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Civil Procedure Code 1908-O. 39, 1 and 2 and O. 43, R. 1-Ex-parte ad-interim order to maintain status quo-Plaintiff filing suit for declaration of his status as a tenant on the basis of a letter written on the letter head of a Limited Company and signed by defendant-Also seeking gram of interim injunction pending the suit restraining defendants from interfering with his possession of suit property-Trial Court refusing to pass such order-District Court, on appeal, passing an ex-parte ad interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo without indicating what the status quo was-Held, the order was not proper in an original suit-The said order should not have been passed at the initial stage of a litigation. Civil Procedure Code 1908-Ss. 115, 151 and O. 39, R. 1 and 2 and O.43, R. 1-Interim Mandatory Injunction-Grant of Remedy-Transfer of Property Act 1882-S. 107-District Court issuing an ad-interim order to maintain status quo-Plaintiff’s plea that he was dispossessed of the suit premises subsequent to said order-District Court passing interim mandatory injunction directing the defendant to restore possession of the suit property to plaintiff-No specific and adequate prima facie finding that plaintiff was in possession on the date of filling of suit and passing of status quo order and that he had been subsequently dispossessed in violation of the status quo order-Genuineness and validity of the document witnessing lease not examined-Held, order passed without proper or adequate finding on these aspect would be without jurisdiction-Mandatory injunction being an extraordinary relief, such an order not supported by necessary findings justifying its grant can not be sustained. Constitution of India-Article 227-Jurisdiction of High Court-Held, it is to be invoked to correct errors of jurisdiction-where a court comes to a finding of fact by asking itself a wrong question or approaches the question in an improper manner, the said finding of fact can not be said to be one rendered with jurisdiction and is amenable to correction at the hands of the court u/a 227-Failure to render the necessary findings to support its order by the court is also a jurisdictional error liable to correction-High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not setting aside the interim mandatory injunction which was not supported by necessary findings. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of his status as a tenant of suit property and for perpetual injunction restraining the appellant-defendant, the owners of the building, from interfering with his peaceful possession. Plaintiff also moved an application for grant of interim injunction pending the suit, restraining defendant from interfering with his possession of the property. It was claimed by the plaintiff that suit property was leased to him by defendant and transaction was evidenced by writing on the letter head of a company owned by defendant. Lease was denied by defendant. Trial court found that there was no urgency which justified the grant of an ad-interim ex parte order of injunction. On appeal, Additional District Judge passed an ex parte ad-interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo as on 19.06.1998. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an application u/s 151 of the Code for an interim mandatory injunction alleging that he was in possession on 19.06.1998 when order to maintain status quo was passed and that he was dispossessed on the next day in violation of that order. District Court passed as order of interim mandatory injunction directing to restore possession of suit property to plaintiff. This was challenged by the defendants before the High Court in a proceeding u/s 115 of the code. The High Court set aside the order and remanded the matter for consideration by the District Court. The High Court pointed out that the essential condition for passing an interim mandatory injunction was that the party claiming it must be shown to be in possession on the date of the order directing the parties to maintain status quo and that he was dispossessed after such an order was passed. Since, specific findings on both these aspects were lacking, the Addl. District Judge acted without jurisdiction in passing the interim mandatory order of injunction. The District Court reconsidered the application for interim mandatory injunction and allowed the same by upholding the claim of the plaintiff. The challenge by the defendants to that order before the High Court under article 227 of the constitution was rejected. Hence the present appeal by the defendants challenging the said orders. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. In an original suit of this nature, it was not appropriate for the Additional District Judge to pass an order directing the parties to maintain status quo, without indicating what the status quo was. If he was satisfied that the appellant before him had made out at a prima facie case for an ad interim ex perte injunction and the balance of convenience justified the grant to such an injunction, it was for him to have passed such an order of injunction. But simply directing the parties to maintain status quo without indicating what the status quo was, is not an order that should be passed at the initial stage of litigation, especially when one court had found no reason to grant an ex parte order of injunction and the appellate court was dealing with only the limited question whether an ad interim order of injunction should or should not have ben granted by the trial court, since the appeal was only against the refusal of an ad interim ex parte order of injunction and the main application for injunction pending suit, was still pending before the trial court itself. [183-e, f, g] 2.1. An interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily granted. It is an order that is passed only in circumstances which are clear and the prima facie materials clearly justify a finding that the status quo has been altered by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of justice demanded that the status quo ante be restored by way of an interim mandatory injunction. [184-b-c] 2.2. Before ordering an interim mandatory injunction or refusing it, the court has first to consider whether the plaintiff has proved that he was in possession on the date of suit and on the date of order and he had been dispossessed the next day. Unless a clear