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MUSLIM – BIGAMY – In the light of the language of Section 494 IPC and also Section 198 of the Code and in the light of the Personal Law governing the parties, this Court is well satisfied that the prosecution so far as the offence under Section 494 IPC is concerned, is unsustainable and the same is liable to be quashed

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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.S. NARAYANA 
Criminal Petition No.1216 of 2001
and Criminal Revision Case No.201 of 2001 

16-03-2006 

Shaik Pakeer Ahammad 

The State of A.P. and another

Counsel for petitioner : Sri Koneti Raja Reddy

Counsel for respondents : Public Prosecutor

:COMMON ORDER: 

1. Crl.P.No.1216/2001 is filed under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, hereinafter in short referred to as "Code" for the purpose
of convenience, to quash proceedings in C.C.No.47/2001 on the file of Judicial
First Class Magistrate-cum-Special Mobile Court, Guntur by the petitioners/A-1
to A-4. The 2nd respondent is the defacto complainant. The offences are
Sections 498-A and 494 Indian Penal Code, hereinafter referred to as "IPC".
Crl.R.C.No.201/2001 is filed by the respondent/husband aggrieved by an order
made in M.C.No.23/99 on the file of VII Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur,
dated 9-1-2001. The 1st respondent in the said Criminal Revision Case is the
wife. The learned Magistrate in the said Maintenance Case recorded the evidence
of P.W.1-wife, P.W.2 and P.W.3 and also R.W.1, marked Exs.P-1, Exs.R-1 to R-8 
and ultimately came to the conclusion that the wife is entitled for a monthly
maintenance of Rs.500/- from the date of petition i.e., 22-6-1999.
Aggrieved by the same, the Criminal Revision Case is filed under Section 397
r/w. Section 401 of the Code.
2. Sri Koneti Raja Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the
petitioners in Criminal Petition and also the petitioner in the Criminal
Revision Case made the following submissions. The learned Counsel would 
maintain that the wife cannot further proceed with the prosecution of the
offences under Section 498-A and 494 IPC. with which the petitioners in the
Criminal Petition had been charged for the reason that the proceedings had been
initiated after a long lapse of time. In fact it is abuse of process of Court as
well as process of Law for the reason that the wife had been making repeated
complaints and in fact at a particular point of time there was some settlement
between the parties and again she thought of initiating yet another action and
the same is hopelessly barred by limitation. Even otherwise, the learned
Counsel would contend that the allegations made by the wife are baseless and
totally unsustainable. The learned Counsel also explained that inasmuch as a
complaint relating to the offence of Bigamy had been made, the parties being
Muslims governed by the Muslim personal Law, the provisions of Section 494 IPC
are not attracted at all. Even otherwise, the language of Section 494 IPC
itself would show that the marriage should be a void marriage. The learned
Counsel had drawn the attention of this Court to the relevant passage in
Mohammedan Law by Mulla in this regard. The learned Counsel also would maintain 
that at any rate the police cannot file the charge sheet in relation to the
offence under Section 494 IPC and at the best it can be by means of a complaint
by the person aggrieved. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of
this Court to Sections 198 and 198-A of the Code and further had drawn the
attention of this Court to Sections 468, 469, 470, 472 and 473 of the Code and
would maintain that in any view of the matter, the further proceedings cannot be
proceeded with and they are liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel also
incidentally had drawn the attention of this Court to the findings recorded in
the Maintenance Case and would maintain that even granting of maintenance cannot 
be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the case.
3. The learned Public Prosecutor had taken this Court through the
allegations made in the charge sheet and would maintain that these are all
matters to be gone into at the appropriate stage and hence the proceedings
cannot be quashed at this stage.
4. Heard the Counsel on record.
5. Crl.R.C.No.201/2001 is preferred by the husband/respondent in
M.C.No.23/99 on the file of VII Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur under
Section 397 r/w. Section 401 of the Code and the 1st respondent in the said
Criminal Revision Case is the wife/petitioner in the aforesaid Maintenance Case.
Section 397 of the Code deals with Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision. The opening words of sub-section (1) of the said Section 397 read :
"The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local
jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded
or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court,
and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence
or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released
on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record."

The Revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court or the Sessions
Judge. In Waryam Singh Vs. Amarnath 1 and K.Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of 
Andhra Pradesh 2 it was held that the Revisional jurisdiction should not be
lightly exercised as it cannot be invoked as a matter of right. Be that as it
may, though the ground of Talaq was taken and several contentions had been
raised before the learned Magistrate, the learned Magistrate had recorded the
oral evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.3 and R.W.1 and also appreciated the documentary 
evidence Ex.P-1 and Exs.R-1 to R-8 and recorded reasons in detail and also had
taken note of the fact that the husband is working as a Secondary Grade Teacher
and came to the conclusion that fixing the quantum of Rs.500/- per month towards
maintenance from the date of the petition would be just and proper. On a
careful analysis of the reasons which had been recorded by the learned
Magistrate, who in fact had framed the Points for consideration at para-9 and
proceeded to discuss the matter commencing from paras 10 to 15, this Court is
well satisfied that there is no illegality or legal infirmity so as to interfere
with the order made in Crl.R.C.No.201/2001.
6. The next important aspect is whether the charge sheet in
C.C.No.47.2001 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate-cum-Special Mobile
Court, Guntur is to be quashed for the reasons which had been specified in the
Criminal Petition aforesaid. The petitioners in the Criminal Petition/A-1 to A-
4 are the husband of the defacto complainant and the relatives. The Police had
laid the charge sheet under Section 498-A and 494 IPC. The brief facts of the
Prosecution episode are as hereunder :
 A-1, the husband, married Shaik Peda Nagulubee, the defacto complainant, 
on 16-6-1995 at Tadikonda village and the marriage was solemnised by one Pashee 
Imam of Bismilla Majid and after marriage the complainant joined A-1 at Mutluru
village and the marriage was consummated and at the time of marriage a dowry of
Rs.40,000/- was given apart from a gold ring and a gold chain to A-1. It is
also stated that the complainant was given 181/2 tulas of gold and house
articles. The 1st petitioner/husband in the Criminal Petition and the
complainant lived happily for about three months and A-1 secured job as a
Secondary Grade Teacher at Kothapalli village of Rompicherla Mandal. The
complainant's parents paid a sum of Rs.20,000/- to secure the job and another
sum of Rs.20,000/- to purchase his scooter. It is also stated that after A-1
got the job the petitioners/accused felt that the property brought by the
complainant was not sufficient and started harassing her. Thus the complainant
filed a complaint before the Nagarampalem L & O Police Station which was
registered as Cr.No.51/96 under Section 498-A IPC. It is stated that during the
course of investigation of the crime, a compromise was arrived at, at the
intervention of elders and the 1st petitioner/A-1/husband agreed to live with
the L.W.1/complainant/wife separately. Thereafter the complainant/wife and the
1st petitioner/A-1/husband started living at Old Guntur for about 11/2 years.
It is stated that the 1st petitioner/A-1 was coming to the house once in 10 days
or 15 days and the complainant/wife questioned the conduct of the 1st
petitioner/A-1 and asked him to take her to his working place. Then it was
revealed that the 1st petitioner/A-1 had married a second wife and that was the
reason why he stopped coming to the complainant/wife. Again the
complainant/wife gave a complaint on 5-2-2001 which was registered as
Cr.No.13/2001 under Sections 498-A and 494 IPC of Nagarampalem L & O Police 
Station. After investigation, the police filed a charge sheet against the
petitioners and the same is pending on the file of Judicial First Class
Magistrate-cum-Special Mobile Court, Guntur. This appears to be the brief
factual matrix alleged prosecution episode.
7. As can be seen from the allegations, the fact that at a particular
point of time, in fact a settlement was arrived at and subsequent thereto there
was reunion of the marital tie and again there was desertion. These are all
almost admitted facts. It is also not in serious controversy that the parties
are Muslims governed by the Mohammedan Personal Law. Section 498-A IPC reads as 
hereunder :
Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty: Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subject such woman
to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, 'cruelty' means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive, the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security is on account or failure by her or any person related to her
to meet such demand. 

