//
you're reading...
legal issues

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973: s.482 – Order of High Court quashing criminal proceedings, relying upon the finding of civil court on the same issue as involved in the criminal proceedings, in respect of the same subject matter – HELD: Is not sustainable – The findings of fact recorded by civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice-versa – However, in the instant case, the complainant having approached the civil court and failed, filing of the complaint by him, pending his civil appeal, with inordinate delay without any plausible explanation and with the sole intention of harassing the other party amounted to an abuse of the process of law and, therefore, the order of High Court, though not sustainable in law, is not interfered with – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.420/323/ 467/468/471/120-B – Practice and Procedure – Simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings – Administration of justice – Abuse of the process of law – Delay/Laches. An agreement to sell the suit land was executed on 4.1.1988 by the owner, namely, `KL’ in favour of respondents 1 to 4, to whom the land had already been mortgaged. Since the sale deed was not executed by the stipulated date i.e. 10.6.1989, the respondents filed a suit for specific performance and pursuant to the decree dated 8.5.1996, passed in the said suit, the sale deed was executed in favour of respondents 1 to 4 on 17.5.1996. Meanwhile, the father of the appellants also filed on 6.2.1996 a suit for specific performance against the said `KL’ stating that he had executed on 22.10.1988 an agreement to sell in his favour stipulating that the sale deed would be executed and registered by 15.6.1989. He filed another suit seeking cancellation/setting aside the decree dated 8.5.1996, which was dismissed on 10.6.2002, and consequently he filed a regular first appeal. Thereafter, he filed an FIR on 22.7.2002 against the respondents alleging commission of offences punishable u/ss 420/423/ 467/468/120-B IPC. On the petition filed by the respondents, the High Court quashed the FIR and the consequent criminal proceedings. In the instant appeal the question for consideration before the Court was: “whether criminal proceedings can be quashed by the High Court relying upon a finding of civil court on an issue involved in criminal proceedings in respect of the same subject matter.” =Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The findings of fact recorded by the civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice-versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while dealing with the same subject matter; and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions of ss. 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the relevance of previous judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into consideration. [para 19] [26-F-H; 27-A] M.S. Sherrif Vs. The State of Madras & Ors., 1954 SCR1229= AIR 1954 SC 397; K.G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police & Anr., 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 350= AIR 2002 SC 3372; Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., 2005 (2 ) SCR708 = (2005) 4 SCC 370; P. Swaroopa Rani Vs. M. Hari Narayana alias Hari Babu, 2008 (3) SCR900 = AIR 2008 SC 1884; Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam & Anr. Vs. State (Delhi Admn) & Anr., 2009 (3) SCR1017=  (2009) 5 SCC 528; and Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Prasad, 2009 (7) SCR977 = (2009) 13 SCC 729, relied on. M/s Karamchand Ganga Pershad & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1244, stood overruled V.M. Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR79= (1995) 5 SCC 767 – disapproved. Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazair Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18, referred to. 1.2. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the civil court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. [para 22] [28-A-D] Chandrapal Singh & Ors. Vs. Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 1238; State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR259= AIR 1992 SC 604; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., 2000 (1) SCR417=AIR 2000 SC 754; and Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. & Ors., 2008 (12) SCR623 = (2008) 12 SCC 531 – relied on. 1.3. In the instant case, the judgment and order of the High Court dated 13.02.2009 quashing the criminal proceedings against the respondents, though not sustainable in the eyes of law, is not interfered with in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The agreement to sell in favour of the appellants’ father is dated 22.10.1988 and sale deed was to be executed and registered by 15.06.1989. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed the suit in 1989. It is difficult to believe that the appellants’ father was not aware of the pendency of that suit. No explanation has been furnished as to why after expiry of the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of appellant’s father, i.e. 15.06.1989, he did not file the suit for specific performance which was subsequently filed on 6.2.1996. Even if it is presumed that he was not aware of pendency of the suit filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 4, no explanation could be furnished that while he filed another suit in 1996 for setting aside the decree dated 8.5.1996 in the suit of the respondents, why did he wait till the decision of that suit for lodging the FIR, as the civil and criminal proceedings could have proceeded simultaneously. The FIR was filed only on 23.07.2002 i.e. after filing the appeal before the High Court on 15.07.2002. Therefore, there is an inordinate delay on the part of the complainant in filing the FIR and there is no explanation whatsoever for the same. [para 20] [27-B-E] Sahib Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR95=AIR 1997 SC 3247, relied on. 1.4. The allegations made in the FIR were substantially similar to the allegations made by the appellants in the civil suit, which had been decided against them. The FIR was lodged only after loosing in the civil court. Thus, it is evident that the FIR was lodged with the sole intention of harassing the respondents and enmeshing them in long and arduous criminal proceedings. Such an action on the part of the appellants’ father would not be bona fide, and the criminal proceedings initiated by him against the respondents amount to an abuse of the process of law. [para 24] [29-B-D] Case Law Referene: AIR 1971 SC 1244 stood overruled para 12 1954 SCR1229 relied on para 13 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR79 disapproved para 14 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR350 relied on para 15 AIR 1945 PC 18 referred to para 15 2008 (3) SCR900 relied on para 16 2005 (2) SCR708 relied on para 17 2009 (3) SCR1017 relied on para 18 2009 (7) SCR977 relied on para 18 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 95 relied on para 21 AIR 1982 SC 1238 relied on para 22 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 relied on para 22 2000 (1) SCR417 relied on para 22 2008 (12) SCR623 relied on para 22 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1500 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 13.2.2009 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Misc. M. No. 4136 of 2003. K.T.S. Tulsi, Priyanka A., Niraj Gupta for the Appellant. Abhinav Ramkrishna, Rakesh Dahiya, Kuldip Singh for the Respondents.

