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the Supreme Court in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India7, it cannot be said that judicial pronouncements made by Judges and Judicial Officers can be subjects for prosecuting those Judges or Judicial Officers in discharge of their judicial functions, particularly in any private complaint filed by the aggrieved party whether such aggrieved party is a party to those proceedings in which judicial pronouncements were rendered. 20. Section 77 IPC reads as follows: "77. Act of Judge when acting judicially.- Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law." Under this provision, no judicial act performed by a Judge can be an offence. For applicability of Section 77, the following ingredients are necessary: a) that the act was done by a Judge b) that the said act was done by the Judge when acting judicially and c) that it was done in exercise of any power which is given to the Judge by law (or) the said act was done by the Judge in good faith believing that the power was given to him by law.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Hyderabad.

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU 
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1472 of 2010 

17-09-2010 

Tummala Lakshmana Rao 

Sri Sadhu Narayana and 7 others. 

Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri Thummala Lakshmana Rao (in person)

Counsel for the respondents: Nil

:ORDER: 

1. The petitioner seeks to file this revision petition questioning order
dated 16.04.2010 passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in
S.R.No.660 of 2010 refusing to take cognizance of the complaint for offences
punishable under Sections 109, 120-B, 166, 167, 193, 196, 199, 200, 217, 218,
219, 415, 420, 500 and 506 IPC and dismissing the complaint under Section 203 
Cr.P.C. The petitioner/complainant filed the complaint in the lower court
against the respondents 1 to 7 alleging the above offences against them.
2. The petitioner/complainant retired from service as Principal District
Judge in the Andhra Pradesh Judiciary. The 1st respondent is the Administrative
Officer working in Special Court for Trial of Offences under the S.Cs., and
S.Ts., (POA) Act, Anantapur. During the crucial time, he was working as Central
Nazir in the District Court, Kadapa. During the same period, the petitioner was
working as Principal District Judge, Kadapa District. The 2nd respondent was
previously an Advocate practising in this Court and was also Standing Counsel
for the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. He is presently Judge of the High Court
of A.P. The 3rd respondent has been a Judge in the High Court of A.P. The 4th
respondent was formerly the Chief Justice of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
He is presently a Judge in the Supreme Court of India. The 5th respondent was
Judge in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh during the relevant period. Now he
is the Lokayukta of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The 6th respondent is presently
working as 12th Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad. Formerly
during the relevant period mentioned in the complaint, he was the I Additional
Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Kadapa. The 7th respondent is successor
in office to the 4th respondent as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh. He is now a Judge in the Supreme Court of India.

3. On 27.01.2003 one Judgment Debtor (JDr) in an Execution Petition (EP), by
name S.M. Basha was produced in custody after his arrest before the IV
Additional Junior civil Judge, Kadapa. While keeping the said JDr in custody of
the court, the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa posted the matter to
30.01.2003 for further proceedings in E.P. On 30.01.2003, the JDr was not
produced in court by the staff in Central Nazarat of the District Court, Kadapa.
According to the petitioner, on 30.01.2003 at about 6.00 p.m, the 1st respondent
presented a written report of court Attender by name Venkataswamy on guard duty 
to the effect that on that day at about 7.00 p.m when the JDr was being taken to
answer calls of nature, the JDr escaped from his custody. The petitioner
forwarded the said report of the Court Attender to the Police Station and Crime
No.19 of 2003 was registered on that report. The petitioner as Unit Head placed
the said Attender Venkataswamy under suspension pending departmental enquiry 
for his negligence. When the petitioner gave show-cause notice to Venkataswamy
for launching proceedings for departmental enquiry, Venkataswamy submitted 
explanation/representation to the effect that the said JDr was not entrusted to
his custody, that batta was also not given to him, that one Amin/Bailiff A.V.
Ratnam kept warrant in his custody and released the JDr, that as the JDr could
not be produced in the Executing Court on 30.01.2003 and as he could not be
traced till 3.00 p.m, A.V. Ratnam along with all the Bailiffs came to him and
obtained his signature by threat and force on the report which was forwarded to
the police by the petitioner, that he was made a scapegoat; and requested the
petitioner to revoke suspension order on him. By then, the 1st respondent was
transferred from the post of Central Nazir of the District Court, Kadapa and in
his place one B.V. Sampath was posted and had taken charge. On direction of the
petitioner, B.V. Sampath, Central Nazir verified records and registers and
submitted report dated 17.02.2003 to the petitioner. While so, P. Hasnaiah to
whom custody of the JDr was said to have been entrusted on 27.01.2003 and 
Chandra who is other court guard on duty during that period submitted common
representation dated 19.02.2003 to the petitioner stating that even though in
their 'C' book maintained by the 1st respondent it was entered as if custody of
the JDr was given to them as court guards, neither the JDr nor diet and watching
batta was given to them. After considering the above material, the petitioner
came to the conclusion that without entrusting custody of the JDr and also diet
and watching batta to court guards, the 1st respondent and the Bailiff released
the JDr from custody without order of the Executing Court, and finding the JDr
not attending the court till evening of 30.01.2003, they hatched a plan by
creating a story as if the JDr had escaped from custody of the court guard
Venkataswamy. Thereupon, the petitioner forwarded the entire material to the
investigating officer by official memo dated 26.02.2003.

