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Swiss Bank accounts of Indians =Writ Petition (Civil) No.176 of 2009 was filed by Shri Ram Jethmalani and five others against the Union of India, the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities Exchange Board of India, the Director, Directorate of Enforcement and the Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Department of

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 1

 REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

 I.A. NO.8 OF 2011

 IN

 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.176 OF 2009

Ram Jethmalani & Ors. ... Petitioners

 Vs.

Union of India & Ors. ... Respondents

 O R D E R

1. Writ Petition (Civil) No.176 of 2009 was filed by Shri 

Ram Jethmalani and five others against the Union of India, 

the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities Exchange Board of 

India, the Director, Directorate of Enforcement and the 

Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Department of 

 2

Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, against 

the purported inaction of the Government to arrange for 

recovery of large sums of money deposited by Indian citizens 

in foreign banks and, in particular, in Swiss Banks. In 

that context the Petitioners, inter alia, prayed for the 

following reliefs :-

 "(a) that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue 

 notice to all the Respondents calling upon them to 

 disclose all the facts which have come to their 

 knowledge so far pertaining to the aforementioned 

 issues and the steps taken by them in this regard; 

 (b) to make orders from time to time to ensure that the 

 outcome of the investigations are not suppressed or 

 even unduly delayed; 

 (c) the suitable directions be issued to the Respondent 

 No.1 to apply to the Foreign Banks, more 

 particularly the UBS Bank for freezing the amounts 

 in the said foreign banks, particularly, the UBS 

 Bank which as stated above is holding, inter alia, 

 the Khan and Tapurias' assets." 

2. On 4th July, 2011, on I.A. No.1 of 2009 in the Writ 

Petition several directions were given. In fact, the said 

order was divided into three parts. The first part of the 

order dealt with the alleged failure of the Central 

 3

Government to recover the large sums of money kept in such 

foreign banks and in tax havens having strong secrecy laws 

with regard to deposits made by individuals. The second 

part dealt with the unlawful activities allegedly funded out 

of such deposits and accounts which were a threat to the 

security and integrity of India. The amounts deposited in 

such tax havens in respect of one Shri Hassan Ali Khan and 

Shri Kashinath Tapuria and his wife Chandrika Tapuria were 

alleged to be in billions of dollars in UBS Bank in Zurich 

alone. Income Tax demands were made to Shri Hassan Ali Khan 

for Rs.40,000 crores and a similar demand was served on the 

Tapurias amounting to Rs.20,580 crores. On being convinced 

that, in the absence of any known source of income, the 

large sums of money involved in the various transactions by 

Hassan Ali Khan and the Tapurias were the proceeds of crime, 

which required a thorough investigation, this Court felt the 

necessity of appointing a Special Investigation Team to act 

on behalf and at the behest of the directions of this Court. 

It was noted by this Court that the issues involved were 

complex and would require expertise and knowledge of 

 4

different departments and the coordination of efforts 

between various agencies and departments. It was also 

recorded that on behalf of the Union of India, it had been 

submitted that a High Level Committee had recently been 

formed under the initiative of the Department of Revenue in 

the Ministry of Finance, composed of :

 (i) Secretary, Department of Revenue, as the Chairman;

 (ii) Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India; 

 (iii) Director (IB);

 (iv) Director, Enforcement;

 (v) Director, CBI;

 (vi) Chairman, CBDT;

 (vii) DG, Narcotics Control Bureau;

 (viii) DG, Revenue Intelligence;

 (ix) Director, Financial Intelligence Unit; and 

 (x) JS(FT & TR-I), CBDT.

with powers to co-pt, as necessary, representatives not 

below the rank of Joint Secretary such as the Home 

Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and the 

 5

Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. It was further recorded 

that the Union of India had claimed that such a multi-

disciplinary group and committee would enable the conducting 

of an efficient and a systematic investigation into the 

matters concerning allegations against Hassan Ali Khan and 

the Tapurias and would also be able to take appropriate 

steps to bring back the monies deposited in foreign banks. 

In the light of such submission made on behalf of Union of 

India and citing the judgments of this Court in (1) Vineet 

Narain Vs. Union of India [(1996) 2 SCC 199],(2) NHRC Vs. 

State of Gujarat [(2004) 8 SCC 610], (3) Sanjiv Kumar Vs. 

State of Haryana [(2005) 5 SCC 517] and (4) Centre for PIL 

Vs. Union of India [(2011) 1 SCC 560], this Court completed 

the second part of the order by directing as follows :- 

 49. In light of the above we herewith order:

 (i) That the High Level Committee constituted by 

 the Union of India, comprising of (i) 

 Secretary, Department of Revenue; (ii) Deputy 

 Governor, Reserve Bank of India; (iii) 

 Director (IB); (iv) Director, Enforcement; 

 (v) Director, CBI; (vi) Chairman, CBDT; 

 (vii)DG, Narcotics Control Bureau; (vii) DG, 

 Revenue Intelligence; (ix) Director, 

 6

 Financial Intelligence Unit; and (x) JS (FT & 

 TR-I), CBDT be forthwith appointed with 

 immediate effect as a special Investigation 

 Team;

(ii) That the Special Investigation Team, so 

 constituted, also include Director, Research 

 and Analysis Wing;

(iii) That the above Special Investigation Team, so 

 constituted, be headed by and include the 

 following former eminent judges of this 

 Court: (a) Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.P. Jeevan 

 Reddy as Chairman; and (b) Hon'ble Mr. 

