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(1) Whether the provisions of Rules 121 and 122-A of the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules (for short, the `M.P. Rules’) are ultra vires Section 15 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (for short, `the Advocates Act’), inter alia for the reason that there is no nexus between the rule making power of the State Bar Councils and the powers provided under Section 15(1) or 15(2)(c) of the Advocates Act? Was the delegation of legislative power under Section 15 of the Advocates Act excessive, inasmuch as it does not provide any guidelines for removal of office-bearers of the State Bar Councils? (2) Whether despite the absence of the enabling provisions in the principal statute, namely, the Advocates Act, empowering subordinate State Bar Councils to enact provisions for removal of the office bearers of the State Bar Councils by `no confidence motions’, such power could be read into the general clause of Section 15(1) of the Advocates Act? (3) Whether Rules 121 and 122-A of the M.P. Rules are invalid for want of prior approval from the Bar Council of India?

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                                                             REPORTABLE

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 CIVIL APPEAL NO.6482 OF 2011

         (Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) No. 15722 of 2011)

Pratap Chandra Mehta                                       ... Appellant

                                 Versus

State Bar Council of M.P. & Ors.                         ... Respondents

                                   With

                 CIVIL APPEAL NO.6483 OF 2011

         (Arising out of SLP (CIVIL) No. 16088 of 2011)

Rameshwar Neekhra                                           ... Appellant

                                                   Versus

State Bar Council of M.P. & Ors.                       ... Respondents

                            J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar J.

1.       Leave granted.

2.       From the very simple facts of these  cases, the following 

substantial   questions   of   law   and   public   importance   arise   for 

                                     1

consideration of this Court:

(1)     Whether the provisions of Rules 121 and 122-A of the State 

        Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules (for short, the `M.P. 

        Rules') are ultra vires Section 15 of the Advocates Act, 1961 

        (for short, `the Advocates Act'), inter alia for the reason that 

        there   is   no   nexus   between   the   rule   making   power   of   the 

        State Bar Councils and the powers provided under Section 

        15(1) or 15(2)(c) of the Advocates Act?   Was the delegation 

        of  legislative  power   under   Section  15   of  the   Advocates   Act 

        excessive,   inasmuch   as   it   does   not   provide   any   guidelines 

        for removal of office-bearers of the State Bar Councils?

(2)     Whether   despite   the   absence   of the   enabling  provisions   in 

        the   principal   statute,   namely,   the   Advocates   Act, 

        empowering   subordinate   State   Bar   Councils   to   enact 

        provisions for removal of the office bearers of the State Bar 

        Councils   by   `no   confidence   motions',   such   power   could   be 

        read   into   the   general   clause   of   Section   15(1)   of   the 

        Advocates Act?

(3)     Whether Rules 121 and 122-A of the M.P. Rules are invalid 

        for want of prior approval from the Bar Council of India?

                                         2

3.        The necessary facts are that the Parliament enacted the 

Advocates   Act  on  19th  May,   1961.     Section   15  of   the   Advocates 

Act empowers the State Bar Councils to frame Rules to carry out 

the   powers   conferred   upon   the   State   Bar   Councils   under 

Sections   15(1),   15(2),   28(1)   and   28(2)   read   with   Chapter   II   and 

other provisions of the Advocates Act.   The State Bar Council of 

Madhya   Pradesh   (for   short   `the   State   Bar   Council'),   with   the 

approval   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India,   made   and   published   the 

M.P. Rules in 1962.   These M.P. Rules came to be amended on 

27th April, 1975.  

4.        Section   15 of the  Advocates Act provides  that the  State 

Bar Councils can frame/amend the Rules with prior approval of 

the  Bar   Council  of  India.    Section   15(2)(a)  of  the   Advocates   Act 

read  with   Part   III  and   IX   of  the   Bar   Council   of   India   Rules   (for 

short,   `the   Rules')   contemplates   that   election   to   the   State   Bar 

Council shall be held.  In furtherance to this legislative mandate, 

the election to the State Bar Council were held in the year 2008 

and   Mr.   Rameshwar   Neekhra   was   elected   as   Member   and   then 

Chairman   of   the   State   Bar   Council   by   its   members   on   31st 

                                          3

August, 2008.  After the expiry of 2= years, fresh elections were 

held on 12th February, 2011 and the said Mr. Neekhra was again 

elected   as   member,   and   then   the   Chairman   of   the   State   Bar 

Council by its members.   He is stated to have secured 21 votes, 

out of a total 25 votes of the Members of the State Bar Council. 

Mr.   Adarsh   Muni   Trivedi   was   elected   as   Vice-Chairman   of   the 

State Bar Council.  

5.       At the very threshold of the 15th  Meeting of the General 

Body   of   the   State   Bar   Council   held   on   27th  March,   2011   at 

Jabalpur, a number of Members submitted two requisitions: one 

stated that due to lack of confidence in the Chairman and Vice-

Chairman,   a   `no   confidence   motion'   should   be   issued;   and   the 

second   requisition   stated   that,   since   the   election   of   the 

Committees for the second term was not as per the constitution, 

re-election   for   the   Committees   may   be   conducted.     They 

requested   the   State   Bar   Council   to   call   a   special   meeting   to 

consider these requisitions.  It is also recorded in these Minutes 

that   the   Chairman   and   Vice-Chairman   had   offered   their 

resignation,   subject   to   withdrawal   of   the   requisition   of   `no 

confidence   motion'.     There   was  a  long  discussion,   whereafter   it 

                                       4

was   resolved   that   the   agenda   of   the   special   meeting   was   to   be 

circulated   on   the   same   day   i.e.   27th  March,   2011   by   registered 

post.   Copy of the resolution passed and the requisition motion 

of `no confidence', would be circulated to all Hon'ble Members of 

the State Bar Council i.e. who were present and those who were 

not   present.   These   Minutes,   annexed   as   `P-10'   (colly)   to   the 

petition, read as under:

             "Before   the   start   of   the   meeting   Hon'ble 

             Members   S/s   Vinod   Kumar   Bhardwaj, 

             Kuldeep   Bhargava,   Ghanshyam   Singh, 

             Prem          Singh         Bhadouria,              Shivendra 

             Upadhyay,   Champa   Lal   Yadav,   Dinesh 

             Narayan   Pathak,   Khalid   Noor   Fakhruddin, 

             Mrigendra   Singh   Baghel,   Jai   Prakash 

             Mishra,   Prabal   Pratap   Singh   Solanki,   Ku. 

             Rashmi   Ritu   Jain   and   B.K.   Upadhyay 

             submitted   two   requisition   motion   of   no 

             confidence.  In one of the requisition motion 

             of no confidence they have stated that they 

             have   no   confidence   in   Chairman,   Vice- 

             Chairman and Treasurer therefore, they are 

             moving no confidence motion against them. 

             In the second requisition motion they have 

             requested   that   since   the   election   of   the 

             Committees for the second term were not as 

             per   the   constitution   therefore   and   even 

             otherwise   they   want   re-election   for   the 

             Committees.     For   both   the   requisition 

             motion they have requested to call a special 

             meeting   and   consider   their   vote   of   no 

             confidence           against              Chairman,         Vice-

             Chairman   and   Treasurer.     For   another 

                                             5

           requisition   motion   they   have   requested   to 

           call   a   special   meeting   and   consider   their 

           proposal.     When   the   meeting   was   started 

           both   the   requisition   motion   were   placed 

           before   the   Hon'ble   Chairman.     Shri   Ganga 

           Prasad   Tiwari,   Hon'ble   Treasurer,   Shri 

           Rameshwar   Neekhra,   Hon'ble   Chairman 

           and   Shri   A.M.   Trivedi,   Hon'ble   Vice-

           Chairman   stated   that   they   offer   their 

           resignation   subject   to   withdrawal   of 

           requisition of no confidence motion.   There 

           had been long discussion and members S/s 

           Vinod   Kumar   Bhardwaj,   Prem   Singh 

           Badhouria,   Champa   Lal   Yadav,   Pratap 

           Mehta,          Vijay         Kumar         Choudhary, 

           Ghanshyam   Singh,   Z.A.   Khan,   Kuldeep 

           Bhargava, Khalid Noor Fakhruddin, Rajesh 

           Pandey   Mrigendra   Singh   Bhagel,   Prabal 

           Pratap Singh Solanki expressed their views. 

           There   had   been   divergent   views   in   respect 

           of   withdrawal   of   no   confidence   motion   as 

           well   as   conditional   resignation   offered   by 

           Hon'ble   Chairman,   Vice-Chairman   and 

           Treasurer.   As such it is resolved to hold a 

           special   meeting   on   16th  April,   2011   at 

           Jabalpur   from   12.30P.M.   onwards   in   term 

           of Rule 122(A) & (B) of State Bar Council of 

           Madhya  Pradesh  Rules.    It   is   resolved that 

           agenda   of   the   meeting   be   circulated   today 

           itself   by   registered   post   and   copy   of   the 

           resolution   passed   along   with   requisition 

           motion of no confidence be circulated to all 

           Hon'ble   Members   of   the   Council   who   are 

           present   and   to   them   also   who   are   not 

           present today."

6.      It   appears   from   the   record   that   in   terms   of   the   above 

minutes of the 15th Meeting of the General Body of the State Bar 

                                         6

Council held on 27th March, 2011, the notices of the 16th Meeting 

were also issued and circulated. The 16th  Meeting of the General 

Body   of   the   State   Bar   Council   was   decided   to   be   held   on   16th 

April, 2011 in the Meeting dated 27th March, 2011 itself. 

7.        After   issuing   the   notice   in   accordance   with   the   M.P. 

Rules, a meeting of the State Bar Council was held on 16th April, 

2011.  At this meeting, the `no confidence motion' was moved by 

13 members of the State Bar Council, in terms of Rule 122-A of 

the   M.P.   Rules,   against   both   the   Chairman   and   the   Vice-

Chairman.     The   parties   to   the   present   appeals   are   at   some 

variance   as   to   the   manner,   knowledge   and   the   decision   with 

which   the   meeting   was   closed.     The   respondents   herein   have 

contended   that   in   this   meeting,   there   was   actual   discussion   of 

the `no confidence motion' moved by some of the members of the 

State Bar Council, which was a part of the formal agenda notice 

issued by the Secretary of the State Bar Council.  In the Minutes 

placed   on   record   as   Annexure   R-16/6,   it   has   been   stated   that 

item   No.2     of   the   agenda,   which   was   to   consider   the 

requisitioning of `no confidence motion', was actually considered 

and the question arose as to whether Shri Rameshwar Neekhra, 

                                         7

the   Chairman   could   still   preside   over   the   meeting.     There   was 

some   discussion   on   that   issue,   whereafter   the   Chairman   along 

with the Secretary is stated to have left the meeting on 16th April 

2011. The Advocate General had then presided over the meeting, 

and the `no confidence motion' is stated to have been passed by 

majority of the members.  It will be useful to refer to the Minutes 

of the Meeting, held on 16th  April, 2011 on this issue, which are 

as follows:

               "Twelve of the Members have quit away the 

               meeting   on   the   ground   that   by   virtue   of 

               Rule   15   of   Chapter   V   no   matter   can   be 

               decided   and   reconsidered   for   a   period   of 

               three months unless the Council by 2/3 of 

               majority   of   the   Members   present   shall 

               permit.     The   affect   of   this   rule   is   also 

               required   to   be   considered   by   the   Hon'ble 

               High   Court   and   all   these   issues   are   open 

               before the Hon'ble High Court.

                           So   far   as   the   presiding   over   of   the 

               meeting is concerned, Rule 14 of Chapter V 

               says   that   in   the   absence   of   any   provision 

               the matter is to be decided by the majority. 

               That being so the   majority of the Members 

               present   have   decided   to   consider   the   No 

               Confidence   Motion   hence   this   meeting   is 

               now   being   presided   over   by   Advocate 

               General to whom the majority has decide to 

               preside.

                           Before   the   start   of   the   Meeting 

               Hon'ble   Member   Shri   Prabal   Pratap   Singh 

                                             8

Solanki   has   asked   Shri   Rameshwar 

Neekhra,   Chairman   to   kindly   decide   that 

the Members are ready to participate in the 

No   Confidence   Motion   but   at   that   time 

Hon'ble   Chairman   quit   the   Meeting   Hall 

along with his followers and also took away 

the   Secretary   saying   that   we   are   not   going 

to participate in the No Confidence Motion.

