interest,

 appropriate steps can be taken by the authorities including closure

 but in accordance with law. The minimum qualifications,

 experience, other criteria for making appointments etc are the

 94
matters which will fall squarely within the power of the State to

frame regulations but power to veto or command that a particular

person or class of persons ought to be appointed to the school

failing which the grant-in-aid will be withdrawn, will apparently be a

subject which would be arbitrary and unenforceable. Even in

T.M.A. Pai's case (supra), which view was reiterated by this Court

in the case of Secy. Malankara Syrian Catholic College (supra), it

was held that the conditions for proper utilization of the aid by the

educational institution was a matter within the empowerment of

the State to frame regulations but without abridging or diluting the

right to establish and administer educational institutions. In that

case, while dealing with the appointment of a person as Principal,

the Court clearly stated the dictum that the freedom to choose the

person to be appointed as Principal has always been recognized

as a vital facet to right to administer the educational institution. It

being an important part of the administration and even if the

institution is aided, there can be no interference with the said right.

The power to frame regulations and control the management is

subject to another restriction which was reiterated by the Court in

P.A. Inamdar's case (supra) stating that it is necessary that the

 95
 objective of establishing the institution was not defeated.

1. At last, what is the purpose of granting protection or privilege to

 the minorities in terms of Article 29, and at the same time,

 applying negative language in Article 30(2) in relation to State

 action for releasing grant-in-aid, as well as the provisions of DSE

 Act, 1973 and the rules framed thereunder? It is obvious that the

 constitutional intent is to bring the minorities at parity or equality

 with the majority as well as give them right to establish, administer

 and run minority educational institutions. With the primary object

 of Article 21A of the Constitution in mind, the State was expected

 to expand its policy as well as methodology for imparting

 education. DSE Act, as we have already noticed, was enacted

 primarily for the purpose of better organization and development

 of school education in the Union Territory of Delhi and for matters

 connected therewith or incidental thereto. Thus, the very object

 and propose of this enactment was to improve the standard as

 well as management of school education. It will be too far

 fetched to read into this object that the law was intended to make

 inroads into character and privileges of the minority. Besides, in

 the given facts and circumstances of the case, the Court is also

 96
duty bound to advance the cause or the purpose for which the law

is enacted. Different laws relating to these fields, thus, must be

read harmoniously, construed purposively and implemented to

further advancement of the objects, sought to be achieved by

such collective implementation of law. While, you keep the rule of

purposive interpretation in mind, you also further add such

substantive or ancillary matters which would advance the purpose

of the enactment still further. To sum up, we will term it as

`doctrine of purposive advancement'. The power to regulate,

undisputedly, is not unlimited. It has more restriction than

freedom particularly, in relation to the management of linguistic

minority institutions. The rules, which were expected to be

framed in terms of Section 28 of the DSE Act, were for the

purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. Even,

otherwise, it is a settled principle of law that Rules must fall within

the ambit and scope of the principal legislation. Section 21 is

sufficiently indicative of the inbuilt restrictions that the framers of

the law intended to impose upon the State while exercising its

power in relation to a linguistic minority school.

 97
1. To appoint a teacher is part of the regular administration and

 management of the School. Of course, what should be the

 qualification or eligibility criteria for a teacher to be appointed can

 be defined and, in fact, has been defined by the Government of

 N.C.T. of Delhi and within that specified parameters, the right of

 the linguistic minority institution to appoint a teacher cannot be

 interfered with. The paramount feature of the above laws was to

 bring efficiency and excellence in the field of school education

 and, therefore, it is expected of the minority institutions to select

 the best teacher to the faculty. To provide and enforce the any

 regulation, which will practically defeat this purpose would have to

 be avoided. A linguistic minority is entitled to conserve its

 language and culture by a constitutional mandate. Thus, it must

 select people who satisfy the prescribed criteria, qualification and

 eligibility and at the same time ensure better cultural and linguistic

 compatibility to the minority institution. At this stage, at the cost of

 repetition, we may again refer to the judgment of this Court in

 T.M.A. Pai's case (supra), where in para 123, the Court

 specifically noticed that while it was permissible for the State and

 its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of a teacher,

 98
 once the teachers possessing the requisite qualifications were

 selected by the minorities for their educational institutions, the

 State would have no right to veto the selection of the teachers.

