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Interim order : Interim direction to tenant, in a suit by creditor against landlords/borrowers to deposit arrears of rent in Court and to continue to deposit the rents in Court with a condition that tenant would pay interest if rent was not so deposited -Held: Such interim direction cannot be considered to be injunction order – Such interim direction would not fall under order 39 Rule 1 CPC as the prayer did not relate to clause (a), (b) or (c) of the said rule, nor under Order 39 rule 2 CPC as there was no contract between the creditor and the tenant nor any injury caused by tenant to bank – Injunction – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.39 rr.1 and 2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or.39 rule 2A – Application under – Held: Maintainable only when there is disobedience of any injunction granted or order made under Rule 1 or 2 of Or.39 or breach of the terms on which injunction was granted or the order was made – Direction to pay money either by way of final or interim order is not an injunction – On facts, on an application by bank, interim direction to tenant to deposit rents to the loan account of landlord/borrower – Tenant vacated the tenanted godown – Landlord had no locus to file application under Or.39 r.2A alleging disobedience of interim order – Trial court erred in misinterpreting the interim order and in allowing the application under Or.39 r.2A. Contempt jurisdiction : Held: Cannot be invoked for enforcement of money decree or directions/orders for payment of money – If garnishee who is directed to pay money does not pay the amount, the remedy is execution and not action for contempt or disobedience in Or.39 r.2A – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.21 r.46B, Or.39 r.2A – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The respondent-defendant no. 1 and his brother offered to construct and let out godowns to appellant and for that purpose obtained loan of Rs.10 lakhs from Bank for construction of godowns and mortgaged their properties in favour of Bank. Three godowns were constructed by respondent and his brother and let out to appellant for five years in 1978. On instruction of lessors, appellant credited the rents to the loan account of lessors with the bank. Appellant vacated the said godowns and surrendered back possession in December, 1983. The Bank filed suit against the respondent-defendants 1 to 3 and their guarantors for recovery of loan amount, by sale of mortgaged properties and balance if any personally from the borrowers and their guarantors. Respondent contested the claim on the ground that the loan was obtained for constructing godowns for appellant who had agreed to remain in occupation of those godowns till repayment of entire loan amount and appellant had vacated the godowns prematurely and should be made party to the suit and also made liable for payment of the suit claim. The trial court directed impleadment of appellant as seventh defendant in the suit. In June, 1994, during pendency of suit, appellant took one godown on month to month lease with a condition to surrender same without any notice. On 18.1.1996, the bank filed an application in its suit, seeking an interim direction to appellant to restrain it from paying the rent for the said godown to lessors and to deposit the rents to the loan account of defendants 1 to 3 with the bank. The trial Court allowed the application by order dated 27.5.1996. It held that when appellant earlier took the godowns on rent for five years, the borrowers had authorized the Bank to receive the rent with the condition that if the lease was not continued, the lessors-borrowers would be liable to pay the loan amount from their own resources. It further held that bank was authorized under the loan documents executed by the lessors to receive the rents in respect of the mortgaged property directly from the tenant. It directed appellant to deposit rent payable to landlords upto 31.3.1996 with the Bank by way of fixed deposit in the name of lessors. In regard to the rent payable from 1.4.1996, in respect of every 12 months, the court directed that 2 months rent be paid directly to lessors and 10 months rent be deposited with plaintiff Bank; and that if appellant failed to deposit rent as directed, it would be liable to pay interest. Appellant vacated the said godown on 7.2.1997. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application under Order 39 r. 2A CPC alleging that appellant disobeyed the order dated 27.5.1996. In the said application respondent prayed that action be taken against appellant and its officers for contempt, by seizing and auctioning their movable and immovable properties and by sending its four officers to prison for not depositing the rents in terms of order dated 27.5.1996. In the said application, the respondent contended that in view of the interim order dated 27.5.1996, appellant became liable to deposit the rent for the three godowns from 1.12.1983 till 31.3.1996 and also to continue to pay the rents from 1.4.1996. The application was resisted by appellant and its officers. The trial court by order dated 15.12.2004 allowed the said application. It interpreted the order dated 27.5.1996 as directing appellant to deposit rent of three godowns from December, 1983 up to 31.3.1996. Consequently, it held that appellant was liable to pay the said arrears with interest at 13% per annum (Rs. 1, 12, 24, 792/-) and as the said amount was not deposited, appellant was held liable under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC for disobedience of the order dated 27.5.1996. It also directed that the assets of appellant should be attached under order 39 Rule 2A CPC. The High Court dismissed the appeal with an observation that it was not competent to consider the validity of the `injunction order’ in an appeal against an order passed under order 39 Rule 2A CPC, for disobedience of the `injunction order’. The High Court assumed that in the appeal against the order dated 15.12.2004 passed under Order 39 Rule 2A, appellant was trying to challenge the validity of the `injunction order’ dated 27.5.1996. Hence the present appeal. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The order dated 27.5.1996 was passed on an application dated 12.1.1996 filed by the plaintiff bank. It was not filed either under Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39 CPC. In fact, the application did not mention the provision of law under which it was filed. The bank did not claim that appellant had any privity of contract with it, nor claimed that appellant was a co-obligant. In the application, the bank specifically stated that the relief sought by it in the said application for deposit of rent was in regard to the godown belonging to defendants 1 to 3 that was taken on rent by appellant during June, 1994. There is a further clear averment in the application that it had vacated the godowns earlier taken by it on lease, after the lease period (of 5 years) and that appellant had again taken one godown on rent during the pendency of the suit and that the application related to that godown. The order dated 27.5.1996 did not consider any claim for rent in regard to the three godowns which were vacated in December 1983. The court did not hold or direct that appellant was liable to pay any amount by way of rent or otherwise in regard to the three godowns for the period December, 1983 to 31.3.1996. In fact there was no reference to the three godowns at all except to the statement of the bank that appellant had vacated those godowns after the lease period (in December 1983). Thus there was no application for an `injunction’, nor any order of `injunction’ by the court. An interim direction to a tenant in a suit by the creditor against the landlords/borrowers, to deposit the arrears of rent in court and to continue the deposit the rents in court with a condition that the tenant would pay interest if the rent was not so deposited, cannot be considered to be an order of `injunction’. In a general sense, though every order of a court which commands or forbids is an injunction, but in its accepted legal sense, an injunction is a judicial mandate operating in personam by which, upon certain established principles of equity, a party is required to do or refrain from doing a particular thing. A direction to pay money either by way of final or interim order, is not considered to be an `injunction’ as assumed by the courts below. [Para 16] [1121- D-H; 1122-A-G] Howard C. Joyce – A Treatise on the Law relating to injunctions (1909) S. 1 – referred to. 1.2. Admittedly the application dated 12.1.1996, on which the order dated 27.5.1996 was passed, did not fall under Rule 1 of Order 39 CPC as the prayer therein did not relate to any of the three matters mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the said rule. It did not also fall under Rule 2 of Order 39 as admittedly there was no contract between the bank and appellant nor any allegation that appellant was committing any injury of any kind to the bank. Therefore, the order dated 27.5.1996 was not an order under either Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 CPC. The suit itself was for recovery of the amounts due by the borrowers, by sale of the mortgaged properties belonging to the borrowers (defendants 1 to 3) and to recover the balance personally from the borrowers and guarantors (defendants 1 to 6). When appellant was subsequently added as seventh defendant at the instance of defendants 1 to 3, no relief was sought against appellant nor was the prayers amended seeking any decree against appellant. If there was no prayer in the suit against appellant, obviously no interim relief could have been sought against appellant as a defendant. Even assuming that the final relief was sought against appellant also, the position is that appellant was only a `garnishee defendant’ and not a `principal defendant’. The order dated 27.5.1996 was not an injunction order, but an interim prohibitory (garnishee) order by way of attachment before judgment, in regard to the rents payable for one godown taken by it on lease in June, 1994. [Para 17] [1122-G-H; 1123-A-D] 2.1. An application under Order 39, Rule 2A CPC is maintainable only when there is disobedience of any `injunction’ granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order was made. The application by the bank, on which the said order dated 27.5.1996 was passed, was neither under Rule 1 nor under Rule 2 of Order 39 CPC and none of the ingredients required for an application under either Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 existed was found in the application by the bank. Even otherwise, the respondent had no locus to file an application under Order 39 Rule 2A alleging disobedience of the order dated 27.5.1996. The plaintiff bank which filed the application dated 12.1.1996 on which the said order dated 27.5.1996 was passed, did not complain of any disobedience or breach of the order dated 27.5.1996, nor sought any action or relief against appellant alleging non-compliance or disobedience of the order dated 27.5.1996. As the interim order dated 27.5.1996 was not made on an application made by the respondent and as the interim order was not intended for the benefit to the respondent who was the first defendant in the suit, he could not be said to be a person aggrieved by the alleged disobedience or breach of the order dated 27.5.1996. [Paras 18, 19] [1123-E-H; 1124-A-C] 2.2. The power exercised by a court under order 39, Rule 2A CPC is punitive in nature, akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The person who complains of