Section 494 IPC reads as hereunder :
Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife: Whoever, having a husband or
wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage, is void by reason of
its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
Exception:- This section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such
husband or wife has been declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction, nor
to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or
wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall
have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and
shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time
provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such
marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of
the real state of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge.

In the aforesaid provision, the words "....in which such marriage, is void by
reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife ...." would
assume some importance. 
8. Taking cognizance of a case beyond the period of limitation without
there being a request for extension of time and without application of mind of
the Court in relation thereto no doubt would be without jurisdiction. The
relevant provisions of the Code may be looked into in this context. Section 468
of the Code dealing with Bar to take cognizance after the lapse of period of
limitation reads as hereunder :
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take
cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the
expiry of the period of limitation.

(2) The period of limitation shall be,-
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year; 
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to
offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the
offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may
be, the most severe punishment. 

Section 469 of the Code reads as hereunder :
Commencement of the period of limitation :
(1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence,-
(a) on the date of the offence; or
(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by
the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes
to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier;
or
(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on
which the identity of the offender is known to the person
(2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be
computed shall be excluded. 

Section 470 of the Code reads as hereunder :

Exclusion of time in certain cases :

(1) In computing the period of limitation the time during which any person has
been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution, whether in a court of
first instance or in a Court of appeal or revision against the offender, shall
be excluded : Provided that no such exclusion shall be made unless the
prosecution relates to the same facts and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court
which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to
entertain it.
(2) Where the institution of the prosecution in respect of an offence has been
stayed by an injunction or order, then, in computing the period of limitation,
the period of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it
was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
(3) Where notice of prosecution for an offence has been given, or where, under
any law for the time being in force, the previous consent, or sanction of the
Government or any other authority is required for the institution of any
prosecution for an offence, then, in computing the period of limitation, the
period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining
such consent of sanction shall be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation, the time during which the offender,-
(a) has been absent from India or from any territory outside India which is
under the administration of the Central Government, or
(b) has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, shall be excluded.

Section 472 of the Code reads as hereunder :
Continuing offence:
In the case of continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to
run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues.

Under Section 473 of the Code dealing with Extension of period of limitation in
certain cases reads as hereunder :

"Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter,
any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of
limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the
Court that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to
do in the interests of justice.
Section 190 of the Code dealing with Cognizance of offences by Magistrate reads
:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first
class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf
under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence,-
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or
upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. 
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class
to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his
competence to inquire into or try.

Section 198 of the Code dealing with Prosecution for offences against marriage
reads :
(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter 20 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), except upon a complaint made by some person 
aggrieved by the offence :
Provided that-
(a) Where such person is under the age of eighteen years, or is an idiot or a
lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a
woman who, according to the local customs and manners, ought not to be compelled 
to appear in public, some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a
complaint on his or her behalf;
(b) Where such person is the husband and he is serving in any of the Armed
Forces of the Union under conditions which are certified by his Commanding
officer as precluding him from obtaining leave of absence to enable him to make
a complaint in person, some other person authorised by the husband in accordance
with the provisions of sub-section (4) may make a complaint on his behalf;
(c) Where the person aggrieved by an offence punishable under Section 494 or 495
Indian Penal Code is the wife, complaint may be made on her behalf by her
father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter or by her father's or mother's
brother or sister or, with the leave of the Court, by any other person related
to her by blood, marriage or adoption.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), no person other than the husband of the
woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by any offence, punishable under Section 
497 or Section 498 of the said Code:
Provided that in the absence of the husband, some person who had care of the
woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed may, with the 
leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf.
(3) When in any case falling under Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1),
the complaint is sought to be made on behalf of a person under the age of
eighteen years or of a lunatic by a person who has not been appointed or
declared by a competent authority to be the guardian of the person of the minor
or lunatic, and the Court is satisfied that there is a guardian so appointed or
declared, the Court shall, before granting the application for leave, cause
notice to be given to such guardian and give him a reasonable opportunity of
being heard.
(4) The authorization referred to in Clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section
(1), shall be in writing, shall be signed or otherwise attested by the husband,
shall contain a statement to the effect that he has been informed of the
allegations upon which the complaint is to be founded, shall be countersigned by
his Commanding officer and shall be accompanied by a certificate signed by the
officer to the effect that leave of absence for the purpose of making a
complaint in person cannot for the time being be granted to the husband.
(5) Any document purporting to be such an authorization and complying with the
provisions of sub-section (4), and any document purporting to be a certificate
required by that sub-section shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed
to be genuine and shall be received in evidence.
(6) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence under Section 376 of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860), where such offence consists of sexual intercourse by a
man with his own wife, the wife being under fifteen years of age, if more than
one year has elapsed from the date of the commission of the offence.
(7) The provisions of this section apply to the abatement of, or attempt to
commit, an offence as they apply to the offence.