 Further, the Court specifically noticed the view recorded by

 Khanna, J. in reference to Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case

 (supra), and to clauses 11 and 12 of the Bill in particular, where

 the learned Judge had declared that, it is the law declared by the

 Supreme Court in subsequently contested cases as opposed to

 the Presidential reference, which would have a binding effect and

 said:

 "123.........The words `as at present advised'
 as well as the preceding sentence indicate the
 view expressed by this Court in relation to
 Kerala Education Bill, 1957, in this respect
 was hesitant and tentative and not a final view
 in the matter."

 What the Court had expressed in para 123 above, appears to

have found favour with the Bench dealing with the case of T.M.A. Pai

(supra). In any case, nothing to the contrary was observed or held in

the subsequent judgment by the larger Bench.

1. The concept of equality stated under Article 30(2) has to be read

 in conjunction with the protection under Article 29 and thus it must

 99
then be given effect to achieve excellence in the field of education.

Providing of grant-in-aid, which travels from Article 30(2) to the

provisions of the DSE Act and Chapter VI of the Rules framed

thereunder, is again to be used for the same purpose, subject to

regulations which themselves must fall within the permissible

legislative competence. The purpose of grant-in-aid cannot be

construed so as to destroy, impair or even dilute the very

character of the linguistic minority institutions. All these powers

must ultimately, stand in comity to the provisions of the

Constitution, which is the paramount law. The Court will have to

strike the balance between different facets relating to grant-in-aid,

right to education being the fundamental right, protection available

to religious or linguistic minorities under the Constitution and the

primary object to improve and provide efficiency and excellence in

school education. In our considered view, it will not be

permissible to infringe the constitutional protection in exercise of

State policy or by a subordinate legislation to frame such rules

which will impinge upon the character or in any way substantially

dilute the right of the minority to administer and manage affairs of

its school. Even though in the case of Mohinder Kaur (supra), the

 100
 Bench of this Court held that upon restoration of the minority

 character of the institution, the provisions of the Act and the rules

 framed thereunder would cease to apply to a minority institution.

 We still would not go that far and would preferably follow the view

 expressed by larger Bench of this Court in T.M.A. Pai's case

 (supra) and even rely upon other subsequent judgments, which

 have taken the view that the State has the right to frame such

 regulations which will achieve the object of the Act. Even if it is

 assumed that there is no complete eclipse of the DSE Act in the

 Rules in the case of minority institutions, still Rule 64(1)(b), if

 enforced, would adversely effect and dilute the right and

 protection available to the minority school under the Constitution.

1. Now, we will revert back to the facts of the present case. There is

 no dispute to the fact that the appellant-school is a linguistic

 minority institution and has been running as such for a

 considerable time. Admittedly, it was receiving grant-in-aid for all

 this period. Its minority status was duly accepted and declared by

 the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of this very

 institution and which has attained finality. In this very judgment,

 the Court also held that certain provisions of DSE Rules, 1973

 101
would not apply to this minority school. Thereafter, vide letter

dated 12th March, 1985, the Managing Committee was required to

give an undertaking that it would make reservation in service for

Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes, to which the school had

replied relying upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in its

own case. However, vide letter dated 21st March, 1986, Secretary

(Education), Government of N.C.T., Delhi had informed the

appellants that the circular requiring Government aided schools to

comply with the provisions relating to reservation was not

applicable to the minority institutions. In face of the judgment of

the Court, such a requirement was not carried out by the

appellant-school and the controversy was put at rest vide letter

dated 21st March, 1986 and the institution continued to receive the

grant-in-aid. However, in September, 1989, again, a letter was

addressed to all the government aided schools including the

appellant stating that it was a precondition for all agencies

receiving grant-in-aid, not only to enforce the requirement of

providing reservation in the posts but even not to make any

regular appointments in the general category till the vacancies in

the reserved category were filled up. This was challenged before

 102
 the High Court. At the very outset, we may notice that we entirely

 do not approve the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of

 the Delhi High Court in the case of Sumanjit Kaur (supra) insofar

 as it held that the regulation would be unconstitutional since they

 are likely to interfere with the choice of the medium of instruction

 as well as minority character of the institution by compelling the

 appointments to the teaching faculty of the persons, who may be

 inimical towards the minority community.