          At this Juncture Shri Vinod Kumar 

Bhardwaj,   Hon'ble   Member   State   Bar 

Council   of  Madhya   Pradesh  requested  Shri 

R.D. Jain, Hon'ble Advocate General and Ex 

Official Member who remained present from 

the   very   beginning   of   the   meeting   and   has 

watched   all   the   proceedings   &   discussions 

which   took   place   by   the   Hon'ble   Members 

Shri   Bhardwaj   requested   the   Hon'ble 

Advocate General Shri R.D. Jain to preside 

over the meeting which was seconded by all 

the members present as following:

1.        S/Shri   Vinod   Kumar   Bhardwaj,   (2) 

      Kuldeep   Bhargava   (3)   Jai   Prakash 

      Mishra   (4)   Shivendra   Upadhyay   (5) 

      Ms.   Rashmi   Ritu   Jain   (6)   Dinesh 

      Narayan   Pathak   (7)   Prem   Singh 

      Bhadouria   (8)   Champa   Lal   Yadav   (9) 

      Ghanshyam   Singh   (10)   Mrigendra 

      Singh Baghel (11) Prabal Pratap Singh 

      Solanki   (12)   Khalid   Noor   Fakhruddin 

      (13)   Shri   Ghanshyam   Singh,   Hon'ble 

      Members.

          Shri   R.D.   Jain,   Hon'ble   Adovate 

General and Ex Officio Member stated that 

the meeting need not be adjourned and the 

Hon'ble Advocate General also read out the 

part   of   the   order   of   Hon'ble   High   Court   in 

WP No. 6372/11.

                            9

          Item No. 2 Resolution No. 258/GB/2011

          The Item No. 2 of the agenda was read over. 

          The   members   are   asked   to   give   their   vote 

          for or against by raising their hands.

          Since   the   majority   of   the   Members   of   the 

          Council   have   supported   the   motion   by 

          raising   hands   it   stands   passed   under   Rule 

          122(A).

          The   following   Members   are   present   in   the 

          house as per below:

          S/Shri   (1)   Vinod   Kumar   Bhardwaj   (2)   Jai 

          Prakash Mishra (3) Shivendra Upadhyay (4) 

          Ms. Rashmi Ritu Jain (5) Kuldeep Bhargava 

          (6)   Dinesh   Narayan   Pathak   (7)   Prem   Singh 

          Bhadouria   (8)   Champa   Lal   Yadav   (9) 

          Ghanshyam   Singh   (10)   Mrigendra   Singh 

          Baghel   (11)   Khalid   Noor   Fakhruddin   (12) 

          Prabal   Pratap   Singh   Solanki   (13)   Bal 

          Krishna   Upadhyay   have   supported   the 

          motion   and   hence   the   motion   stands 

          passed   by   a   majority   of   all   the   members 

          present and the voting under Rule 122-A."

8.      We   may   notice   that   two   sets   of   minutes   recorded 

differently for the same meeting have also been placed on record 

as Annexure P-10 (colly) and R-16/4 respectively.  It needs to be 

noticed that one set of minutes is only signed by the Secretary of 

the State Bar Council while the other is signed by the Secretary 

as well as by other members who passed the Resolution.

9.      In the  Minutes of  the meeting dated  16th  April,  2011, it 

                                   10

had   been   specifically   recorded   that   the   Resolution   is   not   to   be 

given   effect   to   in   view   of   the   orders   passed   by   the   Madhya 

Pradesh High Court on 15th April, 2011 in Writ Petition No. 6372 

of   2011.     However,   the   copy   of   the   proceeding   was   to   be 

communicated   to   the   Registrar   General   of   the   High   Court   of 

Madhya   Pradesh.     This   Resolution   had   been   signed   by   the 

members present.  

10.       One   Pratap   Chandra   Mehta   had   filed   this   above-

mentioned Writ Petition No. 6372 of 2011, challenging the  vires 

of Rules 121 and 122-A of the M.P. Rules.   These Rules related 

to   the   term   of,   and   procedure   for   passing   a   `no   confidence 

motion' against the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and the Treasurer 

etc.  As already noticed, the Court had directed that the meeting 

of  the State Bar Council could be held  on 16th  April,  2011, but 

the Resolution, if passed, would not be given effect to, till further 

orders.   The matter was ordered to be listed for hearing on 25th 

April,   2011.     In   the   meanwhile,   another   writ   petition   was   also 

filed being Writ Petition No. 6628 of 2011 and the High Court in 

its   final   judgment   observed   that,   in   both   the   petitions   same 

relief,   on   virtually   the   same   grounds,   had   been   claimed.     The 

                                        11

High Court had framed two basic points for decision:

       Whether   Rule   122-A,   as   framed   under   Section   15   of   the
1.

       Advocates Act was, ultra vires; and

       Whether the second Resolution, dated 16th  April, 2011 was
2.

       invalid?

11.       Vide   its   detailed   judgment   dated   20th  May,   2011,   the 

High  Court   decided  both  the  issues   against   the   petitioners   and 

dismissed   the   writ   petitions   while   vacating   the   interim   order. 

The High Court held as under:

               "22. On point (E) of para 16 above, it was 

             urged   from   the   petitioner's   side   that   if 

             Section   15(1)   of   the   Act   is   taken   to   be   the 

             source   of   power   for   framing   Rules 

             prescribing   the   tenure   for   an   elected 

             chairman,   and   prescribing   curtailment 

             such   tenure   through   a   no-confidence 

             motion,          then         such         delegation         to 

             subordinate   legislation   must   be   struck 

             down   as   it   confers   wholly   unguided   and 

             thus   unfettered   powers   upon   the   delegate 

             subordinate   legislative   Authority.     In   reply 

             it   could   not   be   shown   that   there   is   any 

             express   guidance   or   that   any   policy 

             guidance can be deciphered from all or any 

             of   the   provisions   of   the   Act   or   from   the 

             scheme of the Act, regarding what tenure, if 

             any,   should   be   permitted,   and   if   so   under 

             what   circumstances   and   by   what   process, 

             subject to what restrictions.

                                            12

23.    A   totally   misplaced   reliance   was 

       placed upon the case of V. Sudheer 

       v.   Bar   Council   of   India   [(1993)   3 

       SCC   176]   which   merely   says   that 

       the State Bar Council under Section 

       24(1)(e)   of   the   Act   could   have 

       prescribed   pre-enrolment   training, 

       but   the   Bar   Council   of   India   could 

       not   do   so   under   Section   49   of   the 

       Act.   `Hukam   Chand   v.   Union   of 

       India   [(1972)   2   SCC   601]   was   also 

       unnecessarily   cited.     It   deals   with 

       power   to   frame   a   rule   with 

       retrospective   effect   and   has   no 

       relevance here.   Two decision of the 

       Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of 

       `Vasanlal   Maganbhai   vs.   State   of 

       Bombay   [AIR   1961   4(para)   and   in 

       the   case   of   `Agricultural   Market 

       Committee   vs.   Shalimar   Chemical 

       Works'   reported   in   [(1997)   5   SCC 

       516   (para   26)   were   cited   from   the 

       petitioners   side,   both   laying   down 

       the   same   principle,   which   needs   to 

       be   discussed.     The   relevant   part   of 

       the latter (1997) decision reads "The 

       principle   which   therefore   emerges 

       out   is   that   the   essential   legislative 

       function             consists           of         the 

       determination   of   the   legislative 

       policy   and   the   legislature   cannot 

       abdicate             essential          legislative 

       function   in   favour   of   another. 

       Power          to          make         subsidiary 

       legislation may be entrusted by the 

       legislature   to   another   body   of   its 

       choice   but   the   legislature   should 

       before   delegating,   enunciate   either 

       expressly   or   by   implication,   the 

       policy   and   the   principles   for   the 

                            13

          guidance           of         the              delegates". 

          However, the words of the Supreme 

          Court   immediately     following   the 

          above   quoted   words   bring   out   the 

          implication.     They   read   "The   effect 

          of   these   principles   is   that   the 

          delegate.........cannot                              widen         or 

          constrict the scope of the Act or the 

          policy   laid   down   thereunder.     It 

          cannot, in the garb of making rules, 

          legislate on the field covered by the 

          Act......".  We do not find the rule in 

          question   to   be   widening   or 

          constricting   the   scope   of   either   the 

          Act   or   any   policy   laid   down   under 

          the Act.  Nor is the Rule in question 

          legislating   upon   any   field   covered 

          by   the   Act.     To   the   same   effect   is 

          cited   the   case   of   `Addl.   District 

          Magistrate Vs. Sir Ra,' (2005) 5 SCC 

          451 (para 16).

27.    This brings us to the last point raised 

       by   the   petitioners.     The   decisions   of 

       the   Delhi   and   Kerala   High   Court 

       reported   respectively   in   AIR   1975   Del 

       200   `Bar   Council   of   Delhi   Vs.   Bar 

       Council of Kerala Vs.....' were read out 

       before   us.   It   was   pointed   out   that   in 

       the  Delhi  case   common   law  was  used 

       to justify an implied power of removal 

       of the elected Chairman on the ground 

       that   the   statute   had   not   changed   the 

       common   law.     The   correctness   of   the 

       law   laid   down   in   that   decision   was 

       assailed   by   placing   reliance   on   AIR 

       1954 SC 210 `Jagan Nath Vs. Jaswant 

       Singh',   (1982)   1   SCC   691   `Jyoti   Basu 

       Vs.   Debi   Ghoshal',   (1984)1SCC   91 

       `Arun   Kumar   Bose   Vs.   Mohd.   Furkan 

                             14

       Ansari ` and (1992) 4 SCC  80  `Mohan 

       Lal   Tripathi   Vs.   District   Magistrate'. 

       And   it   was   argued   that   concepts 

       familiar   to   common   law   and   equity 

       must remain strangers to Election Law 

       unless   statutorily   embodied.                         In 

       respect   of   the   Kerala   High   Court 

       decision  it  was  argued  that  the   Court 

       fell   in   error   in   reading   the   power   of 

       removal   as   `incidental'.     It   is   not 

       necessary   to   go   into   these   arguments 

       because   as   stated   above   the   Rule 

       regarding   removal   is   not   justified 

       under Section 15(2) but under Section 

       15(1)   of   the   Act,   which   is   of   wide 

       amplitude   and   there   is   no   reason   to 

       restrict   the   scope   of   Rule   making 

       power   under   Section   15(1)   so   as   to 

       exclude (i) prescription of tenure, or (ii) 

       removal   on   a   vote   of   no-confidence 

       from   the   ambit   of   the   Rule   making 

       power conferred by that provision.

28.    Before moving on to the next issue, we 

       may   refer   to   a   decision   cited   by   the 

       Respondent   no.6   (of   W.P.   No.   6628). 

       In   this   interesting   decision   by   a   Full 

       Bench   of   Gujarat   High   Court   in   the 

       case   of   `N.B.   Posia   Vs.   Director' 

       reported   in   AIR   2002   Guj   348   (PB) 

       (relevant paragraphs are 46 and 66 of 

       that   law   report)   it   has   been  held   that 

       though   there   was   no   provision   in   the 

       Act   or   statutory   Rules   for   removal   of 

       an         elected         Chairman         of         the 

       Committee,   yet   (i)   the   words   "ceasing 

       to   hold   office   for   any   reason"   include 

       the removal by a no-confidence motion 

       and (ii) if a holder of an office if elected 

       by   a   simple   majority,   he   can   be 

                                  15

                    removed           (through         no-confidence 

                    motion)   by   a   simple   majority   (even   in 

                    absence   of   a   statutory   provision   for 

                    such removal).  With utmost respect to 

                    the   said   decision,   we   find   ourselves 

                    totally unable to subscribe to either of 

                    the two propositions therein."

12.       It is the legality and correctness of the above reasoning 

that   has   been   questioned   before   us  in   the   present   appeals.   We 

have   already   noticed   that   the   questions   which   arise   for 

consideration in the present cases are of some public importance 

and   are   matters   which   are   likely   to   arise   repeatedly   in   the 

conduct of affairs of the State Bar Councils.   Before we proceed 

to   discuss   the   legal   aspects   of   the   propositions   involved   in   the 

present cases, it will be more appropriate for the Court to notice 

the  scheme   of the   Advocates   Act  and  the   relevant  provisions   of 

the laws and rules.

13.       The   Parliament   of   India   enacted   the   Advocates   Act   on 

19th  May,   1961   to   amend   and   consolidate   the   laws   relating   to 

legal   practitioners   and   to   provide   for   the   constitution   of   State 

Bar   Councils   and   an   All   India   Bar   Council.     The   object   of   the 

Advocates   Act   is   to   constitute   one   common   Bar   for   the   whole 

                                         16

country  and  to provide  machinery   for   its  regulated  functioning. 