prima facie finding that the plaintiff was in possession on those dates is entered, an order for interim mandatory injunction could not have been passed and any such order passed would be one without jurisdiction. [183-h-; 184-a] 2.3. Admittedly, the defendants are the owners of the building. The plaintiff was setting up a case that the plaint schedule part of the building had been granted to him on lease on 17.04.1998 and that he had obtained possession thereof on the basis of such a lease transaction. The lease, thus set up by the plaintiff has been denied by the defendants who had pleaded that the plaintiff had been entrusted with some renovation work for which he was being paid and the alleged document relied on by him was a concocted one. The grant of mandatory injunction would necessarily depend upon the plaintiff establishing before the court that on 19.06.1998 when the court directed the parties to maintain status quo, he was in possession as a tenant of the plaint schedule property. The burden in that behalf is clearly on the plaintiff, the claim he made, having been denied by the defendants. Therefore, the first question that the District Court had to consider pursuant to the order of remand by the High Court was whether the plaintiff had prima facie established that the building was let out to him as claimed. What the plaintiff has relied upon is seen to be a letter on the letter-head of Khaitan Paper Machine Limited signed by the first defendant describing himself as Managing Director and Partner of Khaitan Estates. Prima facie it is seen that whereas the letter-head is that of Khaitan Paper Machine Limited, obviously a limited company, the signature is that of the Managing Director and partner of Khaitan Estates, an entity different from Khaitan Paper Machine Limited. It is difficult to imagine that the letter-head of one company was used for dealing with the properties of another entity which appears to be a partnership as per the description contained in the letter. Prima facie, the document does not satisfy the requirements of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and thought it acknowledges receipt of a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs there is no stamp affixed to indicate that it was intended to be a receipt for the said sum. The genuineness of this document which is seriously disputed by the defendants, its admissibility in evidence and validity, have to be decided in the suit. Therefore, one of the questions that has to be decided is whether this letter is genuine and if it is genuine, whether it is capable of bringing into existence a lease or accepted as evidencing a lease transaction between the parties. Since this is the document on which the suit is based, the finding on the genuineness and validity of this document and the alleged transaction created by it will have a great bearing on the claim of possession by the plaintiff. [184-d, e, f, h; 185-a, c-e] 2.4. The approach of the Additional District Judge and the manner in which he dealt with the question in spite of the directions in the order of remand by the High Court leave a lot to be desired. Instead of discussing the evidence properly to find whether the plaintiff had prima facie proved his possession on 19.06.1998 as a tenant as claimed by him and whether he had adduced any evidence to show prima facie that he had been forcibly dispossessed on 20.06.1998, the day after the grant of ad interim ex parte order to maintain status quo, the Additional District Judge has passed the interim order of mandatory injunction. Thus, we find that the order of interim mandatory injunction, an extraordinary relief in itself, is not supported by the necessary findings justifying its grant. We also find that the approach made by the Additional District Judge in not the approach that is called for, in entertaining a claim of this nature put forward by a plaintiff and hence the order is also vitiated by an erroneous approach to the question falling for decision. [186-f-g; 187-b] 3.1. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be restrictive in the sense that it is to be invoked only to correct errors of jurisdiction. But when a court asks itself a wrong question or approaches the question in an improper manner, even if it comes to a finding of fact, the said finding of fact cannot be said to be one rendered with jurisdiction and it will still be amenable to correction at the hands of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The failure to render the necessary findings to support its order would also be a jurisdictional error liable to correction. Here the jurisdiction to grant an interim mandatory injunction could be exercised on entering a finding that on the day the order for maintaining the status quo was passed, the plaintiff was in possession and a day after the interim order was passed, he was in fact dispossessed. [187-g, h; 188-a-b] 3.2. The High Court, we must say, has also not properly exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In fact, it has failed to exercise its jurisdiction. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it behoved the High Court to consider whether the order of interim mandatory injunction was supported by the necessary findings. That is certainly a question of jurisdiction, since the jurisdiction to pass an interim mandatory order can only be based on such clear findings and the grant of an interim order without such findings would be acting without jurisdiction. [187-c-e] 4. Thus, prima facie, we find that the tenancy claimed by the plaintiff remains to be proved in the suit. For the present, we should say that prima facie, the plaintiff has not been able to establish the foundation for the possession claimed by him. The prima facie infirmities attached to the letter said to create the tenancy cannot also be ignored, since that transaction is the foundation of the plaintiff’s claim of possession. The disturbance of the status quo by the defendants has not been established. Thus, prima facie it is clear that the plaintiff has not laid the foundation for the grant of an interim order of mandatory injunction in his favour. The order so passed by the Additional District Judge, and confirmed by the High Court, therefore, calls for interference in this appeal. [188-d-f] L. Nageswara Rao, Ankit Singa, Sanjeev Pandey and Nikhil Nayyar for the Appellants. Shravan Kumar, Kumar Jyoti Tiwari and S. Chandra Shekhar for the Respondent.

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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1101 of 2006

PETITIONER:
KISHORE KUMAR KHAITAN & ANR

RESPONDENT:
PRAVEEN KUMAR SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/02/2006

BENCH:
S.B. SINHA & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T 

(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CIVIL) NO.11469 OF 2005)

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

 Leave granted. 

1. The respondent herein, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, 
filed a suit TS No.119 of 1998 before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, 
Howrah for a declaration of his status as a tenant of the suit property and for 
a perpetual injunction restraining the appellants herein, hereinafter referred 
to as the defendants, the owners of the building, from interfering with the 
peaceful possession of the plaintiff and for other incidental reliefs. Along 
with the suit, the plaintiff moved an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 
and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'), 
for an interim injunction pending the suit, restraining the defendants from 
interfering with his possession of the plaint schedule property. When the 
application for interim injunction was moved on 12.6.1998, the trial court 
found that there was no urgency which justified the grant of an ad-interim 
ex parte order of injunction and taking the view that the delay will not defeat 
justice, refused to pass an ad-interim order of injunction and issued notice to 
the defendants to show cause within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, as 
to why the temporary injunction, as prayed for by the plaintiff, shall not be 
granted. Feeling himself aggrieved by the non-grant of an ad interim ex 
parte injunction, the plaintiff filed an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of The 
Code of Civil Procedure before the District Court. The Additional District 
Judge on 19.6.1998, while entertaining the civil miscellaneous appeal 
admitted the same and issued notice to the defendants fixing 4.9.1998 for 
their appearance. After allowing an application for amendment of the 
application for injunction by way of incorporating a schedule thereto, the 
Additional District Judge along with the issuance of notice to the defendants 
to show cause why the prayer for temporary injunction shall not be granted, 
stating that in the light of the materials available it was just and proper to 
direct the parties to maintain the status quo as on date and delay in the grant 
of an ad-interim order may cause complications, passed an ex parte ad 
interim order directing both the parties to maintain status quo as on that day 
till 17.7.1998. Thereafter alleging that he was in possession on 19.6.1998 
when the order to maintain status quo was passed by the Additional District 
Judge and that he was dispossessed on 20.6.1998 in violation of that order, 
the plaintiff filed an application under Section 151 of the Code for an interim 
mandatory injunction directing the defendants to put him in possession of 
the suit premises. The District Court originally passed an order of interim 
mandatory injunction directing the defendants to restore possession of the 
suit property to the plaintiff. This was challenged by the defendants before 
the High Court in a proceeding under Section 115 of the Code. The High 
Court set aside the order of the trial court and remanded the application for 
interim mandatory injunction for reconsideration by the District court. 
Thereafter, the District court reconsidered the application for interim 
mandatory injunction and allowed the same by upholding the claim of the 
plaintiff that he was dispossessed after the interim order of status quo was 
passed by that Court. A challenge by the defendants to that order before the 
High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution was rejected by the High 
Court. This appeal by special leave is filed by the defendants challenging 
those orders.

2. We may note two incidental facts at this stage. The first is the 
filing of a suit TS No.153 of 1998 by the present defendants for a declaration 
that the document relied on as a rent deed by the present plaintiff, be 
adjudged void and cancelled and for consequential reliefs flowing from the 
grant of the main relief. The second is that even though the petition for 
special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court dated 25.11.2004 
was filed in this Court on 31.3.2005, in enforcement of the order of the 
District Court under challenge in this appeal, possession was delivered over 
to the plaintiff on 8.4.2005 through the process of court. 

3. It is the case of the plaintiff that the suit property was leased to 
him by the first defendant on 17.4.1998 and that the transaction was 
evidenced by writing in the letter-head of Khaitan Paper Machine Limited 
owned by the first defendant. According to the plaintiff, there was an 
earlier litigation between the first defendant and one Shivanand Mishra, 
Shivanand Mishra claiming a tenancy over a portion of the present suit 
premises and at the instance of the present plaintiff, that suit was 
compromised, as part of the compromise a sum of Rs.2 lakhs was paid to 
Shivanand Mishra and Shivanand Mishra gave up his claim of tenancy. 
According to the plaintiff, the said sum of Rs.2 lakhs which was paid to 
Shivanand Mishra was advanced by him to the first defendant and it was in 
consideration of the same and the help rendered by the plaintiff in the matter 
of settling the dispute with Shivanand Mishra, that the first defendant agreed 
to handover possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff immediately after 
recovering possession from Shivanand Mishra and it was in furtherance of 
the promise that the tenancy agreement was executed on 17.4.1998. Thus, 
the plaintiff claimed that he had been put in possession of the suit property 
as a tenant. In derogation of the tenancy thus created in his favour, the 
defendants were attempting to dispossess the plaintiff forcibly and it was in 
that situation that the plaintiff was filing the suit for a declaration of his 
tenancy rights over the suit property and for a perpetual injunction 
restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession as a tenant. 
As already noticed, though the plaintiff filed an application under Order 
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code for an interim injunction restraining the 
defendants from interfering with his possession, the trial court did not pass 
an ad interim order of injunction, but only issued notices to the defendants 
calling upon them to show cause why the prayer for injunction shall not be 
granted. It is against this refusal of ad interim injunction ex parte, that the 
plaintiff filed the appeal before the District Court in which, on 19.6.1998, 
the Additional District Judge passed an ad interim ex parte order directing 
both the parties to maintain status quo. 

4. It is necessary to notice at this stage that in an original suit of 
this nature, it was not appropriate for the Additional District Judge to pass an 
order directing the parties to maintain status quo, without indicating what the 
status quo was. If he was satisfied that the appellant before him had made 
out a prima facie case for an ad interim ex parte injunction and the balance 
of convenience justified the grant of such an injunction, it was for him to 
have passed such an order of injunction. But simply directing the parties to 
maintain status quo without indicating what the status quo was, is not an 
order that should be passed at the initial stage of a litigation, especially when 
one court had found no reason to grant an ex parte order of injunction and 
the appellate court was dealing with only the limited question whether an ad 
interim order of injunction should or should not have been granted by the 
trial court, since the appeal was only against the refusal of an ad interim ex 
parte order of injunction and the main application for injunction pending 
suit, was still pending before the trial court itself. Therefore, we are prima 
facie of the view that the Additional District Judge ought not to have passed 
an equivocal order like the one passed in the circumstances of the case. But 
of course, that aspect has relevance only to the extent that before ordering 
an interim mandatory injunction or refusing it, the court has first to consider 
whether the plaintiff has proved that he was in possession on the date of suit 
and on the date of the order and he had been dispossessed the next day. 
Unless a clear prima facie finding that the plaintiff was in possession on 
those dates is entered, an order for interim mandatory injunction could not 
have been passed and any such order passed would be one without 
jurisdiction.

5. An interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily 
granted. It is an order that is passed only in circumstances which are clear 
and the prima facie materials clearly justify a finding that the status quo has 
been altered by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of justice 
demanded that the status quo ante be restored by way of an interim 
mandatory injunction. Keeping this principle in mind, it is necessary to see 
whether in the case on hand, the Additional District Judge was justified in 
passing the interim order of injunction.

6. Admittedly, the defendants are the owners of the building. The 
plaintiff was setting up a case that the plaint schedule part of the building 
had been granted to him on lease on 17.4.1998 and that he had obtained 
possession thereof on the basis of such a lease transaction. The lease, thus 
set up by the plaintiff has been denied by the defendants who had pleaded 
that the plaintiff had been entrusted with some renovation work for which he 
was being paid and the alleged document relied on by him was a concocted 
one. The grant of mandatory injunction would necessarily depend upon the 
plaintiff establishing before the court that on 19.6.98 when the court directed 
the parties to maintain status quo, he was in possession as a tenant of the 
plaint schedule property. The burden in that behalf is clearly on the 
plaintiff, the claim he made, having been denied by the defendants. 
Therefore, the first question that the District Court had to consider pursuant 
to the order of remand by the High Court was whether the plaintiff had 
prima facie established that the building was let out to him as claimed. 
The building is seen to be of a substantial dimension , within the 
District of Howrah, part of a city, commercially important. Prima facie 
it is difficult to imagine that such a building or the second floor and part 
of the ground floor of a building of this nature would have been let out in 
such an informal manner and the transaction not being evidenced even by a 
rent deed executed by the lessor and the lessee in terms of Section 107 of the 
Transfer of Property Act. What the plaintiff has relied upon is seen to be a 
letter on the letter-head of Khaitan Paper Machine Limited signed by the 
first defendant describing himself as Managing Director and Partner of 
Khaintan Estates. Prima facie it is seen that whereas the letter-head is that 
of Khaitan Paper Machine Limited, obviously a limited company, the 
signature is that of the Managing Director and partner of Khaitan Estates, an 
entity different from Khaitan Paper Machine Limited. It is difficult to 
imagine that the letter-head of one company was used for dealing with the 
properties of another entity which appears to be a partnership as per the 
description contained in the letter. Secondly, the letter purports to be an 
acknowledgement for having received a sum of Rs.2 lakhs as security from 
the plaintiff and creating a tenancy in favour of the plaintiff, and inducting 
the plaintiff into possession in respect of the entire second floor and shop 
rooms in the ground floor as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.7,000/- and 
conferring upon the plaintiff a right to do certain other acts in the premises. 
It is also stated that a stamped agreement would be created by the signatory 
as well as his wife, in favour of the plaintiff. Prima facie, the document 
does not satisfy the requirements of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property 
Act and though it acknowledges receipt of a sum of Rs.2 lakhs, there is no 
stamp affixed to indicate that it was intended to be a receipt for the said sum. 
As noticed, the rent stipulated is also Rs.7,000 per month. Suffice it to 
notice, that the genuineness of this document which is seriously disputed by 
the defendants, its admissibility in evidence and validity, have to be decided 
in the suit. Therefore, one of the questions that has to be decided is whether 
this letter is genuine and if it is genuine, whether it is capable of bringing 
into existence a lease or accepted as evidencing a lease transaction between 
the parties. Since this is the document on which the suit is based, the 
finding on the genuineness and validity of this document and the alleged 
transaction created by it will have a great bearing on the claim of possession 
by the plaintiff. No doubt the signature of defendant No.1 found in the 
document is admitted but with an explanation that it is a got up document. 
A suit has also been filed by the defendants challenging it.

7. At this stage it is not necessary to go further into this aspect 
because what we are concerned with is whether pursuant to the order of 
remand earlier made by the High Court directing the District Court to take 
evidence and to decide the question falling for decision, the District Court 
has considered the relevant aspects and whether its order granting an interim 
mandatory order of injunction is capable of being sustained or is free from 
jurisdictional error.

8. While setting aside the original order passed by the Additional 
District Judge, and remanding the application for an interim mandatory 
injunction, the High Court specifically pointed out that the essential 
condition for passing an interim mandatory injunction was that the party 
claiming it must be shown to be in possession on the date of the order 
directing the parties to maintain status quo and it must be further to shown 
that he was dispossessed after such an order was passed and that specific 
findings on both these aspects were necessary to sustain an order. The court 
had found that such findings were lacking and hence the Additional District 
Judge acted without jurisdiction in passing the interim mandatory order of 
injunction. The order passed was set aside and the application filed by the 
plaintiff was remanded. Certain directions regarding production of 
documents and their receivability were also issued. The District Court was 
directed to decide the claim of the plaintiff afresh, in accordance with law 
and in the light of the directions issued in that order.

9. It is seen that after the remand, the parties produced some 
evidence. The Additional District Court set out the arguments on the side of 
both the parties. Then it referred to certain decisions cited by the parties. It 
observed that there was at least some prima facie foundation in the claim of 
the plaintiff that the tenancy agreement was executed by defendant No.1 and 
whether it was concocted out of a signed blank letter head and whether it 
had legal force could only be decided in the suit. It did not discuss the oral 
evidence that was taken pursuant to the order of remand and merely stated 
that it has perused the evidence. After referring to some cash memos and 
money receipts produced by the plaintiff, it held that they prima facie 
showed that the plaintiff was in possession. Then it abruptly observed that 
at least prima facie it is proved that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit 
property on 19.6.1998, the date of the passing of the order of status quo. It 
stated that as such his possession must be restored and it was a fit case where 
the court should invoke its inherent jurisdiction to order restoration of 
possession.

10. We must say that the approach of the Additional District Judge 
and the manner in which he dealt with the question in spite of the directions 
in the order of remand by the High Court leave a lot to be desired. Instead 
of discussing the evidence properly to find whether the plaintiff had prima 
facie proved his possession on 19.6.1998 as a tenant as claimed by him and 
whether he had adduced any evidence to show prima facie that he had been 
forcibly dispossessed on 20.6.1998, the day after the grant of ad interim ex 
parte order to maintain status quo, the Additional District Judge has passed 
the interim order of mandatory injunction. We are of the view that there is 
no proper or adequate finding by the Additional District Judge either of 
prima facie possession of the plaintiff on 19.6.1998 or of his forcible 
dispossession on 20.6.1998, Apparently, not even a neighbour or occupant 
of any part of the building was examined in support of the case of forcible 
dispossession on the morning of 20.6.1998. In fact there does not appear to 
be any such finding of dispossession in spite of the direction in that behalf in 
the order of remand. Thus, we find that the order of interim mandatory 
injunction, an extraordinary relief in itself, is not supported by the necessary 
findings justifying its grant. We also find that the approach made by the 
Additional District Judge is not the approach that is called for, in 
entertaining a claim of this nature put forward by a plaintiff and hence the 
order is also vitiated by an erroneous approach to the question falling for 
decision. 

11. The High Court, we must say, has also not properly exercised 
its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In fact, it has 
failed to exercise its jurisdiction. Though the High Court rightly noticed that 
the burden was on the plaintiff to show that he was in possession on the date 
of the order directing the parties to maintain status quo and that he was 
dispossessed in violation of the subsisting interim order, it did not scrutinize 
the order to find out whether the requisite findings had been entered by the 
Additional District Judge on both those aspects. It did not even consider 
whether there was a clear finding that the plaintiff was forcibly dispossessed 
on 20.6.1998 as alleged by him. It did not also consider whether the finding 
on possession was rendered based on a discussion of the available evidence 
and whether the directions in the order of remand had been complied with. 
In short, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution 
of India, it behoved the High Court to consider whether the order of interim 
mandatory injunction was supported by the necessary findings. That is 
certainly a question of jurisdiction, since the jurisdiction to pass an interim 
mandatory order can only be based on such clear findings and the grant of an 
interim order without such findings would be acting without jurisdiction. 
We may incidentally notice that there is no prima facie material to indicate 
that on 20.6.1998 the plaintiff was, in fact, dispossessed by the defendants. 
We may in this context notice that the plaintiff could not show that he had 
either become a member of the tenants association of the building or had 
entered into an arrangement with it for the consumption of electricity in 
terms of the alleged rental arrangement. We have already noticed that none 
of the occupants of the building was examined to prima facie show 
dispossession.

12. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be 
restrictive in the sense that it is to be invoked only to correct errors of 
jurisdiction. But when a court asks itself a wrong question or approaches 
the question in an improper manner, even if it comes to a finding of fact, the 
said finding of fact cannot be said to be one rendered with jurisdiction and it 
will still be amenable to correction at the hands of the High Court under 
Article 227 of the Constitution. The failure to render the necessary findings 
to support its order would also be a jurisdictional error liable to correction. 
Here the jurisdiction to grant an interim mandatory injunction could be 
exercised on entering a finding that on the day the order for maintaining the 
status quo was passed, the plaintiff was in possession and a day after the 
interim order was passed, he was in fact dispossessed. The interim direction 
to maintain status quo was an ex parte order. From the order of the 
Additional District court it is not possible to come to the conclusion that on a 
proper advertence to the relevant materials, prima facie clear findings had 
been rendered by that court on these aspects. The prima facie infirmities 
attached to the letter said to create the tenancy cannot also be ignored, since 
that transaction is the foundation of the plaintiff's claim of possession. 

13. Thus, prima facie, we find that the tenancy claimed by the 
plaintiff remains to be proved in the suit. For the present, we should say 
that prima facie, the plaintiff has not been able to establish the foundation 
for the possession claimed by him. It is significant to note that not even 
another tenant of the building among the various tenants in the building, was 
examined to establish that the plaintiff while in possession, had been 
dispossessed on 20.6.1998 as claimed by him. Any way, the Additional 
District Judge has not referred to any such evidence except referring to the 
affidavit of Shivanand Mishra, who even according to the plaintiff was no 
more in occupation. Thus, the disturbance of the status quo by the 
defendants has not been established. Thus, prima facie it is clear that the 
plaintiff has not laid the foundation for the grant of an interim order of 
mandatory injunction in his favour. The order so passed by the Additional 
District Judge, and confirmed by the High Court, therefore, calls for 
interference in this appeal.

14. Before parting, it is necessary to notice the argument that after 
the order of the High Court and after the filing of this petition for special 
leave to appeal to this Court, the plaintiff was put in possession pursuant to 
the order under challenge through the process of court. Now that we have 
set aside the order of the High Court and that of the Additional District court 
and rejected the prayer of the plaintiff for mandatory injunction, the 
defendants would be entitled to re-delivery of possession by way of 
restitution. The possession will be restored to them through court. But 
considering the questions to be decided in the suit, we direct the defendants, 
once they are put in possession of the premises in restitution, not to create 
any third party interest in respect of the plaint schedule building (being a 
part of the whole building) pending disposal of the suit. Considering the 
nature of the suit and the question involved, we would request the trial court, 
in which the suit has been filed, to try and dispose of the suit expeditiously. 
We clarify that it would not be necessary to consider the interim application 
for prohibitory injunction separately and the same would also be disposed of 
along with the suit by the trial court. The suit will be disposed of after trial 
untrammeled by any of the observations contained in these interim orders.

15. The appeal is, thus allowed, the orders of the High Court and 
that of the Additional District Court are set aside with the directions as 
above and the trial court is requested to dispose of the suit itself 
expeditiously and in accordance with law. The appellants would be entitled 
to their costs throughout.

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