 Justice M.B. Shah as Vice-Chairman; and that 

 the Special Investigation Team function under 

 their guidance and direction;

(iv) That the Special Investigation Team, so 

 constituted, shall be charged with the 

 responsibilities and duties of 

 investigation, initiation of proceedings, and 

 prosecution, whether in the context of 

 appropriate criminal or civil proceedings 

 of: (a) all issues relating to the matters 

 concerning and arising from unaccounted 

 monies of Hassan Ali Khan and the Tapurias; 

 (b) all other investigations already 

 commenced and are pending, or awaiting to be 

 initiated, with respect to any other known 

 instances of the stashing of unaccounted 

 monies in foreign bank accounts by Indians or 

 other entities operating in India; and (c) 

 all other matters with respect to 

 unaccounted monies being stashed in foreign 

 banks by Indians or other entities operating 

 in India that may arise in the course of 

 such investigations and proceedings. It is 

 clarified here that within the ambit of 

 7

 responsibilities described above, also lie 

 the responsibilities to ensure that the 

 matters are also investigated, proceedings 

 initiated and prosecutions conducted with 

 regard to criminality and/or unlawfulness of 

 activities that may have been the source 

 for such monies, as well as the criminal 

 and/or unlawful means that are used to take 

 such unaccounted monies out of and/or 

 bring such monies back into the country, and 

 use of such monies in India or abroad. 

 The Special Investigation Team shall also be 

 charged with the responsibility of preparing 

 a comprehensive action plan, including the 

 creation of necessary institutional 

 structures that can enable and strengthen the 

 country's battle against generation of 

 unaccounted monies, and their stashing away 

 in foreign banks or in various forms 

 domestically.

(v) That the Special Investigation Team so 

 constituted report and be responsible to this 

 Court, and that it shall be charged with the 

 duty to keep this Court informed of all major 

 developments by the filing of periodic status 

 reports, and following of any special orders 

 that this Court may issue from time to time;

(vi) That all organs, agencies, departments and 

 agents of the State, whether at the level of 

 the Union of India, or the State 

 Government, including but not limited 

 to all statutorily formed individual bodies, 

 and other constitutional bodies, extend all 

 the cooperation necessary for the Special 

 Investigation Team so constituted and 

 functioning;

 8

 (vii) That the Union of India, and where needed 

 even the State Governments, are directed to 

 facilitate the conduct of the investigations, 

 in their fullest measure, by the Special 

 Investigation Team so constituted and 

 functioning, by extending all the necessary 

 financial, material, legal, diplomatic and 

 intelligence resources, whether such 

 investigations or portions of such 

 investigations occur inside the country or 

 abroad.

 (viii) That the Special Investigation Team also be 

 empowered to further investigate even where 

 charge-sheets have been previously filed; and 

 that the Special Investigation Team may 

 register further cases, and conduct 

 appropriate investigations and initiate 

 proceedings, for the purpose of bringing back 

 unaccounted monies unlawfully kept in bank 

 accounts abroad.

3. The third part of the order deals with the disclosure of 

various documents referred to by the Union of India in 

relation to the names and particulars of various bank 

accounts of Indian citizens in the Principality of 

Liechtenstein, a small landlocked sovereign nation-state in 

Europe, which is generally acknowledged as a tax haven. 

4. The third part of the order is not of relevance at this 

stage, since an application, being IA No.8 of 2011, has been 

 9

filed by the Union of India in the Writ Petition, purporting 

to be an application under Article 142 of the Constitution 

read with Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, 

seeking modification of the aforesaid order dated 4th July, 

2011. 

5. Before the Application could be moved by the learned 

Attorney General, Mr. Anil B. Divan, learned Senior Advocate 

appearing for the Writ Petitioners, took a preliminary 

objection that the interlocutory application was not 

maintainable on several counts. It was firstly urged that 

in effect, in the guise of an application for modification, 

the Respondents/Applicants were wanting either a re-hearing 

and/or review of the order passed on 4th July, 2011, 

disposing of I.A.No.1 of 2009. Mr. Divan pointed out that 

it was the Government itself which had set up a High Level 

Committee consisting of senior officers of different 

departments to take steps for retrieving the black money 

which had been deposited in banks in tax havens all over the 

world and, in particular, in Swiss Banks and it did not, 

 10

therefore, lie in the mouth of the Government to take a 

different stand when the same Committee had been converted 

into a Special Investigation Team with two former Judges of 

the Supreme Court to monitor the progress of the recovery 

proceedings.

6. Mr. Divan also contended that the formation of a Special 

Investigation Team to monitor the investigation is not a new 

concept and has been resorted to on different occasions in 

order that justice is done between the parties and the rule 

of law is not obstructed either by the investigating agency 

or otherwise. Mr. Divan urged that once the matter had been 

decided on merits and a direction had been given for the 

formation of a Special Investigation Team composed of the 

very officers who had been appointed as members of the High 

Level Committee for the very same purpose, the Government is 

not justified in objecting to the investigation being 

monitored by such Committee headed by two retired Judges of 

the Supreme Court with impeccable credentials. Mr. Divan 

submitted that the contention of the Respondents in I.A. 

 11

No.8 of 2011 was as if by appointing a Special Investigation 

Team, the Supreme Court had taken over the executive powers 

of the Union. It was submitted that although a case 

against the accused was pending since 2007, no attempt had 

been made to interrogate the accused in regard to the 

allegations made against them.

7. Mr. Divan submitted that possibly other fora were 

available to the Respondents, but the present I.A. would not 

provide any remedy to the Respondents. Mr. Divan urged that 

it was on account of the complete inertia of the 

investigating authority that in spite of huge sums of 

unaccounted money deposited in tax havens abroad, little or 

no action was taken to proceed with the investigation or 

even to interrogate the persons accused of having been 

involved in money laundering and acting against the 

interests of the country and its citizens. Mr. Divan 

submitted that the remedy available to the Respondents lay 

in a review petition under the provisions of Order 47 of the 

 12

Supreme Court Rules, 1966, and not by an interlocutory 

application and that too in a disposed of matter. 

8. Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Advocate who 

appeared for the Petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No.136 

of 2011, supported the submissions made by Mr. Anil Divan 

with regard to the maintainability of the Interlocutory 

Application No.8 of 2011 filed by the Union of India. It 

was contended that neither the provisions of Article 142 of 

the Constitution nor Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court 

Rules were attracted in the facts of this case, inasmuch as, 

the said provisions conferred power and not jurisdiction on 

this Court in respect of a matter which was pending before 

it. Mr. Naphade submitted that Article 142 very clearly 

vested the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to pass such 

decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete 

justice in any case or matter pending before it. Mr. 

Naphade also contended that, as had been held by this Court, 

in Saurav Chaudhary Vs. Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 618], 

this Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 

 13

of the Constitution at the time of rendition of the judgment 

and not thereafter. It was further observed that once 

judgment had been delivered by the Court, it could not 

recall the same and could only exercise its power of review 

in case it intended to take a different view from the one 

rendered in the main judgment. Mr. Naphade also urged that 

even the provisions of Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court 

Rules were of no assistance to the Union of India. It was 

submitted that the Rules framed under Article 145(1) of the 

Constitution only empowered the Supreme Court to frame Rules 

to regulate its practice and procedure and does not take in 

its sweep the power to create a new jurisdiction to 

entertain a cause or matter.

9. Reference was also made to the decision of this Court in 

Raja Soap Factory & Ors. Vs. S.P. Shantharaj & Ors.[(1965) 2 

SCR 800], wherein it was observed that by jurisdiction what 

is meant is the extent of power which is conferred upon a 

Court by its Constitution to try a matter or a cause. Such 

 14

power is not capable of being enlarged because an 

extraordinary situation requires the Court to exercise it. 

10. Mr. Naphade submitted that by virtue of this 

application, the Union of India was seeking to review a 

final order passed by this Court, treating the same to be an 

application for recalling the order. Mr. Naphade repeated 

and reiterated his submissions that the application filed on 

behalf of the Union of India and its authorities was not 

maintainable and could only be dismissed.

11. Replying to the submissions made by Mr. Divan and Mr. 

Naphade, the learned Attorney General submitted that in 

earlier cases also this question had been raised and 

considered by this Court. Referring to the decision of a 

Bench of Seven Judges in the case of A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. 

Nayak & Anr. [(1988) 2 SCC 602], the learned Attorney 

General submitted that by a majority judgment this Court 

held that directions, if given in violation of the 

principles of natural justice, if subsequently questioned in 

another appeal instead of by way of a Review Petition under 

 15

Article 137, the same could be set aside by another Bench of 

the Court ex debito justitiae in exercise of its inherent 

powers. The majority amongst the Judges held that the want 

of jurisdiction could be addressed solely by a superior 

Court and, in practice, no decision could be reviewed 

collaterally by any inferior Court, but the superior Court 

could always correct its error either by way of a petition 

or ex debito justitiae. In fact, it was also observed that 

in certain situations, the Supreme Court could always invoke 

its power of review in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction 

in any proceeding pending before it, without insisting on 

the formalities of a review application. The learned 

Attorney General submitted that by appointing two retired 

Judges of the Supreme Court, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy as 

the Chairman and Justice M.B. Shah as the Vice-Chairman, and 

directing that the Special Investigation Team would function 

under their guidance and directions, would amount to 

interference with the executive authority of the different 

officials representing different sections of the 

administration which would lead to a chaotic situation. The 

 16

direction given to include the Director, Research & Analysis 

Wing, was also improper, since the said authority functioned 

under strict rules of secrecy, which could be jeopardized if 

its Director were to be included in the Special 

Investigation Team.

12. The learned Attorney General submitted that, in the 

event there was any doubt as to whether the powers of the 

Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution could be 

invoked for doing complete justice in a matter which was not 

pending before it, the present application could always be 

treated as a Review Petition under Article 137 of the 

Constitution read with Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court 

Rules, 1966. The learned Attorney General submitted that in 

view of the magnitude of the transactions involved and that 

too without any accounting of the monies used, this Court 

should cut across technicalities and consider the matter 

pragmatically. The learned Attorney General submitted that 

the present application may, therefore, be treated as a 

Review Petition under Article 137 of the Constitution read 

 17

with Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and be 

proceeded with accordingly, notwithstanding the objection 

taken on behalf of the Petitioners in regard to the 

different procedure to be adopted in respect of a review 

application. It was also submitted that as indicated in 

A.R. Antulay's case (supra), the Supreme Court can grant 

relief in exercise of its inherent powers as the guardian of 

the Constitution. 

13. Reference was also made by the learned Attorney General 

to the decision of this Court in S. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs. State 

of Karnataka & Anr. [(1993) Supp. (4) SCC 595], which was 

heard along with several other cases by a Bench of three 

Judges. In the said cases an order had been passed on oral 

mentioning which ultimately resulted in several contempt 

petitions being filed. Two of the Hon'ble Judges, after 

considering the anomalous circumstances which had resulted 

from the passing of the order on oral mentioning, held that 

justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and 

neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can 

 18

stand in its way. It was further observed that the order of 

the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone and if the 

Court found that the order was passed under a mistake and it 

would not have exercised the jurisdiction, but for the 

erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist, and its 

perpetration would result in miscarriage of justice, then it 

would not on any principle be precluded from rectifying the 

order. Mistake is accepted as a valid reason to recall an 

order. Their Lordships emphasized the fact that 

rectification of an order stems from the fundamental 

principles that justice is above all. It is exercised to 

remove the error and not for disturbing finality. In the 

judgment it was also observed that the Supreme Court has the 

inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for 

the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process 

of Court. The Court is, therefore, not precluded from 

recalling or reviewing its own order, if it is satisfied 

that it is necessary to do so for the sake of justice. It 

was pointed out that even the learned third Judge held that 

while the Government was mainly responsible for the 

 19

unfortunate state of affairs that should not desist the 

Supreme Court from revising or reviewing the said orders 

which had serious consequences. The learned third Judge 

also observed that it is the duty of the Court to rectify, 

revise and recall its orders as and when it is brought to 

its notice that certain of its orders were passed on a wrong 

or mistaken assumption of facts and that implementation of 

those orders will have serious consequences. 