Though the Advocates Act relates to legal practitioners in its pith 

and   substance,   it   is   an   enactment   dealing   with   the 

qualifications,   enrolment,   right   to   practise   and   discipline   of 

advocates.  It is not only implicit but clear from the provisions of 

the Advocates Act that once an advocate is enrolled by any State 

Bar   Council,   he   becomes   entitled   to   practise   in   all   courts 

including   the   Supreme   Court.   Therefore,   this   is   a   legislation 

which deals with persons entitled to practise before the Supreme 

Court.   In the case of  O.N. Mohindroo  vs.  Bar Council of Delhi &  

Ors. [AIR 1968 SC 888] this Court held that:

            "(10)   The   object   of   the   Act   is   thus   to 

            constitute   one   common   Bar   for   the   whole 

            country   and   to   provide   machinery   for   its 

            regulated functioning. Since the Act sets up 

            one   Bar,   autonomous   in   its   character,   the 

            Bar   Councils   set   up   thereunder   have   been 

            entrusted   with   the   power   to   regulate   the 

            working   of   the   profession   and   to   prescribe 

            rules of professional conduct and etiquette, 

            and the power to punish those who commit 

            breach   of   such   rules.   The   power   of 

            punishment is entrusted to the disciplinary 

            committees  ensuring  a  trial   of  an   advocate 

            by   his   peers.   Section   35,   36   and   37   lay 

            down   the   procedure   for   trying   complaints, 

            punishment   and   an   appeal   to   the   Bar 

            Council of India from the orders passed by 

            the   State   Bar   Councils.   As   an   additional 

                                      17

           remedy   S.   38   provides   a   further   appeal   to 

           the Supreme Court. Though the Act relates 

           to   the   legal   practitioners,   in   its   pith   and 

           substance   it   is   an   enactment   which 

           concerns   itself   with   the   qualifications, 

           enrollment,   right   to   practise   and   discipline 

           of   the   advocates.   As   provided   by   the   Act 

           once a person is enrolled by any one of the 

           State   Bar   Councils,   he   becomes  entitled   to 

           practise in all courts including the Supreme 

           Court.   As   aforesaid,   the   Act   creates   one 

           common   Bar,   all   its   members   being   of   one 

           class,   namely,   advocates.   Since   all   those 

           who   have   been   enrolled   have   a   right   to 

           practise in the Supreme Court and the High 

           Courts,   the   Act   is   a   piece   of   legislation 

           which   deals   with   persons   entitled   to 

           practise before the Supreme Court and the 

           High   Courts.   Therefore   the   Act   must   be 

           held to fall within entries 77 and 78 of List 

           I.   As   the   power   of   legislation   relating   to 

           those   entitled   to   practise   in   the   Supreme 

           Court   and   the   High   Courts   is   carved   out 

           from   the   general   power   to   legislate   in 

           relation   to   legal   and   other   professions   in 

           entry 26 of List III, it is an error to say, as 

           the   High   Court   did,   that   the   Act   is   a 

           composite   legislation   partly   falling   under 

           entries 77 and 78 of List I and partly under 

           entry 26 of List III."

14.     If one looks into the statement of objects and reasons for 

enacting the Advocates Act, it becomes clear that the Act seeks 

to   implement   the   recommendations   of   the   All   India   Bar 

Committee, made in the year 1953, after taking into account the 

                                      18

recommendations   of   the   Law   Commission   on   the   subject   of 

Reform   of   Judicial   Administration,   and   particularly,   the 

recommendations   relating   to   the   Bar   and   to   legal   education.   It 

was,   therefore,   conceptualized   to   legislate   a   law   which   will 

govern   the   State   Councils   and   the   All   India   Bar   Councils   in 

different specified fields.  The main features of the Advocates Act 

were,   the   integration   of   the   Bar   into   a   single   class   of   legal 

practitioners   known   as   advocates;   the   establishment   of     a 

common roll of advocates, having a right to practise in any part 

of  the   country   and  in  any   court,   including  the   Supreme   Court; 

the   prescription   of   uniform   qualifications   for   the   admission   of 

persons   to   become   advocates;   the   division   of   advocates   into 

senior   advocates   and   other   advocates   based   on   merit;   and   the 

creation   of   autonomous   Bar   Councils,   one   for   the   whole   of 

India, i.e, the establishment of an All India Bar Council and one 

for each State.  We may examine some of the relevant provisions 

of the Advocates Act.

15.       Section 2(a) of the Advocates Act defines an `advocate' to 

mean an advocate entered in any roll under the provisions of the 

Advocates Act.

                                        19

          `Bar Council' means a Bar Council constituted under the 

Advocates Act.

          On the other hand, the `Bar Council of India' means the 

Bar   Council   constituted   under   Section   4   for   the   territories   to 

which the Advocates Act extends.

       The   `State   Bar   Council'   means   a   Bar   Council   constituted 

under Section 3 of the Advocates Act.

       The   expression   `prescribed   for   the   purposes   of   this   Act' 

means prescribed by the rules made under the Advocates Act.

16.       The constitution of State Bar Council is provided under 

Section   3   of   the   Advocates   Act   and   as   would   be   evident,   this 

Section   has   been   subjected   to   numerous   amendments   made 

from time to time.  The constitution of the State Bar Council has 

been spelt out in Section 3(2); and Section 3(3) of the Advocates 

Act  which  provides that  there  shall be  a  Chairman  and  a Vice-

Chairman of each State Bar Council, elected by the members, in 

such   manner   as   may   be   prescribed.     The   Advocates   Act,  inter  

                                       20

alia,  imposes certain restrictions and the deeming provisions in 

terms of Sub-sections (3) and (3A) of Section 3 of the Advocates 

Act,   that     every   person   holding   office   as   Chairman   or   as   Vice-

Chairman   of   any   State   Bar   Council   immediately   before   the 

commencement of the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1977, shall, 

on such commencement, cease to hold office as the Chairman or 

Vice-Chairman,   as   the   case   may   be,   but,   would     continue   to 

carry   on   the   duties   of   his   office   until   the     persons   elected   as 

Chairman or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, in accordance 

with the provisions of the Advocates Act, assume charge.

17.       Section   3(4)   of   the   Advocates   Act   requires   that   an 

advocate   shall   be   disqualified   from   voting   at   an   election   under 

sub-section (2) or for being chosen as a member of the State Bar 

Council,   unless   he   possesses   such   qualifications   or   satisfies 

such conditions as are prescribed in this behalf.

18.       All   elections   to   the   State   Bar   Council   are   to   be   held   in 

accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the   Act.     Similarly,   under 

Section 4 of the Advocates Act, Bar Council of India shall consist 

of the persons stated under the Advocates Act.  The provisions of 

                                          21

the Advocates Act dealing with State Bar Councils under Section 

3, are substantially similar to the provisions with respect to the 

Bar Council of India, under Section 4 of the Advocates Act. Every 

Bar   Council   shall   be   a   body   corporate   having   perpetual 

succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold 

property and to sue and be sued in its own name. 

19.       The   functions   of   the   State   Bar   Council   and   the   Bar 

Council   of   India   are   prescribed   under   Sections   6   and   7   of   the 

Advocates   Act.     Besides   admitting   persons   as   advocates   on   its 

rolls [Section 6(a)] and maintaining such rolls [Section 6(b)], it is 

for   the   State   Bar   Councils   to   provide   for   the   elections   of   its 

members   [Sections   6(g)]   and   to   perform   all   other   functions 

conferred on it by or under this Act [Section 6(h)]. Section 6(i) of 

the Advocates  Act allows the  State  Bar Councils to  do all  other 

things necessary for discharging their functions.

20.       Functions   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India   are   of   a   wider 

spectrum   than   that   of   the   State   Bar   Council.     Bar   Council   of 

India   has   to   lay   down   standards   of   professional   conduct   and 

etiquette   for   the   advocates,   the   procedure   to   be   followed   in 

                                        22

Disciplinary   Committees   and   to   safeguard   the   rights,   privileges 

and interest of advocates.

21.       The Bar Council of India may, under Section 7(k) of the 

Advocates   Act,   provide   for   the   election   of   its   members.     This 

provision   is   identical   to   Section   6(g)   of   the   Advocates   Act. 

Similarly,   Sections   6(h)   and   6(i)   are   equivalent   to   Sections   7(l) 

and 7(m) of the Advocates Act.

22.       The election to the Bar Councils is for a specified tenure, 

which is stated under Section 8 of the Advocates Act.   The term 

of the office of an elected member of a State Bar Council, other 

than an elected member thereof referred to in Section  54, shall 

be for five years from the date of publication of the results.  The 

Bar Council of India has been vested with the power of extending 

this period, for reasons to be recorded, and only in the event of 

the   State   Bar   Council   failing   to   provide   for   the   election   of   its 

members   before   the   expiry   of   its   terms.     This   power   is   also 

regulated   by   an   upper   limitation   of   6   months   in   such   grant   of 

extension.

23.       Section   14   of   the   Advocates   Act   mandates   that   no 

                                         23

election of a member to a Bar Council shall be called in question 

on the ground merely that due notice thereof has not been given 

to   any   person   entitled   to   vote   at   the   elections,   if   notice   of   the 

date   has,   not   less   than   thirty   days   before   that   date,   been 

published in the Official Gazette.

24.        Section   15   of   the   Advocates   Act   is   one   of   the   most 

relevant provisions,  which  needs  to  be examined  by  this Court, 

as   according   to   the   contention   raised   by   the   appellants,   Rule 

122-A is  ultra vires  Section 15 of the Advocates Act.   Section 15 

of   the   Advocates   Act   gives   power   to   the   Bar   Council   to   make 

rules to carry out the purposes of `this Chapter'.   `This Chapter' 

means Chapter II of the Advocates Act.   Inter  alia, this Chapter 

deals   with   constitution,   election   and   functions   of   the   Bar 

Councils.   It   will   be   useful   to   refer   to   the   relevant   parts   of   the 

provisions   of   Section   15   of   Chapter   II   of   the   Advocates   Act, 

which are as under:

              "15.   Power   to   make   rules,-   (1)   A   Bar 

              Council   may   make   rules   to   carry   out   the 

              purposes of this chapter.

              (2)   In   particular,   and   without   prejudice   to 

              the   generality   of   the   foregoing   power,   such 

              rules may provide for--

                                           24

            a.  (Note:-   Subs. by   Act  60  of  1973,   sec.12) 

            the election of members of the Bar Council 

            by   secret   ballot   including   the   conditions 

            subject   to   which   persons   can   exercise   the 

            right   to   vote   by   postal   ballot   ,   the 

            preparation   and   revision   of   electoral   rolls 

            and   the   manner   in   which   the   results   of 

            elections shall be published];

            b.                     xxx                        xxx

            c. (Note:- Clause (c) ins. by Act 38 of 1977, 

            sec.   5)   the   manner   of   election   of   the 

            Chairman   and   the   Vice-Chairman   of   the 

            Bar council];

            d.           xxx                        xxx

            e.                  xxx                        xxx

            f.   the  filling   of  casual   vacancies   in   the   Bar 

            Council ;

            g.   the   power   and   duties   of   the   Chairman 

            and the Vice- Chairman of the bar Council ;

            (ga) .            xxx                        xxx

            (gb) .            xxx                        xxx

            h.               xxx                        xxx

            i.   the   constitution   and   functions   of   any 

            committee  of the  Bar  council and the  term 

            of office of members of any such committee;

              (3)  No rules  made under   this  section by  a 

            State   Bar   Council   shall   have   effect   unless 

            they   have   been   approved   by   the   Bar 

            Council of India."

25.      Chapter   III   of   the   Advocates   Act   deals   with   `Admission 

and Enrolment of Advocates'.

         Section 28 of the Advocates Act empowers the State Bar 

Councils   to   make   rules   to   carry   out   the   purposes   of   this 

                                        25

Chapter, i.e., Chapter III.

26.       Section 49 of the Advocates Act appears under Chapter 

VI, i.e., `Miscellaneous' and empowers the Bar Council of India to 

make   rules   for   discharging   its   functions   under   this   Act   and 

besides   providing   for   specific   powers,   the   Bar   Council   of   India 

may   prescribe   rules   under   the   residuary   provisions   of   Section 

49(1)(j) of the Advocates Act, whereby the Council is empowered 

to   make   rules   in   regard   to   any   other   matter   which   may   be 

prescribed.  However, the rules framed would not come into force 

or   take   effect   unless   they   have   been   approved   by   the   Chief 

Justice of India and if the rules relate to Section 49(1)(e) of the 

Advocates   Act   they   will   not   take   effect   unless   they   have   been 

approved by the Central Government.  Under Section 49A of the 

Advocates   Act,   the   Central   Government   is   vested   with   the 

general power of making rules and these rules could be framed 

for the whole of India or for all or any of the Bar councils.  In the 

event   of   conflicts   between   the   rules   framed   by   the   Central 

Government   and   the   Bar   Councils,   the   rules   framed   by   the 

Central   Government   shall   have   precedence   in   terms   of   Section 

49A(4) of the Advocates Act.   We need not elaborate upon other 

                                       26

provisions of the Advocates Act at this stage.

27.       Now   let   us   notice   the   relevant   provisions   in   the   Bar 

Council of India Rules (in short, the `Rules') which were enacted 

in   exercise   of   its   rule   making   powers   under   the   Advocates   Act. 

This   power   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India   originates   from   clauses 

(c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 read with 

Sections 4 and 10B of the Advocates Act.  

28.       Chapter   I  of  Part  II of  the   Rules   deals   with  the  matters 

relating   to   the   Bar   Council   of   India   and   particularly   to   the 

election of members of the Council.  The election of the members 

of the Bar Council of India has to be conducted in terms of Rules 

1 to 10 of the Rules.   Rule 11 of the Rules makes it mandatory 

that   a   member   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India,   who   is   elected   as 

Chairman or Vice-Chairman or member of any Committee of the 

Council,   shall   cease   to   hold   office   as   such   Chairman   or   Vice-

Chairman or member of Committee, on the expiry of his term as 

a   member   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India.     A   restriction   is   further 

sought   to   be   placed   upon   the   right   of   the   person   to   resign.     A 

member can  resign  from  the  membership of the  Bar  Council of 

                                          27

India   only   on   the   grounds   which   are   genuine   and   not   for   the 

purposes   of   sharing   of   terms   fixed   by   the   statute.     Under   Rule 

12(2)   of   the   Rules,   the   Chairman   or   the   Vice-Chairman   shall 

hold the office for a period of two years or until his term of office 

as   member   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India   ceases   whichever   is 

earlier. The election for the post of Chairman and Vice-Chairman 

has to be held at the meeting of the Bar Council of India and in 

accordance with the procedure prescribed under Rule 12 of the 

Rules.     The   Chairman   and   the   Vice-Chairman   perform   the 

functions of exercising general control and supervision over the 

affairs of the Bar Council of India, save as otherwise provided in 

these Rules and subject to the resolutions of the Bar Council of 

India.     Rule   22   of   the   Rules   has   significant   bearing   on   the 

discussion   in   the   present   cases.     This   Rule   relates   to   `no 

confidence motion' against the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, or 

any   other   office   bearer,   and   its   consequences.     The   Rule   22 

reads as under:

             "On   a   motion   of   "No   confidence"   being 

             passed   by   Bar   Council   of   India   by   a 

             Resolution   passed   by   majority   of   not   less 

             than   3/4th  of   the   Members   present   and 

             voting   and   such   majority   passing   "No 

             Confidence   Motion"   is   more   than   2/3rd  of 

                                        28

             the   total   number   of   Members   constituting 

             the   Bar   Council   for   the   time   being,   the 

             Chairman   or   Vice-Chairman   or   any   other 

             office   bearer   against   whom   the   motion   is 

             passed shall cease to hold office forthwith.

                        Notwithstanding                     anything 

             contained   in   the   Act   or   the   Rules   made 

             thereon,   the   Chairman   or   Vice-Chairman 

             shall not preside over the meeting in which 

             motion   of   "No   Confidence"   is   discussed 

             against   him   and   such   meeting   shall   be 

             convened on a notice of at least one month. 

             The   Chairman   or   the   Vice-Chairman   shall 

             have the right to vote, speak or take part in 

             the proceeding of the meeting."

29.       The   Committees   excluding   the   Disciplinary   Committees 

are to be constituted by the Bar Council of India under Chapter 

II.     The   framers   of   the   Rules   have   taken   a   precaution   that   the 

decisions   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India   should   not   be   changed 

without reason and in violation of the relevant provisions.   Rule 

9   of   Chapter   II   of   the   Rules   provides   that   the   decision   on   any 

matter shall be by majority and, in the case of equality of votes, 

the   Chairman   of   the   meeting   shall   have   a   second   or   a   casting 

vote.     Rule   10   of   the   Rules   puts   a   restriction   on   change   of 

decisions.  According to this Rule, no matter once decided, shall 

be re-considered for a period of 3 months unless the Bar Council 

                                         29

of   India   by   a   two-third   majority   of   the   members   present   so 

permits.   Under Rule 12 of the same Chapter, in the absence of 

the  Chairman  or  the  Vice-Chairman   member  at  any  meeting,   a 

member chosen by the members of the Council shall preside at 

the meeting.

30.       We   have   noticed   these   Rules   to   make   a   comparative 

study   of   the   relevant   M.P.   Rules,   to   examine   their   impact   in 

correct   perspective.     In   exercise   of   the   powers   conferred   by 

Sections 15(1), 15(2), 28(1) and 28(2), read with Chapter II and 

other   provisions   of   the   Advocates   Act,   the   State   Bar   Council, 

with the approval of the Bar Council of India as required under 

Sections   15(3)   and   28(3)   of   the   Advocates   Act,   has   framed   the 

M.P.   Rules.     The   M.P.   Rules   deal   with   different   facets   of 

functioning of the State Bar Council.   It is not necessary for us 

to deal with all the aspects of the rules governing the functioning 

of the State Bar Council.   The State Bar Council shall elect the 

members   of   each   Committee   in   its   Meeting   as   per   Rule   1   of 

Chapter VI.  In terms of Rule 3 of the same Chapter, the election 

to   the   Committee   shall   be   conducted   by   the   Chairman   of   the 

State   Bar   Council   and   in   case   the   Chairman   of   the   State   Bar 

                                       30

Council   is   a   candidate   for   being   elected   as   a   member   of   any 

Committee,   the   State   Bar   Council,   before   proceeding   with   the 

elections   to   such   Committee,   shall   appoint   any   one   of   its 

members who is not a candidate for election to such committee, 

to conduct the election to the said Committee and to declare the 

results under his signature.

31.       Under   Chapter   XVI,   Rule   110   of   the   M.P.   Rules,   it   is 

obligatory on the part of the Chairman of the State Bar Council 

to call a meeting, which he shall preside over, when he receives a 

requisition   for   doing   so,   signed   by   not   less   than   3   members   of 

the   State   Bar   Council.     The   Chairman   has   to   exercise   general 

control   and   supervision   over   all   the   matters   of   the   State   Bar 

Council.

32.       The   State   Bar   Council   consists   of   26   elected   members 

and the Advocate General of the State. Rule 118 is the first rule 

that   falls   under   Chapter   XVIII   and   it   requires   that   a   State   Bar 

Council   shall   elect   a   Chairman   and   a   Vice-Chairman   from 

amongst its members for two years.   Rule 118 of the M.P. Rules 

came   to   be   amended   and,   as   per   the   amended   Rule,   the   State 

                                         31

Bar Council has to elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman from 

amongst   its   members   for   2=   years   vide   Resolution   No.   631   of 

1998.

33.       Rule 122-A of the M.P. Rules was amended by the State 

Bar Council  sometime in the  year 1975  and vide its Resolution 

dated 27th  April, 1975, the amendments and newly added rules 

were sent for approval of the Bar Council of India.   Again in its 

Resolution   dated   9th  March,   1980,   the   State   Bar   Council   had 

recorded   that   to   these   amendments/newly   added   Rules, 

approval of the Bar Council of India had been obtained.  It needs 

to be noticed that all the members of the State Bar Council had 

attended   the   meeting   and   were   signatory   to   this   Resolution. 

However, Rule 121, which was amended vide Resolution No. 631 

of 1998 dated 24th January, 1998 is also stated to have received 

approval from the Bar Council of India.  However, no notification 

in   that   regard   is   stated   to   have   been   issued   as   yet.     There   is 

some   controversy   whether   Rule   121   under   the   same   Chapter 

was   amended   and   whether   it   attained   the   approval   of   the   Bar 

Council   of   India.     This   question   is   not   very   material   for   us   to 

examine inasmuch as under both Rules 118 and 121, the period 

                                          32

of term of the elected Chairman and the Vice-Chairman is stated 

to   be   two   years   or   till   they   cease   to   be   members   whichever   is 

earlier.   Besides the above facts, Section 15(3) of the Advocates 

Act   requires   that   the   rules   framed   by   the   State   Bar   Council 

should   be   approved   by   the   Bar   Council   of   India.     It   nowhere 

requires issuance of any notification which, in some cases, can 

be   a  part   of  legislative   provisions.     In  view  of  the   above   factual 

matrix,  it  has to  be  held   that  this controversy  does not  require 

any further consideration by the Court.

34.       The provisions with which we are primarily concerned in 

the   present   case   are   contained   in   Chapter   XVIII   of   the   M.P. 

Rules.  They read as under:

             "118.     The   Bar   Council   shall   elect   a 

             Chairman   and   a   Vice-Chairman   from 

             amongst its members for two years.

             119.     Any   candidate   for   the   office   of 

             Chairman   or   Vice-Chairman   shall   be 

             proposed   by   one   member  and  seconded  by 

             another member.

             120.     The   election   of   Chairman   or   Vice-

             Chairman unless unanimously agreed upon 

             by all the members present at the meeting, 

             shall   be   by   show   of  the   hands.     In  case   of 

             the   tie,   the   election   shall   be   decided   by 

             drawing of lots.

                                         33

             121.     The   Chairman,   the   Vice-Chairman 

             and the Treasurer of the Council, shall hold 

             office   for   a   period   of   two   years   or   till   they 

             cease to be members whichever is earlier.

             122-A The Chairman, Vice-Chairman or the 

             Treasurer   of  the   Council  could  be  removed 

             by   a   vote   of   no   confidence   passed   by 

             majority   of   the   members,   present   and 

             voting in a meeting of the Council especially 

             called   for   the   purpose,   provided   that   at 

             least 7 members of the Council have signed 

             the   requisition   for   holding   such   a   special 

             meeting,   and   such   meeting   shall   be   called 

             within a period of 21 days from the date of 

             receipt of the requisition by the secretary.

             122-B That the Bar Council by a resolution 

             may   reconstitute   any   of   its   committee 

             elected   earlier   by   it,   provided   that   the 

             requisition   for   the   purpose   signed   by   at 

             least   7  members  of  the   Council   is   received 

             by   the   Secretary,   and   such   a   special 

             meeting shall be called within 21 days from 

             the date of receipt of the requisition by the 

             Secretary."

35.       Rule 122-A of the above Rules deals with the removal of 

the Chairman, Vice-Chairman or the Treasurer of the State Bar 

Council by moving a `no confidence motion'.  Existence of such a 

provision   is   not   exceptional,   but   is   a   common   provision   in   any 

electoral   system.     Our   parliamentary   system   is   the   most 

significant   example   of   a   democratic   process,   where   the   `no 

                                           34

confidence motion' under  Article 75(3) of the Constitution is an 

integral part of the process of election.  Similarly, under Rule 22 

of   the   Rules,   a   provision   has   been   made   for   moving   a   `no 

confidence   motion'   and   where   such   motion   is   passed   by   a 

majority   of   not   less   than   three-fourth   of   the   members,   present 

and voting, and such majority passing the `no confidence motion' 

is   more   than   two-third   of   the   total   number   of   members 

constituting  the State  Bar Council for the  time being, it  results 

in   the   removal   of   the   Chairman,   Vice-Chairman   or   any   other 

office   bearer.     Upon   passing   of   such   a   resolution,   the   person 

shall   cease   to   hold   the   office   forthwith.     Every   democratic 

process   is   based   upon   the   freedom   to   elect   and   freedom   to 

remove,   in  accordance   with  law.     Rule   122-A   of  the  M.P.   Rules 

contemplates moving of a `no confidence motion' and upon such 

motion   being   passed   by   majority   of   the   members,   present   and 

voting,  the   office   bearer   against   whom   such  a  motion   is   moved 

shall   be   liable   to   be   removed   from   such   office.     For   successful 

application of Rule 122-A, the law requires the following minimal 

conditions to be satisfied: 

1.    At least 7 members have signed the requisition calling for a 

                                        35

       meeting of the Council;

2.     Such meeting shall be called within 21 days from the date 

       of receipt of requisition by the Secretary.

3.     Such `no confidence motion' has to be passed by a majority 

       of the members present and voting, in the meeting of the  

                 Council, especially called for this purpose.

36.       Once   the   above   conditions   are   satisfied   `no   confidence 

motion'   can   be   passed   and   upon   passing   of   such   motion,   the 

person  is   liable  to   be  removed  from   the   office  which   he   held   in 

the State Bar Council prior to the holding of such meeting.  The 

spirit behind this provision is that where a person is elected by 

following a process of election to the post of an office in the State 

Bar   Council,   he   could   be   removed   by   following   the   prescribed 

procedure in accordance with the Rules.

37.       This   Court   in   the   case   of  Mohan   Lal   Tripathi   v.   District  

Magistrate  [(1992)   4   SCC   80],   examined   the   validity   of   a   `no 

confidence   motion'   passed   by   the   Board   on   28th  March,   1990 

under   Section   87-A   of   the   U.P.   Municipalities   Act   against   the 

President   who   was   directly   elected   by   the   electorate   under 

Section 43(2) of the Act.  The basic argument raised was that he 

                                         36

was   sought   to   be   removed   or   recalled   by   the   other   elected 

members, which was a smaller and different body than the one 

that had elected him and, thus, was violative of the democratic 

mandate.     While   rejecting   this   argument,   the   Court   held   as 

under:

            "2.  Democracy   is   a   concept,   a   political 

            philosophy,   an   ideal   practised   by   many 

            nations   culturally   advanced   and   politically 

            mature   by   resorting   to   governance   by 

            representatives   of   the   people   elected 

            directly   or   indirectly.            But   electing 

            representatives   to   govern   is   neither   a 

            `fundamental   right'   nor   a   `common   law 

            right'   but   a   special   right   created   by   the 

            statutes,   or   a   `political   right'   or   `privilege' 

            and   not   a   `natural',   `absolute'   or   `vested 

            right'.   `Concepts   familiar   to   common   law 

            and   equity   must   remain   strangers   to 

            Election   Law   unless   statutorily   embodied.' 

