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The respondent no. 2, Shri. Raghav Chandra, who is a Commissioner of M.P. Housing Board, Bhopal along with respondent no. 3, Shri. Shahjad Khan, posted as the then Collector, Katni, Jabalpur and respondent no. 4, Shri. Ram Meshram, posted as the Land Acquisition Officer, M.P. Housing Board, Bhopal, whilst, discharging their functions, had allegedly entered into conspiracy and made a secret plot with Shri. B.D. Gautam, the Director of Olphert Company and, subsequently, purchased the land belonging to Olphert Company at higher rates for the M.P. Housing Board, thereby, caused a financial loss of over `4 Crores to the Government. The appellant reported this alleged transaction of purchase of land by the M.P. Housing Board, alleging financial loss to the Government, to the Lokayukta, Bhopal. Subsequently, the Special Police Establishment (Lokayukta), Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as “the Lokayukta Police”) registered an FIR No. 165 of 2002 against accused respondent nos. 2 to 4, as the alleged act or conduct of the accused respondents, all working as Government Servants, amounts to an offence under Section 13 (1-d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of 2

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 REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1706-1708 OF 2011

 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 364-366 of 2010)

Arun Kumar Aggarwal ........ Appellant

 versus

State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. ........Respondents

 J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals, by special leave, are directed against the 

 Judgment and Order dated 22.4.2009 passed by the High 

 Court of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Revision No. 821 of 

 2005, Criminal Revision Petition No. 966 of 2005 and 

 Criminal Case No. 3403 of 2005, whereby the High Court has 

 allowed the revision application and inter alia quashed the 

 Order dated 26.4.2005 in case diary of Crime No. 165 of 2002 

 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge and Special 

 Judge, Katni (hereinafter referred to as "learned Special 

 Judge").

3. The brief factual matrix relating to this appeal is as follows: 

 The respondent no. 2, Shri. Raghav Chandra, who is a 

 Commissioner of M.P. Housing Board, Bhopal along with 

 respondent no. 3, Shri. Shahjad Khan, posted as the then 

 Collector, Katni, Jabalpur and respondent no. 4, Shri. Ram 

 Meshram, posted as the Land Acquisition Officer, M.P. 

 Housing Board, Bhopal, whilst, discharging their functions, 

 had allegedly entered into conspiracy and made a secret plot 

 with Shri. B.D. Gautam, the Director of Olphert Company and, 

 subsequently, purchased the land belonging to Olphert 

 Company at higher rates for the M.P. Housing Board, thereby, 

 caused a financial loss of over `4 Crores to the Government. 

 The appellant reported this alleged transaction of purchase of 

 land by the M.P. Housing Board, alleging financial loss to the 

 Government, to the Lokayukta, Bhopal. Subsequently, the 

 Special Police Establishment (Lokayukta), Jabalpur 

 (hereinafter referred to as "the Lokayukta Police") registered 

 an FIR No. 165 of 2002 against accused respondent nos. 2 to 

 4, as the alleged act or conduct of the accused respondents, 

 all working as Government Servants, amounts to an offence 

 under Section 13 (1-d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of 

 2

Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the PCA") 

and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter 

referred to as "the IPC"). Accordingly a Criminal Case No. 165 

of 2002 was registered against respondent nos. 2 to 4 in the 

Court of learned Special Judge. However, the sanction of the 

Government was necessary as mandated by Section 19 of the 

PCA in order to prosecute the said accused respondents. 

Acting upon the complaint of the appellant, the Lokayukta 

Police, after conducting the investigation, had exonerated 

respondent nos. 2 to 4 of all the charges leveled against them 

and submitted final closure report, under Section 169 of the 

Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as "the Cr. 

P.C."), to the learned Special Judge, Katni as no case had 

been made out to prosecute respondents. Thereafter, the 

learned Special Judge, Katni after hearing the respondents, 

appreciating the evidence on record and perusing the case 

diary, had rejected the closure report vide his Order dated 

26.4.2005. The operative portion of the order dated 

26.4.2005 passed by the learned Special Judge is extracted 

below:

 "31. In this way from above record produced, 

 even prima facie, it is evident that the accused 

 had made secrete plot (durabhi sandhi) with 

 Shri B.D. Gautam the Director of Olphert 

 Company with conspiracy and purchased land 

 of Olphert Company on higher rate and caused 

 3

 financial loss over four crores to the 

 Government which there are sufficient grounds 

 for taking cognizance against the accused 

 persons. 

