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Specific Relief Act, 1963 – ss.13(1)(c) and 20 – Agreement to sell – Failure to execute sale deed – Suit for specific performance and, in the alternative, for refund of earnest money – Trial court partly decreeing the suit and directing refund of earnest money – First appellate court granting relief of specific performance – High Court affirming the decree passed by first appellate court – Held: Grant of decree of specific performance is lawful and also justified on the facts as well as equity – Even if the property was mortgaged to Co-operative Society, there is no bar to transfer the property in view of s. 48(d) of Co-operative Societies Act and ss. 12(1)(c) and 12(2) of Resettlement Act – Purchaser has the right to compel the seller to redeem the mortgage and obtain a valid discharge and then specifically perform the contract where the property is encumbered for an amount not exceeding purchase money – Increase in the price of suit property cannot be a ground for denying decree of specific performance – Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 – s. 48(d) – Maharashtra Re- settlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976 – ss. 12(1)(c) and 12(2) – Equity. The plaintiff-respondent entered into an agreement with the defendants- appellants whereby the latter agreed to sell the suit land to the former. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid at the time of agreement. As the appellants failed to execute the sale deed in favour of the respondent, the latter filed the suit for specific performance and, in the alternative, for refund of earnest money along with damages. The trial court concluded that there was no intention on the part of the defendants to sell the property and partially decreeing the suit, directed the defendants to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- with interest @ 6% p.a. and denied the relief of specific performance of contract. The first appellate court setting aside the decree passed by the trial court, passed the decree for specific performance upon grant of permission by the competent authority as contemplated u/s. 12(c) of Maharashtra Re-settlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976 and also by the Co-operative Society as contemplated u/s. 47(2) of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The High Court affirmed the decree passed by the first appellate court. In the instant appeal, the appellant-defendant contended that no decree for specific performance could have been passed because the property could not be transferred in favour of the respondent in view of the restriction u/s. 48 of Co-operative Societies Act and u/ss. 12(1)(c) 12(2) and 12(3) of the Re-settlement Act; that the courts below failed to appreciate the evidence in its correct perspective; and that the value of the suit property had increased tremendously. Respondent-plaintiff volunteered to pay increased amount towards the consideration i.e. Rs. 1,50,000/- instead of Rs. 40,000/- in view of the increased price of the land. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. All the three courts have returned all the findings of fact in favour of the respondent. Such findings are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and no legal infirmity can be traced in them. It is hardly permissible for Supreme Court to go into such questions of facts alone, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [Para 11] [322-a-b] 2.1 It is not correct to say that the land could not have been transferred in favour of the respondent in view of the restriction contained in the provisions u/s. 48 (d) of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and u/ss. 12(1) (c), 12(2) and 12(3) of Maharashtra Re-settlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976. The appellants did not adduce any evidence that the property in question had been mortgaged or was under the charge of the Co-operative Society. The appellants did not place any such argument or specific plea. In fact, no such issue was either claimed or framed in this regard. [Paras 10 and 12] [323-C-D] 2.2 Besides, the provisions of clause (d) of Section 48 of Maharashtra Co- operative Societies Act, 1960 places a conditional restriction upon alienation of the whole or any part of the land or interest in the property unless and until the whole amount borrowed by the member of the Society has been repaid with interest. Once the loan of the Society has been cleared, it obviously cannot have any objection to transfer the property. No effort was made by the appellants to bring on record any evidence to show as to what was the extent of money currently due to the Society, if at all, and for what amount the property had been mortgaged in its favour. In the absence of any specific evidence in that regard, the Court will have to draw an adverse inference against the appellants for not producing before the court the best available evidence. In any case, the appellants cannot take advantage of their own wrong. [Para 12] [322-D-G] 2.3 As regards the plea that the land could not be transferred in favour of the respondent in view of the restriction contained in Sections 12(1)(c) and 12(2) of the Maharashtra Re-settlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976, a bare reading of the provisions shows that the Government can grant permission for transfer of the property, subject to such conditions, as it may deem fit and proper. Again, the appellants have neither claimed any issue nor led any evidence to substantiate even this plea. [Paras 12 and 13] [323-G-H; 324-A-B] Nathulal v. Phool Chand AIR 1970 SC 546 – relied on. 3.1 Section 13(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 clearly postulates that where a person contracts to sell an immovable property with an imperfect title and the property is encumbered for an amount not exceeding the purchase money, the purchaser has the right to compel the seller to redeem the mortgage and obtain a valid discharge and then specifically perform the contract in its favour. [Para 13] [323-D-E] 3.2 Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act vests the court with a wide discretion either to decree the suit for specific performance or to decline the same. The discretion of the Court has to be exercised as per the settled judicial principles. In the instant case, it is the appellants who have taken advantage of the pendency of the proceedings. They have used the sum given towards earnest money for all this period as well as have enjoyed the fruits of the property. It is, therefore, not only lawful but even equity and facts of the case demand that a decree for specific performance should be granted in favour of the respondent. Besides, the respondent has agreed to pay much higher consideration than what was payable in terms of the agreement of sale. [Paras 14 and 15] [323-F; 325-B-E] Bal Krishna vs. Bhagwan Das (2008) 12 SCC 145; Mohammadia Cooperative Building Society Ltd. vs. Lakshmi Srinivasa Cooperative Building Society Ltd. and Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 310; P.V. Joseph’s son Mathew vs. N. Kuruvila’s Son AIR 1987 SC 2328 – distinguished. 4. The onus to prove that the respondent had obtained signatures of the appellants on blank papers on the pretext of advancing a loan of Rs.2,000/- was entirely upon the appellants. No evidence, much less cogent documentary or oral evidence, was led by the appellants to discharge this onus. The averment has rightly been disbelieved by the courts concerned. The appellants led no evidence and brought nothing to the notice of this Court, even during the course of the hearing, in support of their case. [Para 16] [325-E-H] 5. It is a settled principle of law that before the first appellate court, the party may be able to support the decree but cannot challenge the findings without filing the cross-objections. The appellants have neither filed cross- objections nor any appeal challenging the findings recorded by the trial court. In fact, the entire conduct of the defendant-appellants shows that they have not only failed to prove their claim before the courts of competent jurisdiction but have even not raised proper pleas in their pleadings. [Para 16] [325-G-H; 326-A-B] 6.1 Increase in the price of the land in question cannot be a ground for denying the decree of specific performance to the respondent. The first appellate court, by a well reasoned judgment, has granted the relief of specific performance instead of only granting refund of money, as given by the trial court. The judgment of the first appellate court has been upheld by the High Court and there is no reason whatsoever to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts and law as stated in the judgment under appeal. [Para 17] [326-C-D] 6.2 The respondent has volunteered to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- instead of Rs.40,000/- as the total sale consideration. This offer of the respondent is very fair. Even from the point of view of equity, the offer made by the respondents, substantially balances the equities between the parties. Therefore, no prejudice will be caused to the appellants in any manner whatsoever. [Paras 17 and 18] [326-D-E; 326-F-G] Case Law Reference: AIR 1970 SC 546 Relied on. Para 13 2008 (12) SCC 145 Distinguished. Para 14 2008 (7) SCC 310 Distinguished. Para 14 AIR 1987 SC 2328 Distinguished. Para 14 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6509 of 2005. From the Judgment & Order dated 17.07.2001 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay bench at Aurangabad in Second Appeal No. 96 of 2001. Miten Mahapatra, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Appellants. Nitin Kumar Gupta (for Shivaji M. Jadhav) for the Respondent.