            Right   to   remove   an   elected   representative, 

            too, must stem out of the statute as `in the 

            absence   of   a   constitutional   restriction   it   is 

            within the power of a legislature to enact a 

            law for the recall of officers'. Its existence or 

            validity   can   be   decided   on   the   provision   of 

            the   Act   and   not,   as   a   matter   of   policy.   In 

            the American Political Dictionary the right of 

            recall   is   defined   as,   `a   provision   enabling 

            voters   to   remove   an   elected   official   from 

            office   before   his   or   her   term   expired'. 

            American   Jurisprudence  explains   it   thus, 

            `Recall   is   a   procedure   by   which   an   elected 

            officer  may   be   removed   at   any  time   during 

            his term or after a specified time by vote of 

            the   people   at   an   election   called   for   such 

                                        37

purpose   by   a  specified  number   of citizens'. 

It   was   urged   that   `recall   gives   dissatisfied 

electors   the   right   to   propose   between 

elections   that   their   representatives   be 

removed   and   replaced   by   another   more   in 

accordance   with   popular   will'   therefore   the 

appellant   could   have   been   recalled   by   the 

same body, namely, the people who elected 

him.   Urged   Shri   Sunil   Gupta,   learned 

counsel, that since,   `A referendum  involves 

a   decision   by   the   electorate   without   the 

intermediary   of   representatives   and, 

therefore, exhibits form of direct democracy' 

the removal of the appellant by a vote of no-

confidence by the Board which did not elect 

him   was   subversive   of   basic   concept   of 

democracy.   Academically   the   submission 

appeared attractive but applied as a matter 

of   law   it   appears   to   have   little   merit.   None 

of  the  political   theorists,  on  whom  reliance 

was   placed,   have   gone   to   suggest   that   an 

elected representative can be recalled, only, 

by   the   persons   or   body   that   elected   him. 

Recall   expresses   the   idea   that   a   "public 

officer   is   indeed   a   `servant   of   the   people' 

and   can   therefore   be   dismissed   by   them". 

In   modern   political   set   up   direct   popular 

check by recall of elected representative has 

been   universally   acknowledged   in   any 

civilised   system.   Efficacy   of   such   a   device 

can  hardly  admit  of any  doubt. But  how  it 

should   be   initiated,   what   should   be   the 

procedure,   who   should   exercise   it   within 

ambit   of   constitutionally   permissible   limits 

falls   in   the   domain   of   legislative   power. 

`Under          a         constitutional         provision 

authorizing   municipalities   of   a   certain 

population to frame a charter for their own 

government   consistent   with   and   subject   to 

the Constitution and laws of the State, and 

                              38

a   statutory   provision   that   in   certain 

municipalities   the   Mayor   and   members   of 

the   municipal   council   shall   be   elected   at 

the   time,   in   the   manner,   and   for   the   term 

prescribed   in   the   charter,   a   municipal 

corporation   has   authority   to   enact   a   recall 

provision'.   Therefore,   the   validity   or 

otherwise   of   a   no-confidence   motion   for 

removal   of   a   President,   would   have   to   be 

examined   on   applicability   of   statutory 

provision   and   not   on   political   philosophy. 

The   Municipality   Act   provides   in   detail   the 

provisions   for   election   of   President,   his 

qualification,   resignation,   removal   etc. 

Constitutional   validity   of   these   provisions 

was not challenged, and rightly, as they do 

not   militate,   either,   against   the   concept   of 

democracy   or   the   method   of   electing   or 

removing   the   representatives.   The   recall   of 

an   elected   representative   therefore,  so  long 

it   is   in   accordance   with   law   cannot   be 

assailed on abstract notions of democracy.

7.     Value   of   `historical   evolution'   of   a 

provision or `reference to what preceded the 

enactment'         as   an   external   aid   to 

understand   and   appreciate   the   meaning   of 

a  provision,   its  ambit  or  expanse  has   been 

judicially         recognised         and         textually 

recommended. But this aid to construe any 

provision   which   is   `extremely   hazardous' 

should   be   resorted   to,   only,   if   any   doubt 

arises about the scope of the section or it is 

found   to   be   `sufficiently   difficult   and 

ambiguous to justify the construction of its 

evaluation   in   the   statute   book   as   a   proper 

and   logical   course   and   secondly   the   object 

of   the   instant   enquiry'   should   be   `to 

ascertain   the   true   meaning   of   that   part   of 

the   section   which   remains   as   it   was   and 

                           39

which   there   is   no   ground   for   thinking   the 

substitution of a new proviso was intended 

to alter'. But `considerations stemming from 

legislative   history   must   not,   however, 

override   the   plain   words   of   a   statute'. 

Neither   Section   47-A   nor   87-A   on   plain 

reading   suffer   from   such   defect   as   may 

necessitate   ascertaining   their   intent   and 

purpose   from   the   earlier   sections   as   they 

stood.   That   shall   be   clear   when   relevant 

part of the sections are extracted. But even 

otherwise   there   appears   no   merit   in   the 

submission and for that purpose it appears 

appropriate to narrate,  in  brief,  the history 

of  these  sections. When  Act  2 of  1916  was 

enacted it provided for election of Chairman 

of the Board by a special resolution passed 

by the members under Section 43(1) of the 

Act.   Sub-section   (2)   provided   for   ex-officio 

nomination   by   the   Government   of   the 

Chairman   in   some   municipalities.   Section 

48 empowered the Government to remove a 

Chairman after hearing and giving reasons. 

It did not contain any provision for removal 

of   a   Chairman   by   a   vote   of   no-confidence. 

Ten years later Act 2 of 1926 brought about 

a   very   significant   change   in   the   Act   by 

introducing   Section   47-A   and   conferring 

power   of   removal   of   Chairman,   other   than 

ex-officio,   by   the   members  of   the   Board   by 

expressing   a   vote   of   no-confidence   against 

him.   Section   48,   too,   was   amended   and   a 

Chairman   who   failed   to   resign   after   a   vote 

of   no-confidence   was   liable   to   be   removed, 

by the State Government. Thus it was as far 

back as 1926 that removal of the Chairman 

by   elected   representative   found   its   way   in 

the   Act.   In   1933   by   Act   No.   9   another 

important   Section   87-A   was   added 

providing   for   tabling   of   no-confidence 

                          40

motion   against   the   Chairman.   In   1942 

Section   47-A   was   omitted   as   the   provision 

for resigning by the Chairman was provided 

for in Section 87-A itself. And hearing of the 

Chairman   by   State   Government   under 

Section   48   before   removal   in   consequence 

of  vote  of  no-confidence   was  deleted.   Act  7 

of   1949   introduced   major   changes   in 

Sections   43   and   47-A,   of   the   Act.   Section 

43 was substituted altogether and, it for the 

first   time,   provided   for   election   of   the 

Chairman simultaneously  with members of 

the Board by the electorate directly. Section 

47-A   which   had  been  omitted  by   Act   13   of 

1942   was   reintroduced   and   a   Chairman 

against   whom   a   vote   of   no-confidence   was 

passed   was   required   to   resign.   In   the 

alternative he was permitted to recommend 

to   State   Government   that   the   Board   itself 

may   be   dissolved.   And   if   the   State 

Government agreed with the President then 

it   was   the   Board   which   was   to   go.   The 

intention   apparently   was   to   keep   a   check 

on   the   power   of   Board,   too,   while   taking 

action   against   the   Chairman   as   if   it   was 

found   that   exercise   of   power   by   the   Board 

was   arbitrary   and   President   was   being 

removed   for   extraneous   reasons   then   the 

Government   could   interfere   and   direct 

dissolution   of   the   Board   itself.   Both   the 

sections were amended once again in 1955 

and   by   Act   1   the   election   of   Chairman, 

known   now   as   President,   by   the   members 

of   the   Board   was   reintroduced,   as,   `The 

experience   of   the   working   of   the   Boards 

since   their   constitution   at   the   last   general 

elections   has   generally   been   one   of 

continuing   conflict   between   Presidents 

elected by the popular vote on the one hand 

and   the   members   on   the   other.   This   has 

                          41

greatly   prejudiced   the   normal   working   of 

the   Boards'.   Section   47-A   of   the   Act   was 

substituted   completely   and   it   is   in   this 

shape   that   the   section   stands   today. 

Section 43(1) was amended, once again, by 

Act 47 of 1976 and election of President by 

electorate   was   revived.   In   1982   another 

change was made in this section by Act 17 

and election of President by the members of 

Board was  confined  to municipalities  other 

than a city declared as such under Section 

3 having a population of less than one lakh 

inhabitants.   Sub-section   (2)   provided   for 

election of President of Board of such a City 

Municipality   by   the   electorate   directly. 

From   1982   onwards,   therefore,   the   direct 

election   of   President   by   the   electorate   is 

confined to smaller Municipalities.

10.  Even   the   strained   construction   of   the 

proviso   does   not   result   in   coming   to   the 

conclusion   that   there   was   a   legislative 

omission   of   not   providing   for   removal,   by 

vote of no-confidence of a President elected 

by the electors. Merely because the proviso 

to   Section   47-A   prevents   a   Board   from 

holding   election   of   the   President   in   those 

cases where he had made representation to 

the Government to supersede the  Board, it 

cannot   be   stretched   to   mean   that   sub-

section (a) of Section 47-A cannot apply to a 

President   elected   under   Section   43(2).   The 

proviso is intended as check to prevent the 

Board   from   taking   any   step   which   may 

render   the   representation   made   by   the 

President infructuous as if the Government 

accepts   the   representation   then   it   is   the 

Board   under   sub-section   (3)   which   stands 

dissolved   and   not   the   President.   That 

situation   may   not   arise   in   election   of   a 

                         42

          President under Section 43(2) as election of 

          President   by   electors   cannot   take   place 

          immediately,   therefore,   there   is   no   danger 

          involved,   of   putting   at   naught   the 

          representation   made   by   the   President   to 

          State   Government,   as   is   in   the   case   of 

          Section   43(1).   The   proviso   cannot   be   so 

          construed   as   to   nullify   the   operation   of 

          Section   47   2DA   to   a   President   elected   by 

          electorate.   A   proviso   or   an   exception   is 

          incapable   of   controlling   the   operation   of 

          principal         clause.          Result         of         such 

          construction   would   lead   to   absurdity   as   if 

          Section   47-A   is   held   not   to   apply   to 

          President   elected   under   Section   43(2)   he 

          will   not   be   liable   to   resign   even   though   a 

          vote   of   no-confidence   has   been   passed 

          against him under Section  87-A and it has 

          been communicated to him. Merely because 

          the   proviso   cannot   apply   to   one   of   the 

          situations that may arise cannot be reason 

          to hold that Section 47-A(1)(a) did not apply 

          to President elected by the electorate. `If the 

          language of the enacted part of the statute 

          does   not   contain   provision   which   are   said 

          to   occur   on   it,   you   cannot   derive   those 

          provisions   by   implication   from   a   proviso'. 

          Proviso   could   be   used   for   adopting   a 

          construction   as   suggested   either   when 

          there   was   some   doubt   about   the   scope   of 

          the   section   or   there   would   have   been   at 

          least   some   reasonable   doubt   about 

          accepting   one   or   the   other   construction   as 

          became   necessary   in  Jennings  v.  Kelly  on 

          which   reliance   was   placed   by   the   learned 

          counsel for appellant.

38.    `Election'   is   an   expression   of   wide   connotation   which 

embraces the whole procedure of election and is not confined to 

                                       43

final result thereof.  Rejection or acceptance of nomination paper 

is   included   in   this   term.     This   Court,   in   the   case   of  N.P.  

Ponnuswami   v.   returning   Officer,   Namakkal   Constituency  [AIR 

(39) 1952 SC 64] held that the word `election' has been used in 

Part  XV of  the   Constitution  in a  broad  sense,   that  is  to  say,   to 

connote the entire procedure to be followed to return a candidate 

to the legislature and even the expression `conduct of elections' 

in  Article  324  specifically   points  to this   wide  meaning  and the 

meaning   which   can   be   read   consistently   into   other   provisions 

occurring in the Constitution. In this case, the election process 

as contemplated under the relevant laws is that the members of 

a State Bar Council are elected by the electorate of advocates on 

the   rolls   of   the   State   Bar   Council   from   amongst   the   electorate 

itself.   The   elected   members   then   elect   a   Chairman,   a   Vice-

Chairman and the Treasurer of the State Bar Council as well as 

constitute various committees for carrying out different purposes 

under the provisions of the Advocates Act.  

39.       In  other   words,   the   body   which   elects  the   Chairman   or 

Vice-Chairman   of   a   State   Bar   Council   always   consists   of 

members   elected   to   that   Council.     The   democratic   principles 

                                       44

would   require   that   a   person   who   attains   the   position   of   a 

Chairman   or   Vice-Chairman,   as   the   case   may   be,   could   be 

removed   by   the   same   electorate   or   smaller   body   which   elected 

them   to   that   position   by   taking   recourse   to   a   `no   confidence 

motion' and in accordance with the Rules.   The body that elects 

a person to such a position would and ought to have the right to 

oust him/her from that post, in the event the majority members 

of the body do not support the said person at that time.   Even if, 

for   the   sake   of   argument,   it   is   taken   that   this   may   not   be 

generally   true,   the   provisions   of   Rule   122-A   of   the   M.P.   Rules 

make   it  clear,   beyond   doubt,   that   a   `no   confidence   motion'   can 

be brought against the elected Chairman provided the conditions 

stated   in   the   said   Rules   are   satisfied.     As   already   noticed,   the 

thrust   of   the   challenge   to   the  vires  of   Rule   122-A   is   primarily 

that   Section   15   of   the   Advocates   Act   does   not   contemplate   the 

framing of such a Rule by the State Bar Councils.  Rule 122-A is 

stated to be ultra vires Section 15 of the Advocates Act and, it is 

argued, that the introduction of such provision suffers from the 

vice   of   excessive   delegation.   Section   15   of   the   Advocates   Act 

empowers the State Bar Councils to frame Rules to carry out the 

                                         45

purposes   of   this   Chapter.   `This   Chapter'   obviously   means 

Chapter II of the Act.   Let us examine what Chapter II contains. 

Section   3   requires   the   constitution   of   the   State   Bar   Councils. 

Section 3(3) contemplates that there shall be a Chairman and a 

Vice-Chairman   of   each   State   Bar   Council   elected   by   the   State 

Bar Council in such manner  as may be prescribed.   As already 

noticed   above,   another   important   provision   is   Section   6   of   the 

Act, which details the functions to be performed by the State Bar 

Councils.   Inter  alia,  the functions to be performed by the State 

Bar   Councils   include,   under   Sections   6(1)(d),   to   safeguard   the 

rights,   privileges   and   interests   of   the   advocates   on   its   roll. 

Under   Section   6(1)(g),   the   function   of   the   Bar   Council   is   to 

provide   for   the   election   of   its   members   and   under   Sections 

6(1)(h) and 6(1)(i), the State Bar Council has to perform all other 

functions conferred on it by or under this Act and to do all other 

things necessary for discharging the aforesaid functions.  In our 

view, Sections 6(1)(h) and 6(1)(i) have to be read and interpreted 

conjointly.     We   see   no   reason   why   the   expression   `manner   of 

election   of   its   members'   in   Section   6(1)(g)   should   be   given   a 

restricted   meaning,   particularly   in   light   of   Sections   6(1)(h)   and 

                                       46

6(1)(i).     The   responsibility   of   the   State   Bar   Councils   to   perform 

functions   as  per  the  legislative   mandate  contained  in Section   6 

of the Act is of a very wide connotation and scope.   No purpose 

would be achieved by giving it a restricted meaning or by a strict 

interpretation.     The   State   Bar   Council   has   to   be   given   wide 

jurisdiction   to   frame   rules   so   as   to   perform   its   functions 

diligently   and   perfectly   and   to   do   all   things   necessary   for 

discharging its functions under the Act.  The term of office of the 

members   of   the   State   Bar   Council   is   also   prescribed   under 

Chapter II, which shall be five years from the date of publication 

of   the   result   of   the   election.     On   failure   to   provide   for   election, 

the Bar Council of India has to constitute a special committee to 

do   so   instead.     Section   15(2)   then   provides   that   without 

prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, rules may be 

framed   to   provide   for   the   preparation   of   electoral   rolls   and   the 

manner   in   which   the   result   shall   be   published.     In   terms   of 

Section 15(2)(c), the manner of the election of the Chairman and 

the   Vice-Chairman   of   the   Bar   Council   and   appointment   of 

authorities   which   would   decide   any   electoral   disputes   is 

provided.     The   expression   `manner   of   election   of   the   Chairman' 

                                           47

again is an expression which needs to be construed  in its wide 

connotation.  The rules so framed by the State Bar Council shall 

become effective only when approved by the Bar Council of India 

in terms of Section 15(3) of the Advocates Act.  

40.       The power of the State Bar Council to frame rules under 

Section 15 of the Advocates Act as a delegate of the Bar Council 

of  India  has   to  be  construed   along   with   the   other   provisions   of 

the   Advocates   Act,   keeping   in   mind   the   object   sought   to   be 

achieved  by   this  Act.    In  this   regard,   greater   emphasis  is   to  be 

attached   to   the   statutory   provisions   and   to   the   other   purposes 

stated by the legislature under the provisions of Chapter II of the 

Advocates Act.   This is an Act which has been enacted with the 

object   of   preparing   a   common   roll   of   advocates,   integrating   the 

profession   into   one   single   class   of   legal   practitioners,   providing 

uniformity   in   classification   and   creating   autonomous   Bar 

Councils   in   each   State   and   one   for   the   whole   of   India.     The 

functioning   of   the   State   Bar   Council   is   to   be   carried   out   by   an 

elected body of members and by the office-bearers who have, in 

turn, been elected by these elected members of the said Council. 

The legislative intent derived with the above stated objects of the 

                                          48

Act   should   be   achieved   and   there   should   be   complete   and   free 

democratic functioning in the State and All India Bar Councils. 

The  power  to  frame rules  has to be given a wider scope,  rather 

than a restrictive approach so as to render the legislative object 

achievable.   The functions to be performed by the Bar Councils 

and   the   manner   in   which   these   functions   are   to   be   performed 

suggest   that  democratic   standards   both   in   the   election  process 

and   in   performance   of   all   its   functions   and   standards   of 

professional   conduct   which   need   to   be   adhered   to.     In   other 

words,   the   interpretation   furthering   the   object   and   purposes   of 

the   Act   has   to   be   preferred   in   comparison   to   an   interpretation 

which   would   frustrate   the   same   and   endanger   the   democratic 

principles guiding the governance and conduct of the State Bar 

Councils.     The   provisions   of   the   Advocates   Act   are   a   source   of 

power for the State Bar Council to frame rules and it will not be 

in   consonance   with   the   principles   of   law   to   give   that   power   a 

strict   interpretation,   unless   restricted   in   scope   by   specific 

language. This is particularly so when the provisions delegating 

such   power   are   of   generic   nature,   such   as   Section   15(1)   of   the 

Act, which requires the Bar Councils to frame rules to `carry out 

                                        49

the   purposes   of   this   Chapter'   and   Section   15(2),   which   further 

uses generic terms and expressly states that the Bar Council is 

empowered to frame rules `in particular and without prejudice to 

the   generality   of   the   foregoing   powers'.     If   one   reads   the 

provisions of clauses (a), (c), (g), (h) and (i) of Sub-section (2) of 

Section   15   of   the   Act,   then,   it   is   clear   that   framing   of   rules 

thereunder would guide and control the conduct or business of 

the State Bar Councils and ensure maintenance of the standards 

of democratic governance in the said Councils.   Since the office 

bearers like the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman are elected by 

a   representative   body   i.e.   by   the   advocates   who  are   the   elected 

members of the Council, on the basis of the confidence bestowed 

by the advocates/electorate in the elected members, there seems 

to   be   no   reason   why   that   very   elected   body   cannot   move   a   `no 

confidence   motion'   against   such   office   bearers,   particularly, 

when the rules so permit.

41.       The   Bar   Council   of   India,   as   already   noticed,   has   also 

framed   rules   and   permitted   moving   of   `no   confidence   motion' 

against   its   Chairman/Vice-Chairman   subject   to   compliance   of 

the conditions stated therein.   Similarly, Rule 122-A of the M.P. 

                                         50

Rules   contemplates   the   removal   of   a   Chairman/Vice-Chairman 

by a motion of no confidence, passed by a specific majority of the 

members   and   subject   to   satisfaction   of   the   conditions   stated 

therein.   This provision, thus, can neither be termed as vesting 

arbitrary   powers   in   the   elected   body,   nor   can   it   be   said   to   be 

suffering   from   the   vice   of   excessive   delegation.     The   power 

delegated   to   the   elected   body   is   within   the   framework   of   the 

principal Act, i.e., Section 15, read with the other provisions, of 

the   Advocates   Act.     In   terms   of   Rule   120   of   the   M.P.   Rules,   a 

person   can   be   elected   as   Chairman/Vice-Chairman   only   by 

majority and in case there is a tie, the election shall be decided 

by   drawing   of   lots.     Under   Rule   118   of   the   M.P.   Rules   a 

Chairman/Vice-Chairman   has   to   be   elected   from   amongst   its 

members for two years.  In other words, the term of office of the 

Chairman/Vice-Chairman is controlled by the fact that he has to 

be   elected   to   that   particular   office.     The   removal   contemplated 

under Rule 122-A is not founded on a disciplinary action but is 

merely a `no confidence motion'.  It is only the loss of confidence 

simpliciter  i.e. the majority of the members considering, in their 

wisdom,   that   the   elected   Chairman/Vice-Chairman   should   not 

                                         51

be   permitted   to   continue   to   hold   that   office,   which   is   the   very 

basis for such removal.   One must remember that Rules 118 to 

122-B   all  come   within   Chapter   XVIII  of   the   M.P.   Rules   and,  as 

such, have to be examined collectively.   But for this Chapter, it 

cannot be even anticipated as to who and how the office of the 

Chairman/Vice-Chairman   of   the   State   Bar   Council   shall   be 

appointed.

42.       Now,   let   us   examine   some   judgments   to   substantiate 

what   we   have   aforestated.     In   the   case   of  General   Officer  

Commanding-in-Chief  v. Subhash  Chandra Yadav  [(1988) 2 SCC 

351], this Court stated the principle that the rules framed under 

the provisions of a statute form part of the statute, i.e., the rules 

have   statutory   force.     But   a   rule   can   have   the   effect   of   a 

statutory   provision   provided   it   satisfies   two   conditions:   (1)   it 

must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is 

framed; and (2) it must also come within the scope and purview 

of the rule making power of the statutory authority framing the 

rule.

43.       In   the   case   of  Kunj   Behari   Lal   Butail   v.   State   of   H.P. 

                                         52

[(2000) 3 SCC 40], this Court noticed that it is very common for 

the legislature to provide general rule making power to carry out 

the purposes of the Act.  When such a power is given, it may be 

permissible to find out the object of the enactment and then see 

if   the   rules   framed   thereunder   satisfy   this   test   of   functionality. 

This   test   will   determine   if   the   rule   falls   foul   of   such   general 

power   conferred   on   the   delegatee.   If   the   rule   making   power   is 

expressed   in   usual   general   form,   then   it   has   to   be   seen   if   the 

rules made are protected by the limits prescribed by the parent 

Act.   Still in the case of  Global Energy Ltd.  v. Central  Electricity  

Regulatory   Commission  [(2009)   15   SCC   570],   this   Court   was 

concerned with the validity of clauses (b) and (f) of Regulation 6-

A   of   the   Central   Electricity   Regulatory   Commission   (Procedure, 

Terms   and   Conditions   for   Grant   of   Trading   Licence   and   other 

Related Matters) Regulations, 2004 and dealing with this aspect, 

the Court expressed the view that in some cases guidelines could 

be assumed, by necessary implication, as already laid down and, 

while relying upon the case of Kunj Behari Lal Butail (supra), the 

Court held as under:

             "26.  We   may,   in   this   connection   refer   to   a 

             decision   of   this   Court   in  Kunj   Behari   Lal  

                                         53

            Butail  v.  State   of   H.P.1  wherein   a   three-

            Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   held   as   under: 

            (SCC p. 47, para 14)

                      "14. We are also of the opinion that 

            a   delegated   power   to   legislate   by   making 

            rules   `for   carrying   out   the   purposes   of   the 

            Act'   is   a   general   delegation   without   laying 

            down   any   guidelines;   it   cannot   be   so 

            exercised   as   to   bring   into   existence 

            substantive   rights   or   obligations   or 

            disabilities   not   contemplated   by   the 

            provisions of the Act itself."

            27.  The   power   of   the   regulation-making 

            authority,   thus,   must   be   interpreted 

            keeping   in   view   the   provisions   of   the   Act. 

            The   Act   is   silent   as   regards   conditions   for 

            grant   of   licence.   It   does   not   lay   down   any 

            pre-qualifications   therefor.   Provisions   for 

            imposition   of   general   conditions   of   licence 

            or   conditions   laying   down   the   pre-

            qualifications           therefor         and/or         the 

            conditions/qualifications   for   grant   or 

            revocation   of   licence,   in   absence   of   such   a 

            clear   provision   may   be   held   to   be   laying 

            down   guidelines   by   necessary   implication 

            providing   for   conditions/qualifications   for 

            grant of licence also."

44.      The   above   enunciated   principles   clearly   show   that   the 

language   of   the   statute   has   to   be   examined   before   giving   a 

provision an extensive meaning.  The Court would be justified in 

giving   the   provision   a   purposive   construction   to   perpetuate   the 

object   of   the   Act,   while   ensuring   that   such   rules   framed   are 

                                        54

within the field circumscribed by the parent Act.  It is also clear 

that   it   may   not   always   be   absolutely   necessary   to   spell   out 

guidelines for delegated legislation, when discretion is vested in 

such delegatee bodies.   In  such cases,  the language of the rule 

framed as well  as the purpose sought to be achieved, would be 

the   relevant   factors   to   be   considered   by   the   Court.     In   the 

present case, the minimum guidelines of secrecy and fairness in 

election have been provided in Part IX of the Rules, which have 

been   framed   in   exercise   of   the   supervisory   powers   under 

Sections   49(1)(a),   49(1)(i)   and   49(1)(j)   of   the   Advocates   Act. 