 32. Accused person Shri Raghav Chandra is 

 posted as Commissioner of M.P. Housing Board 

 and Shri Ram Meshram is posted as Land 

 Acquiring Officer in M.P. Housing Board and 

 Shri Shahjaad Khan while remaining posted as 

 Collector, all above accused persons working 

 as Government servant, while discharging their 

 government duties, committed above crime-

 under section 19 of Anti Corruption Act 1988, it 

 is necessary to obtain sanction to prosecute 

 Government Servant U/S 13 of Anti-Corruption 

 Act. Therefore matter may be taken up seeking 

 necessary sanction to prosecute the accused 

 persons Raghav Chandra, Shri Ram Meshram 

 and Shahjaad Khan to prosecute them under 

 Section 13 (1-d), 13 (2) Anti Corruption Act 

 and under Section 120-B I.P.C. and for 

 necessary further action, case be registered in 

 the criminal case diary."

4. Aggrieved by the above observation, respondent nos. 2 to 4 

 preferred Criminal Revision Petitions under Section 482 of the 

 Cr.P.C. before the High Court. The High Court allowed the 

 revision petitions and quashed the Order dated 26.4.2005 of 

 the learned Special Judge on the ground that the Order of the 

 learned Special Judge is illegal and without jurisdiction, in 

 view of the decision of this Court in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh 

 Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117, as the Magistrate cannot impinge 

 upon the jurisdiction of the police by directing them to change 

 their opinion when the closure report had been submitted by 

 the police under Section 169 of the Cr.P.C. The reliance is also 

 4

 placed on the observation made by this Court in the case of 

 Mansukh Lal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat AIR 1997 

 SC 3400 wherein it is observed that:

 "19. Since the validity of "Sanction" depends 

 on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning 

 authority of the facts of the case as also the 

 material and evidence collected during 

 investigation it necessarily follows that the 

 sanctioning authority has to apply its own 

 independent mind for the generation of 

 genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has 

 to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the 

 sanctioning authority should not be under 

 pressure from any quarter nor should any 

 external force be acting upon it to take a 

 decision one way or the other. Since the 

 discretion to grant or not to grant sanction 

 vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, 

 its discretion should be shown to have not 

 been affected by any extraneous consideration. 

 It is shown that the sanctioning authority was 

 unable to apply its independent mind for any 

 reason whatsoever or was under an obligation 

 or compulsion or constraint to grant the 

 sanction, the order will be bad for the reason 

 that the discretion of the authority "not to 

 sanction" was taken away and it was 

 compelled to act mechanically to sanction the 

 prosecution."

5. Being aggrieved, the appellant is before us in this appeal.

6. The issue involved in the present appeal for our consideration 

 is: Whether the High Court is justified in treating the 

 operative portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge as 

 a direction issued to the sanctioning authority to sanction the 

 prosecution of the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 4. 

 5

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis 

 and perused the record. 

8. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Special 

 Judge, vide his Order dated 26.4.2005, refused to accept the 

 closure report submitted before him by the Lokayukta Police 

 as he found it to be not reasonable and finally rejected it. The 

 other portion of the Order, wherein the learned Special Judge 

 observed particularly about the initiation of Challan 

 proceedings, is a mere observation or passing remark. In 

 other words, the learned counsel submits that this portion of 

 the Order, dealing with Challan proceedings, can, at the most, 

 be treated as expression of his personal opinion. He further 

 submits that wholistic reading of this Order clearly suggests 

 that the learned Special Judge's remark pertaining to Challan 

 proceedings is in the nature of mere obiter dicta and could 

 not qualify to be treated as a direction of the Court even by 

 any stretch of imagination. The learned counsel contends that 

 the Order of the learned Special Judge cannot be treated as 

 direction issued to the sanctioning authority to prosecute the 

 respondents as this Order nowhere addresses sanctioning 

 authority and moreover, nowhere directs sanctioning 

 authority to do any affirmative action or abstain from doing 

 anything. Therefore, the High Court is not justified in 

 6

 quashing the Order of the learned Special Judge and treating 

 it to be a direction issued to the sanctioning authority to 

 prosecute the accused respondent nos.2 to 4.