Section 198(1)(c) of the Code is relevant for the present purpose. Section 2(d)
of the Code defines 'complaint' as :
"complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with
a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or
unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include a police report.

9. In Mahender Vs. State 3 it was held that a complaint under Section
198 of the Code does not include police report. The complaint to be maintained
for an offence of Bigamy by a person aggrieved had been dealt with in Banamali
Vs. Emperor 4, Revanasiddaswamy Vs. State 5, Belarani Vs. Jagannath 6. 
10. Section 494 IPC is made cognizable and non-bailable by A.P. Act 3 of
1992 dated 15-2-1982 and shall be tried by a Magistrate of First Class. Section
494 IPC falls under Chapter XX and Section 498-A falls under Chapter XX-A of
IPC. Section 198-A of the Code dealing with Prosecution for offences under
Section 498-A IPC reads as hereunder :
"No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 498-A of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except upon a police report of facts which
constitute such offence or upon a complaint made by the person aggrieved by the
offence or by her father, mother, brother, sister or by her father's or mother's
brother or, with the leave of the Court, by any other person related to her by
blood, marriage or adoption."

While dealing with Section 198 of the Code and Section 494 IPC, a learned Judge
of this Court in D.Vijayalakshmi Vs. Defendant.Sanjeeva Reddy 7 at para-3
observed as hereunder :
 "Coming to the second point, the charge sheet has been filed as aforesaid
by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Musheerabad for the alleged offences under
Section 498(A) and 494 of the IPC. 498-A is cognizable and therefore the police
can investigate and lay the charge sheet ultimately if the investigation
discloses the case against the accused of trial. What was non-cognizable
offence under Section 494 was made cognizable in view of the State amendment 
brought to the First Schedule appended to the Criminal Procedure Code. The
State amendment having received the assent of the President is valid and would
prevail even in the wake of any repugnancy between the State Law and Central Law
in so far as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned. The offence under
Section 498-A of the IPC is cognizable but it is not cognizable elsewhere in the
country. In view of the State amendment the investigating agency is entitled to
investigate the offence alleged under Section 494 of the IPC. But that is not
the end of the matter. There are certain limitations for the Court to take
cognizance. As could be seen from Chapter XIV of the Cr.P.C. one such
limitation is enjoined under Section 198 of the Cr.P.C. Section 198 of the
Cr.P.C. bars the Court from taking cognizance of any offence falling under
Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code and relating to institution of marriage with
the avowed object of preserving the institution of marriage. This bar enjoined
under Section 198 of Cr.P.C. is for the Court but not for the investigating
agency. Although the agency is at liberty to register a case and conduct
investigation into the offence under Section 494 of the IPC, the Court is
precluded from taking cognizance of the said offence in view of the mandatory
provisions of Section 198 of the Cr.P.C. It may be reiterated here that bar is
for the Court but not for the investigating agency. There has been no amendment
to Section 198 so as to bring the same in consonance with the State amendment 
brought to Section 494 of the IPC as has been done in respect of the offence
under Section 498-A by incorporating Section 198-A of IPC. Section 198 being a
legislation of the Parliament would prevail in the event of any inconsistency
between the State law and the Central law since both the subjects pertain to
Concurrent List. The initial cognizance taken by the Court upon the charge
sheet filed by the investigating agency, namely, the Sub-Inspector of Police,
Musheerabad Police Station, itself is bad. That clearly vitiates the entire
trial and the eventual conviction by the trial Court of the 1st respondent
herein. This point has not been addressed by both the Courts below. Of course,
on appreciation of the evidence available on record, the appellate Court has
come to a clear conclusion that the offence under Section 494 of the IPC has not
been made out. In any view of the matter, this revision directed against the
acquittal cannot sustain."