14. On a careful consideration of the submissions made on 

behalf of the respective parties in regard to the 

maintainability of I.A. No.8 of 2011 filed on behalf of the 

Union of India, wherein, inter alia, a prayer has been made 

to modify the order dated 4th July, 2011 and to delete the 

directions relating to the Special Investigation Team in 

paragraphs 49 and 50 of the said order, it appears that the 

I.A. is maintainable. In view of the preliminary objection 

relating to the maintainability of the interlocutory 

application filed on behalf of the Union of India, the said 

 20

issue regarding the maintainability of I.A. No.8 of 2011 has 

been taken up first. 

15. From the arguments advanced on behalf of the respective 

parties, it appears at first blush that Mr. Anil B. Divan is 

technically correct in submitting that since there was no 

matter pending before this Court, the provisions of Article 

142 of the Constitution would not be attracted and that even 

the inherent powers of this Court preserved under Order 47 

Rule 6 of the Rules framed by the Supreme Court in exercise 

of its powers under Article 145 of the Constitution would 

not be applicable. However, this Court has preserved its 

inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary for 

the ends of justice in Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court 

Rules, 1966, framed under Article 145 of the Constitution. 

As has been held in A.R. Antulay's case (supra) and in S. 

Nagaraj's case (supra), such a power was not only inherent 

in the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court was also 

entitled to and under an obligation to do justice to 

exercise such powers as the guardian of the Constitution. 

 21

Justice transcends all barriers and neither rules of 

procedure nor technicalities can stand in its way, 

particularly if its implementation would result in 

injustice. In addition to the decision rendered by this 

Court in A.R. Antulay's case (supra) and in S. Nagaraj's 

case (supra), reference may also be made to another equally 

important pronouncement of this Court in Vineet Narain's 

case (supra), wherein the concept of continuing mandamus was 

introduced in order to maintain the credibility of the 

investigation being conducted. 

16. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court 

in Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. Vs. Chandi Lal Saha [(1991) 

Supp. 2 SCC 465], wherein this Court extended the benefit of 

its judgment to persons who were not even in appeal before 

it.

17. Even if the present application was to be dismissed as 

being not maintainable under Article 142 of the Constitution 

read with Order 47 Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, 

it would not preclude the Applicants from filing an 

 22

application for review under Article 137 of the 

Constitution. As the very working of the Special 

Investigation Team appointed under the order of 4th July, 

2011, is in question, it is necessary to cut across the 

technical tapes sought to be invoked on behalf of the 

Petitioners and hold that in view of the inherent powers 

vested in the Supreme Court of India, preserved in Order 47 

Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, and having regard 

to the fact that the Supreme Court is the guardian of the 

Constitution, I.A. No.8 of 2011, even in its present form is 

maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case, 

which include threats to the security of the country. 

18. The objections raised by Mr. Anil B. Divan and supported 

by Mr. Shekhar Naphade, regarding the maintainability of 

I.A. No.8 of 2011, are, therefore, rejected and the said 

application may therefore be proceeded with for hearing.

 ............................................................J.

 (ALTAMAS KABIR)

New Delhi,

Dated: 23.09.2011.

 23

 REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

 I.A. NO.8 OF 2011

 IN

 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.176 OF 2009

RAM JETHMALANI & ORS. ....PETITIONERS

 VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ....RESPONDENTS

 O R D E R 

1. I have had the opportunity, and the benefit of reading, in draft, the 

learned opinion of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir. However, with 

all humility and with due respect, I would not be able to concur with the 

 24

view taken by my Learned Brother. My Learned Brother has rejected 

the preliminary objections raised by Mr. Anil Divan and Mr. Shekhar 

Naphade, appearing for the writ petitioners and directed the application 

to proceed for hearing. In my opinion, the application is not 

maintainable for a number of reasons. 

2. The application clearly states that the order passed by this Court in 

I.A. No. 1 on 4th July, 2011 impinges upon the doctrine of separation of 

powers. The application thereafter sets out the facts leading to the filing 

of the writ petition invoking Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The 

application sets out the prayers made in the writ petition. Thereafter, it is 

stated that the writ petition, as originally filed, did not contain any prayer 

for appointment of a Special Investigation Team. The application also 

points out that in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of 

India, it had been clearly stated that the Central Government had been 

alive to the need to be able to retrieve information about the alleged 

money lying deposited in the foreign accounts and highlighting steps 

 25

taken by it in his behalf. It further points out that it was on account of 

such an initiative, tax haven countries, including countries like 

Switzerland, made solemn attempts to enter into effective tax 

information exchange agreements with various countries. The 

application proceeds to delineate the steps taken and the strategy 

formulated to eradicate the menace of "Black Money". It states that the 

Government had joined the global crusade against Black Money. It had 

decided to create an appropriate legislative framework by incorporating 

various tax evasion measures in existing Acts. Thereafter, the 

application gives the details of the proposed new legislation for 

unearthing Black Money. After enumerating all the efforts made by the 

Government at national and international level, it is stated that above all 

the Government has constituted a Committee on 27th May, 2011 under 

the Chairman, C.B.D.T. to examine ways to strengthen laws to stop the 

generation of Black Money in the country, its legal transfer abroad and 

its recovery. The Committee also examined various other issues which 

are enumerated in the application. The application further proceeds to 

 26

tabulate the efforts to create further legislative and administrative 

framework to obtain information about illicit money of Indian citizens 

already parked outside the country. Thereafter, the application sets out 

the efforts already made and the results thereof. On the basis of that, it is 

stated that the Government has achieved substantial success not only in 

getting information on illicit money parked outside the country but also 

in stopping the transfer of illicit money outside the country. Thereafter, 

the details are given of the illicit money detected. 

3. It is stated that in the order dated 4th July, 2011, these efforts have 

neither been adverted to nor evaluated before rendering the finding in 

Paragraph 46 of the judgment. 

4. The application thereafter sets out various efforts made in the 

matter of investigation of the case of Hasan Ali Khan and Kashinath 

Tapuriah. The application thereafter reproduces the directions sought in 

I.A. No.1 of 2009, which was filed on 8th September, 2009. Thereafter, it 

is submitted that even in this application, no prayer was made for 

 27

appointment of a Special Investigation Team [SIT]. It is further 

submitted that such a prayer ought not to have been granted on the basis 

of written submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners in the 

absence of requisite pleadings in the writ petition or in the absence of a 

formal prayer. The application further proceeds to state that it is filed 

invoking the inherent power of this Court under Article 142(1) of the 

Constitution of India for doing complete justice in any case or matter 

pending before it. 

5. In the grounds of the application, it is stated that this Court while 

exercising its jurisdiction would not be pleased to attain to itself, the task 

entrusted to the executive. It is emphatically submitted in the application 

that the order is without jurisdiction since the constitution of the High 

Level Committee is within the realm of a decision on policy matters. It is 

also submitted that formation of a SIT headed by two former Judges of 

this Court not only impinges on the policy decision of the Government 

but also impinges upon the doctrine of separation of powers. This, 

 28

according to the application, would be beyond the jurisdiction conferred 

on this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, which can 

be exercised for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III and 

for no other purpose. It is further submitted that the judgment proceeds 

on admissions, concessions, submissions and acknowledgments 

attributed to the counsel appearing for the Union of India. It is pointed 

out that such concessions and admissions do not appear to have been 

made. On the basis of the facts pleaded, the prayer is made for 

modification of the order dated 4th July, 2011 and deletion of the 

directions relating to SIT in Paragraphs 49 and 50. Since the directions 

given in these paragraphs have been reproduced verbatim by His 

Lordship, Justice Kabir, the same are not necessary to be reproduced 

herein again. 

6. The aforesaid facts have been stated merely to indicate that the 

application would not be maintainable, in its present form, as in 

substance, it is more in the nature of a Memorandum of Appeal. In my 

 29

opinion, the application seeks to reopen the whole matter on merits 

which would not be permissible in an application for modification. 

Therefore, in my opinion, the application deserves to be dismissed at the 

threshold. 

7. As the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties 

have been succinctly noticed by my Learned Brother Altamas Kabir, J. 

in His Lordship's order, the same need not be repeated herein.

8. In my opinion, an application for clarification/modification 

touching the merits of the matter is not maintainable. The Court can 

consider the matter, if at all, only upon a review application on limited 

grounds. In considering the application for review, the procedure laid 

down under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 read with 

Article 137 would have to be followed. Review of a judgment is a 

serious matter and is, therefore, governed by constitutional and statutory 

provisions. This view of mine will find support from a number of earlier 

 30

decisions of this Court. It would, at this stage, be appropriate to make a 

reference to some of the observations made. 

9. In the case of Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savit ri Devi & Ors.1 this 

Court considered the issue as to whether an application for 

clarification/modification would be maintainable in the face of the 

provisions contained in Article 137 and Order XL Rule 1 of Supreme 

Court Rules. Upon consideration of the entire issue, it was observed as 

follows:- 

 "It is now well settled that an application for 

 clarification or modification touching the merit of the 

 matter would not be maintainable. A Court can rehear 

 the matter upon review of its judgment but, therefore, the 

 procedure laid down in Order 40 Rules 3 and 5 of the 

 Supreme Court Rules, 1966 as also Article 137 of the 

 Constitution are required to be complied with as review 

 of a judgment is governed by the constitutional as well as 

 statutory provisions.

 ...........................................................................

 ......................................................... " The prayer 

 of the applicant is that apart from the corrections which 

 are required to be made in the judgment, as noticed 

 hereinbefore, the merit of the matter may also be 

 considered, inter alia, with reference to the pleadings of 

1 2004 (12) SCC 713

 31

 the parties. Such a course of action, in our opinion, is 

 not contemplated in law. If there exist errors apparent on 

 the face of the record, an application for review would 

 be maintainable but an application for clarification 

 and/or modification cannot be entertained unless it is 

 shown that the same is necessary in the interest of 

 justice. An application which is in effect and substance 

 an application for review cannot be entertained dehors 

 the statutory embargo contained in Order 40 Rules 3 and 

 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966."

10. I am of the considered opinion that the present application would 

be an abuse of the process of the Court as it seeks to camouflage an 

application for Review as an application for modification. In my 

opinion, such a course ought not to be encouraged. It would be relevant 

to notice the observations made by this Court in paragraph 16 of the 

judgment in the case of Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban 

& O rs.2 . 

 "16. At the outset, we have to refer to the practice of filing 

 review applications in large numbers in undeserving cases 

 without properly examining whether the cases strictly 

 come within the narrow confines of Rule XL of the 

 Supreme Court Rules. In several cases, it has become 

 almost everyday experience that review applications are 

 filed mechanically as a matter of routine and the grounds 

 for review are a mere reproduction of the grounds of 

2 2000 (7) SCC 296

 32

 special leave and there is no indication as to which ground 

 strictly falls within the narrow limits of Rule XL of the 

 Rules. We seriously deprecate this practice. If parties file 

 review petitions indiscriminately, the time of the Court is 

 unnecessarily wasted, even it be in chambers where the 

 review petitions are listed. Greater care, seriousness and 

 restraint is needed in filing review applications."

11. In my opinion, ten years down the line, the situation is even worst 

than what is depicted by the aforesaid observations. Now we are facing 

an almost daily practice of having to consider applications for 

"modification and clarification". 

12. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court also considered the nature 

and scope of the jurisdiction to review its own order/judgment. Since the 

application herein has been described as an application for 

"modification", it would be necessary to notice the observations made by 

this Court in Paragraph 17 and 18 of the judgment. The observations of 

this Court are as under:-

 "17. We next come to applications described as 

 applications for "clarification", "modification" or 

 "recall" of judgments or orders finally passed. We may 

 point out that under the relevant Rule XL of the Supreme 

 33

Court Rules, 1966 a review application has first to go 

before the learned Judges in circulation and it will be for 

the Court to consider whether the application is to be 

rejected without giving an oral hearing or whether notice 

is to be issued.

Order XL Rule 3 states as follows:

"3. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an application 

for review shall be disposed of by circulation without any 

oral arguments, but the petitioner may supplement his 

petition by additional written arguments. The Court may 

either dismiss the petition or direct notice to the opposite 

party...."

In case notice is issued, the review petition will be listed 

for hearing, after notice is served. This procedure is meant 

to save the time of the Court and to preclude frivolous 

review petitions being filed and heard in open court. 

However, with a view to avoid this procedure of "no 

hearing", we find that sometimes applications are filed for 

"clarification", "modification" or "recall" etc. not 

because any such clarification, modification is indeed 

necessary but because the applicant in reality wants a 

review and also wants a hearing, thus avoiding listing of 

the same in chambers by way of circulation. Such 

applications, if they are in substance review applications, 

deserve to be rejected straight away inasmuch as the 

attempt is obviously to bypass Order XL Rule 3 relating to 

circulation of the application in chambers for 

consideration without oral hearing. By describing an 

application as one for "clarification" or "modification", 

-- though it is really one of review -- a party cannot be 

permitted to circumvent or bypass the circulation 

procedure and indirectly obtain a hearing in the open 

Court. What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted 

 34

 to be done indirectly. (See in this connection a detailed 

 order of the then Registrar of this Court in Sone Lal v. 

 State of U.P deprecating a similar practice.)

 18. We, therefore, agree with the learned Solicitor 

 General that the Court should not permit hearing of such 

 an application for "clarification", "modification" or 

 "recall" if the application is in substance one for review. 

 In that event, the Court could either reject the application 

 straight away with or without costs or permit withdrawal 

 with leave to file a review application to be listed initially 

 in chambers."

13. These observations leave no manner of doubt that the Court should 

not permit hearing of such an application for "clarification", 

"modification" or "recall" if the application is in substance one for 

review. It is clearly indicated that in those circumstances the Court could 

either reject the application straight away or permit withdrawal with 

leave to file a review application to be listed initially in chambers.

14. Examined on the touch stone of the observations made above, I am 

of the considered opinion that the application herein though described as 

an application for modification is in substance more in the nature of a 

 35

Memorandum of Appeal. At best, it could be said to be in substance an 

Application for Review. It certainly does not lie within the very narrow 

limits within which this Court would entertain an application for 

modification.

15. In yet another case of Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. Vs. 

State of Gujarat & Ors.3 this Court, faced with a similar situation, had 

this to say : 

 "The petition is in essence and substance seeking for a 

 review under the guise of making an application for 

 direction and modification apparently being fully aware 

 of the normal procedure that such applications for 

 review are not, unless the Court directs, listed for open 

 hearing in Court, at the initial stage at least, before 

 ordering notice to the other side and could be summarily 

 rejected, if found to be of no prima facie merit. The move 

 adopted in itself is unjustified, and could not be 

 countenanced also either by way of review or in the form 

 of the present application as well. The nature of relief 

 sought, and the reasons assigned are such that even 

 under the pretext of filing a review such an exercise 

 cannot be undertaken, virtually for rehearing and 

 alteration of the judgment because it is not to the liking 

 of the party, when there is no apparent error on record 

 whatsoever to call for even a review. The said move is 

 clearly misconceived and nothing but sheer abuse of 

 process, which of late is found to be on the increase, 

 more for selfish reasons than to further or strengthen the 

3 (2004 (5) SCC 353)

 36

 cause of justice. The device thus adopted, being 

 otherwise an impermissible move by mere change in 

 nomenclature of the applications does not change the 

 basic nature of the petition. Wishful thinking virtually 

 based on surmises too, at any rate is no justification to 

 adopt such undesirable practices. If at all, it should be 

 for weighty and substantial reasons and not to exhibit the 

 might or weight or even the affluence of the party 

 concerned or those who represent such parties when they 

 happen to be public authorities and institutions.

16. This Court approved the observations made in the case of Gurdip 

Singh Uban (supra) and observed that what cannot be done directly 

cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. The Court should not permit 

hearing of such an application for "clarification", "modification" or 

"recall" if the application is in substance a clever move for review. 

17. These observations were reiterated in the case of A.P. SRTC & 

Ors. Vs. Abdul Kareem 4. This Court observed that the petition was in 

essence and substance seeking for a review under the guise of making an 

application for direction and modification apparently being fully aware 

of the normal procedure that such applications for review are not, unless 

4 2007 (2) SCC 466

 37

the Court directs, listed for open hearing in Court, at the initial stage at 

least, before ordering notice to the other side and could be summarily 

rejected, if found to be of no prima facie merit. The Court further 

observed that such a move ought not to be countenanced. The move was 

clearly misconceived and nothing but sheer abuse of process, which of 

late is found to be on the increase, more for selfish reasons than to 

further or strengthen the cause of justice.

18. To be fair, it must be noticed that the learned Attorney General 

appearing for the Union of India had relied on a number of judgments in 

support of his submissions that the Court would have inherent powers to 

modify its own order/judgment. The primary judgment relied upon by 

the learned Attorney General is in the case of S. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs. 

State of Karnataka & Anr.5. I am of the considered opinion that the 

aforesaid judgment would be of no assistance to the submissions made 

by the learned Attorney General. The aforesaid judgment was rendered 

in the background of very peculiar facts. It would appear that this Court 

5 1993 (Supp.4) SCC 595

 38

had passed an order having far reaching consequences and pre-judicially 

affecting the rights of other groups of employees under Articles 14 

and 16 of the Constitution of India. The order had permitted backdoor 

entry of thousands of stipendiary graduates because of the negligence of 

the State in putting correct facts before the Court. The Government 

seemed to have woken up after considerable damage had already been 

done and moved an application for modification/clarification of the order 

dated 30th October, 1991. The learned Attorney General placed strong 

reliance on the observations made by this Court in Paragraph 18, 19 and 

36 of the judgment in support of the submission that the Court should not 

decline to review its orders when it is brought to the notice of the Court 

that it would be in the interest of justice to modify the same. In order to 

appreciate the submission of learned Attorney General, it would be 

appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in Paragraphs 

18, 19 and 36 of the judgment, which are as under:-

 "18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. 

 Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law 

 can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not 

 be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered 

 39

for consistency but it is not as inflexible in 

Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law 

bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction 

exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and 

fairness. If the Court finds that the order was passed 

under a mistake and it would not have exercised the 

jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in 

fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in 

miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be 

precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted 

as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the 

nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending 

on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the 

power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either 

statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the 

mistake is of the Court. In Administrative Law the scope 

is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied 

of the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal 

obligation to set it right by recalling its order. Here as 

explained, the Bench of which one of us (Sahai, J.) was a 

member did commit an error in placing all the 

stipendiary graduates in the scale of First Division 

Assistants due to State's failure to bring correct facts on 

record. But that obviously cannot stand in the way of the 

Court correcting its mistake. Such inequitable 

consequences as have surfaced now due to vague 

affidavit filed by the State cannot be permitted to 

continue.

19. Review literally and even judicially means re-

examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy 

inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human 

fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the 

statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision 

legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily 

and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental 

 40

mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was 

no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the 

highest court indicating the circumstances in which it 

could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to 

avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja 

Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court 

observed that even though no rules had been framed 

permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was 

available on the limited and narrow ground developed 

by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court 

approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in 

Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order 

made by the Court was final and could not be altered:

 "... nevertheless, if by misprision in 

 embodying the judgments, by errors have 

 been introduced, these Courts possess, by 

 Common law, the same power which the 

 Courts of record and statute have of 

 rectifying the mistakes which have crept in .... 

 The House of Lords exercises a similar power 

 of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its 

 own judgments, and this Court must possess 

 the same authority. The Lords have however 

 gone a step further, and have corrected 

 mistakes introduced through inadvertence in 

 the details of judgments; or have supplied 

 manifest defects in order to enable the 

 decrees to be enforced, or have added 

 explanatory matter, or have reconciled 

 inconsistencies."

Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same 

decision as under:

 "It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence 

 extended in such cases is mainly owing to the 

 natural desire prevailing to prevent 

 41

 irremediable injustice being done by a Court 

 of last resort, where by some accident, 

 without any blame, the party has not been 

 heard and an order has been inadvertently 

 made as if the party had been heard."

Rectification of an order thus stems from the 

fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is 

exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing 

finality. When the Constitution was framed the 

substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by 

this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the 

Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the 

practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such 

provision expressly conferred the substantive power to 

review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the 

Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this 

Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which 

any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of 

this power Order XL had been framed empowering this 

Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds 

analogous to Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure 

Code. The expression, `for any other sufficient reason' in 

the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a 

decree or order passed under misapprehension of true 

state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient 

ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 

1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent 

power to make such orders as may be necessary in the 

interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of 

Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or 

reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is 

necessary to do so for sake of justice.

36. There is yet another circumstance. The question is, 

whether this Court should enforce the 1982 Rules as 

 42

amended in 1987. The 1987 amendments have the effect 

of smuggling in thousands of persons into Government 

service by a back-door -- without complying with the 

requirements of Articles 14 and 16. One can understand 

the rules as framed in 1982, but it is extremely difficult to 

appreciate or understand the reasons for which the 1987 

amendment was brought in. The question, to repeat, is 

whether this Court should extend its arm -- its 

discretionary power under Articles 136 and 32, as the 

case may be, to implement such unconstitutional rules 

and help these persons to gain a back-door entry into 

Government service -- that too at the highest level in 

group `C' services straightaway. It is true that no one 

has questioned the 1987 amendments. The petitioners do 

not question them because they are advantageous to 

them; they want them to be implemented. The 

Government cannot and does not question them because 

it has itself made them. The parties who are affected 

namely the persons awaiting employment under the 

Government probably do not even know what is 

happening. But where an unconstitutional provision of 

such vast impact is brought to the notice of this Court 

and it is asked to enforce it, it is the constitutional duty of 

this Court to refuse to do so. I am, therefore, of the firm 

opinion that this Court should refuse to make any orders 

directing implementation of the rules as amended in 

1987. The proper direction would be to direct the 

absorption of the S.Gs. in accordance with the 1982 

Rules as originally framed (i.e., without reference to the 

1987 amendments) and to the extent provided therein. Of 

course those S.Gs. who have been absorbed already into 

group `C' service in accordance with the said rules will 

remain unaffected since disturbing them, without notice 

to them and in view of all the circumstances of this 

case, may not be advisable. All those S.Gs. who have 

not so far been absorbed in group `C' service shall 

 43

 continue in the present status, drawing Rs 960 per 

 month. They will be entitled for absorption in group 

 `C' posts only in accordance with the 1982 Rules, 

 without reference to the 1987 amendments."

Relying on these observations, learned Attorney General, submits that 

the Court should regardless of any technical objections proceed to hear 

the present application without insisting that the applicant should seek its 

relief in an application for review. 

19. I am of the considered opinion that the facts and circumstances 

highlighted in the present application would not enable the applicant to 

satisfy the conditions under which this Court exercised its inherent 

jurisdiction in the S. Nagaraj's case (supra). A perusal of the judgment 

would clearly show that the Court was anxious to "even the balance". 

On the one side, there were orders of the Court passed on vague and 

incomplete affidavit, creating rights and hopes in favour of five thousand 

stipendiary graduates to be absorbed as First Division Assistant, and on 

the other hand, there were others, the likely injustice to whom had been 

highlighted in the affidavit filed by the Government and in the writ 

 44

petition filed by different sections of the employees. The Court in fact 

emphasised the principle of finality of orders and binding nature of 

directions issued by the Court which could only be overridden, if there is 

injustice inherent in the situation (see Page 615, Para 14 e & f). A little 

later in the judgment, in Paragraph 16, the Court observed as follows:-

 "16. "Mere eligibility was not sufficient unless 

 availability of posts was also established. In absence of 

 posts and due to equitable considerations arising in 

 favour of other employees the practical difficulty in 

 appointing all the five thousand stipendiary graduates as 

 First Division Assistants appears to be insurmountable. 

 Even so we have no hesitation in saying that we would 

 have refused to modify our order dated October 30, 

 1991 at the instance of the Government but the Court 

 cannot be unjust to other employees." (emphasis 

 supplied)

20. These observations make it abundantly clear that the Court was 

dealing with a particularly unsavory situation created by the Government 

which had led to insurmountable difficulties and possible injustice to 

both the stipendiary Magistrates and other employees. The Court, 

therefore, observed that but for this unique situation, it would have 

refused to modify the order dated 30th October, 1991. In Paragraph 18, 

 45

the Court makes it clear that the order was passed under a mistake. The 

Court would not have exercised its jurisdiction but for the erroneous 

assumption, which in fact did not exist. In Paragraph 36, again, it is 

reiterated by the Court that it would be the duty of the Court to rectify, 

revise and recall its orders as and when it is brought to its notice and 

certain of its orders were based on wrong or mistaken assumption of 

facts and that implementation of those orders would have serious 

consequences. 

21. In my opinion, in the present case, there is no question of mistaken 

facts, being presented by anyone to the Court. The application also fails 

to indicate any miscarriage of justice or injustice which would be caused 

to any particular class. The other authorities cited by the learned 

Attorney General followed the judgment in S. Nagaraj's case (supra) 

and would not advance the cause of the applicant or Union of India any 

further. 

 46

22. The judgment in Gurdip Singh Uban's case (supra) rather 

supports the writ petitioner as noticed in the earlier part of this order. 

The learned Attorney General further submitted that this Court would be 

fully justified in passing the orders in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction 

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It can always correct its 

non errors brought to its notice either by way of a review petition or ex 

debito justitiae. In support of the submission, the learned Attorney 

general has relied on judgment of this Court in the case of A.R. Antulay 

Vs. R.S.  Nayak & Anr.6 

23. In my opinion, the aforesaid judgment was also delivered in view 

of the peculiar circumstances of the case. The Court therein set out the 

circumstances in which this Court can pass the appropriate orders 

unhindered by technical rules. The observations made in paragraph 48, 

which are of relevance, are as under :

 "48. According to Shri Jethmalani, the doctrine of per 

 incuriam has no application in the same proceedings. We 

 are unable to accept this contention. We are of the opinion 

6 1988 (2) SCC 602

 47

 that this Court is not powerless to correct its error which 

 has the effect of depriving a citizen of his fundamental 

 rights and more so, the right to life and liberty. It can do 

 so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any proceeding 

 pending before it without insisting on the formalities of a 

 review application. Powers of review can be exercised in a 

 petition filed under Article 136 or Article 32 or under any 

 other provision of the Constitution if the court is satisfied 

 that its directions have resulted in the deprivation of the 

 fundamental rights of a citizen or any legal right of the 

 petitioner. See the observations in Prem Chand Garg v. 

 Excise Commissioner."

24. In my opinion, the aforesaid observations would not be applicable 

in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The application herein 

is not moved by an individual, who had been deprived of his 

fundamental rights by an order dated 4th July, 2011. The application is 

filed by the Union of India challenging the order on various legal and 

factual issues. In Antulay's case (supra), one of the grounds taken was 

that the directions have been issued by the Court without following the 

principle of audi alteram partem. In the present case, the directions had 

been issued after hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length and 

on numerous dates. These directions, in my opinion, cannot be recalled 

 48

in an application seeking only modification of the order. At this stage, it 

would also not be possible to treat the present application for 

modification as an application for review.

25. In view of the above, with utmost respect, it would not be possible 

to agree with the order passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Altamas Kabir. In 

my opinion, the applicant Union of India has failed to make out a case to 

enable this Court to treat the modification application as application for 

review and proceed to hear the same in open Court. In my opinion, the 

present application is wholly misconceived. It is, therefore, dismissed. 

Union of India is, however, at liberty to take recourse to any other legal 

remedy that may be available to it. 

 ...................................J.

 [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

New Delhi;

September 23, 2011.

 49

 REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

 I.A. NO.8 OF 2011

 IN

 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.176 OF 2009

RAM JETHMALANI & ORS. Petitioner(s)

 VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondent(s)

 O R D E R 

 Since we have differed in our views regarding the 

maintainability of I.A. No.8 of 2011 filed in W.P. No.176 

of 2009, let the matter be placed before Hon'ble the Chief 

Justice of India, for reference to a third Judge.

 ......................J.  (ALTAMAS KABIR)

 ......................J. (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)New Delhi; September 23, 2011. 

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