a letter written to the civil court in Patna i...

Image via Wikipedia

 REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1500 OF 2010
 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5440 of 2009)

Kishan Singh (D) through L.Rs. ...Appellants

 Versus

Gurpal Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

 JUDGMENT

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and

Order dated 13.02.2009 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court at

Chandigarh in Criminal Misc. No. 4136 of 2003, wherein the First

Information Report (for short, "FIR") dated 23.07.2002 lodged by the

appellant under Sections 420/423/467/468/471/120-B of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as, "IPC") has been quashed

placing reliance on the decree of Civil Court between the same

parties in respect of the same subject matter.
3. The only question for our consideration involved in this appeal

is as to whether criminal proceedings can be quashed by the High

Court relying upon a finding of Civil Court on an issue involved in

criminal proceedings in respect of the same subject matter.

4. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that one

Kishori Lal executed an Agreement to Sell dated 4.1.1988 in favour of

Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 for land measuring 114 Kanals, 2 Marlas

situate in the revenue estate of Mauza Jadali, Tehsil Khanna, Punjab,

at the rate of Rs. 11000/- per bigha. Kishori Lal had received a sum

of Rs. 1 Lakh as Earnest Money from the said respondents. The said

land had already been mortgaged with the said respondents for Rs.

52000/-. As per the terms of the said Agreement dated 4.1.1988, the

sale deed was to be executed and registered by 10th June, 1989.

 Kishori Lal entered an Agreement to Sell dated 22.10.1988 with

Kishan Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, in respect of

the same land at the rate of Rs. 15300/- per bigha and received a

sum of Rs. 54000/- as earnest money. As per the said agreement,

the sale was to be executed and registered by 15.06.1989.

 2
5. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed suit No. 60 of 1989 against Kishori

Lal in Civil Court, Ludhiana for specific performance and got an

interim relief restraining Kishori Lal to alienate the suit land in favour

of anyone else by any manner. Sh. Kishan Singh, father of the

appellants, filed Civil Suit No. 81 of 1996 against Kishori Lal for

specific performance on 6.2.1996, however, the suit filed by the

respondent Nos. 1 to 4 against Kishori Lal was decreed in their favour

vide Judgment and decree dated 8.5.1996 and in pursuance thereof,

the sale has been executed by Kishori Lal in favour of the respondent

Nos. 1 to 4 on 17.05.1996.

6. Being aggrieved, Kishan Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the

appellants, filed suit No. 1075 of 1996 seeking cancellation/setting

aside of the decree dated 8.5.1996 passed in favour of respondent

Nos. 1 to 4. The said Civil Suit stood dismissed by the Civil Court

vide Judgment and decree dated 10.06.2002 against which, the

appellants have preferred Regular First Appeal (for short, "RFA") No.