9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submits 

 that the Order of the learned Special Judge is in the nature of 

 command and amounts to a direction to the sanctioning 

 authority to prosecute respondent nos. 2 to 4. Therefore, this 

 Order of the learned Special Judge is illegal and without 

 jurisdiction. The learned counsel further supported the 

 impugned Order and Judgment of the High Court. 

10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties before us. 

 The short point in issue before us is based on the nature of 

 the Order passed by the learned Special Judge whether it 

 amounts to a direction issued by the Court to the concerned 

 authority or mere observation of the Court. 

11. We will first discuss the nature and scope of the expression 

 `direction' issued by the Court. This Court in Rameshwar 

 Bhartia v. The State of Assam, 1953 SCR 126 whilst 

 distinguishing the expression `Sanction' from the `Direction', 

 for the purpose of initiating the prosecution has held:

 "15. But where a prosecution is directed, it 

 means that the authority who gives the 

 direction is satisfied in his own mind that the 

 case must be initiated. Sanction is in the 

 7

 nature of a permission, while a direction is in 

 the nature of a command." (Emphasis 

 supplied).

12. In Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwan 

 Das, Lakhimpur kheri, (1964) 6 SCR 411, this Court has 

 observed that the expression "direction" cannot be construed 

 in vacuum, but must be collated to the directions which the 

 Assistant Appellate Commissioner can give under Section 31 

 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. 

13. This Court in Rajinder Nath v. CIT, (1979) 4 SCC 282, while 

 considering the meaning of expression `finding' and 

 `direction', occurring in Section 153(3)(ii) of the Income Tax 

 Act, 1961, has held: 

 "11. ... As regards the expression "direction" in 

 Section 153(3)(ii) of the Act, it is now well 

 settled that it must be an express direction 

 necessary for the disposal of the case before 

 the authority or court. It must also be a 

 direction which the authority or court is 

 empowered to give while deciding the case 

 before it. The expressions "finding" and 

 "direction" in Section 153(3)(ii) of the Act 

 must be accordingly confined." (Emphasis 

 supplied). 

14. In Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi & Ors., (1985) 4 SCC 

 628, this Court has observed that "A direction may mean an 

 8

 order issued to a particular individual or a precept which 

 many may have to follow. It may be a specific or a general 

 order."

15. In Giani Devender Singh v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 391, 

 this Court, whilst considering the direction issued by the High 

 Court in a Public Interest Litigation, has observed that the 

 directions should not be vague, sweeping or affected by 

 sarcasm which are not capable of being implemented. It 

 should be specific, just and proper in the facts and 

 circumstances of the case. This Court further held:

 "10. It appears to us that when the High Court 

 was not in a position to precisely discern what 

 was the complaint alleged by the petitioner 

 and when the High Court was of the view that 

 the prayer made by the petitioner was absurd 

 and it also held that the officers who were 

 alleged to have been carrying on nefarious 

 activities were more imaginary than real, the 

 direction in general and sweeping terms to 

 sack erring officers (whomsoever they may be) 

 and overhaul the administration by recruiting 

 only conscientious and devoted people like the 

 petitioner in order to satisfy the vanity of the 

 petitioner, should not have been made. If the 

 High Court intends to pass an order on an 

 application presented before it by treating it as 

 a public interest litigation, the High Court must 

 precisely indicate the allegations or the 

 statements contained in such petition relating 

 to public interest litigation and should indicate 

 how public interest was involved and only after 

 ascertaining the correctness of the allegation, 

 9

 should give specific direction as may deem just 

 and proper in the facts of the case.

 11. It appears to us that the application was 

 disposed of by the Division Bench of Madhya 

 Pradesh High Court in a lighter vein and the 

 order dated 27-2-1992 is couched in veiled 

 sarcasm. Such course of action, to say the 

 least, is not desirable and the High Court 

 should not have issued mandate in general 

 and sweeping terms which were not intended 

 to be implemented and were not capable of 

 being implemented because of utter vagueness 

 of the mandate and of its inherent absurdity." 

 (Emphasis supplied) 

16. The Blacks Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) defines the term 

 `Direction' as an order; an instruction on how to proceed.

17. The meaning of expression "Direction" has been discussed in 

 Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 26A, at pg. 955-956 as thus:

 "The word "direction" is of common usage, and 

 is defined as meaning the act of governing, 

 ordering, or ruling; the act of directing, 

 authority to direct as circumstances may 

 require; guidance; management; 

 superintendence; "prescription;" also a 

 command, an instruction, an order, an order 

 prescribed, either verbally or written, or 

 indicated by acts; that which is imposed by 

 directing, a guiding or authoritative 

 instruction; information as to method."

18. According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd 

 ed. 2005) the word `Direction' means: address of letter, order 

 1

 or instruction as to what one has to do. A direction may serve 

 to direct to places as well as to persons. Direction contains 

 most of instruction in it and should be followed. It is 

 necessary to direct those who are unable to act for 

 themselves. Directions given to servants must be clear, 

 simple and precise.

19. According to the Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 

 12A, the term `Direction' means a guiding or authoritative 

 instruction, prescription, order, command. 

20. To sum up, the direction issued by the Court is in the nature 

 of a command or authoritative instruction which contemplates 

 the performance of certain duty or act by a person upon 

 whom it has been issued. The direction should be specific, 

 simple, clear and just and proper depending upon the facts 

 and circumstances of the case but it should not be vague or 

 sweeping. 

21. At this stage, it is pertinent to consider the nature and scope 

 of a mere observation or obiter dictum in the Order of the 

 Court. The expression obiter dicta or dicta has been discussed 

 in American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol. 20, at pg. 437 as thus:

 "74. -Dicta

 Ordinarily, a court will decide only the 

 questions necessary for determining the 

 1

 particular case presented. But once a court 

 acquires jurisdiction, all material questions are 

 open for its decision; it may properly decided 

 all questions so involved, even though it is not 

 absolutely essential to the result that all 

 should be decided. It may, for instance, 

 determine the question of the constitutionality 

 of a statute, although it is not absolutely 

 necessary to the disposition of the case, if the 

 issue of constitutionality is involved in the suit 

 and its settlement is of public importance. An 

 expression in an opinion which is not 

 necessary to support the decision reached by 

 the court is dictum or obiter dictum.

 "Dictum" or "obiter dictum: is distinguished 

 from the "holding of the court in that the so-

 called "law of the case" does not extend to 

 mere dicta, and mere dicta are not binding 

 under the doctrine of stare decisis,

 As applied to a particular opinion, the question 

 of whether or not a certain part thereof is or is 

 not a mere dictum is sometimes a matter of 

 argument. And while the terms "dictum" and 

 "obiter dictum" are generally used 

 synonymously with regard to expressions in an 

 opinion which are not necessary to support the 

 decision, in connection with the doctrine of 

 stare decisis, a distinction has been drawn 

 between mere obiter and "judicial dicta," the 

 latter being an expression of opinion on a point 

 deliberately passed upon by the court." 

 (Emphasis supplied). 

Further at pg. 525 and 526, the effect of dictum has been 

discussed:

 "190. Decision on legal point; effect of dictum

 1

 ... In applying the doctrine of stare decisis, a 

 distinction is made between a holding and a 

 dictum. Generally stare decisis does not attach 

 to such parts of an opinion of a court which are 

 mere dicta. The reason for distinguishing a 

 dictum from a holding has been said to be that 

 a question actually before the court and 

 decided by it is investigated with care and 

 considered in its full extent, whereas other 

 principles, although considered in their relation 

 to the case decided, are seldom completely 

 investigated as to their possible bearing on 

 other cases. Nevertheless courts have 

 sometimes given dicta the same effect as 

 holdings, particularly where "judicial dicta" as 

 distinguished from "obiter dicta" are involved."

22. According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd 

 ed. 2005), the expression "observation" means a view, 

 reflection; remark; statement; observed truth or facts; 

 remarks in speech or writing in reference to something 

 observed.

23. The Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Ed. 1993) defines term `obiter 

 dictum' as an opinion not necessary to a judgment; an 

 observation as to the law made by a judge in the course of a 

 case, but not necessary to its decision, and therefore of no 

 binding effect; often called as obiter dictum, ; a remark by 

 the way.

24. The Blacks Law Dictionary, (9th ed, 2009) defines term `obiter 

 dictum' as a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial 

 1

 opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the 

 case and therefore not precedential (although it may be 

 considered persuasive). -- Often shortened to dictum or, less 

 commonly, obiter. "Strictly speaking an `obiter dictum' is a 

 remark made or opinion expressed by a judge, in his decision 

 upon a cause, `by the way' -- that is, incidentally or 

 collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the 

 court; or it is any statement of law enunciated by the judge or 

 court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy, or 

 suggestion.... In the common speech of lawyers, all such 

 extrajudicial expressions of legal opinion are referred to as 

 `dicta,' or `obiter dicta,' these two terms being used 

 interchangeably."

25 The Word and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 29 defines the 

 expression `obiter dicta' or `dicta' thus: 

 "Dicta are opinions of a judge which do not 

 embody the resolution or determination of the 

 court, and made without argument or full 

 consideration of the point, are not the 

 professed deliberate determinations of the 

 judge himself; obiter dicta are opinions uttered 

 by the way, not upon the point or question 

 pending, as if turning aside for the time from 

 the main topic of the case to collateral 

 subjects; It is mere observation by a judge on 

 a legal question suggested by the case before 

 him, but not arising in such a manner as to 

 require decision by him; "Obiter dictum" is 

 made as argument or illustration, as pertinent 

 1

 to other cases as to the one on hand, and 

 which may enlighten or convince, but which in 

 no sense are a part of the judgment in the 

 particular issue, not binding as a precedent, 

 but entitled to receive the respect due to the 

 opinion of the judge who utters them; 

 Discussion in an opinion of principles of law 

 which are not pertinent, relevant, or essential 

 to determination of issues before court is 

 "obiter dictum"

26. The concept of "Dicta" has also been considered in Corpus 

 Juris Secundum, Vol. 21, at pg. 309-12 as thus:

 "190. Dicta

 a. In General

 A Dictum is an opinion expressed by a court, 

 but which, not being necessarily involved in 

 the case, lacks the force of an adjudication; an 

 opinion expressed by a judge on a point not 

 necessarily arising in the case; a statement or 

 holding in an opinion not responsive to any 

 issue and noty necessary to the decision of the 

 case; an opinion expressed on a point in which 

 the judicial mind is not directed to the precise 

 question necessary to be determined to fix the 

 rights of the parties; or an opinion of a judge 

 which does not embody the resolution or 

 determination of the court, and made without 

 argument, or full consideration of the point, 

 not the professed deliberate determination of 

 the judge himself. The term "dictum" is 

 generally used as an abbreviation of "obiter 

 dictum" which means a remark or opinion 

 uttered by the way.

 Such an expression or opinion, as a general 

 rule, is not binding as authority or precedent 

 within the stare decisis rule, even on courts 

 1

 inferior to the court from which such 

 expression emanated, no matter how often it 

 may be repeated. This general rule is 

 particularly applicable where there are prior 

 decisions to the contrary of the statement 

 regarded as dictum; where the statement is 

 declared, on rehearing, to be dictum; where 

 the dictum is on a question which the court 

 expressly states that it does not decide; or 

 where it is contrary to statute and would 

 produce an inequitable result. It has also been 

 held that a dictum is not the "law of the case," 

 nor res judicata."

27. The concept of "Dicta" has been discussed in Halsbury's Laws 

 of England, Fourth Edition (Reissue), Vol. 26, para. 574 as 

 thus:

 "574. Dicta. Statements which are not 

 necessary to the decision, which go beyond 

 the occasion and lay down a rule that it is 

 unnecessary for the purpose in hand are 

 generally termed "dicta". They have no binding 

 authority on another court, although they may 

 have some persuasive efficacy. Mere passing 

 remarks of a judge are known as "obiter 

 dicta", whilst considered enunciations of the 

 judge's opinion on a point not arising for 

 decision, and so not part of the ratio decidendi, 

 have been termed "judicial dicta". A third type 

 of dictum may consist in a statement by a 

 judge as to what has been done in other cases 

 which have not been reported. 

 ... Practice notes, being directions given 

 without argument, do not have binding judicial 

 effect. Interlocutory observations by members 

 of a court during argument, while of 

 persuasive weight, are not judicial 

 pronouncements and do not decide anything."