disobedience or breach has to clearly make out beyond any doubt that there was an injunction or order directing the person against whom the application is made, to do or desist from doing some specific thing or act and that there was disobedience or breach of such order. While considering an application under order 39 Rule 2A, the court cannot construe the order in regard to which disobedience/breach is alleged, as creating an obligation to do something which is not mentioned in the `order’, on surmises and inferences. The power under Rule 2A should be exercised with great caution and responsibility. It is shocking that the trial court entertained an application under Order 39 Rule 2A from a person who was not entitled to file the application, accepted an interpretation of the order which does not flow from the order, and created liability where none existed, resulting in attachments of the assets of appellant to an extent of more than Rs.1.12 crores. The order dated 15.12.2004 cannot be supported or sustained under any circumstances. [Para 24] [1127-B-F] 3.1. The garnishee proceedings are governed by Rules 46 and 46A to 46F of Order 21 CPC. The amount due by a garnishee, if disputed has to be determined as if it was an issue in the suit and the court can appropriate order determine the extent of liability of the garnishee. In this case, there was no adjudication of the amount payable by appellant. Whatever amount that was due in pursuance of the order dated 27.5.1996 in regard to one godown taken on lease in June 1994, was deposited by appellant and the plaintiff bank at whose instance the order was made has no complaint or grievance. [Para 20] [1124-D-H; 1125-A] 3.2. If a garnishee, or a defendant, who is directed to pay any sum of money, does not pay the amount, the remedy is to levy execution and not in an action for contempt or disobedience/breach under order 39 Rule 2A. This is evident from Rule 46B of Order 21 read with Rule 11A of Order 38 CPC. Contempt jurisdiction, either under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, or under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code, is not intended to be used for enforcement of money decrees or directions/orders for payment of money. The process and concept of execution is different from process and concept of action for disobedience/contempt. [Para 21] [1125-A-C] 4.1. The application dated 12.1.1996 filed by the bank did not claim or seek a direction for payment of alleged arrears of rent relating to three godowns taken on lease in the year 1978 and vacated in December 1983. In particular, it did not make any claim for rent, for the period December, 1983 to 31.3.1996 when appellant was not in occupation of three godown. The bank stated in its application that appellant had vacated those godowns after completion of the lease period (that is in December, 1983) and that subsequently during the pendency of the suit the appellant had taken one of those godowns again on rent in June, 1994. The relief claimed in the application was that in regard to the godown taken on rent by appellant in June, 1994, it should be directed to deposit the rents in court as the borrowers/debtors were attempting to collect the said rent and thereby deny the benefit of rent to the bank even though the borrowers had agreed under the loan documents that the rents in regard to the godowns could be directly received by the bank. Therefore when the application itself was only in regard to the rent for one godown from June, 1994 onwards, the trial court could not come to the conclusion that the said order dated 27.5.1996 directed FCI to deposit the rent for three godowns for the period December, 1983 to 31.3.1996 and that failure to do so was punishable under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC. The trial court by a convoluted reasoning based on a baseless interpretation of the order dated 27.5.1996 held that appellant had not placed any evidence in the proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A that it had vacated the three godowns in December, 1983 and therefore, it continued to be liable to pay the rents for three godowns from December 1983 onwards. [Para 22] [1125-D-H; 1126-A-B] 4.2. It is not understandable how in a suit filed in the year 1991 by the bank against the borrowers for enforcement of mortgage, an order made on the bank’s application for deposit of rents relating to a godown taken in June, 1994, can be interpreted by the court considering the application under order 39 Rule 2A CPC, as containing a direction for deposit of rents in regard to three godowns vacated in December 1983, for the period December, 1983 to 31.3.1996. [Para 23] [1126-D-F] 5. It is unfortunate that the High Court dismissed the appeal on a wholly baseless and erroneous assumption that the appellant was trying to challenge only the order dated 27.5.1996, in the appeal against the order dated 15.12.2004. When a huge liability of Rs.1,12,24,792.99 was sought to be created on the appellant in a proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A, the High Court did not even bother to refer to the facts and merits, and chose to sum-marily dispose of the appeal thereby allowing perpetration of a patent abuse of process of court by the respondent. The travails of the appellant could have been avoided if the trial court and the High Court had been diligent to ensure that its process were not misused and abused by the respondent. [Paras 25, 26] [1127-G-H; 1128-A-E] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.380 of 2007 From the Judgement and Order dated 06.03.2006 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in FAFO No. 343 of 2005. P.P. Malhotra, Ajit Pudussery, K. Vijayan, with him, for the Appellant. S.R. Yadav, Braj Kishore Mishra, Vikram, Tanushree Sinha, Aparna Jha, with him for the Respondent.