2488 of 2002 before the High Court, which is still pending.

7. Kishan Singh, predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, filed

FIR No.144 dated 23.07.2002 under Sections 420/423/467/468/120-B

 3
IPC at Police Station Division No. 8, Ludhiana alleging forging of the

signatures of Kishori Lal on the agreement to sell dated 4.1.1988.

8. The respondents preferred a Criminal Misc. No. 4136-4 of 2003

before the High Court for quashing of the FIR No. 144 dated

23.07.2002 and proceeding subsequent thereto, on the ground that

appellants had lodged it after losing the civil case and with inordinate

delay. Findings on factual issues recorded in civil proceedings are

binding on criminal proceedings. The High Court, vide its Judgment

and order dated 13.02.2009, allowed the said application and

quashed the FIR on the ground that the appellants could not succeed

before the Civil Court and findings have been recorded by the Civil

Court to the effect that the document i.e. agreement to sell was not

forged or fabricated. Hence, this appeal.

9. Sh. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellants, has submitted that there is no prohibition in law for

simultaneously pursuing the civil as well as criminal remedies

available in law. Both the proceedings have to take course and to be

decided according to the evidence adduced therein. Findings of fact

recorded by the Civil Court are not binding on the criminal courts or

 4
vice-versa. The High Court committed a grave error in quashing the

FIR only on the basis of findings of fact recorded by the Civil Court.

10. Per contra, Sh. Abhinav Ramkrishna, learned counsel

appearing for the respondents, has vehemently opposed the appeal

contending that Kishan Singh filed the FIR at a much belated stage,

i.e. after dismissal of the civil suit by the Trial Court on 10.06.2002. In

case, the agreement in their favour provided that sale deed was to be

executed by 15th June, 1989, there could be no justification for them

to wait and file suit No. 81/1996 for specific performance on 6.2.1996.

Thus, FIR has been filed with inordinate delay of about 14 years and

even if, it is presumed that they were not aware of pendency of suit

No. 60/1989. Kishan Singh had become fully aware of all the

relevant facts at the time of filing the suit no. 1075 of 1996. There is

no explanation of delay even after 1996. Thus, the Judgment and

Order of the High Court does not warrant any interference. The

appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

11. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned

counsel for the parties and perused the record. The issue as to

whether the findings recorded by Civil Court are binding in criminal

 5
proceedings between the same parties in respect of the same subject

matter, is no more Res Integra.

12. In M/s Karamchand Ganga Pershad & Anr. Vs. Union of

India & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1244, this Court, while dealing with the

same issue, held as under :-

 "It is well established principle of law that the
 decisions of the civil courts are binding on the
 criminal courts. The converse is not true."

13. The said Judgment was delivered by a three-Judge Bench of

this Court without taking note of the Constitution Bench Judgment in

M.S. Sherrif Vs. The State of Madras & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 397 on

the same issue, wherein this Court has held as under :-

 "As between the civil and the criminal
 proceedings we are of the opinion that the
 criminal matters should be given precedence.
 There is some difference of opinion in the
 High Courts of India on this point. No hard
 and fast rule can be laid down but we do not
 consider that the possibility of conflicting
 decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a
 relevant consideration. The law envisages
 such an eventuality when it expressly refrains
 from making the decision of one court binding
 on the other, or even relevant, except for
 certain limited purposes, such as sentence or
 damages. The only relevant consideration
 here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
 Another factor which weighs with us is that a

 6
 civil suit often drags on for years and it is
 undesirable that a criminal prosecution should
 wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all
 about the crime. The public interests demand
 that criminal justice should be swift and sure;
 that the guilty should be punished while the
 events are still fresh in the public mind and
 that the innocent should be absolved as early
 as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial.
 Another reason is that it is undesirable to let
 things slide till memories have grown too dim
 to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast
 rule. Special considerations obtaining in any
 particular case might make some other
 course more expedient and just."