 1

28. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 

 SCC 101 and Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva 

 Shetty, (2003) 7 SCC 197, this Court has observed that "Mere 

 casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing 

 expression of a judge, however eminent, can be treated as an 

 ex cathedra statement, having the weight of authority."

29. In State of Haryana v. Ranbir, (2006) 5 SCC 167, this Court 

 has discussed the concept of the obiter dictum thus:

 "A decision, it is well settled, is an authority for 

 what it decides and not what can logically be 

 deduced therefrom. The distinction between a 

 dicta and obiter is well known. Obiter dicta is 

 more or less presumably unnecessary to the 

 decision. It may be an expression of a 

 viewpoint or sentiments which has no binding 

 effect. See ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla. 

 It is also well settled that the statements 

 which are not part of the ratio decidendi 

 constitute obiter dicta and are not 

 authoritative. (See Divisional Controller, 

 KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty)"

30. In Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555, 

 this Court has held: 

 "Thus, observations of the Court did not relate 

 to any of the legal questions arising in the case 

 and, accordingly, cannot be considered as the 

 part of ratio decidendi. Hence, in light of the 

 aforementioned judicial pronouncements, 

 which have well settled the proposition that 

 1

 only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding 

 or authoritative precedent, it is clear that the 

 reliance placed on mere general observations 

 or casual expressions of the Court, is not of 

 much avail to the respondents."

31. In view of above, it is well settled that obiter dictum is a mere 

 observation or remark made by the court by way of aside 

 while deciding the actual issue before it. The mere casual 

 statement or observation which is not relevant, pertinent or 

 essential to decide the issue in hand does not form the part of 

 the judgment of the Court and have no authoritative value. 

 The expression of the personal view or opinion of the Judge is 

 just a casual remark made whilst deviating from answering 

 the actual issues pending before the Court. These casual 

 remarks are considered or treated as beyond the ambit of the 

 authoritative or operative part of the judgment.

32. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of 

 the opinion that the refusal of the learned Special Judge, vide 

 its Order dated 26.4.2005, to accept the final closure report 

 submitted by Lokayukta Police is the only ratio decidendi of 

 the Order. The other part of the Order which deals with the 

 initiation of Challan proceedings cannot be treated as the 

 direction issued by the learned Special Judge. The relevant 

 portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge dealing with 

 1

 Challan Proceeding reads as "Therefore matter may be taken 

 up seeking necessary sanction to prosecute the accused 

 persons Raghav Chandra, Shri Ram Meshram and Shahjaad 

 Khan to prosecute them under Section 13 (1-d), 13 (2) Anti 

 Corruption Act and under Section 120-B I.P.C and for 

 necessary further action, case be registered in the criminal 

 case diary." The wordings of this Order clearly suggest that it 

 is not in the nature of the command or authoritative 

 instruction. This Order is also not specific or clear in order to 

 direct or address any authority or body to perform any act or 

 duty. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, this Order can 

 be considered or treated as the direction issued by the 

 learned Special Judge. The wholistic reading of this Order 

 leads to only one conclusion, that is, it is in the nature of 

 `Obiter Dictum' or mere passing remark made by the learned 

 Special Judge, which only amounts to expression of his 

 personal view. Therefore, this portion of the Order dealing 

 with Challan proceeding, is neither relevant, pertinent nor 

 essential, while deciding the actual issues which were before 

 the learned Special Judge and hence, cannot be treated as the 

 part of the Judgment of the learned Special Judge.

33. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion 

 that, the portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge 

 1

 which deals with the Challan proceedings is a mere 

 observation or remark made by way of aside. In view of this, 

 the High Court had grossly erred in considering and treating 

 this mere observation of the learned Special Judge as the 

 direction of the Court. Therefore, there was no occasion for 

 the High Court to interfere with the Order of the learned 

 Special Judge. 

34. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned Order 

 and Judgment of the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 821 

 of 2005, Criminal Revision Petition No. 966 of 2005 and 

 Criminal Case No. 3403 of 2005 dated 22.4.2009 is set aside. 

 We restore the Order of the learned Special Judge dated 

 26.4.2005.

35. We direct the respondents to comply with the order passed by 

 the Trial Court within two months from this date. 

 ........................

 ...J.

 [G.S. SINGHVI]

 ........................

 ...J.

 [H.L. DATTU]

New Delhi,

September 02, 2011. 

 2

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