Fariabagh, Ahmednagar, Maharashtra.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL No. 6509 OF 2005

Laxman Tatyaba Kankate & Anr. ...Appellants

 Versus

Smt. Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak ...Respondent

 JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. Civil Judge, Senior Division, Shrirampur, District

 Ahmednagar (for short `the Trial Court'), in a suit for specific

 performance and in the alternative for recovery of Rs.

 10,000/-, vide his judgment and decree dated 25th July, 1995

 partially decreed the suit of the plaintiff (respondent herein),

 dismissing her claim for specific performance, ordered

 refund of earnest money with interest at the rate of 6% per

 annum pendente lite and future, with proportionate cost.

 1
1. Against this decree, the respondent filed an appeal before

 the District Judge, Ahmednagar (hereinafter referred to as

 `the First Appellate Court'), who, vide his judgment and

 decree, dated 28th November, 2000, decreed the suit in its

 entirety. The Court granted decree for specific performance

 in respect of the land in question and upon grant of

 permission by the competent authority, as contemplated

 under Section 12 (c) of the Maharashtra Re-settlement of

 Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to

 as `the Re-settlement Act') and also by the Society, as

 contemplated under Section 47(2) of the Maharashtra

 Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, (for short `the Societies

 Act'), the appellants were entitled to specific performance

 upon payment of the balance sale consideration of Rs.