14. In V.M. Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1995) 5 SCC

767, this Court has held as under :-

 "As seen that the civil court after full-dressed
 trial recorded the finding that the appellant
 had not come into possession through the
 Company but had independent tenancy rights
 from the principal landlord and, therefore, the
 decree for eviction was negatived. Until that
 finding is duly considered by the appellate
 court after weighing the evidence afresh and if
 it so warranted reversed, the findings bind the
 parties. The findings, recorded by the criminal
 court, stand superseded by the findings
 recorded by the civil court. Thereby, the
 findings of the civil court get precedence over
 the findings recorded by the trial court, in
 particular, in summary trial for offences like
 Section 630. The mere pendency of the
 appeal does not have the effect of suspending
 the operation of the decree of the trial Court

 7
 and neither the finding of the civil court gets
 disturbed nor the decree becomes
 inoperative."

15. The correctness of the aforesaid judgment in V.M. Shah

(supra) was doubted by this Court and the case was referred to a

larger Bench in K.G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police & Anr.,

AIR 2002 SC 3372. In the said case, the Judgment in V.M. Shah

(supra) was not approved. While deciding the case, this Court

placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Privy Council in Emperor

Vs. Khwaja Nazair Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 wherein it has been

held as under :-

 "It is conceded that the findings in a civil
 proceeding are not binding in a
 subsequent prosecution founded upon the
 same or similar allegations. Moreover, the
 police investigation was stopped and it cannot
 be said with certainty that no more information
 could be obtained. But even if it were not, it is
 the duty of a criminal court when a
 prosecution for a crime takes place before it
 to form its own view and not to reach its
 conclusion by reference to any previous
 decision which is not binding upon it."
 (Emphasis added)

 8
16 In Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah &

Anr., (2005) 4 SCC 370, this Court held as under :-

 "Coming to the last contention that an effort
 should be made to avoid conflict of findings
 between the civil and criminal courts, it is
 necessary to point out that the standard of
 proof required in the two proceedings are
 entirely different. Civil cases are decided on
 the basis of preponderance of evidence while
 in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the
 prosecution and proof beyond reasonable
 doubt has to be given. There is neither any
 statutory provision nor any legal principle that
 the findings recorded in one proceeding may
 be treated as final or binding in the other, as
 both the cases have to be decided on the
 basis of the evidence adduced therein."

17. In P. Swaroopa Rani Vs. M. Hari Narayana alias Hari Babu,

AIR 2008 SC 1884, this Court has held as under :-

 "t is, however, well settled that in a given
 case, civil proceedings and criminal
 proceedings can proceed simultaneously.
 Whether civil proceedings or criminal
 proceedings shall be stayed depends upon
 the fact and circumstances of each case......
 Filing of an independent criminal proceeding,
 although initiated in terms of some
 observations made by the civil court, is not
 barred under any statute......It goes without
 saying that the respondent shall be at liberty
 to take recourse to such a remedy which is

 9
 available to him in law. We have interfered
 with the impugned order only because in law
 simultaneous proceedings of a civil and a
 criminal case is permissible."

18. In Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam & Anr. Vs. State

(Delhi Admn) & Anr., (2009) 5 SCC 528, this Court considered all

the earlier Judgments on the issue and held that while deciding the

case in Karam Chand (supra), this Court failed to take note of the

Constitution Bench Judgment in M.S. Sherrif (supra) and, therefore,

it remains per incuriam and does not lay down the correct law.

 A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Vishnu Dutt

Sharma Vs. Daya Prasad, (2009) 13 SCC 729, wherein it has been

held by this Court that the decision in Karamchand (supra) stood

overruled in K.G. Premshankar (supra).

19. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands

crystallized to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the Civil

Court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is

concerned and vice-versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and

criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities

while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is

 1
neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by

the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding

between the same parties while dealing with the same subject matter

and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence

adduced therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions

of Sections 41 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with

the relevance of previous Judgments in subsequent cases may be

taken into consideration.

20. In view of the above, the Judgment and order of the High Court

dated 13.02.2009 is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to

be set aside. However, the facts and circumstances of the case do

not warrant so. The agreement to sell in favour of the appellants'

father is dated 22.10.1988 and sale deed was to be executed and

registered by 15.06.1989. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed Civil suit

No. 60/1989 in 1989. It is difficult to believe that the appellants' father

was not aware of the pendency of that suit. No explanation has been

furnished as to why after expiry of the date of execution of the sale

deed in favour of Kishan Singh, i.e. 15.06.1989, the appellants' father

did not file the suit for specific performance which was subsequently

filed on 6.2.1996 as Civil Suit No. 81/1996. Even if it is presumed

 1
that Kishan Singh was not aware of pendency of suit filed by the

respondent Nos. 1 to 4, no explanation could be furnished that in

case, the appellants' father filed another suit No. 1075/1996 for

setting aside the decree dated 8.5.1996 in Civil Suit no.60/1989, why

did he wait till the decision of that suit for lodging FIR, as the civil and

criminal proceedings could have proceeded simultaneously. The FIR

has been filed only on 23.07.2002 i.e. after filing the RFA No.