1. We are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge as

 well as the Division Bench erred in law in stating the above

 proposition as it is contra-legam. The Preamble of our

 Constitution requires the people of India to constitute into a

 `Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic'. Secularism,

 therefore, is the essence of our democratic system. Secularism

 and brotherhoodness is a golden thread that runs into the entire

 constitutional scheme formulated by the framers of the

 Constitution. The view of the learned Single Judge and the

 Division Bench in the case of Sumanjit Kaur (supra), runs contra

 to the enunciated law. We are afraid that while deciding a

 constitutional matter in accordance with law, the Court would not

 103
be competent to raise a presumption of inimical attitude of and

towards one community or the other. We do not approve the view

of the High Court that a provision of an Act or a Circular issued

thereunder could be declared as unconstitutional on such

presumptuous ground. However, to the extent that it may interfere

with the choice of medium of instructions as well as minority

character of the institution to some extent is a finding recorded in

accordance with law. The Division Bench while entertaining the

appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, had

primarily concentrated on the point that the selection of the

teacher was valid and not violative of the Rules and accepted the

findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, resulting in grant of

relief to the appellants. Further, in our considered view and for the

reasons afore-recorded, the judgment of the Division Bench in the

present case while dismissing the writ petition filed by the

appellants before that Court cannot be sustained in law. Further,

in the judgment under appeal the Division Bench was right in not

accepting the reason given by the learned Single Judge founded

on other persons being inimical towards minority. It was expected

of the Division Bench to critically analyze other reasons given by

 104
 the learned Single Judge in the case of Sumanjit Kaur (supra),

 which had been followed in the present case. We could have had

 the benefit of the independent view of the Division Bench as well.

 Reasoning is considered as the soul of the judgment. The Bench

 referred to the fact that the view in the Kerala Education Bill, 1957

 case (supra) was tentative but still erred in ignoring paragraph 123

 of the T.M.A. Pai's case (supra) as well as the other judgments

 referred by us, presumably, as they might not have been brought

 to the notice of the Bench. The discussion does not analyze the

 various principles enunciated in regard to the protection available

 to the linguistic minorities under Article 29 of the Constitution and

 the result of principle of equality introduced by Article 30(2) of the

 Constitution. For the detailed reasons recorded in this judgment,

 we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the view of the

 Division Bench in the Judgment under appeal.

1. A linguistic minority has constitution and character of its own. A

 provision of law or a Circular, which would be enforced against the

 general class, may not be enforceable with the same rigors

 against the minority institution, particularly where it relates to

 establishment and management of the school. It has been held

 105
that founders of the minority institution have faith and confidence

in their own committee or body consisting of the persons selected

by them. Thus, they could choose their managing committee as

well as they have a right to choose its teachers. Minority

institutions have some kind of autonomy in their administration.

This would entail the right to administer effectively and to manage

and conduct the affairs of the institution. There is a fine distinction

between a restriction on the right of administration and a

regulation prescribing the manner of administration. What should

be prevented is the mal-administration. Just as regulatory

measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character

and content of the minority institutions, similarly, regulatory

measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound

administration. Every linguistic minority may have its own socio,

economic and cultural limitations. It has a constitutional right to

conserve such culture and language. Thus, it would have a right

to choose teachers, who possess the eligibility and qualifications,

as provided, without really being impressed by the fact of their

religion and community. Its own limitations may not permit, for

cultural, economic or other good reasons, to induct teachers from

 106
 a particular class or community. The direction, as contemplated

 under Rule 64(1)(b), could be enforced against the general or

 majority category of the Government aided school but, it may not

 be appropriate to enforce such condition against linguistic minority

 schools. This may amount to interference with their right of choice

 and, at the same time, may dilute their character of linguistic

 minority. It would be impermissible in law to bring such actions

 under the cover of equality which in fact, would diminish the very

 essence of their character or status. Linguistic and cultural

 compatibility can be legitimately claimed as one of the desirable

 features of a linguistic minority in relation to selection of eligible

 and qualified teachers.

1. A linguistic minority institution is entitled to the protection and the

 right of equality enshrined in the provisions of the Constitution.

 The power is vested in the State to frame regulations, with an

 object to ensure better organization and development of school

 education and matters incidental thereto. Such power must

 operate within its limitation while ensuring that it does not, in any

 way, dilute or impairs the basic character of linguistic minority. Its

 right to establish and administer has to be construed liberally to

 107
 bring it in alignment with the constitutional protections available to

 such communities. The minority society can hardly be compelled

 to perform acts or deeds which per se would tantamount to

 infringement of its right to manage and control. In fact, it would

 tantamount to imposing impermissible restriction. A school which

 has been established and granted status of a linguistic minority for

 years, it will not be proper to stop its grant-in-aid for the reason

 that it has failed to comply with a condition or restriction which is

 impermissible in law, particularly, when the teacher appointed or

 proposed to be appointed by such institution satisfy the laid down

 criteria and/or eligibility conditions. The minority has an inbuilt

 right to appoint persons, which in its opinion are better culturally

 and linguistically compatible to the institution.