Further,   clause   (5)   of   this   Part   even   extends   to   the   State   Bar 

Councils the power to independently resolve all election disputes 

through   tribunals   constituted   for   this   purpose.   Therefore,   the 

powers  delegated  have  an in-built  element of guidance  that the 

Chairman/Vice-Chairman   will   be   appointed   and   regulated   by 

the   majority   members   of   the   State   Bar   Council.   Their   conduct, 

and   the   conduct   of   the   State   Bar   Council   as   a   whole,   is   to   be 

maintained   in   consonance   with   democratic   principles   and 

keeping   the   high   professional   standards   of   advocates   in   mind. 

Thus, it is not a power which falls beyond the purview and scope 

                                          55

of Section 15 of the Advocates Act read in conjunction with other 

provisions,  particularly   Chapter  II and  also  keeping  in  view  the 

object of the Act.  

45.       Purposive construction, to a large extent, would help to 

resolve the controversy raised in the present case.   The purpose 

of   the   Advocates   Act   is   the   democratic   and   harmonious 

functioning of the State Bar Councils, to achieve the object and 

purposes of the Act.  We are unable to see how the provisions of 

Rule 122-A fall foul of the ambit and scope of Section 15 of the 

Advocates Act and, for that matter, any other provisions of that 

Act.     On   the   contrary,   they   are   in   line   with   the   scheme   of   the 

parent Act.

46.       Having   dealt   with   the   primary   aspect   of   this   case,   now 

we   would   consider   the   contention   that   the   recall   of   the 

Chairman/Vice-Chairman,   by   a   smaller   and   distinct   body   of 

members   of   the   State   Bar   Council,   does   not   fall   within   the 

purview of the authority of the delegatee Council, under Section 

15(2)(c)   of   the   Advocates   Act,   i.e.   to   legislate   on  `the   manner   of 

election'.  Even   on  this  ground,  according   to  the   appellants,  the 

provisions of Rule 122-A are unsustainable.  We find no merit in 

                                          56

this contention  as well as it has no substance.   The election to 

the post of Chairman/Vice-Chairman of the State Bar Council is 

not by the larger body, i.e., the advocates enrolled on the rolls of 

the   State   Bar   Council,   but   is   by   a   distinct   body,   i.e.   elected 

members   of   the   State   Bar   Council.     Once   they   elect   the 

Chairman/Vice-Chairman   of   the   State   Bar   Council   as   per   the 

scheme of Rules 118 to 123, then all actions taken by such body 

would have to be accepted by all concerned as correct, if they are 

within the domain of the rules governing such body.   We do not 

consider   it   necessary   to   deliberate   on   this   issue   in   any   greater 

detail.     Suffice   it   to   refer   to   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the 

case   of  Mohan   Lal   Tripathi  (supra),   where   the   Court   was 

concerned   with   an   elected   candidate,   who,   in   terms   of   the 

statute,   was   elected   by   a   larger   electorate   and   was   recalled   by 

smaller   representative   body   rather   than  by   the  electorate   itself. 

Similar arguments were raised that the recall was violative of the 

spirit   and   purpose   of   the   election   and   was   arbitrary,   irrational 

and   violative   of   the   democratic   norms.   These   arguments   were 

rejected by the Court, after detailed deliberation and examining 

the   fields   of   democratic   norms.     We   have   already   referred   in 

                                           57

paragraph   37   of   this   judgment,   the   relevant   parts   of   the   said 

discussion.

47.       Similarly, in the case of Ram Beti v. District Panchyat Raj  

Adhikari  [(1998)   1   SCC   680],   the   Court   was   dealing   with   a 

situation where a Pradhan of the Panchayat was removed by the 

Gram   Panchayat,   a   smaller   body,   instead   of   removal   by   the 

Gram   Sabha   which   had   elected   him.     They   questioned   the 

validity of Section 14 of the U.P. Panchayati Raj, Act, 1947.  The 

Court, while rejecting the contentions, as are even being raised 

before us in the present case, held as under:

             "6.... It is no doubt true that under Section 

             11(1)   of   the   Act   provision   is   made   for 

             holding of two general meetings of the Gram 

             Sabha   in   each   year   as   well   as   for 

             requisitioning   of   a   meeting   by   one-fifth   of 

             the   members.     But   the   legislature,   in   its 

             wisdom, thought it proper that the matter of 

             removal   of   a   Pradhan,   instead   of   being 

             considered   at   the   meeting   of   the   Gram 

             Sabha,   should   be   considered   by   the 

             members   of   the   Gram   Panchayat.     The 

             considerations   which   weighed   with   this 

             Court   for   upholding   the   validity   of   sub-

             section   (2)   of   Section   87-A   of   the   U.P. 

             Municipalities   Act,   1916   relating   to   the 

             removal   of   the   President   of   a   Municipal 

             Board   in   Mohan   Lal   Tripathi   are,   in   our 

             opinion,   also   applicable   to   the   removal   of 

             the  Pradhan   of  the  Gram   Sabha.    Although 

                                       58

under   Section   14   of   the   Act   the   power   of 

removal   of   a   Pradhan   is   conferred   on   the 

members of the Gram Panchayat, which is a 

smaller body than the Gram Sabha, but the 

members   of   the   Gram   Pancyhayat,   having 

been   elected   by   the   members   of   the   Gram 

Sabha, represent the same electorate which 

has   elected  the   Pradhan.     The  removal  of  a 

Pradhan by two-third members of the Gram 

Sabha   through   their   representatives.     Just 

as   the   Municipal   Board   is   visualized   as   a 

body   entrusted   with   the   responsibility   to 

keep   a   watch   on   the   President,   whether 

elected by it or by the electorate, so also the 

Gram   Panchayat   is   visualized   as   a   body 

entrusted   with   the   responsibility   to   keep   a 

watch on the Pradhan who is not elected by 

it   and   is   elected   by   the   members   of   the 

Gram Sabha.   An arbitrary functioning of a 

Pradhan   is   disregard   of   the   statute   or   his 

acting   contrary   to   the   interests   of   the 

electorate   could   be   known   to   the   members 

of   the   Gram   Panchayat   only   and,   in   the 

circumstances,   it   is   but   proper   that   the 

members   of   the   Gram   Panchayat   are 

empowered to take action for removal of the 

Pradhan,   if   necessary.     It   is   no   doubt   true 

that   in   Section   11   of   the   Act   provision   is 

made   for   holding   two   general   meetings   of 

the   Gram   Sabha   in   each   year   and   for 

requisitioning   of   a   meeting   of   the   Gram 

Sabha  by  one-fifth  of  its  members.   But,  at 

the   same   time,   we   cannot   lose   sight   of   the 

fact   that   the   number   of   members   of   the 

Gram   Sabha   is   also   fairly   large.     It   would 

range from one thousand to more than three 

thousand.     Elections   to   public   offices   even 

at village level give rise to sharp polarization 

of   the   electorate   on   caste   or   communal 

basis.   The possibility  of disturbance of law 

                           59

            and   order   in   a   meeting   of   the   Gram   Sabha 

            called   for   considering   a   motion   for   removal 

            of   the   Pradhan   cannot   be   excluded. 

            Moreover,   there   cannot   also   be   due 

            deliberation   of   a   serious   matter   as   no-

            confidence   motion   by   a   very   large   body   of 

            persons.   While amending Section 14 of the 

            Act  so as to confer the power to remove the 

            Pradhan   of  a  Gram   Sabha  on  the   members 

            of the Gram Panchayat the legislature must 

            have taken into consideration the prevailing 

            social   environment.     Moreover,   by   way   of 

            safeguard   against   any   arbitrary   exercise   of 

            the power of removal it is necessary that the 

            motion must be passed by a majority of two-

            thirds of the members present and voting. 

            7.     For   the   reasons   aforementioned   we   are 

            unable   to   hold   that   Section   14   of   the   Act, 

            insofar   as   it   empowers   the   members   of   the 

            Gram Panchayat to remove the Pradhan of a 

            Gram   Sabha   by   moving   a   motion   of   no 

            confidence,   is   unconstitutional   and   void 

            being   violative   of   the   concept   of   democracy 

            or is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to be 

            hit by Article 14 of the Constitution."

48.      For   the   reasons   aforestated,   as   well   as   the   reasons 

recorded   in   the   above   reproduced   judgments,   which,   with 

respect,   we   adopt,   we   have   no   hesitation   in   rejecting   this 

contention of the appellants.

49.      The   next   argument   that   was   raised   on   behalf   of   the 

                                       60

appellants   is   that,   in   view   of   Rule   15   of   Chapter   V   of   the   M.P. 

Rules, the State Bar Council is debarred from re-considering the 

same   matter   for   a   period   of   three   months,   and   as   such,   the 

decision passing `no confidence motion' is vitiated because of the 

limitation   contained   in   the   said   Rule.     Rule   15   of   Chapter   V 

reads as under:

                     "No   matter   once   decided   shall   be 

              reconsidered   for   a   period   of   three   months 

              unless   the   Council   by   a   two-third   majority 

              of the members present, so permits."

50.        Though   the   language   of   the   above   Rule   clearly   shows 

that no matter once decided shall be reconsidered for a period of 

three   months   but   clearly   makes   an   exception   that   wherever 

2/3rd  majority of the members present of the State Bar Council 

permits,   this   bar   will   not   operate.     In   other   words,   there   is   no 

absolute   bar   and   the   Rule   makes   out   an   exception   when   the 

matters could be reconsidered.   But that is not the situation in 

the present case.   The first pre-requisite under this rule is that 

matter   should  be   `once   decided',   and  then   alone,   the  bar   of  re-

consideration   would   operate;   that   too   depending   on   the   facts 

and   circumstances   of   a   given   case.     `Once   decided'   obviously 

means   the   matter   should   be   concluded   or   finally   decided   in 

                                           61

contradistinction of being `kept pending' or `deferred'. Therefore, 

we   must   now   examine,   whether   the   matter   in   relation   to   `no 

confidence motion' had been finally decided at any point of time 

before the date on which the `no confidence motion' is stated to 

have   been  passed.     This  also   we   are   proceeding   to   consider   on 

the assumption that the matter related to `no confidence motion', 

for   the   sake   of   arguments,   would   be   covered   under   Rule   15   of 

the M.P. Rules.

51.       After   issuance   of   a   notice   in   accordance   with   the   M.P. 

Rules,   admittedly,   the   15th  Meeting   of   the   General   Body   of   the 

State   Bar   Council   was   held   on   27th  March,   2011   at   Jabalpur, 

during which two requisitions were made: one, relating to a `no 

confidence   motion'   against   the   Chairman/Vice-Chairman,   and 

second,  that  there  should   be  re-election   of  the   Committees.     In 

the   minutes,   it   was   also   stated   that   the   Chairman/Vice-

Chairman had offered their resignation subject to withdrawal of 

`no   confidence   motion'.     There   were   discussions   on   this   matter 

and   it   was   resolved   that   the   agenda   of   the   meeting   would   be 

circulated on the same day itself, by post, to all the members of 

the   State   Bar   Council,   whether   present   at   the   meeting   or   not 

                                       62

and   the   next   meeting   would   be   held   on   16th  April,   2011   at 

Jabalpur.  These notices were issued and as decided the meeting 

was held on  16th  April,  2011.  During  the course  of  the  meeting 

on   16th  April   2011,   some   of   the   members   left   the   meeting,   the 

Advocate   General   of   Madhya   Pradesh   presided   over   the 

continuation of the meeting and the `no confidence motion' was 

passed on the same day.   Of course, there is some dispute with 

regard to the recording of the minutes of this meeting.  We have 

already   reproduced   the   minutes   which   were   recorded   by   the 

respective   parties.     We   are   not   very   inclined   to   rely   upon   the 

minutes produced  by the  appellants,  inasmuch as  they  are  not 

signed  by  all the members present and  voting.   Even  if, for the 

sake   of   arguments,   we   take   that   the   minutes   produced   by   the 

appellants   are   correct,   then   it   must   follow   that   both   the 

meetings took place on 16th  April, 2011.   However, it is obvious 

from the record that in the 15th meeting of the General Body held 

on   27th  March,   2011,   no   final   decision   had   been   taken   and   it 

was   decided   to   circulate   the   minutes   and   other   papers   of   the 

meeting to all members.  

52.       Another ancillary argument to the above is that by virtue 

                                        63

of  the   bar   under   Rule   15  of  the   M.P.   Rules,   the   Chairman   and 

Vice-Chairman were elected to their respective posts in February 

2011 and, as such, the election itself was a `decision' which was 

incapable   of   being   reconsidered   and   revised   in   the   meetings   of 

March   and   April,   2011.     According   to   the   appellants,   the 

limitation contained in Rule 15 of the M.P. Rules shall vitiate the 

decision of passing  a  `no confidence  motion'.   This argument is 

also   misconceived   in   law   and   on   the   facts   of   the   present   case. 

Election is not a `decision' as contemplated under Rule 15 of the 

M.P.   Rules.     It   is   not   a   matter   on   which   the   State   Bar   Council 

decides,   as   firstly,   this   matter   falls   within   the   discretion   of 

individual advocates on the rolls of the State Bar Council to elect 

the representative members of the said Councils, and secondly it 

falls within the discretion of such elected representatives to elect 

a   person   as   Chairman/Vice-Chairman.     It   is   not   a   `decision' 

which   relates   to   the   matters   as   contemplated   under   the   M.P. 

Rules.   Passing   of   a   `no   confidence   motion'   in   law,   therefore, 

cannot be termed as reconsideration of the decision taken.  

53.       Once the Council is constituted in terms of the Act and 

the Rules framed thereunder, then it has to take decisions in the 

                                          64

role   of   a   Council   in   relation   to   various   matters,   including 

rejecting or passing a `no confidence motion'.   This is even clear 

from   the   case   of  Ram   Beti  (supra)   wherein   it   was   held   that   the 

smaller   representative  body  is   better   equipped to   make   a  recall 

decision and it has more information in its hands, to make such 

a   recall   decision.   The   decision   is,   therefore,   substantially 

different in character from the election decision. A statutory bar 

may exist in this respect, in some cases, but in its absence, the 

Court cannot infer or imply a time bar on challenging the results 

of   election   as   a   feature   of   common   law   or   general   democratic 

principles.

54.       Thus,   the   bar   contemplated   under   Rule   15   of   the   M.P. 

Rules does  not operate,  on merits,  when  applied  to the  facts  of 

the present case.   Thus, we have no hesitation  in rejecting this 

contention, raised by the appellants.

55.       It is also the contention of the appellants that the group 

supporting   the   Chairman/Vice-Chairman   of   the   State   Bar 

Council,   in   the   meeting   dated   16th  April,   2011,   had   raised   the 

issue   that   `no   confidence   motion'   and   reconstitution   of   the 

                                        65

committee could not be considered in view of the bar contained 

in   Rule   15   of   the   M.P.   Rules,   in   the   form   of   `a   point   of   order' 

against the requisition asked for by the other group.  Firstly, we 

have   already   rejected   the   contention   of   the   appellants   that   the 

matters   were   discussed   and   concluded,   either   through   the 

February   2011   elections   or   in   the   15th  Meeting   of   the   Council 

dated   27th  March,   2011,   as,   according   to   the   minutes,   the 

meeting   had   only   been   deferred   for   issuance   of   appropriate 

agenda and requisition notice to all the members present or not 

present.  Treating it as a valid point of order, the Chairman had 

accepted the same and then he along with some members, had 

walked out of the meeting.  

56.        As indicated above, the meeting then was presided over 

by   the   Advocate   General,   Madhya   Pradesh,   whereafter   the   `no 

confidence   motion'   was   passed.     We   are   unable   to   accept   the 

approach   adopted   by   the   Chairman/Vice-Chairman   as,   on   the 

peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   this   case,   it  ex   facie  was 

untenable   and   without   any   basis.     It   was   the   duty   of   the 

Chairman/Vice-Chairman to face the `no confidence motion', as 

they   were   elected   office   bearers   and   if   they   had   lost   the 

                                            66

confidence of majority group which elected them to this post and 

a `no confidence motion' had been moved against them in terms 

of   Rule   122-A,   they   were   expected   to   face   the   consequences 

thereof.   This,   alone,   would   have   served   the   ends   of   democratic 

governance   and   proper   functioning   of   the   State   Bar   Council. 

Therefore,   in   our   considered   view,   even   on   this   issue,   the 

appellants cannot succeed.

57.       Then   it   is   contended   that   removal   from   an   office   is 

punitive.     It   being   punitive,   there   has   to   be   a   just   cause   and 

adherence   to   the   principles   of   natural   justice   by   granting 

hearing   before   the   removal   from   office   is   given   effect   to.     To 

clarify, it is submitted that removal from an elected office, even 

in   face   of   a   valid   rule,   would   have   to   meet   these   twin 

requirements of just cause and hearing, before a person can be 

removed   from   office.     On   the   other   hand,   the   learned   counsel 

appearing for the respondents, while relying upon the judgment 

of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bar Council of Delhi v. Bar  

Council   of   India  [AIR   1975   Del   200],   contended   that   by 

application of the General Clauses Act, 1897 even in absence of 

any   specific   provision,   the   right   of   persons   to   elect   a 

                                         67

Chairman/Vice-Chairman   would   include   the   right   to   undo   the 

same by moving a `no confidence motion'. 

58.       It   needs   to   be   noticed   at   the   very   threshold   of 

consideration   of   this   submission   that   `no   confidence   motion' 

cannot   be   equated   in   law   to   removal   relatable   to   a   disciplinary 

action or as a censure.  It is stricto senso not removal from office, 

but a removal resulting from loss of confidence.  It is relatable to 

no   confidence   and   is   not   removal   relatable   to   the   conduct   or 

improper  behaviour  of the  elected   person.    Even  the   concept   of 

`term'   under   the   Rules,   is   referable   to   and   is   controlled   by   a 

super-imposed  limitation   of   no   confidence.     This   tenure   cannot 

be compared to a statutory tenure as is commonly understood in 

the   service   jurisprudence.     The   distinction   between   removal   by 

way   of   `no   confidence   motion'   and   removal   as   a   result   of 

disciplinary action or censure is quite well accepted in law.  They 

are   incapable   of   being   inter-changed   in   their   application   and 

must essentially operate in separate fields. The Court has always 

prioritized   harmonious   functioning   of   the   State   Bar   Council.   In 

the case of  Afjal Imam  v. State  of Bihar  and others, [JT 2011 (5) 

19], the recall of a Mayor and the re-election of a different Mayor 

                                        68

in his place has been held  to  implicitly  shorten  the term of the 

appointees   of   the   previous   Mayor,   if   such   is   in   the   interest   of 

smooth functioning of the body.

59.       Noticing   this   distinction,   a   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the 

case   of  Babubhai   Muljibhai   Patel   v.   Nandlal   Khodidas   Barot 

[(1974)   2   SCC   706],   while   dealing   with   the   question   whether 

grounds for removal must necessarily be specified when passing 

a   motion   of   no   confidence,   noticed   the   difference   between   `no 

confidence   motion'   and   a   censure   motion   and   described   the 

same as follows:

             "19.....It   does   not,   however,   follow 

             therefrom   that   the   ground   must   also   be 

             specified when a motion of no confidence is 

             actually   passed   against   a   President.   It   is 

             pertinent   in   this   context   to   observe   that 

             there is a difference between a motion of no 

             confidence   and   a   censure   motion.   While   it 

             is necessary in the case of a censure motion 

             to set out the ground or charge on which it 

             is   based,   a   motion   of   no   confidence   need 

             not   set   out   a   ground   or   charge.   A   vote   of 

             censure   presupposes   that   the   persons 

             censured   have   been   guilty   of   some 

             impropriety or lapse by act or omission and 

             it   is   because   of   that   lapse   or   impropriety 

             that   they   are   being   censured.   It   may, 

             therefore,   become   necessary   to   specify   the 

             impropriety or lapse while moving a vote of 

             censure. No such consideration arises when 

                                         69

              a   motion   of   no   confidence   is   moved. 

              Although a ground may be mentioned when 

              passing   a   motion   of   no   confidence,   the 

              existence   of   a   ground   is   not   a   prerequisite 

              of   a   motion   of   no   confidence.   There   is   no 

              legal   bar   to   the   passing   of   a   motion   of   no 

              confidence   against   an   authority   in   the 

              absence   of   any   charge   of   impropriety   or 

              lapse   on   the   part   of   that   authority.   The 

              essential   connotation   of   a   no-confidence 

              motion is that the party against whom such 

              motion   is   passed   has   ceased   to   enjoy   the 

              confidence   of   the   requisite   majority   of 

              members.   We   may   in   the   above   context 

              refer to page 591 of  Practise  and  Procedure  

              of   Parliament,  Second   Ed.   by   Kaul   and 

              Shakdher wherein it is observed as under:

                 "A   no-confidence   motion   in   the   Council 

              of   Ministers   is   distinct   from   a   censure 

              motion.   Whereas,   a   censure   motion   must 

              set out the grounds or charge on which it is 

              based and is moved for the specific purpose 

              of   censuring   the   Government   for   certain 

              policies   and   actions,   a   motion   of   no 

              confidence need not set out any grounds on 

              which   it   is   based.   Even   when   grounds   are 

              mentioned in the notice and read out in the 

              House,   they   do   not   form   part   of   the   no-

              confidence motion."

60.        Still, in another case, titled B.P. Singhal v. Union of India  

&   Anr.  [JT   2010   (5)   SC   640],   the   Court,   while   dealing   with   the 

doctrine   of   pleasure   in   relation   to   the   term   of   the   office   of   the 

Governor,  for a tenure of 5  years, noticed  that Article  156(1)  of 

the   Constitution   dispenses   with   the   need   to   assign   reasons   or 

                                           70

the need to give notice in the event of removal.   But the need to 

act   fairly   and   reasonably   still   cannot   be   dispensed   with. 

Exception   was   carved   out   against   acting   in   a   manner   which   is 

arbitrary,   capricious   or   unreasonable.     In   face   of   the   above 

enunciated   principles,   we   are   of   the   considered   view   that   the 

concept   of   just   cause   and   right   of   hearing,   the   features   of 

common   law,   are   not   applicable   to   the   elected   offices   where   a 

person   is   so   elected   by   majority   in   accordance   with   statutory 

rules.   It would also have hardly any application to moving of a 

`no   confidence   motion'   in   so   far   as   these   are   controlled   by 

specific provisions and are not arbitrary or unreasonable.  There 

is   nothing   in   Rule   122-A   of   the   M.P.   Rules   that   requires 

adherence to these two concepts when a motion of no confidence 

is moved against a sitting Chairman/Vice-Chairman. Of course, 

it does not  imply that the action can be  arbitrary  or capricious 

and   absolutely   contrary   to   the   spirit   of   the   Rule.     There   is   no 

dispute     in   the   facts   of   the   present   case   that   majority   of   the 

members   had   passed   the   `no   confidence   motion'   in   the   16th 

Meeting of the State Bar Council on 16th April, 2011.  We are not 

able to accept the view taken by the High Court of Delhi in the 

                                         71

case of Bar Council of Delhi (supra) in saying that solely with the 

aid   of   General   Clauses   Act,   the   power   to   elect   would   deem   to 

include   power   to   remove   by   a   motion   of   no   confidence, 

particularly,   with   reference   to   the   facts   and   circumstances   of 

this case.  The power to requisition a `no confidence motion' and 

pass the same, in terms of Rule 122-A of the M.P. Rules, is clear 

from   the   bare   reading   of   the   Rule,   as   relatable   to   loss   of   faith 

and   confidence  by   the   elected   body  in  the   elected   office   bearer. 

We   have   already   discussed   in   some   detail   and   concluded   that 

Rule 122-A of the M.P. Rules is not  ultra vires  the provisions of 

the   Advocates   Act,   including   Section   15.     When   the   law   so 

permits,   there   is   no   right   for   that   office   bearer   to   stay   in  office 

after the passing of the `no confidence motion' and, in the facts 

and   circumstances   of  the   present   case,   it   is   clearly   established 

that the appellants had lost the confidence of the majority of the 

elected members and thus the Resolution dated 16th April, 2011 

cannot be faulted with.  

61.        Before   concluding   the   judgment   we   would   proceed   to 

record our conclusions and answer the three questions posed at 

the outset of the judgment as follows:

                                           72

Answers to: 

         Question
                      No.   1

         We hold that the provisions of Rules 121 and 122-A (in 

particular) of the M.P. Rules are not ultra vires of the provisions, 

including   the   provisions   of   Section   15,   of   the   Advocates   Act. 

These   rules   also   do   not   suffer   from   the   vice   of   excessive 

delegation.

          Question No. 2

         In view of our answer to Question No. 1, there is no need 

for us to specifically answer this question. 

         Question No. 3

         In view of the language of Section 15(3) of the Advocates 

Act and the factual matrix afore-noticed by us, it is clear that the 

amended rules of the M.P. Rules had received the approval of the 

Bar Council of India, particularly Rule 122-A.   The Rules would 

not be invalidated for want of issuance of any notification, as it 

is not the requirement in terms of Section 15(3) of the Advocates 

Act and in any case would be a curable irregularity at best. 

      For the reasons afore-stated, we dismiss these appeals.

                                      73

                                   .....................................J.

                                               [Dr. B.S. Chauhan]

                                   .....................................J.

                                                     [Swatanter   Kumar]

New Delhi;

August 9, 2011                            74

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