FCI Godowns, Nimmada

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 1

 Reportable

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.380 OF 2007

Food Corporation of India ... Appellant

Vs.

Sukh Deo Prasad ... Respondent

 JUDGMENT

R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.

 The Food Corporation of India (`FCI' for short) challenges the

order dated 6.3.2006 of the Allahabad High Court, rejecting its appeal

against the order dated 15.12.2004 passed by the Additional District

Judge (Special judge EC), Jhansi ordering attachment of its properties

under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code for

short) to an extent of Rs. 1,12,24,792.99.
 2

Facts of the case :

2. In the year 1976, the respondent (Sukh Deo Prasad) offered to

construct and let out godowns to FCI. For that purpose, the

respondent and his brother V.K.Shukla obtained a term loan of Rs.10

lakhs from the State Bank of India, Jhansi Branch (for short `the

bank') on 31.8.1977 and as security therefor mortgaged their land (in

Khard village) and house property (at Jhansi) in favour of the Bank

by deposit of title deeds. The repayment of the said loan was also

guaranteed by one Raj Narain Khare and Shri Kishan on 6.10.1977.

In addition, another sum of Rs.5 lacs was sanctioned by the bank, by

way of term loan to the respondent on 29.8.1977, repayment of which

was guaranteed by one Ram Kishore Gupta and Khachore.

3. Three godowns were constructed by the respondent and his

brother and let out to FCI for a term of five years in the year 1978. On

the instructions of the lessors, FCI credited the rents to the loan

account of the landlords with the bank. FCI vacated the said godowns

and surrendered back possession in December, 1983.
 3

4. The bank filed Suit No.93/1991 (the court of the Special Judge,

E.C. Jhansi) against the respondent (Defendant No.1), the wife and

son of his brother V.K.Shukla (defendants 2 and 3), Raj Narain Khare

(Defendant No.4 - guarantor for the loan of Rs.10 lacs) and Ram

Kishore Gupta and Khachore (defendants 5 and 6 -- guarantors for the

loan of Rs.5 lacs) for recovery of Rs.20,68,120.74 with interest at the

rate of 11% with monthly rents, by sale of the mortgaged properties

and for recovery of the balance amount, if any, personally from the

defendants.

5. Defendants 1 to 3 in the suit contested the claim. They inter

alia contended that the loan was obtained for the purpose of

constructing godowns for FCI, that FCI had agreed to continue in

occupation of those godowns as tenant until the entire loan due by

them (landlords) to the bank was cleared, that FCI had vacated the

godowns prematurely, and that therefore it should be made a party to

the suit and made liable for payment of the suit claim. Issue No.7 was

framed in the suit, as to whether suit was bad for non-joinder of FCI,

and considered as a preliminary issue. By order dated 18.5.1994, the

court directed FCI be impleaded as the seventh defendant in the suit.
 4

FCI was not given any opportunity to show cause before being

impleaded.

6. In June 1994, during the pendency of the said suit, the

respondent and his son Sunil Kumar offered a fresh lease of one of

the three godowns and the appellant took it temporarily on a month to

month tenancy on a rent of Rs.0.50 paise per sq. ft. The tenancy

agreement made it clear that FCI could surrender back the godown

without any notice, whenever the same was not required.

7. On 18.1.1996 the bank filed an application in its suit, seeking

an interim direction to FCI to restrain it from paying the rent for the

said godown to defendants 1 to 3 and for a further interim direction to

FCI to deposit the rents relating to the godown, to the loan account of

defendants 1 to 3 with the bank. In the said application, the bank

averred that FCI had earlier taken the godowns on rent in the year

1978 and had vacated them on the expiry of the lease period of 5

years; that in June, 1994, FCI had again taken on lease one of the

godowns; that inspite of having agreed that the bank was entitled to

receive the rents from the tenant (FCI), defendants 1 to 3 were

collecting the rent in respect of the said godown directly from FCI
 5

with the intention of denying the same to the bank, and that therefore

it was entitled to an interim direction.

8. The trial court allowed the said application by order dated

27.5.1996. It found that when FCI had earlier taken the godowns on

rent for five years, the borrowers had authorized the Bank to receive

the rent with the condition that if the lease was not continued by FCI,

the borrowers would be liable to pay the loan amount from their own

resources. It held that bank was authorized under the loan documents

executed by the borrowers to receive the rents in respect of the

mortgaged property directly from the tenant. But as the borrowers

were disputing the amount of liability, it issued the following

directions in regard to the rent for the godown :

(a) FCI shall deposit the rent payable to defendants 1 and 2
 (landlords) up to 31.3.1996 with the Punjab National Bank by
 way of a fixed deposit in the name of the defendants 1 and 2.

(b) In regard to the rent payable from 1.4.1996, in respect of every
 12 months rent, 2 months rent shall be paid directly to
 defendants 1 and 2 (towards building maintenance) and balance
 10 months' rent shall be deposited with plaintiff Bank, to be
 invested in the name of the landlords/defendants 1 and 2 by
 way of MCC periodical deposits.

(c) If FCI failed to deposit the rent as aforesaid, it shall be liable to
 pay interest @ 13% per annum on the rent defaulted.
 6

(d) The amounts so deposited will be dealt with in terms of
 decision on issue No.10 as to the amount due to the bank, in the
 final judgment to be rendered.

9. FCI vacated the said godown taken on rent in June 1994 on

7.2.1997. Before doing so, it issued a notice dated 31.12.1996 to the

landlords (respondent and his son) that tenancy would stand

terminated on expiry of 30 days from the date of service of the said

notice and called upon them to take possession. It informed the

landlords that it had deposited the rents upto December 1996 in the

Bank in terms of the order dated 27.5.1996 and sent the FD receipt to

the court. It also issued a public notice in the Daily Newspaper

`Dainik Jagran' dated 18.2.1997 that it had vacated the godown taken

on rent on 18.6.1994, on 7.2.1997.

10. The respondent herein filed an application under Order 39 Rule

2A of the Code (Contempt Application 31/1996) on 6.11.1996

alleging that FCI had disobeyed the order dated 27.5.1996 and

consequently the District Manager of FCI (Shri Ashraf Ali) should be

sent to civil jail and properties of FCI should be attached and

auctioned. The said application was dismissed for default

on 12.11.1997.
 7

11. Thereafter the respondent filed yet another application (Misc.

49/1998) under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code against FCI, its Senior

Regional Manager and three District managers. In the said application

respondent prayed that action should be taken against FCI and its

officers for contempt, by seizing and auctioning the movable and

immovable properties of FCI and by sending its four officers to

prison for not depositing the rents in terms of order dated 27.5.1996.

In the said application, the respondent contended that in view of the

interim order dated 27.5.1996, FCI became liable to deposit the rent

for the three godowns from 1.12.1983 till 31.3.1996 and also continue

to pay the rents from 1.4.1996. The application was resisted by FCI

and its officers.

12. The trial court by order dated 15.12.2004 allowed the said

application. It interpreted the order dated 27.5.1996 as directing FCI

to deposit of rent of three godowns from December, 1983 up to

31.3.1996. Consequently, it held that FCI was liable to pay the said

arrears with interest at 13% per annum. Acting on a calculation sheet

provided by the respondent, it held that a sum of Rs.1,12,24,792.99

was due by FCI towards such rent and interest; and as the said
 8

amount was not deposited, FCI was liable to be punished under Order

39 Rule 2A of the Code for disobedience of the order dated

27.5.1996. It therefore directed that the assets of FCI, both movable

and immovable, should be attached under order 39 Rule 2A CPC in

respect of the said sum of Rs.1,12,24,792.99.

13. Feeling aggrieved, FCI filed an appeal (FAFO No. 343/2005)

before the Allahabad High Court. The High Court dismissed the

appeal by a brief order dated 6.3.2006, without prejudice to the rights

of FCI to challenge the order of injunction, with an observation that it

was not competent to consider the validity of the `injunction order' in

an appeal against an order passed under order 39 Rule 2A of the

Code, for disobedience of the `injunction order'. The High Court

assumed that in the appeal against the order dated 15.12.2004 passed

under Order 39 Rule 2A, FCI was trying to challenge the validity of

the `injunction order' dated 27.5.1996. The said order is challenged

by FCI in this appeal by special leave.

Questions for decision

14. On the contentions urged, the following questions arise for

consideration :
 9

(i) What is the purport and effect of the order dated 27.5.1996
 described by the trial court and the High Court as the
 `injunction order'.

(ii) Whether the respondent, who was the first defendant in the
 mortgage suit filed by the bank, could maintain an application
 under order 39 Rule 2A of the Code for the alleged
 disobedience by FCI (a co-defendant), of the order dated
 27.5.1996 made in an application filed by the plaintiff bank?

(iii) Whether the trial court was justified in allowing such
 application under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code, holding that
 FCI was liable to pay the rents for three godowns from
 December, 1983 to 31.3.1996 and interest thereon and direct
 attachment of the assets of FCI to an extent of
 Rs.1,12,24,792.99?

(iv) Whether the High Court was justified in disposing of FCI's
 appeal in a summary manner?

Re : Question (i) :

15. At the outset it should be made clear that we are considering

only the purport and effect of the interim order dated 27.5.1996 and

not the correctness or validity of the said order, as what is under

challenge is not the order dated 27.5.1996, but the order dated

15.12.2004 under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code holding that FCI had

disobeyed the order dated 27.5.1996.
 10

16. The order dated 27.5.1996 was passed on an application dated

12.1.1996 filed by the plaintiff bank. It was not filed either under

Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39 of the Code. In fact, the application did not

mention the provision of law under which it was filed. The bank did

not claim that FCI had any privity of contract with it, nor claim that

FCI was a co-obligant. In the application, the bank specifically stated

that the relief sought by it in the said application for deposit of rent

was in regard to the godown belonging to defendants 1 to 3 that was

taken on rent by FCI during June, 1994. There is a further clear

averment in the application that FCI had vacated the godowns earlier

taken by it on lease, after the lease period (of 5 years) and that FCI

had again taken one godown on rent during the pendency of the suit

and that the application related to that godown. The order dated

27.5.1996 did not consider any claim for rent in regard the to three

godowns which were vacated in December 1983, nor consider the

contention of defendants 1 to 3 in their written statement that FCI had

agreed to continue beyond five years. The court did not hold or direct

that FCI was liable to pay any amount by way of rent or otherwise in

regard to the three godowns for the period December, 1983 to

31.3.1996. In fact there was no reference to the three godowns at all
 11

except to the statement of the bank that FCI had vacated those

godowns after the lease period (in December 1983). The court was of

the view that having regard to the dispute raised by the

defendants/borrowers in regard to the amount claimed by the bank, it

will not be proper to direct FCI to pay the rents directly to the bank.

As the bank had stated that FCI had not paid the rent for the godown

which it had taken on lease in June, 1994, for non-fulfilment of the

formalities by the landlords, the court directed FCI to deposit the

rents in regard to that godown up to 31.3.1996 and the same be kept

in a fixed deposit with some other nationalized bank. It also directed

that in regard to the rent accruing in regard to that godown from

1.4.1996 from out of rent payable during every year, two months rent

in a year should be paid to defendants 1 and 2 towards repairs and

maintenance and remaining 10 months rent should be deposited with

the bank, for being invested in a MCC deposit. It also directed that in

the event of non-payment of such rent by FCI, it shall pay interest at

13% per annum. Thus there was no application for an `injunction',

nor any order of `injunction' by the court. An interim direction to a

defendant-tenant in a suit by the creditor against the

landlords/borrowers, to deposit the arrears of rent in court and to
 12

continue the deposit the rents in court with a condition that the tenant

will have to pay interest if the rent was not so deposited, cannot be

considered to be an order of `injunction'. In a general sense, though

every order of a court which commands or forbids is an injunction,

but in its accepted legal sense, an injunction is a judicial mandate

operating in personam by which, upon certain established principles

of equity, a party is required to do or refrain from doing a particular

thing [see Howard C. Joyce - A Treatise on the Law relating to

injunctions (1909) S. 1 at 2-3]. A direction to pay money either by

way of final or interim order, is not considered to be an `injunction'

as assumed by the courts below.

17. Admittedly the application dated 12.1.1996, on which the order

dated 27.5.1996 was passed, did not fall under Rule 1 of Order 39 as

the prayer therein did not relate to any of the three matters mentioned

in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the said rule. It did not also fall under

Rule 2 of Order 39 as admittedly there was no contract between the

bank and FCI nor any allegation that FCI was committing any injury

of any kind to the bank. Therefore, the order dated 27.5.1996 was not

an order under either Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code. The

suit itself was for recovery of the amounts due by the borrowers, by
 13

sale of the mortgaged properties belonging to the borrowers

(defendants 1 to 3) and to recover the balance personally from the

borrowers and guarantors (defendants 1 to 6). When FCI was

subsequently added as seventh defendant at the instance of

defendants 1 to 3, no relief was sought against FCI nor was the

prayers amended seeking any decree against FCI. If there was no

prayer in the suit against FCI, obviously no interim relief could have

been sought against FCI as a defendant. Even assuming that the final

relief was sought against FCI also, the position is that FCI was only a

`garnishee defendant' and not a `principal defendant'. The order dated

27.5.1996 was not an injunction order, but an interim prohibitory

(garnishee) order by way of attachment before judgment, in regard to

the rents payable for one godown taken by it on lease in June, 1994.

Re : Question (ii)

18. An application under Order 39, Rule 2A of the Code is

maintainable only when there is disobedience of any `injunction'

granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 or

breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the

order was made. We have already noticed that the application by

the bank, on which the said order dated 27.5.1996 was passed, was
 14

neither under Rule 1 nor under Rule 2 of Order 39 CPC and none of

the ingredients required for an application under either Rule 1 or

Rule 2 of Order 39 existed was found in the application by the bank.

As the order dated 27.5.1996 was neither under Rule 1 or 2 of Order

39, the application under Rule 2A of Order 39 was not maintainable.

19. Even otherwise, the respondent had no locus to file an

application under Order 39 Rule 2A alleging disobedience of the

order dated 27.5.1996. The plaintiff bank which filed the application

dated 12.1.1996 on which the said order dated 27.5.1996 was passed,

did not complain of any disobedience or breach of the order dated

27.5.1996, nor sought any action or relief against FCI alleging non-

compliance or disobedience of the order dated 27.5.1996. As the

interim order dated 27.5.1996 was not made on an application made

by the respondent and as the interim order was not intended for the

benefit to the respondent who was the first defendant in the suit, he

could not be said to be a person aggrieved by the alleged

disobedience or breach of the order dated 27.5.1996.

20. The garnishee proceedings are governed by Rules 46 and 46A

to 46F of Order 21 of the Code. Sub-para (1) of Rule 46 A provides

that in the case of a debt (other than a debt secured by a mortgage or a
 15

charge) which has been attached under Rule 46, upon the application

of the attaching creditor, the court may issue notice to the garnishee

liable to pay such debt, calling upon him either to pay into court the

debt due from debtor or to appear and show cause why he should not

do so. Rule 46B provides that where the garnishee does not forthwith

pay into court the amount due from him to the debtor and does not

appear and show cause in answer to the notice, the court may order

the garnishee to comply with the terms of such notice, and on such

order, execution may issue as though such order were a decree against

him. Rule 46C provides that where the garnishee disputes liability,

the court may order that any issue or question necessary for the

determination of liability shall be tried as if it were an issue in a suit,

and upon the determination of such issue shall make such order or

orders as it deems fit. It would thus be seen that the amount due by a

garnishee, if disputed has to be determined as if it was an issue in the

suit and the court can appropriate order determine the extent of

liability of the garnishee. In this case, there was no adjudication of

the amount payable by FCI. Whatever amount that was due in

pursuance of the order dated 27.5.1996 in regard to one godown

taken on lease in June 1994, was deposited by FCI and the plaintiff
 16

bank at whose instance the order was made has no complaint or

grievance.

21. At all events, if a garnishee, or a defendant, who is directed to

pay any sum of money, does not pay the amount, the remedy is to

levy execution and not in an action for contempt or

disobedience/breach under order 39 Rule 2A. This is evident from

Rule 46B of Order 21 read with Rule 11A of Order 38 of the Code.

Contempt jurisdiction, either under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971,

or under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code, is not intended to be used for

enforcement of money decrees or directions/orders for payment of

money. The process and concept of execution is different from

process and concept of action for disobedience/contempt.

Re : Question (iii)

22. The application dated 12.1.1996 filed by the bank did not claim

or seek a direction for payment of alleged arrears of rent relating to

three godowns taken on lease in the year 1978 and vacated in

December 1983. In particular, it did not make any claim for rent, for

the period December, 1983 to 31.3.1996 when FCI was not in

occupation of three godown. As noticed above, the bank stated in its
 17

application that FCI had vacated those godowns after completion of

the lease period (that is in December, 1983) and that subsequently

during the pendency of the suit the appellant had taken one of those

godowns again on rent in June, 1994. The relief claimed in the

application was that in regard to the godown taken on rent by FCI in

June, 1994, it should be directed to deposit the rents in court as the

borrowers/debtors were attempting to collect the said rent and thereby

deny the benefit of rent to the bank even though the borrowers had

agreed under the loan documents that the rents in regard to the

godowns could be directly received by the bank. Therefore when the

application itself was only in regard to the rent for one godown from

June, 1994 onwards, we fail to understand how the trial court could

come to the conclusion that the said order dated 27.5.1996 directed

FCI to deposit the rent for three godowns for the period December,

1983 to 31.3.1996 and that failure to do so was punishable under

Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code. The trial court by a convoluted

reasoning based on a baseless interpretation of the order dated

27.5.1996 held that FCI had not placed any evidence in the

proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A that it had vacated the three
 18

godowns in December, 1983 and therefore, it continued to be liable to

pay the rents for three godowns from December 1983 onwards.

23. The obvious question that ought to have been posed is if rents

were payable from December, 1983 onwards by FCI, why the

respondent as landlord, did not take any action to recover the same;

and if the bank was entitled to receive the said rents, why the bank

did not take action to recover the same. Obviously any claim for rent

against the defendant in regard to any period beyond three years

would be barred by limitation, in the absence of any

acknowledgement or payment on account. It is un-understandable

how in a suit filed in the year 1991 by the bank against the borrowers

for enforcement of mortgage, an order made on the bank's application

for deposit of rents relating to a godown taken by FCI on rent from

the borrower in June, 1994, can be interpreted by the court

considering the application under order 39 Rule 2A of the Code, as

containing a direction for deposit of rents in regard to three godowns

vacated in December 1983, for the period December, 1983 to

31.3.1996. The absurdity, perversity and arbitrariness of the order

dated 15.12.2004 becomes evident from the following :
 19

(i) FCI is held liable for payment of rent of Rs.1,12,24,792/99 in a

 collateral supplemental proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A of

 the Code, initiated by a person who was not a `person

 aggrieved'.

(ii) Such liability is created in respect of a time barred claim for

 rent by the landlord.

(iii) FCI is made liable for the said sum without the landlords filing

 a suit for recovery of rents and without adjudication of the

 claim for such rent;

(iv) Such liability is inferred by interpreting a garnishee order

 obtained by the landlord's creditor in regard to a different lease

 relating to a different period.

24. The power exercised by a court under order 39, Rule 2A of the

Code is punitive in nature, akin to the power to punish for civil

contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The person who

complains of disobedience or breach has to clearly make out beyond

any doubt that there was an injunction or order directing the person

against whom the application is made, to do or desist from doing

some specific thing or act and that there was disobedience or breach

of such order. While considering an application under order 39
 20

Rule 2A, the court cannot construe the order in regard to which

disobedience/breach is alleged, as creating an obligation to do

something which is not mentioned in the `order', on surmises

suspicions and inferences. The power under Rule 2A should be

exercised with great caution and responsibility. It is shocking that the

trial court had entertained an application under Order 39 Rule 2A

from a person who was not entitled to file the application, has

accepted an interpretation of the order which does not flow from the

order, and has created an liability where none existed, resulting in

attachments of the assets of FCI to an extent of more than Rs.1.12

crores. The order dated 15.12.2004 cannot be supported or sustained

under any circumstances.

Re : Question (iv)

25. FCI filed an appeal contending that the order of the trial court

dated 15.12.2004 under Order 39, Rule 2A of the Code directing

attachment of its assets to an extent of Rs. 1,12,24,792.99 was

erroneous, without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. In that

context it raised contentions about the scope and ambit of the order

dated 27.5.1996. It also incidentally mentioned that the 27.5.1996
 21

being a garnishee order was patently erroneous and without

jurisdiction, in a mortgage suit. The High Court however assumed

that FCI was not challenging the order dated 15.12.2004 passed by

the trial court under Order 39 Rule 2A but was only challenging the

`injunction order' dated 27.5.1996 for disobedience of which the

application under Order 39 Rule 2A was filed. As a consequence, it

dismissed the appeal of FCI without examining the several

contentions raised by the FCI as to the maintainability of the

application under Order 39 Rule 2A or the jurisdiction of the trial

court to pass such an order under Order 39 Rule 2A and the errors

and perversities pointed out in such order.

26. It is unfortunate that the High Court has failed to even refer to

these aspects and has dismissed the appeal on a wholly baseless and

erroneous assumption that the appellant was trying to challenge only

the order dated 27.5.1996, in the appeal against the order dated

15.12.2004. We feel dismayed that when a huge liability of

Rs.1,12,24,792.99 was sought to be created on the FCI in a

proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A, the High Court did not even

bother to refer to the facts and merits, and chose to summarily dispose
 22

of the appeal thereby allowing perpetration of a patent abuse of

process of court by the respondent. The travails of the FCI could

have been avoided if the trial court and the High Court had been

diligent to ensure that its process were not misused and abused by the

respondent.

Conclusion

27. We therefore allow this appeal with costs of Rs.25,000/-

payable by respondent, set aside the order of the High Court and the

trial court and dismiss the application filed by the respondent under

Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code.

 ..........................J.
 (R V Raveendran)New Delhi; .........................J.
March 24, 2009. (Markandey Katju)

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