1. To frame policy is the domain of the Government. If, as a matter

 of policy, the Government has decided to implement the

 reservation policy for upliftment of the socially or otherwise

 backward classes, then essentially it must do so within the frame

 work of the Constitution and the laws. The concept of reservation

 has been provided, primarily, under Article 16 of the Constitution.

 Therefore, it would be the requirement of law that such policies

 108
are framed and enforced within the four corners of law and to

achieve the laudable cause of upliftment of a particular section of

the society. In regard to the ambit and scope of reservation, this

Court in the case of M. Nagaraj v. Union of India [(2006) 8 SCC

212] held as under :-

 "39. Reservation as a concept is very wide.
 Different people understand reservation to
 mean different things. One view of reservation
 as a generic concept is that reservation is an
 anti-poverty measure. There is a different
 view which says that reservation is merely
 providing a right of access and that it is not a
 right to redressal. Similarly, affirmative action
 as a generic concept has a different
 connotation. Some say that reservation is not
 a part of affirmative action whereas others say
that it is a part of affirmative action.
JNTU Hyderabad.

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 40. Our Constitution has, however,
 incorporated the word "reservation" in Article
 16(4) which word is not there in Article 15(4).
 Therefore, the word "reservation" as a subject
 of Article 16(4) is different from the word
 "reservation" as a general concept.

 41. Applying the above test, we have to
 consider the word "reservation" in the context
 of Article 16(4) and it is in that context that
 Article 335 of the Constitution which provides
 for relaxation of the standards of evaluation
 has to be seen. We have to go by what the
 Constitution-framers intended originally and
 not by general concepts or principles.
 Therefore, schematic interpretation of the
 Constitution has to be applied and this is the
 basis of the working test evolved by
 Chandrachud, J. in the Election case14."

 109
1. Thus, the framework of reservation policy should be such, as to fit

 in within the constitutional scheme of our democracy. As and

 when the Government changes its policy decision, it is expected

 to give valid reasons and act in the larger interest of the entire

 community rather than a section thereof. In its wisdom and

 apparently in accordance with law Government had taken a policy

 decision and issued the circular dated 21st March, 1986 exempting

 the minority institutions from complying with the requirements of

 the Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules. Despite this and judgment of

 the High Court there was a change of mind by the State that

 resulted in issuance of the subsequent circular of September,

 1989. From the record before us, no reasons have been recorded

 in support of the decision superseding the circular dated 21st

 March, 1986. It is a settled canon of administrative jurisprudence

 that state action, must be supported by some valid reasons and

 should be upon due application of mind. In the affidavits filed on

 behalf of the State, nothing in this regard could be pointed out and

 in fact, none was pointed out during the course of arguments.

 Absence of reasoning and apparent non-application of mind would

 give colour of arbitrariness to the state action. This aspect attains

 110
 greater lucidity in light of the well accepted norm that minority

 institution cannot stand on the same footing as a non-minority

 institution.

1. Besides that, State actions should be actio quaelibet it sua via and

 every discharge of its duties, functions and governance should

 also be within the constitutional framework. This principle equally

 applies to the Government while acting in the field of reservation

 as well. It would not be possible for the Courts to permit the State

 to impinge upon or violate directly or indirectly the constitutional

 rights and protections granted to various classes including the

 minorities. Thus, the State may not be well within its constitutional

 duty to compel the linguistic minority institution to accept a policy

 decision, enforcement of which will infringe their fundamental right

 and/or protection. On the contrary, the minority can validly

 question such a decision of the State in law. The service in an

 aided linguistic minority school cannot be construed as `a service

 under the State' even with the aid of Article 12 of the Constitution.

 Resultantly, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion

 that Rule 64(1)(b) cannot be enforced against the linguistic

 minority school. Having answered this question in favour of the

 111
 appellant and against the State, we do not consider it necessary

 to go into the constitutional validity or otherwise of Rule 64(1)(b) of

 the Rules, which question we leave open.

1. For the reasons afore-stated, we allow the appeal and hold that

 Rule 64(1)(b) and the circular of September, 1989, are not

 enforceable against the linguistic minority school in the NCT of

 Delhi. There shall be no order as to costs.

 ........................................J.
 [ DR. B.S. CHAUHAN ] ........................................
 J.
 [ SWATANTER KUMAR ]
New Delhi
July 8, 2010 112

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