2488/2002 before the High Court on 15.07.2002. Therefore, there is

an inordinate delay on the part of the appellants' father in filing the

FIR and there is no explanation whatsoever for the same.

21. Prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by the informant

with all its vivid details gives an assurance regarding truth of its

version. In case, there is some delay in filing the FIR, the

complainant must give explanation for the same. Undoubtedly, delay

in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant's case improbable

when such delay is properly explained. However, deliberate delay in

lodging the complaint is always fatal. [vide: Sahib Singh Vs. State

of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 3247].

 1
22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court has

to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence of such

an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing

such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an

after thought or had given a coloured version of events. In such

cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the

reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the Civil

Court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side

with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance

on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be

permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the

jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to

be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and

persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a

view to spite the other party because of a private and personal

grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal

proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of

the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (vide :

Chandrapal Singh & Ors. Vs. Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR 1982 SC

1238; State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR

 1
1992 SC 604; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR

2000 SC 754; and Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. & Ors., (2008)

12 SCC 531).

23. The case before us relates to a question of the genuineness of

the agreement to sell dated 4.1.1988. The said agreement was

between Kishori Lal and respondents and according to the terms of

the said agreement, the sale deed was to be executed by 10.6.1989.

As the sale deed was not executed within the said time, suit for

specific performance was filed by the other party in 1989 which was

decreed in 1996. So far as the present appellants are concerned,

agreement to sell dated 22.10.1988 was executed in favour of their

father and the sale deed was to be executed by 15.6.1989. No action

was taken till 1996 for non-execution of the sale deed. The

appellants' father approached the court after 7 years by filing Suit

No.81/1996 for specific performance. However, by that time, the suit

filed by the present respondents stood decreed. The appellants'

father filed another Suit No.1075/96 for setting aside the judgment

and decree passed in favour of the respondents 1 to 4. The said suit

was dismissed by the Additional District Judge (Senior Division),

Khanna on 10.6.2002. Subsequently, the appellants preferred RFA

 1
No. 2488/02 on 15.7.2002 against the aforesaid order, and the said

appeal is still pending before the Punjab & Haryana High Court.

24. It is to be noted that the appellants' father Kishan Singh lodged

FIR No.144/02 on 23.7.2002 through his attorney Jaswant Singh

Mann under Sections 420/323/467/468/471/120-B IPC, against the

respondents. The allegations made in the FIR were substantially

similar to the allegations made by the appellants in Civil Suit

No.1075/96, which had been decided against them. It is evident

that the aforesaid FIR was filed with inordinate delay and there has

been no plausible explanation for the same. The appellants lodged

the aforesaid FIR only after meeting their Waterloo in the Civil Court.

Thus, it is evident that the FIR was lodged with the sole intention of

harassing the respondents and enmeshing them in long and arduous

criminal proceedings. We are of the view that such an action on the

part of the appellants' father would not be bona fide, and the criminal

proceedings initiated by him against the respondents amount to an

abuse of the process of law.

25. In view of the above, and to do substantial justice, we are not

inclined to interfere with the order passed by the High Court quashing

 1
the criminal proceedings against the respondents in spite of the fact

that the impugned judgment dated 13.02.2009 passed in Criminal

Misc. No. 4136 of 2003 is not sustainable in the eyes of law.

26. With these observations, the appeal stands disposed of.

 ..................................J.
 (P. SATHASIVAM) ..................................J.
New Delhi, (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
August 12, 2010 1

About advocatemmmohan

ADVOCATE

Discussion

Comments are closed.

Blog Stats

  • 2,887,333 hits

ADVOCATE MMMOHAN

archieves

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,905 other followers
Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com
%d bloggers like this: