//
you're reading...
legal issues

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.19(b) – Protection under – Scope – Landed property – Respondent no.1-owner entered into agreement for sale with appellant – But subsequently executed sale deed in respect of same property in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 – Appellant filed suit for specific performance against respondent no.1 – Sale deed executed in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 registered subsequent to institution of the suit – Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the sale deed executed in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 was not subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, and, that respondent nos. 2 to 6 were bonafide purchasers for consideration without notice – Order upheld by first appellate court and High Court – Justification of – Held: Not justified – The sale executed by respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 could not be termed as a complete sale until the document got registered – In view of s.47 of the Registration Act, the registration related back to the date of execution but it does not mean that sale would be complete in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 prior to the date of registration of the sale deed – As the sale stood completed during the pendency of the suit, doctrine of lis pendens is applicable – Moreover, appellant had been in possession of the suit land since long and this fact had also been mentioned by respondent No.1 in the sale deed in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6, therefore, the question of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 being bonafide purchasers for value and having paid money in good faith without notice does not arise – Respondents No.2 to 6, therefore, cannot take the benefit of the provisions of s.19(b) of the Specific Relief Act – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.54 – Registration Act, 1908 – s.47 – Doctrines – Doctrine of lis pendens. Maxim – `pendente lite, nihil innovetur’ – Applicability of. Respondent no.1-owner entered into an agreement for sale with the appellant in respect of certain landed property. However, subsequently, on 2.8.1971, respondent No.1 executed a sale deed in respect of the same property in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a suit for specific performance against respondent no.1. The sale deed executed in favour of respondents 2 to 6 was registered subsequent to the institution of the suit (on 3-9-1971). The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the sale deed would be deemed to have come into force on 2-8-1971, as the registration thereof dated 3-9-1971 would relate back to the date of execution (by virtue of the application of the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908) which was prior to institution of the suit for specific performance and thus, the doctrine of lis pendens would not apply; and that respondents 2 to 6 were bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice and, therefore, the sale deed in their favour was to be protected. The order was upheld by the first appellate court as well as the High Court. The questions for consideration in the instant appeal were: 1) whether the sale deed executed by respondent No.1 in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 could be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens and 2) whether respondent nos.2 to 6 could held to be vendees without notice of an agreement to sell in favour of the appellant by respondent no.1. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD:1.1. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, mandatorily requires that the sale of any immovable property of the value of hundred rupees and upward can be made only by a registered instrument. Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, provides that registration of the document shall relate back to the date of the execution of the document. The aforesaid two provisions make it crystal clear that sale deed in question requires registration, and even if registration had been done subsequent to the filing of Suit, it related back to the date of execution of the sale deed, which was prior to institution of the Suit. However, in the instant case, in spite of the fact that the registration of the sale deed would relate back to the date of execution, the sale cannot be termed as complete until its registration and it becomes effective only once it stands registered. Thus, the fiction created by Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, does not come into play before the actual registration of the document takes place. [Paras 9, 11] [983-C-D; 984-F-G] 1.2. The doctrine of lis pendens would apply in the instant case, as the registration of the sale deed was subsequent to filing of the suit and subsequent purchasers i.e., respondent Nos. 2 to 6, cannot claim benefit of the provisions of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The sale deed in favour of respondent Nos.2 to 6 clearly disclosed that the suit land had been mortgaged to the appellant and it was in his possession since 1970. The subsequent purchaser has to be aware before he purchases the suit property. Thus, respondent Nos. 2 to 6 could not be held to be bona fide purchasers for value paid in good faith without notice of the original contract and the sale in their favour was subject to the doctrine of lis pendens. Legal maxim, pendente lite, nihil innovetur; provides that as to the rights of the parties to the litigation, “the conveyance is treated as if it never had any existence; and it does not vary them.” [Paras 13, 14, 15] [985-H; 986-B; 987-B-C] 1.3. The sale executed by respondent No.1 in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 on 2.8.1971 could not be termed as a complete sale until the document was got registered on 3.9.1971. In view of the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, the effect of registration would be that registration would relate back to the date of execution but it does not mean that sale would be complete in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 prior to 3.9.1971 i.e. the date of registration of the sale deed. As sale stood completed during the pendency of the suit, doctrine of lis pendens is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The courts below failed to appreciate that the fiction created by Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908, itself is a consequence of registration of the sale deed. More so, as the appellant had been in possession of the suit land being a mortgagee since 1970 and this fact had also been mentioned by the respondent No.1 in the sale deed dated 2.8.1971 in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6, the question of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 being bonafide purchasers for value and paid money in good faith without having notice of the interest of the appellant does not arise, simply for the reason that the said respondents were fully aware that the suit land was in possession of the appellant. Thus, the respondents No.2 to 6 cannot take the benefit of the provisions of Section 19(b) of the Act, 1963. [Para 17] [987-G-H; 988-A-D] Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 796 and R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah & Ors. v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 1658 – relied on. Ram Saran Lall & Ors. v. Mst. Domini Kuer & Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1747; Hiralal Agrawal Etc. v. Rampadarath Singh & Ors. Etc. AIR 1969 SC 244; S.K. Mohammad Rafiq (Dead) by LRs. v. Khalilul Rehmad & Anr. Etc. AIR 1972 SC 2162; Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar AIR 1995 SC 73; Chandrika Singh (Dead) by LRs. v. Arvind Kumar Singh (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. AIR 2006 SCC 2199;- referred to. 2. The respondents are directed to execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant to the extent of land, for which the agreement to sell was executed. However, in order to meet the ends of justice, it is held that respondent Nos. 2 to 6 shall be entitled to receive the amount paid by them to respondent No.1 as consideration along with 10% interest per annum on the same. Respondent No.1 shall be entitled to redeem the land over and above the extent of land in respect of which the agreement to sell had been executed, if any, in accordance with law. [Para 18] [988-E-F] Case Law Reference: AIR 1961 SC 1747 referred to Para 9 AIR 1969 SC 244 referred to Para 10 AIR 1972 SC 2162 referred to Para 10 AIR 1995 SC 73 referred to Para 10 AIR 2006 SCC 2199 referred to Para 10 (2008) 5 SCC 796 relied on Para 12 AIR 2001 SC 1658 relied on Para 14 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 995-996 of 2003. From the Judgment & Order dated 9.10.2001 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 1545 of 1979. Dhruv Mehta, Shobha, Mohinder P. Thakur and Ridima for the Appellants. R.K. Kapoor, Harish Pant and Anis Ahmed Khan for the Respondents.

Palais de Justice de Chandigarh, Inde

Image via Wikipedia

 REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NOs.995-996 OF 2003

Har Narain (Dead) by LRs. ...Appellant

 Versus

Mam Chand (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. ...Respondents 

 J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. These appeals have been preferred against the 

judgments and orders dated 9.10.2001 and 9.9.2002 

passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana High 

Court at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No.1545 of 1979 

dismissing the Regular Second Appeal, as well as the 

 1

Review Application, filed by the appellant concurring with 

the judgments and orders of the trial Court as well as of 

the First Appellate Court on all issues raised in the case.

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these 

appeals are that the defendant/respondent No.1-Mam 

Chand (since deceased through LRs.) (hereinafter called 

the `respondent') was the owner of land admeasuring 22 

kanals situate within the Revenue estate of Village 

Asraka Majra, District Riwari, Haryana. The said 

respondent had mortgaged the entire land in favour of 

the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, namely, Har 

Narain (since deceased and now represented through his 

LRs.) for Rs.7,000/-. The appellant was also put in 

possession of the said land. The respondent No.1entered 

into an Agreement for Sale of 8 kanals of the said 

property with the appellant for Rs.7500/- and he received 

Rs.200/- as earnest money in cash while a sum of 

Rs.7000/- to be adjusted as mortgage amount. However, 

 2

the said respondent No.1 executed the sale deed on 

2.8.1971 in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6. 

3. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed Suit No.172 of 

1971, for specific performance against the respondent 

no.1 for executing the sale deed of the land in question 

on 10.8.1971 and the trial Court restrained him from 

alienating the suit property by any means. Respondent 

no.1 moved an application dated 16.8.1971 for 

vacating/modifying the interim order dated 10.8.1971 

wherein he disclosed that the entire land in dispute had 

already been alienated in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6. 

However, the sale deed executed in favour of the said 

respondents was registered on 3.9.1971. The suit was 

contested by the respondents on various grounds, 

however, the trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment 

and decree dated 4.9.1973 on various grounds, inter alia, 

that sale deed deemed to have come into force on 

2.8.1971, as the registration thereof dated 3.9.1971 

would relate back to the date of execution which had 

 3

been prior to institution of the suit and thus, the doctrine 

of lis pendens would not apply. The said respondents 2 

to 6 were bona fide purchasers for consideration without 

notice. Therefore, the sale deed in their favour was to be 

protected. 

4. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed First Appeal 

No.508 of 1973, however, the same was dismissed by the 

First Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 

22.3.1979. The appellant further approached the High 

Court by filing the Regular Second Appeal No.1545 of 

1979 which was dismissed by the High Court vide 

judgment and order dated 9.10.2001. However, as none 

had appeared on behalf of the appellant on the said date 

before the High Court, the appellant filed the application 

to recall the said judgment and order dated 9.10.2001 

under Order 41 Rule 19 read with Section 151 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called `CPC'). 

The said application was allowed vide order dated 

9.9.2002 and the matter was heard afresh on merit on 

 4

the same day. The Court agreed with the proposition laid 

down by the courts below that principles of lis pendens 

would not apply in the facts and circumstances of this 

case as the sale deed has been executed before the filing 

of the suit though, the same was got registered 

subsequent to the institution of the suit. Hence, these 

appeals. 

5. Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior counsel 

appearing for the appellant has submitted that the courts 

below reached the conclusion that doctrine of lis pendens 

was not applicable in the facts of the case merely on the 

ground that the sale deed has been executed by the 

respondent No.1 in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 prior 

to institution of the suit and the registration of the sale 

deed would relate back to the date of execution by virtue 

of the application of the provisions of Section 47 of the 

Registration Act, 1908 (herein after called the `Act 1908') 

without taking note of the fact that the execution of a 

sale deed of immovable property of more than Rs.100/- 

 5

in value is not capable to transfer the title unless the 

deed is registered as required under Section 52 of the 

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter called the `Act, 

1882) and Section 17 of the `Act 1908. In case, the 

appellant had been in the possession of the suit land 

being the mortgagee of the entire property since long, the 

question of protection under Section 19(b) of the Specific 

Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the `Act 1963') to the 

respondent nos.2 to 6 that they were bonafide 

purchasers for value and paid money in good faith 

without notice of the earlier contract, becomes 

meaningless for the reason that they had a notice that 

the land was in possession of the appellant and this fact 

had also been mentioned by the respondent No.1 in the 

sale deed dated 2.8.1971 in their favour. Thus, the 

appeals deserve to be allowed.

6. On the contrary, Shri R.K. Kapoor, learned counsel 

appearing for the respondents has vehemently opposed 

the appeals contending that there are concurrent 

 6

findings of fact by three courts and this Court being the 

fourth court should not re-appreciate the factual matrix 

of the case and interfere in the appeals. The sale deed 

might have been registered at a later stage but the 

document becomes effective from the date of its 

execution. The findings so recorded by the courts below 

do not require any interference. The appeals lack merit 

and are liable to be dismissed.

7. We have considered the rival submissions made by 

learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 

 Admitted facts remain that the entire land 

admeasuring 22 kanals had been mortgaged by Mam 

Chand, respondent No.1 in favour of appellant vide deed 

dated 30.6.1970 and the appellant had been put in 

possession thereof. The possession of the land is with 

the appellant since 1970. An agreement to sell was 

entered into between the appellant and respondent No.1 

on 25.5.1971. Sale deed was executed by the respondent 

No.1 in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 on 2.8.1971 and 

 7

the said sale deed was got registered on 3.9.1971. The 

suit had been filed on 10.8.1971 i.e. subsequent to the 

date of execution of the sale deed and before the 

registration thereof on 3.9.1971. The trial court also 

passed an ex-parte order dated 10.8.1971 restraining 

the respondent No.1 from alienating the suit land, 

however it was subsequently modified vide order dated 

31.8.1971. 

 The basic questions arise as to whether in the fact-

situation of this case, the sale deed executed by the 

respondent No.1 in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 could 

be subject to the doctrine of lis pendens and in case the 

appellant had been in possession of the suit land being 

mortgagee since 1970, the respondent nos.2 to 6 can be 

held to be vendees without notice of an agreement to sell 

in favour of the appellant by the respondent no.1.

8. All the courts below have proceeded on the 

presumption that as the registration of a document 

relates back to the date of execution and in the instant 

 8

case though the registration was subsequent to 

institution of the suit, it would relate back to the 

execution of the deed and the doctrine of lis pendens 

would not apply. Further, without considering the fact 

that the appellant had been in possession of the suit land 

since 1970, though, this fact had been mentioned in the 

sale deed in favour of respondent nos.2 to 6 by the 

respondent No.1 whether it could be held that they were 

not put to notice of the fact that the appellant had some 

interest in the property and whether in such fact-

situation the respondent nos.2 to 6 may be entitled for 

benefit of the provisions of Section 19 of the Act, 1963. 

9. Section 54 of the Act, 1882, mandatorily requires 

that the sale of any immovable property of the value of 

hundred rupees and upward can be made only by a 

registered instrument. Section 47 of the Act, 1908, 

provides that registration of the document shall relate 

back to the date of the execution of the document. Thus, 

the aforesaid two provisions make it crystal clear that 

 9

sale deed in question requires registration. Even if 

registration had been done subsequent to the filing of 

Suit, it related back to the date of execution of the sale 

deed, which was prior to institution of the Suit. A similar 

issue though in a case of right of pre-emption was 

considered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in 

Ram Saran Lall & Ors. v. Mst. Domini Kuer & Ors., 

AIR 1961 SC 1747, by the majority of 3:2, the Court 

came to the conclusion that as the mere execution of the 

sale deed could not make the same effective and 

registration thereof was necessary, it was of no 

consequence unless the registration was made. Thus, in 

spite of the fact that the Act, 1908, could relate back to 

the date of execution in view of provisions of Section 47 

of the Act, 1908, the sale could not be given effect to 

prior to registration. However, as the sale was not 

complete until the registration of instrument of sale is 

complete, it was not completed prior to the date of its 

registration. The court held:

 10

 "Section 47 of the Registration Act does not, 

 however, say when sale would be deemed to 

 be complete. It only permits a document when 

 registered, to operate from a certain date which 

 may be earlier than the date when it was 

 registered. The object of this section is to decide 

 which of two or more registered instruments in 

 respect of the same property is to have effect. 

 The section applies to a document only 

 after it has been registered. It has nothing 

 to do with the completion of the 

 registration and therefore, nothing to do 

 with the completion of a sale when the 

 instrument is one of sale. A sale which is 

 admittedly not completed until the 

 registration of the instrument of sale is 

 completed, cannot be said to have been 

 completed earlier because by virtue of 

 Section 47 the instrument by which it is 

 effected, after it has been registered, 

 commences to operate from an earlier date. 

 Therefore, we do not think that the sale in this 

 case can be said, in view of Section 47 to have 

 been completed on January 31, 1946." 

 (Emphasis added).

10. This view has subsequently been followed and 

approved by this Court as is evident from the judgments 

in Hiralal Agrawal Etc. v. Rampadarath Singh & Ors. 

Etc., AIR 1969 SC 244; S.K. Mohammad Rafiq (Dead) 

by LRs. V. Khalilul Rehmad & Anr. Etc., AIR 1972 SC 

2162; Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar, 

 11

AIR 1995 SC 73; and Chandrika Singh (Dead) by LRs. 

V. Arvind Kumar Singh (Dead) by LRs. & Ors., AIR 

2006 SCC 2199. 

11. However, all these cases are related to right to pre-

emption though the legal issue involved therein remained 

the same. In view of the above, we are of the considered 

opinion that in spite of the fact that the registration of 

the sale deed would relate back to the date of execution, 

the sale can not be termed as complete until its 

registration and it becomes effective only once it stands 

registered. Thus, the fiction created by Section 47 of the 

Act, 1908, does not come into play before the actual 

registration of the document takes place. 

12. In Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (Dead) 

Through LRs. & Ors., (2008) 5 SCC 796, this Court dealt 

with a similar issue and considered the effect of doctrine 

of lis pendens and the provisions of Section 19(b) of the 

Act, 1963. Facts of the said case had been that an 

agreement to sell stood executed between the first 

 12

purchaser and owner of the land on 4th July, 1974 for a 

sum of Rs.30,000/- and a sum of Rs.5,000/- was given 

as advance. The remaining amount was to be paid before 

31st July, 1974. As the said amount was not paid, the 

owner again sold the suit property to another party 

(appellant) on 5th May, 1975 for a sum of Rs.45,000/- 

and possession of the suit property was handed over to 

the appellant therein. Thus, the first purchaser filed the 

suit for enforcement of the specific performance of the 

contract. The trial court dismissed the Suit holding that 

the agreement was genuine and appellant was a bona 

fide purchaser for value paid in good faith, without notice 

of the earlier agreement, therefore, no decree for specific 

performance could be passed in favour of the plaintiff 

therein. The First Appellate Court reversed the said 

judgment and decree. The Second Appeal was dismissed 

by the High Court. This Court considered the provisions 

of Section 52 of the Act, 1882, and Section 19 (b) of the 

Act, 1963, and held that as the subsequent sale was 

subsequent to the filing of the Suit, Section 19(b) of the 

 13

Act 1963 read with Section 52 of the Act, 1882, could not 

grant any benefit to the subsequent purchaser and the 

subsequent sale was subject to the doctrine of lis 

pendens. Second sale could not have the overriding effect 

on the first sale. The Court held as under:

 "So far as the present case is concerned, it 

 is apparent that the appellant who is a 

 subsequent purchaser of the same 

 property, has purchased in good faith but 

 the principle of lis pendens will certainly 

 be applicable to the present case 

 notwithstanding the fact that under 

 Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act his 

 right could be protected."

13. In view of the above, it is evident that doctrine of lis 

pendens would apply in the present case as the 

registration of the sale deed was subsequent to filing of 

the Suit and subsequent purchasers i.e. respondent Nos. 

2 to 6 cannot claim benefit of the provisions of Section 

19(b) of the Act, 1963. 

14. So far as the issue of notice of first sale to 

respondent Nos. 2 to 6 is concerned, it has to be 

examined bearing in mind that the sale deed in favour of 

 14

the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 clearly disclosed that the Suit 

land had been mortgaged to the appellant and it was in 

his possession since 1970. In R.K. Mohammed 

Ubaidullah & Ors. v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab (Dead) by 

LRs. & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1658, this Court considered a 

similar case wherein the question had arisen as to 

whether the vendees of subsequent sale were bona fide 

purchasers of the suit property in good faith for value 

without notice of original contract and whether they 

were not required to make any inquiry as to the equitable 

or further interest of the other party at the time of 

execution of sale in their favour. In view of the fact that 

they had been aware that the land was in possession of 

first purchaser, the Court took note of the definition of 

"notice" as provided in Section 3 of the Act, 1882, and 

particularly Explanation II thereof for deciding the case. 

The said Explanation reads: 

 "Any person acquiring any immovable property 

 or any share or interest in any such property 

 shall be deemed to have notice of title, if any, of 

 any person who is for the time being in actual 

 possession thereof."

 15

This Court came to the conclusion that in view of Section 

19(b) of the Act, 1963 and definition of "notice" 

contained under Section 3 of the Act, 1882, it could not 

be held that the subsequent purchasers were bona fide 

purchasers in good faith for value without notice of the 

original contract and they were required to make inquiry 

as to the nature of the possession or title or further 

interest, if any, of the other party over the suit property 

at the time when they entered into sale transaction, 

notwithstanding, that they were already aware that the 

other party was in possession of the suit property as the 

tenant. Thus, what is material is the inquiry at the time 

when subsequent sale transaction was entered into. 

15. The instant case is squarely covered by the 

aforesaid judgment, so far as this issue is concerned. 

The subsequent purchaser has to be aware before he 

purchases the suit property. Thus, we are of the 

considered opinion that respondent Nos. 2 to 6 could not 

be held to be bona fide purchasers for value paid in good 

 16

faith without notice of the original contract and the sale 

in their favour was subject to the doctrine of lis pendens. 

Legal maxim, pendente lite, nihil innovetur; provides that 

as to the rights of the parties to the litigation, "the 

conveyance is treated as if it never had any existence; and 

it does not vary them."

16. It has half-heartedly been argued by Shri Kapoor, 

learned counsel for the respondents that respondent 

Nos. 2 to 6 are the first purchasers as there was an 

agreement to sell executed in their favour on 19.2.1971 

and he had taken us through the judgments of the trial 

court as well as the First Appellate Court where passing 

remarks have been made by the courts in respect of the 

same on the basis of the written statement filed by the 

respondent No.1, though this point has not been agitated 

by the respondent Nos. 2 to 6, nor any issue had been 

framed in this respect either by the trial court or as an 

additional issue by the First Appellate Court. In view of 

the fact that the respondent No.1 has been executing 

 17

documents in respect of the same land in favour of 

different persons as is evident from the record, the 

contention raised by Shri Kapoor is not worth 

consideration. 

17. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable 

conclusion that the sale executed by respondent No.1 in 

favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 on 2.8.1971 could not 

be termed as a complete sale until the document got 

registered on 3.9.1971. In view of the provisions of 

Section 47 of the Act, 1908 the effect of registration 

would be that registration would relate back to the date 

of execution but it does not mean that sale would be 

complete in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 prior to 

3.9.1971 i.e. the date of registration of the sale deed. In 

view of the above, as sale stood completed during the 

pendency of the suit, doctrine of lis pendens is applicable 

in the facts and circumstances of the case. The courts 

below failed to appreciate that the fiction created by 

Section 47 of the Act 1908, itself is a consequence of 

 18

registration of the sale deed. More so, as the appellant 

had been in possession of the suit land being a 

mortgagee since 1970 and this fact had also been 

mentioned by the respondent No.1 in the sale deed dated 

2.8.1971 in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6, the 

question of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 being bonafide 

purchasers for value and paid money in good faith 

without notice does not arise, simply for the reason that 

the said respondents were fully aware that the suit land 

was in possession of the appellant. Thus, the 

respondents No.2 to 6 cannot take the benefit of the 

provisions of Section 19(b) of the Act, 1963. 

18. In view of the above, the appeals succeed and are 

allowed. The judgment and decree of the courts below are 

set aside. The respondents are directed to execute the 

sale deed in favour of the appellant to the extent of land, 

for which the agreement to sell was executed within a 

period of three months from today. However, in order to 

meet the ends of justice it is necessary to hold that 

 19

respondent Nos. 2 to 6 shall be entitled to receive the 

amount paid by them to the respondent No.1 as 

consideration along with 10% interest per annum on the 

same. The respondent No.1 shall be entitled to redeem 

the land over and above the extent of land in respect of 

which the agreement to sell had been executed, if any, in 

accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. 

 ..................................J.

 (P. SATHASIVAM)

 .................................J.

New Delhi, (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

October 8, 2010

 20

2122

About advocatemmmohan

ADVOCATE

Blog Stats

  • 2,880,951 hits

ADVOCATE MMMOHAN

archieves

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,905 other followers

Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com
%d bloggers like this: