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Hassan Ali Khan black money = The allegation against the Respondent No.1 and the other accused is that they have committed an offence punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, hereinafter referred to as `the PML Act’=the distinction between an application for cancellation of bail and an appeal preferred against an order granting bail. The two stand on different footings. While the ground for cancellation of bail would relate to post-bail incidents, indicating misuse of the said privilege, an appeal against an order granting bail would question the very legality of the order passed. This difference was explained by this Court in State of U.P. Vs. Amarmani Tripathi [(2005) 8 SCC 21].

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 REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1883 OF 2011

 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6114 OF 2011)

Union of India ... Appellant 

 Vs.

Hassan Ali Khan & Anr. ... Respondents

 O R D E R

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1. Leave granted. 

2. The Special Leave Petition out of which this 

Appeal arises has been filed against the judgment 

 2

and final order dated 12th August, 2011, passed by 

the Bombay High Court in Crl. Bail Application 

No.994 of 2011, whereby the High Court granted bail 

to the Respondent No.1, Hassan Ali Khan, in 

connection with Special Case No.1 of 2011, wherein 

the Respondent No.1 is the Accused No.1. 

3. The allegation against the Respondent No.1 and 

the other accused is that they have committed an 

offence punishable under Section 4 of the 

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, 

hereinafter referred to as `the PML Act'. The said 

case has been registered on the basis of a 

complaint filed by the Deputy Director, Directorate 

of Enforcement, Ministry of Finance, Department of 

Revenue, Government of India, on 8th January, 2007, 

on the basis of Enforcement Case Information Report 

No.02/MZO/07 based on certain information and 

documents received from the Income Tax Department. 

 3

On the said date, the Income Tax Department carried 

out a search in the premises owned and/or possessed 

by the Respondent No.1 and a sum of Rs.88,05,000/- 

in cash was found in his residence at Peddar Road, 

Mumbai, and was seized. A number of imported 

watches and some jewellery were also found and 

seized during the search. 

4. The search also revealed that the Respondent 

No.1 had purchased an expensive car, worth about 

Rs.60 lakhs, from one Anil Shankar of Bangalore 

through one Sheshadari and that he had paid till 

then a sum of Rs.46 lakhs towards purchase of the 

said car. It also appears that the documents which 

were recovered by the Income Tax Department 

contained several transfer instructions said to 

have been issued by the Respondent No.1 for 

transfer of various amounts to different persons 

from the bank accounts held by him outside India. 

 4

The said amounts forming the subject matter of the 

instructions issued by the Respondent No.1 ran into 

billions of dollars. The Income Tax Department 

assessed the total income of the Respondent No.1 

for the Assessment Years 2001-02, 2006-07 and 

2007-08 as Rs.110,412,68,85,303/-. Furthermore, 

during the investigation, the Directorate of 

Enforcement also obtained a document said to have 

been signed by the Respondent No.1 on 29th June, 

2003, which was notarized by one Mr. Nicolas Ronald 

Rathbone Smith, Notary Public of London, on 30th 

June, 2003.

5. Further, an investigation was conducted under 

the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, 

hereafter referred to as `FEMA'. Show-cause notices 

were issued to the Respondent No.1 for alleged 

violation of Sections 3A and 4 of FEMA for dealing 

in and acquiring and holding foreign exchange to 

 5

the extent of US$ 80,004,53,000, equivalent to 

Rs.36,000 crores approximately in Indian currency, 

in his account with the Union Bank of Switzerland, 

AG, Zurich, Switzerland.

6. Inquiries also revealed that Shri Hassan Ali 

Khan had obtained at least three Passports in his 

name by submitting false documents, making false 

statements and by suppressing the fact that he 

already had a Passport. In addition to the above, 

it was also indicated that investigations had 

revealed that he had sold a diamond from the 

collection of the Nizam of Hyderabad and had routed 

the sale proceeds through his account in Sarasin 

Bank in Basel, Switzerland, to the Barclays Bank in 

the United Kingdom. 

7. Based on the aforesaid material, the 

Directorate of Enforcement, Mumbai Zonal Office, 

arrested the Respondent No.1 on 7th March, 2011, 

 6

and, thereafter, he was produced before the Special 

Judge, PMLA, Mumbai, on 8th March, 2011, and was 

remanded in custody. Subsequently, by an order 

dated 11th March, 2011, the Special Judge, PMLA, 

rejected the prayer made on behalf of the 

Directorate of Enforcement for remand of the 

Respondent No.1 to its custody and released him on 

bail. However, since a Public Interest Litigation 

was pending in this Court in which the Directorate 

of Enforcement was required to file a status report 

in respect of the investigations carried out in 

connection with the case, the fact that the 

Respondent No.1 had been released on bail was 

brought to the notice of this Court and this Court 

stayed the operation of the bail order and 

authorized the detention of the Respondent No.1 in 

custody, initially for a period of four days. The 

Union of India thereupon filed Special Leave 

Petition (Crl.) No.2455 of 2011 and upon observing 

 7

that the material made available on record prima 

facie discloses the commission of an offence by the 

Respondent No.1 punishable under the provisions of 

the PML Act, this Court vide order dated 29th March, 

2011, disposed of the appeal as well as the Special 

Leave Petition and set aside the order dated 11th 

March, 2011, of the Special Judge, PMLA, Mumbai, 

and directed that the Respondent No.1 be taken into 

custody. Thereafter, the Respondent No.1 was 

remanded into custody from time to time and the 

complaint came to be filed on 6th May, 2011. A 

further prayer for bail was thereafter made on 

behalf of the Respondent No.1 on 1st July, 2011, but 

the same was dismissed by the Special Judge, PMLA, 

Mumbai, on the same day. 

8. The said order of the Special Judge, PMLA, 

Mumbai, rejecting the Respondent No.1's prayer for 

bail was challenged before the Bombay High Court in 

 8

Bail Application No.994 dated 2nd July, 2011. After 

a contested hearing, the Bombay High Court by its 

order dated 12th August, 2011, granted bail to the 

Respondent No.1 and the said order is the subject 

matter of the present proceedings before this Court. 

9. Learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Haren 

P. Raval, appearing for the Union of India, 

submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate 

the astronomical amounts of foreign exchange dealt 

with by the Respondent No.1, for which there was no 

accounting and in respect whereof the Income Tax 

Department had for the Assessment years 2001-02 to 

2007-08 assessed the total income as 

Rs.110,412,68,85,303/-. The learned ASG also 

submitted that transfer of the huge sums from one 

bank to another was one of the methods adopted by 

persons involved in money-laundering to cover the 

trail of the monies which were the proceeds of 

 9

crime. The learned ASG contended that the large sums 

of unaccounted money, with which the Respondent No.1 

had been dealing, attracted the attention of the 

Revenue Department and on investigation conducted 

under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1959, 

(FEMA), show cause notices were issued to the 

Respondent No.1 for alleged violation of Sections 3A 

and 4 thereof for acquiring and holding foreign 

exchange and dealing with the same to the extent of 

US$ 80,004,53,000, equivalent to Rs.36,000/- crores, 

approximately, in Indian currency, in his account 

with the Union Bank of Switzerland, AG, Zurich, 

Switzerland. 

10. Mr. Raval submitted that the Respondent No.1, 

Shri Hassan Ali Khan, used the different passports 

which he had acquired by submitting false documents, 

to open bank accounts in foreign countries to engage 

in the laundering of tainted money which brought 

 10

such transactions squarely within the scope and 

ambit of Section 3 of the PML Act, 2002. Mr. Raval 

submitted that Section 3 of the aforesaid Act by 

itself was an offence since it provides that any 

person directly or indirectly attempting to indulge 

in or knowingly assisting or knowingly being a party 

or actually involved in any process or activity 

connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting 

it as untainted property, would be guilty of the 

offence of money-laundering. The learned ASG 

submitted that the key expressions used in Section 3 

are "proceeds of crime" and "projecting it as an 

untainted property". In other words, in order to 

prove an offence of money-laundering, it has to be 

established that the monies involved are the 

proceeds of crime and having full knowledge of the 

same, the person concerned projects it as untainted 

property. The process undertaken in doing so, 

amounts to be offence of money-laundering. 

 11

11. In this connection, the learned ASG referred to 

Section 2(u) of the PML Act, which describes 

"proceeds of crime" to mean any property derived or 

obtained, directly or indirectly by any person as a 

result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled 

offence or the value of any such property. He, 

thereafter, referred to the definition of "scheduled 

offence" in Section 2(y) of the above Act to mean 

(i) the offences specified under Part A of the 

Schedule; or (ii) the offences specified under Part 

B of the Schedule if the total value involved in 

such offences amounted to Rs.30 lakhs or more. 

12. The learned ASG submitted that the enormous 

sums of money held by Shri Hassan Ali Khan in 

foreign accounts in Switzerland, United Kingdom and 

Indonesia and the transactions in respect thereof, 

prima facie indicated the involvement of the 

Respondent No.1 in dealing with proceeds of crime 

 12

and projecting the same as untainted property, which 

was sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 

3 of the PML Act, 2002. The learned ASG submitted 

that under Section 24 of the aforesaid Act, when a 

person is accused of having committed an offence 

under Section 3, the burden of proving that the 

monies involved were neither proceeds of crime nor 

untainted property, is on the accused. It was urged 

that once a definite allegation had been made 

against Shri Hassan Ali Khan on the basis of 

documents seized, that the monies in his various 

accounts were the proceeds of crime, the burden of 

proving that the money involved was neither the 

proceeds of crime nor untainted, shifted to him and 

it was upto him to prove the contrary. The learned 

ASG submitted that Shri Hassan Ali Khan had failed 

to discharge the said burden and hence the large 

sums of money in the several accounts of the 

Respondent No.1 would have to be treated as tainted 

 13

property, until proved otherwise. The learned ASG 

submitted that the Respondent No.1 had himself made 

certain statements which were recorded under Section 

50 of the PML Act, parts whereof were not hit by the 

provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 

13. The learned ASG also referred to the provisions 

of Section 45 of the aforesaid Act which make 

offences under the said Act cognizable and non-

bailable and also provides that notwithstanding the 

provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no 

person accused of an offence punishable for a term 

of imprisonment of more than three years under Part 

A of the Schedule to the Act, is to be released on 

bail or on his own bond, unless the Public 

Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose 

the application for such release and where the 

Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the 

Court is satisfied that there are reasonable 

 14

grounds for believing that the accused is not 

guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to 

commit any offence while on bail. The learned ASG 

submitted that an exception had been made for 

persons under the age of 16 years or a woman or a 

person who is sick or infirm. 

14. Referring to Part A of the Schedule to the PML 

Act, the learned ASG submitted that the same had 

been divided into paragraphs 1 and 2. While 

paragraph 1 deals with offences under the Indian 

Penal Code under Sections 121 and 121-A thereof, 

paragraph 2 deals with offences under the Narcotic 

Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The 

learned ASG submitted that, on the other hand, Para 

B is divided into five paragraphs. Paragraph 1 

deals with offences under the Indian Penal Code, 

while paragraph 2 deals with offences under the 

Arms Act, 1959. Paragraph 3 deals with offences 

 15

under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, 

paragraph 4 deals with offences under the Immoral 

Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, and paragraph 5 

deals with offences under the Prevention of 

Corruption Act, 1988. The learned ASG submitted 

that the facts of the case attracted the provisions 

of paragraph 1 of Part A of the Schedule, since the 

money acquired by Shri Hassan Ali Khan, besides 

being the proceeds of crime, is also connected with 

transactions involving the international arms 

dealer, Adnan Khashoggi. The learned ASG submitted 

that the same became evident from the notarized 

document which had been obtained by the Directorate 

of Enforcement during the course of investigation 

which had been signed by the Respondent No.1 on 29th 

June, 2003, at London and notarized by Mr. Nicolas 

Ronald Rathbone Smith, Notary Public of London, 

England, on 30th June, 2003. It was also submitted 

that the said document certified the genuineness of 

 16

the signature of the Respondent No.1 and also 

mentioned his Indian Passport No. Z-1069986. The 

learned ASG further contended that the said 

notarized document also referred to Dr. Peter 

Wielly, who was a link between Mr. Adnan Khashoggi, 

and one Mr. Retro Hartmann on whose introduction 

the Respondent No.1 opened an account at UBS, 

Singapore, and was also linked with Mr. Kashinath 

Tapuriah. The learned ASG submitted that there 

were other materials to show the involvement of Dr. 

Wielly in the various transactions of the 

Respondent No.1, Hassan Ali Khan. 

15. Further submissions on behalf of the Appellant 

were advanced by Mr. A. Mariarputham, learned 

Senior Advocate, who referred to the purported 

theft of the jewellery of the Nizam of Hyderabad 

and the sale of the same by the Respondent No.1, on 

 17

account whereof US$ 700,000 had been deposited by 

the Respondent No.1 in the Barclays Bank in London. 

16. Mr. Mariarpurtham then submitted that although 

the High Court had relied on the provisions of 

Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. in granting bail to the 

Respondent No.1, the said provisions were not 

attracted to the facts of this case since charge 

sheet had already been filed within the statutory 

period and the High Court could not, therefore, 

have granted statutory bail to the Respondent No.1 

on the ground that it had been submitted on behalf 

of the Appellant that it would still take some time 

for the Appellant to commence the trial. Mr. 

Mariarputham submitted that while the Respondent 

No.1 had been arrested on 7th March, 2011 and had 

been produced before the Special Judge and remanded 

to custody on 8th March, 2011, the charge sheet had 

been filed on 6th May, 2011 within the prescribed 

 18

period of 60 days. It was submitted that the High 

Court had wrongly interpreted the provisions of 

Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. in granting bail to the 

Respondent No.1.

17. In support of his submissions, the learned 

counsel referred to the Constitution Bench decision 

of this Court in Sanjay Dutt Vs. State through CBI, 

Bombay (II) [(1994) 5 SCC 410], wherein it was held 

that the indefeasible right of an accused to be 

released on bail by virtue of Section 20(4)(bb) of 

the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 

(Prevention) Act, 1987, was enforceable only prior 

to the filing of the challan and it did not survive 

or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, 

if not already availed of. Their Lordships held 

further that if the right to grant of statutory 

bail had not been enforced till the filing of the 

challan, then there was no question of its 

 19

enforcement thereafter, since it stood extinguished 

the moment the challan was filed because Section 

167(2) Cr.P.C. ceased to have any application. 

Reference was also made to the decision of a Three 

Judge Bench of this Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya 

Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2001) 5 SCC 453], 

wherein the scope of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. and the 

proviso thereto fell for consideration and it was 

the majority view that an accused had an 

indefeasible right to be released on bail when 

investigation is not completed within the specified 

period and that for availing of such right the 

accused was only required to file an application 

before the Magistrate seeking release on bail 

alleging that no challan had been filed within the 

period prescribed and if he was prepared to offer 

bail on being directed by the Magistrate, the 

Magistrate was under an obligation to dispose of 

the said application and even if in the meantime a 

 20

charge-sheet had been filed, the right to statutory 

bail would not be affected. It was, however, 

clarified that if despite the direction to furnish 

bail, the accused failed to do so, his right to be 

released on bail would stand extinguished. 

18. It was, therefore, submitted that the Bombay 

High Court had granted bail to the Respondent No.1 

on an incorrect interpretation of the law and the 

said order granting bail was, therefore, liable to 

be set aside. 

19. Appearing for the Respondent No.1, Hassan Ali 

Khan, learned counsel, Shri Ishwari Prasad A. 

Bagaria, firstly contended that an offence which 

did not form part of the scheduled offences 

referred to in Section 45 of the PML Act would not 

attract the provisions of Section 3 of the said 

Act. It was submitted that whatever be the amounts 

involved and even if the same had been unlawfully 

 21

procured, the same might attract the provisions of 

the Income Tax Act or FEMA, but that would not 

satisfy the two ingredients of Section 3 which 

entails that not only should the money in question 

be the proceeds of crime, but the same had also to 

be projected as untainted property. Mr. Bagaria 

submitted that in the instant case all that has 

been disclosed against the Respondent No.1 is that 

he dealt with large sums of money, even in foreign 

exchange and operated bank accounts from different 

countries, which in itself would not indicate that 

the monies in question were the proceeds of crime. 

Mr. Bagaria also submitted that at no stage has it 

been shown that the said amounts lying in the 

accounts of the Respondent No.1 in Switzerland, the 

United Kingdom and Indonesia had been projected as 

untainted money. Furthermore, as far as the 

allegation regarding the theft of the Nizam's 

jewellery is concerned, except for mere 

 22

allegations, there was no material in support of 

such submission in the face of the case made out by 

the Respondent No.1 that he had brokered the sale 

of some portions of the jewellery for which he had 

received a commission of US$30,000 which he had 

spent in Dubai.

20. Mr. Bagaria submitted that in the complaint, 

reference had been made in paragraph 13 thereof to 

"scheduled offences" which have been set out in 

sub-paragraphs 13.1 to 13.5. Mr. Bagaria pointed 

out that the offences indicated related to alleged 

offences under the provisions of the Indian Penal 

Code, the Passport Act, 1967 and the Antiquities 

and Art Treasures Act, 1972, which do not come 

either under Part A or Part B of the Schedule to 

the PML Act, 2002, except for the offences under 

the Indian Penal Code, the sections whereof, which 

have been included in paragraph 1 of Part B, are 

 23

not attracted to the facts of this case. Mr. 

Bagaria submitted that as a result, none of the 

offences mentioned as scheduled offences in the 

charge-sheet were covered by the Schedule to the 

PML Act, 2002, and could at best be treated as 

offences under the Indian Penal Code, the Passport 

Act and the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 

1972. On the question of the alleged absconsion of 

the Respondent No.1, Mr. Bagaria submitted that the 

said Respondent had not gone to Singapore on his 

own volition, but had there been taken by one 

Amalendu Kumar Pandey and Shri Tapuriah. Shri 

Pandey was subsequently made a witness and Shri 

Tapuriah was made a co-accused with the Respondent 

No.1.

21. Mr. Bagaria also contended that once bail had 

been granted, even if the special leave petition is 

maintainable, the power to cancel grant of such 

 24

bail lies with the High Court or the Court of 

Sessions under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. and, 

consequently, all the principles laid down by this 

Court relating to cancellation of bail, would have 

to be considered before the order granting bail 

could be cancelled. Mr. Bagaria submitted that 

even though the offences were alleged to have been 

committed by the Respondent No.1 as far back as in 

the year 2007, till he was arrested on 7th May, 

2011, there had been no allegation that he had in 

any manner interfered with the investigation or 

tampered with any of the witnesses. Mr. Bagaria 

submitted that even the apprehension expressed on 

behalf of the appellant that there was a 

possibility of the Respondent No.1 absconding to a 

foreign country on being released on bail, was 

without any basis, since such attempts, if at all 

made, could be secured by taking recourse to 

various measures. Mr. Bagaria submitted that such 

 25

a submission could not be the reason for cancelling 

the bail which had already been granted to the 

Respondent No.1. 

22. Mr. Bagaria submitted that in the absence of 

any provisions in the PML Act that the provision 

thereof would have retrospective effect, the 

provisions of the PML Act could not also be made 

applicable to the Respondent No.1. Mr. Bagaria 

submitted that once it is accepted that the PML 

Act, 2002, would not apply to the Respondent No.1, 

the provisions of Section 45 thereof would also not 

apply to the Respondent's case and his further 

detention would be unlawful. Mr. Bagaria concluded 

on the note that, in any event, the PML Act had 

been introduced in the Lok Sabha on 4th August, 

1998, and all the offences alleged to have been 

committed by the Respondent No.1, were long prior 

to the said date. 

 26

23. Having carefully considered the submissions 

made on behalf of the respective parties and the 

enormous amounts of money which the Respondent No.1 

had been handling through his various bank accounts 

and the contents of the note signed by the 

Respondent No.1 and notarized in London, this case 

has to be treated a little differently from other 

cases of similar nature. It is true that at present 

there is only a nebulous link between the huge sums 

of money handled by the Respondent No.1 and any 

arms deal or intended arms deals, there is no 

attempt on the part of the Respondent No.1 to 

disclose the source of the large sums of money 

handled by him. There is no denying the fact that 

allegations have been made that the said monies 

were the proceeds of crime and by depositing the 

same in his bank accounts, the Respondent No.1 had 

attempted to project the same as untainted money. 

The said allegations may not ultimately be 

 27

established, but having been made, the burden of 

proof that the said monies were not the proceeds of 

crime and were not, therefore, tainted shifted to 

the Respondent No.1 under Section 24 of the PML 

Act, 2002. For the sake of reference, Section 24 

is extracted hereinbelow :-

 "24. Burden of proof. - When a person is 

 accused of having committed the offence 

 under Section 3, the burden of proving 

 that proceeds of crime are in tainted 

 property shall be on the accused."

24. The High Court having proceeded on the basis 

that the attempt made by the prosecution to link up 

the acquisition by the Respondent No.1 of different 

Passports with the operation of the foreign bank 

accounts by the said Respondent, was not 

believable, failed to focus on the other parts of 

the prosecution case. It is true that having a 

foreign bank account and also having sizeable 

amounts of money deposited therein does not ipso 

 28

facto indicate the commission of an offence under 

the PML Act, 2002. However, when there are other 

surrounding circumstances which reveal that there 

were doubts about the origin of the accounts and 

the monies deposited therein, the same principles 

would not apply. The deposit of US$ 700,000 in the 

Barclays Bank account of the Respondent No.1 has 

not been denied. On the other hand, the allegation 

is that the said amount was the proceeds of the 

sale of diamond jewellery which is alleged to have 

been stolen from the collection of the Nizam of 

Hyderabad. In fact, on behalf of the Respondent 

No.1 it has been submitted that in respect of the 

said deal, the Respondent No.1 had received by way 

of commission a sum of US$ 30,000 which he had 

spent in Dubai.

25. Although, at this stage, we are also not 

prepared to accept the convoluted link attempted to 

 29

be established by the learned ASG with the opening 

and operation of the bank accounts of the 

Respondent No.1 in the Union Bank of Switzerland, 

AG, Zurich, Switzerland, the amounts in the said 

bank account have not been sought to be explained 

by the Respondent No.1. We cannot also ignore the 

fact that the total income of the Respondent No.1 

for the assessment years 2001-02 to 2007-08 has 

been assessed at Rs.110,412,68,85,303/- by the 

Income Tax Department and in terms of Section 24 of 

the PML Act, the Respondent No.1 had not been able 

to establish that the same were neither the 

proceeds of crime nor untainted property. In 

addition to the above is the other factor involving 

the notarized document in which the name of Adnan 

Khashoggi figures.

26. Lastly, the manner in which the Respondent No.1 

had procured three different passports in his name, 

 30

after his original passport was directed to be 

deposited, lends support to the apprehension that, 

if released on bail, the Respondent No.1 may 

abscond. 

27. As far as Mr. Bagaria's submissions regarding 

Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. are concerned, we cannot 

ignore the distinction between an application for 

cancellation of bail and an appeal preferred 

against an order granting bail. The two stand on 

different footings. While the ground for 

cancellation of bail would relate to post-bail 

incidents, indicating misuse of the said privilege, 

an appeal against an order granting bail would 

question the very legality of the order passed. 

This difference was explained by this Court in 

State of U.P. Vs. Amarmani Tripathi [(2005) 8 SCC 

21].

 31

28. Taking a different view of the circumstances 

which are peculiar to this case and in the light of 

what has been indicated hereinabove, we are of the 

view that the order of the High Court needs to be 

interfered with. We, accordingly, allow the appeal 

and set aside the judgment and order of the High 

Court impugned in this appeal and cancel the bail 

granted to the Respondent No.1.

 ...............................................................J.

 (ALTAMAS KABIR)

 ...............................................................J.

 (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)NEW DELHIDATED: 30.09.2011

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