 30,000/-. It also directed the appellants to submit an

 application seeking permission from the competent authority

 and execute a registered sale deed in favour of the

 respondent herein.

1. The legality and correctness of the aforesaid decree was

 challenged by the appellants before the High Court of

 2
 Judicature at Bombay at its Aurangabad Bench in Second

 Appeal No. 96 of 2001 which came to be dismissed vide

 judgment dated 17th July, 2001. Aggrieved from the

 aforesaid concurrent decrees passed by the Courts, the

 present appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India

 has been preferred by the appellants.

1. The necessary facts are that, according to the respondent,

 an agreement to sell dated 08.01.1991 was entered into

 between the parties in terms whereof the appellants had

 agreed to sell the land admeasuring 1H. 60 R. in Village

 Pimpri Lokai, Taluka Shrirampur, District Ahmednagar in

 Block No. 220, the boundaries of which were stated in the

 plaint. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid at that time and it

 was agreed that upon obtaining the permission from the

 competent authority, the demarcation of the land would be

 effected and the possession of the suit land would be given.

 The appellants were expected to execute the sale deed in

 favour of the respondent, as the respondent was always

 ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. Though

 the appellants assured that they would execute the sale

 3
 deed in favour of the respondent, they failed to do so. A

 notice dated 05.06.1992 was served upon the appellants but

 no sale deed was executed.

1. Thereafter, according to the respondent, the appellants also

 started causing obstruction in the peaceful possession of the

 respondent and one of such incidents occurred on

 11.07.1992, which compelled the respondent to file the suit

 for specific performance, and in the alternative, for the

 refund of earnest money along with damages. One Vitthal

 Laxman Kankate also applied to the Court, vide Exh. 23, to

 be impleaded as a party, as he claimed right and interest in

 the said land. This application was allowed.

1. The suit was contested by the appellants who took various

 legal objections including, that the suit was bad for non-

 joinder of the necessary parties and, thus, was not

 maintainable. On merits, it was stated that no agreement,

 as alleged, was executed between the parties and the entire

 case, as pleaded by the respondent, was false. It was also

 averred that defendant No. 2 in the suit (appellant No. 2 in

 4
 the present appeal) had also filed a suit wherein injunction

 was granted in favour of the said party.

1. A plea was also taken that the agreement to sell was not a

 registered document, as such, the same could not be acted

 upon. The appellants also took the stand that there was

 rapid increase in the market value of the land and, therefore,

 they could not have agreed to sell the property at the price

 indicated in the agreement. However, it was really not in

 dispute that the plaintiff and the defendants were acquainted

 to each other. The learned Trial Court, on the basis of the

 record before it, noticed that the appellants claimed that they

 wanted to obtain a loan for a sum of Rs. 2,000/- from the

 respondent and had agreed to sign certain papers by way of

 security, that the respondent, on the pretext, got certain

 blank papers signed from the appellant as well as his son

 and that there was no intention to sell the property in

 question.

1. On the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed the

 5
following issues and gave findings thereon :

 " Issues Findings

 1 Does the plaintiff prove that the Proved
 defendant agreed to sell the field for
 Rs. 40,000/-?

 2 Does the plaintiff prove that the amount Proved
 Rs. 10,000/- was paid as earnest money?

 3 Does the plaintiff prove that amount of Proved
 Rs. 30,000/- was agreed to be paid at the
 time of execution of sale deed?

 4 Does the plaintiff prove that the sale deed Proved
 was to be executed within 1 month from
 the permission of the Competent
 Authority?

 5 Does the defendant prove that the Not proved
 plaintiff paid Rs. 2,000/- only as loan and
 the signature were obtained on blank
 stamp paper by way of security?

 6 Does the plaintiff prove that she was Proved
 ready and willing to perform her part of
 contract?

 7 Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a Not proved
 decree of Specific Performance?

 8 Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of Does not
 necessary party? survive

 9 What relief and order? as per final
 order

 Additional issues

 6
 1 Whether the agreement is binding on Yes
 the defendant No. 2.

 2 Does plaintiff prove that by way of Yes
 alternate relief, she is entitled to refund
 of earnest money with damages?"

1. The learned Trial Court decided all the material issues in

 favour of the respondent and, while upholding the

 agreement in favour of the respondent, it also returned a

 finding in favour of the respondent that she was always

 ready and willing to perform her part of the contract and had

 paid a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as earnest money. It may

 be noticed, that the stand taken by the appellants, that the

 signatures were obtained on blank papers, was answered by

 the Court in the negative. Despite these facts, the learned

 Trial Court, as already noticed, partially decreed the suit and

 directed the appellants to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- with

 interest at the rate of 6% per annum and without any

 additional amount of damages, as prayed by the

 respondent. The learned First Appellate Court, while setting

 aside the decree passed by the Trial Court only for payment

 of money, passed the decree for specific performance while

 7
otherwise affirming the conclusions arrived at by the Trial

Court. The First Appellate Court returned the findings in

favour of the respondent and held as under :

 "Therefore, the sale is permissible with the
 prior permission of the government. Admittedly, the
 respondent No. 1 has agreed to obtain permission
 from the government prior to sale transaction.
 Therefore, there would not be legal bar while
 granting a relief of specific performance. The
 authority cited by the learned counsel for appellant
 is directly in point. The facts of the said authority
 and the facts of the present case are identical one.
 Hence, the reasons on account of which the
 learned trial court was not pleased to grant a relief
 of specific performance cannot be accepted. After
 having come to conclusion that there is no bar of
 section 12 of the Re-settlement Act, the another
 reason on account of which the learned trial court
 was not pleased to grant the said relief, is proper or
 not is to be considered. The learned trial court has
 observed that in view of provisions of the Section
 48(e) of the Societies Act, the agreement for sale is
 void one, and hence it can't be enforced. According
 to learned trial court there was charge on the suit
 land in favour of the society i.e. since the
 respondent no. 1 has taken the loan amount. The
 learned trial court has relief on the entry in the
 record of rights, while coming to conclusion that
 there was charge of the society of the suit land in
 view of the loan transaction, and the appellant was
 aware of it in view of her admission that she had
 seen the entry. Consequently, the learned trial
 court has come to conclusion that there is a bar
 while granting relief of specific performance u/s 48
 (e) of the Co.op. societies Act. In my opinion, in
 view of the authority reported in the case of
 Narayan vs. Macchindra, 1994 Mh. L.J.558 it can't

 8
 be said that there would be any legal bar while
 enforcing the agreement Exh.45. .................

 x x x x x x x x x x

 .................. Therefore, there would not be any
 legal impediment while granting a relief of specific
 performance subject to certain conditions i.e. prior
 permission of the state government and permission
 from the society of village Pimprilokai, taluka
 Newasa. There are no reasons on record so as to
 prevent the appellant from claiming a relief of
 specific performance. The respondents were not
 able to show as to why discretion should not be
 grant a relief of specific performance. Since the
 agreement for sale, Exh. 45, is lawful one, it can be
 safely enforced. Consequently, the finding in
 respect of point No. 2 is answered in the affirmative.
 In view of the findings in respect of point Nos. 1 and
 2, it logically follows that the judgment and decree
 of the learned trial court have to be set aside, and
 suit filed by appellant is decreed, which is for a
 relief of specific performance however subject to
 certain conditions i.e. regarding prior permission of
 the state government of society of village
 Pimprilokai. Incase, both authorities are not
 pleased to grant permission then appellant would
 be entitled to claim refund of the earnest amount
 from respondents which is to the tune of Rs.
 10,000/-."

1. The findings and the conclusions of fact and law arrived at

 by the Courts were affirmed by the High Court which

 sustained the decree passed by the First Appellate Court.

 The learned counsel appearing for the appellants

 9
 vehemently argued that the decree for specific performance

 could not have been passed by the Courts against the

 appellants, as the property was mortgaged to the

 cooperative society, and the property being under the

 charge of the society, no title could be passed in favour of

 the respondent. Secondly, it was contended that the Courts

 have failed to appreciate the evidence in its correct

 perspective and the judgment under appeal is liable to be

 set aside. Lastly, it was contended that during the pendency

 of the proceedings, the value of the land has increased

 tremendously and it would be unjust and unfair to pass a

 decree for specific performance in favour of the respondent.

1. At the very outset, we may notice that all the three Courts

 have returned all the findings of fact in favour of the present

 respondent. Such findings are based upon proper

 appreciation of evidence and no legal infirmity can be traced

 in them. It is hardly permissible for this Court to go into such

 questions of facts alone, in exercise of its jurisdiction under

 Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

 10
1. From the judgment of the learned Trial Court, it is apparent

 that the appellants had not placed any such argument or

 specific plea before that Court. In fact, as is evident from

 the afore reproduced issues, no such issue was either

 claimed or framed, in this regard. It is rightly contended by

 the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that the

 appellants had not adduced any evidence that the property

 in question had been mortgaged or was under the charge of

 the society. Be that as it may, the provisions of clause (d) of

 Section 48 of the Societies Act, places a restriction upon

 alienation of the whole or any part of the land or interest in

 the property unless and until the whole amount borrowed by

 the member of the society has been repaid with interest. In

 other words, the restriction is conditional and once the loan

 of the society has been cleared, the society obviously

 cannot have any objection to transfer the said property. No

 effort was made by the appellants to bring on record any

 evidence to show as to what was the extent of money

 currently due to the society, if at all, and for what amount the

 property had been mortgaged in favour of the society. In the

 11
 absence of any specific evidence in that regard, the Court

 will have to draw an adverse inference against the

 appellants for not producing before the Court the best

 available evidence. In any case, the appellants cannot take

 advantage of their own wrong. Coming to the other

 submission, that the land could not be transferred in favour

 of the respondent in view of the restriction contained in

 Section 12 (1) (c) and Section 12 (2) of the Re-settlement

 Act, the bare reading of these provisions show that the

 Government can grant permission for transfer of the

 property, subject to such conditions, as it may deem fit

 and proper.

1. In the present case, the appellants have neither claimed any

 issue nor led any evidence before the Court to substantiate

 even this plea. Furthermore, the learned First Appellate

 Court while relying upon the judgment of this Court in the

 case of Nathulal v. Phoolchand [AIR 1970 SC 546], had

 dealt with both these contentions rightly and in accordance

 with the law. We see no reason as to how a presumption

 can be raised against the respondent on face of the fact that

 12
 the appellants chose not to lead any evidence on either of

 these aspects. These contentions raised on behalf of the

 appellants are, therefore, without any substance. The

 learned counsel appearing for the appellants drew our

 attention to Section 13 (1) (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

 (for short `the Act'), which clearly postulates that where a

 person contracts to sell immovable property with an

 imperfect title and the property is encumbered for an amount

 not exceeding the purchase money, the purchaser has the

 right to compel the seller to redeem the mortgage and obtain

 a valid discharge and then specifically perform the contract

 in its favour. Even from this point of view, the right of the

 present respondent is fully protected.

1. It will also be useful to refer to the provisions of Section 20

 of the Act which vests the Court with a wide discretion either

 to decree the suit for specific performance or to decline the

 same. Reference in this regard can also be made to the

 case of Bal Krishna v. Bhagwan Das [(2008) 12 SCC 145],

 where this Court held as under :

 13
 "13. ........The compliance with the
 requirement of Section 16(c) is mandatory and in
 the absence of proof of the same that the plaintiff
 has been ready and willing to perform his part of the
 contract suit cannot succeed. The first requirement
 is that he must aver in plaint and thereafter prove
 those averments made in the plaint. The plaintiff's
 readiness and willingness must be in accordance
 with the terms of the agreement. The readiness and
 willingness of the plaintiff to perform the essential
 part of the contract would be required to be
 demonstrated by him from the institution of the suit
 till it is culminated into decree of the court.

 14. It is also settled by various decisions of
 this Court that by virtue of Section 20 of the Act, the
 relief for specific performance lies in the discretion
 of the court and the court is not bound to grant such
 relief merely because it is lawful to do so. The
 exercise of the discretion to order specific
 performance would require the court to satisfy itself
 that the circumstances are such that it is equitable
 to grant decree for specific performance of the
 contract. While exercising the discretion, the court
 would take into consideration the circumstances of
 the case, the conduct of parties, and their
 respective interests under the contract. No specific
 performance of a contract, though it is not vitiated
 by fraud or misrepresentation, can be granted if it
 would give an unfair advantage to the plaintiff and
 where the performance of the contract would
 involve some hardship on the defendant, which he
 did not foresee. In other words, the court's
 discretion to grant specific performance is not
 exercised if the contract is not equal and fair,
 although the contract is not void."

 Similar view was taken by this Court in the case of

Mohammadia Cooperative Building Society Ltd. v. Lakshmi

Srinivasa Cooperative Building Society Ltd. & Ors. [(2008) 7

SCC 310], where the Court reiterated the principle that

 14
jurisdiction of the Court to grant specific performance is

discretionary and role of the plaintiff is one of the most

important factor to be taken into consideration. We may also

notice that in the case of P.V. Joseph's son Mathew v. N.

Kuruvila's Son [AIR 1987 SC 2328], this Court further

cautioned that while exercising discretionary jurisdiction in

terms of Section 20 of the Act, the Court should meticulously

consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The Court is

expected to take care to see that the process of the Court is

not used as an instrument of oppression giving an unfair

advantage to the plaintiff as opposed to the defendant in the

suit.

1. The discretion of the Court has to be exercised as per the

 settled judicial principles. All the aforesaid principles are

 squarely satisfied in the present case and it is the appellants

 before us who have taken advantage of the pendency of the

 proceedings. They have used the sum of Rs. 10,000/-,

 which was given as earnest money for all this period, as well

 as, have enjoyed the fruits of the property. The present case

 15
 does not fall within the ambit of any of the aforesaid cases

 specified under Section 20 (2) of the Act. In the present

 case, it is not only lawful but even equity and facts of the

 case demand that a decree for specific performance should

 be granted in favour of the respondent. Besides all this, the

 respondent before us has agreed to pay much higher

 consideration than what was payable in terms of the

 agreement to sell between the parties.

1. The onus to prove that the respondent had obtained

 signatures of the appellants on blank papers on the pretext

 of advancing a loan of Rs. 2,000/- was entirely upon the

 appellants. No evidence, much less cogent documentary or

 oral evidence, was led by the appellants to discharge this

 onus. The averment has rightly been disbelieved and the

 plea was rightly rejected by the concerned Courts in the

 judgment under appeal. The appellants led no evidence and

 nothing was brought to our notice, even during the course of

 the hearing, to show that this plea could be accepted. It is a

 settled principle of law that before the First Appellate Court,

 the party may be able to support the decree but cannot

 16
 challenge the findings without filing the cross objections. As

 it appears from the record, the present appellants have

 neither filed cross objections nor their appeal challenging the

 findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. In fact, the

 entire conduct of the present appellants shows that they

 have not only failed to prove their claim before the Courts of

 competent jurisdiction but have even not raised proper pleas

 in their pleadings.

1. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that there has

 been considerable increase in the price of the land in

 question. Though that may be true, it cannot be a ground

 for denying the decree of specific performance to the

 respondent. The learned First Appellate Court, by a well

 reasoned judgment, has granted the relief of specific

 performance instead of only granting refund of money, as

 given by the Trial Court. The judgment of the First Appellate

 Court has been upheld by the High Court and we see no

 reason whatsoever to interfere with the concurrent findings

 of facts and law as stated in the judgment under appeal.

 However, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent

 17
 volunteered and after taking instructions stated that they

 would be willing to pay a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- instead of

 Rs. 40,000/- as the total sale consideration. We find this

 offer of the respondent to be very fair.

1. We have already held that the defence taken up by the

 appellants in the suit was totally unbelievable. There is no

 reason or ground as to why the relief of specific performance

 should be declined to the respondent. She satisfied all the

 requirements of Section 20 of the Act. Even then, if we

 examine this case purely from the point of view of equity, the

 offer now made by the respondent substantially balances

 the equities between the parties and the very argument

 raised on behalf of the appellants that there has been

 increase in the price of the land in question loses its

 significance. Now, no prejudice will be caused to the

 appellants in any manner whatsoever.

1. For the reasons afore recorded, we see no legal or other

 infirmity in the judgment under appeal. While dismissing the

 present appeal, we direct that the respondent will abide by

 18
 her offer and would pay a total sale consideration of Rs.

 1,50,000/- and upon payment of Rs. 1,50,000/- - Rs.

 10,000/- = Rs. 1,40,000/- and complying with the

 conditions stated in the judgment dated 28th November,

 2000 of the First Appellate Court, the sale deed shall be

 registered in favour of the respondent in terms of the decree

 passed by the First Appellate Court subject to the above

 modifications.

1. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we

 leave the parties to bear their own costs.

 ................................J.
 [ DR. B.S. CHAUHAN ]

 ..............................J.
 [ SWATANTER KUMAR ]
New Delhi
July 8, 2010. 19
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