11. In the light of the language of Section 494 IPC and also Section 198
of the Code and in the light of the Personal Law governing the parties, this
Court is well satisfied that the prosecution so far as the offence under Section
494 IPC is concerned, is unsustainable and the same is liable to be quashed. As
far as the offence under Section 498-A IPC is concerned, the bar of limitation
had been pointed out. No doubt in all fairness, the Counsel for petitioners had
drawn the attention of this Court to a decision in Arun Vyas Vs. Anita Vyas 8
wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the offence under Section 498-A IPC
held that cruelty is a continuing offence and a new starting point of limitation
starts on last act of cruelty and where the wife was harassed and sent out of
the matrimonial home, the complaint even if time barred can be entertained if it
gives unfair advantage to the accused/husband or results in miscarriage of
justice. The Counsel also placed reliance on the decisions in Antony Vs. State
of Kerala 9, Jhopri Sao Vs. State of Bihar 10, Beena Alexander Vs. Alexander
Kurain 11, Gurvel Singh Vs. Rajinder Singh 12. Reliance also was placed on
Thirupandi, In re 13 wherein it was held that where the accused was charged with
an offence punishable with imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.5000/-, the
cognizance would be barred under clause (c) of Section 468 of the Code when the
charge sheet is submitted more than 3 years after the commission of the offence.
Submissions at length were made in relation to the bar of limitation under
Section 468 of the Code in the context of Section 498-A IPC. The words "....
Shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years and
shall also be liable to fine" in Section 498-A IPC would assume some importance.
Section 468(2)(c) of the code specifies that the period of limitation shall be 3
years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year but not exceeding 3 years. The provision is silent in relation to either
"or fine" or in relation to "and fine". Section 468(2)(a) of the Code specifies
6 months period of limitation if the offence is punishable with fine only. It
is pertinent to note that Section 468(2)(b) and (c) of the Code do not
specifically mention the aspects either "or fine" or "and fine" in the offences
concerned. In the decisions referred to supra it was no doubt observed that
imprisonment in lieu of fine is not contemplated by Sections 468 and 469 of the
Code and the period of imprisonment in lieu of fine was not taken into account
by the Parliament while enacting the said provisions. It was also observed that
if the period of imprisonment which may be imposed in lieu of fine can be taken
into consideration, then sub-section 2, clause (a) of Section 468 of the Code
will become redundant as there would be no offence punishable with fine only.
Such construction cannot be given to Section 468 of the Code and the Section to
be construed in such a manner which gives effect to all the provisions of the
said Section. In a slightly different context this question had been dealt with
in the decision referred (13) supra.
12. It is no doubt true that if Section 468(2)(b) and (c) of the Code if
construed strictly adopting the literal interpretation, then several of the
offences whereunder fine also is prescribed along with imprisonment may not fall
either under Section 468(2)(b) or (c) of the Code, as the case may be. The
Parliament in its wisdom appears to have mentioned fine only in Section
468(2)(a) of the Code and it specified imprisonment only in both Section
468(2)(b) and (c) of the Code. If the strict or literal interpretation that
whenever an offence specifies 3 years "and fine" would not fall under Section
468(2)(c) of the Code, then the result would be that even offences punishable
with lesser period than 3 years and one year wherever "and fine" is specified
may not fall either under Section 468(2)(b) or (c) of the Code, as the case may
be. The clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 468 of the Code
may have to be read harmoniously while construing the said provision.
13. Chapter III of the IPC 1860 deals with Punishments. Section 53 of
the IPC aforesaid reads as hereunder :
 "The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of
this Code are,-
First :- Death
Secondly:- Imprisonment for life;
Thirdly:- (Repealed by Act XVII of 1949);
Fourthly:- Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions,
 namely:- (1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour,
 (2) simple;
 Fifthly:- Forfeiture of property;
 Sixthly:- Fine

Sections 64 and 66 of IPC dealing with Sentence of imprisonment for non-payment
of fine and Description of imprisonment for non-payment of fine read as
hereunder :
Sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of fine: In every case of an offence
punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, in which the offender is sentenced
to a fine, whether with or without imprisonment,
 and in every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine, or
with fine only, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine,
 it shall be competent to the Court which sentences such offender to direct
by the sentence that, in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall
suffer imprisonment for a certain term, which imprisonment shall be in excess of
any other imprisonment to which he may have been sentenced or to which he may be 
liable under a commutation of a sentence.
Description of imprisonment for non-payment of fine: The imprisonment which the
Court imposes in default of payment of a fine may be of any description to which
the offender might have been sentenced for the offence.

Section 67 IPC deals with Imprisonment for non-payment of fine, when offence
punishable with fine only. Section 68 IPC deals with Imprisonment to terminate
on payment of fine. Even on a careful analysis of different provisions of
Chapter III of IPC dealing with Punishments if a view is taken that when offence
is punishable wit imprisonment for a term specified in clauses (b) of sub-
section (2) of Section 468 of the Code and fine imposed does not fall under the
said provisions for the reason that "and fine" had not been dealt with by the
said provisions, this may lead to absurdity especially in the light of Section
468(2)(a) of the Code where the period of limitation in relation to offence
punishable with fine only had been dealt with. It is no doubt true that
normally a provision to be interpreted as it stands and it is not for the Courts
to Legislate or to introduce or to read what is not specifically specified by a
particular statutory provision. However, in the light of the views expressed by
different High Courts referred to supra and also taking into consideration the
provisions of the IPC referred to supra, this Court is of the considered opinion
that this is the only possible interpretation that can be given that, for
offences where the period of imprisonment as specified in clauses (b) and (c) of
sub-section (2) of Section 468 of the Code fall within the period of
imprisonment and though and fine had been specified, the said provisions would
be attracted. It is needless to say that if in an offence "or fine" is
specified inasmuch as the same would be alternative, the said provisions would
be attracted. However, inasmuch as there are several offences wherein apart
from imprisonment, imposition of fine also is provided for, it may be
appropriate if the Parliament further clarifies the Legislative intent by
suitably amending the provision, if need be. This Court need not express any
further opinion relating to this aspect.
14. Coming to the present case, in the light of the facts and
circumstances, inasmuch as at a particular point of time a settlement was
arrived at and after a long lapse of time, evidently the complainant/wife being
aggrieved of the second marriage of the 1st petitioner/A-1/husband might have
thought of initiating this action again. In the light of the allegations made
in the charge sheet, this Court is satisfied that these allegations are being
made only with a view to set the Law into motion and absolutely there are no
justifiable grounds to further proceed with prosecution of the petitioners even
under Section 498-A IPC as well since there are no bona fides on the part of the
1st respondent/complainant/wife.
15. In the result, Criminal Revision Case is hereby dismissed. The
proceedings in C.C.No.47/2001 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate-
cum-Special Mobile Court, Guntur are hereby quashed and the Criminal Petition is
accordingly hereby allowed.

?1 AIR 1954 S.C. 215 
2 AIR 1962 S.C. 1788 
3 1988 Crl.L.J. 544
4 AIR 1943 Patna 212 
5 (1990 Crl.L.J. 1001 (Kar)
6 AIR 1967 Calcutta 203 
7 (2000(2) ALT (Crl) 136 (A.P.)
8 (AIR 1999 S.C. 2071)
9 (AIR 2001 S.C. 2637)
10 (1980) 28 BLJR 658 
11 (1990) 1 KLT 342 
12 (1990) 1 DMC 139 (P&H). 
13 1981 Crl.L.J. NOC 11 

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