4. The police originally filed charge sheet in Crime No.19 of 2003 against
the JDr alone. On 07.04.2003, the investigating officer filed memo before the
Magistrate seeking permission for further investigation in that crime and
obtained permission for further investigation of the case. After further
investigation, the police filed additional charge sheet against A.V. Ratnam,
Bailiff and the 1st respondent for offences punishable under Sections 183, 193,
203, 211, 225-A and 406 IPC. After filing of additional charge sheet, the 6th
respondent as Magistrate issued non-bailable warrants against the 1st respondent
and other accused and they were remanded to judicial custody. The petitioner
revoked suspension against Venkataswamy, Attender. The petitioner also
transferred the criminal case to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kadapa.

5. In this background, allegations in the complaint and in sworn statement of
the complainant have to be scrutinised.

6. According to the petitioner/complainant, the 1st respondent developed deep
animosity against him and in order to cause incalculable harm and injury to the
petitioner and to get the criminal proceedings against him quashed by cheating,
had entered into criminal conspiracy starting with the 2nd respondent to achieve
the said object and that the other respondents have joined the conspiracy and
played their respective role at various stages of the conspiracy and committed
the above said offences. The 1st respondent filed Criminal Petition No.2627 of
2003 in this court to quash proceedings in C.C.No.2 of 2003 on the file of
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kadapa. The 1st respondent engaged the 2nd respondent
as his Advocate to file the said criminal petition. It is contended by the
petitioner that the 2nd respondent as Advocate on record/Standing Counsel for
High Court of A.P., and subordinate courts represented and defended the
petitioner in his capacity as District Judge, Kadapa in Writ Petition No.17998
of 2004 which was disposed of on 24.11.2004. The said fact has absolutely no
bearing on the 2nd respondent filing criminal petition on behalf of the 1st
respondent, because the above writ proceedings are subsequent to filing of the
criminal petition in the High Court of A.P.

7. It is contended by the petitioner that without making him as party to
the criminal petition inspite of he being the first informant to the police, the
respondents 1 and 2 alleged malaifides and bias against the petitioner in the
criminal petition which was signed by the 2nd respondent as Advocate. It is
further contended by the petitioner that in the criminal petition, the 2nd
respondent on behalf of the 1st respondent made deliberate false statements of
facts contrary to record and that the said criminal petition amounts to a
declaration within the meaning of Sections 191 and 199 IPC and that therefore,
the respondents 1 and 2 are liable for offence punishable under Section 193 IPC.

8. But, the complainant ignored Section 195 Cr.P.C. while accusing the
respondents of offences punishable under Sections 193, 196, 199 and 200 IPC.
Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C. bars taking cognizance of the above offences except
on complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that
Court may authorize in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which
that Court is subordinate. Section 195(1)(b)(i) reads as follows:-
"Section 195: Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants,
for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given
in evidence-

(1) No Court shall take cognizance.
(a) --------------------------------------------------------
(b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following section of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive),
199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 when such offence is alleged to
have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, --------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
except on the complaint in writing of that Court,
 or of some other Court to which that Court is
 subordinate."

Therefore, the petitioner/complainant cannot initiate proceedings in Criminal
Court for taking cognizance of the above said offences against any of the
respondents. 

9. Further grievance of the petitioner is on passing of order dated
19-04-2006 by the third respondent in Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003, which
is a criminal petition filed by the first respondent through the second
respondent as his Advocate. It is contended by the petitioner that the said
order is with full of factual mistakes and distortions apart from vitiated by
corrupt mind. The petitioner also brands proceedings conducted by the 5th
respondent as Enquiring Judge against the petitioner in departmental enquiry and
also report of the 5th respondent given after departmental enquiry to the High
Court, are vitiated by corrupt mind and that the 5th respondent corruptly
carried out the same factual errors and distortions contained in order in
Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003 into his enquiry report. On that basis, the
petitioner filed the present complaint in the lower Court for offences
punishable under Sections 217, 218 and 219 IPC. It is contended by the
petitioner, placing reliance on Dr.S. DUTT v. STATE OF U.P.1 of the Supreme
Court that the word 'corruptly' is not used in the sense of 'dishonestly' or
'fraudulently' as defined in IPC and that it does not necessarily include an
element of bribe taking and that it is used in a much larger sense as denoting
conduct which is morally unsound or debased. In FASIL AHMED v. EMPERIOR2, it 
was observed by the Lahore High Court that the word 'corruptly' does not connote
a motive necessarily connected with bribery or passing of money as an inducement
to use fabricated evidence. In RAMA NANA v. EMPERIOR3, it was observed that 
corrupt motive connotes a desire to screen an offender from legal consequences
of his act.

10. When queried as to how a Magistrate can take cognizance of offences 
punishable under Sections 217, 218, 219, 166 and 167 IPC without previous
sanction of the appropriate Government under Section 197 Cr.P.C., the petitioner
contended that committing crime is not part of duty of any public servant much
less a Judge and that therefore no previous sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.
is required in this case. The petitioner placed reliance on certain Supreme
Court verdicts in this regard. In SHAMBOO NATH MISRA v. STATE OF U.P.4, the 
Supreme Court held that fabrication of record and mis-appropriation of public
fund is not part of his official duty and that therefore sanction for his
prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 465, 468, 477-A and
109 IPC is not necessary. In CHOUDHURYDARY PARVEEN SULTANA v. STATE OF WEST 
BENGAL5, the Supreme Court held that if the authority vested in a public servant
is mis-used for doing things which are not otherwise permitted under the law,
such acts cannot claim the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. and have to be
considered dehors duties which a public servant is required to discharge or
perform and that therefore inspite of prosecution for such excess or misuse of
authority, no protection can be demanded by the public servant concerned. It
was a case relating to prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 384
and 506 IPC. 

11. This Court proposes to make distinction between two sets of offences
contained in the Indian Penal Code. One set of offences are those which can be
committed by any person including a public servant. The second set of offences
are those which can be committed by a public servant alone and not by any other
person who is not a public servant. In case, a public servant commits an
offence covered by the first set, then a debate may arise whether such offence
was committed by the public servant in discharge of his official duty or
purporting to discharge his official duty, or whether such offence was committed
by way of misuse or abuse of his official power as public servant. But, if the
public servant is alleged to have committed an offence under the second set of
offences, then the above debate may not arise at all. The offences under
Sections 217, 218, 219, 166 and 167 IPC are capable of being committed by a
public servant alone and not by any other person. In my opinion, such offences,
which are capable of being committed by public servants alone and not by others,
have to be kept on par with the offences punishable under the Prevention of
Corruption Act. When a public servant, which term includes a Judge as per
section 21 IPC, is accused of offences punishable under Sections 217, 218, 219,
166 and 167 IPC, then previous sanction of the appropriate Government under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. is a mandatory condition precedent for taking cognizance of
such offences. In the case on hand, the petitioner did not obtain such sanction
from the appropriate Government before seeking the lower Court to take
cognizance of the above offences against the respondents 1 to 7, who are all
public servants and Judges.

12. In so far as the respondents 4 and 7 are concerned, they had no direct and
individual roles to play as against the petitioner. When certain allegations
were levelled against the petitioner, the 4th respondent in his official
capacity as the then Chief Justice of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, placed
the matter before the Disciplinary Committee. It is the Disciplinary Committee
of the High Court which started disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner
and which appointed the 5th respondent as the Enquiring Judge against the
petitioner and is stated to have accepted report given by the 5th respondent as
Enquiring Judge.
As successor in office of the 5th respondent, the 7th respondent is stated to
have forwarded report of the Enquiring Judge and resolution of the Disciplinary
Committee accepting the said report, to the Government of Andhra Pradesh for
taking further steps in passing final order in disciplinary proceedings on the
petitioner on the basis of the departmental enquiry and report of the enquiring
Judge. The 7th respondent had absolutely no role much less individual and
personal role vis--vis affairs relating to the petitioner. Any action
initiated or taken by the High Court in pursuance of resolutions of the
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court cannot make either the 4th respondent
or the 7th respondent liable personally much less under criminal law.
Resolutions of the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court are collective
decisions of all members in the Disciplinary Committee and are not individual
decisions of the then Chief Justices.

13. Further, the same bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C. is applicable in respect
of the alleged offences under Sections 193, 196, 199 and 200 IPC in relation to
charges framed in departmental enquiry against the petitioner and also in
relation to proceedings before the enquiring Judge. The allegation against the
6th respondent is that he gave false evidence as D.W-1 before the enquiring
Judge against the petitioner. It is contended by the petitioner that the 6th
respondent as D.W-1 was examined by the enquiring Judge after asking the 
petitioner to go out of the enquiry place and in the absence of the petitioner.
It is further contended by the petitioner that examination-in-chief of D.W-1 as
well as cross-examination of D.W-1 was conducted by the same presenting officer.
Typing in D.W-1's deposition that examination-in-chief was conducted by the
presenting officer, appears to be odd. It may be mistake on the part of the
Typist by copying and pasting of the previous deposition up to that level. At
any rate, this Court cannot comment as to how such mistake had arisen. It may
be open to the petitioner to question the departmental proceedings before the
appropriate Forum, in case, he is found guilty of the charges in the
departmental enquiry and in case, report of the enquiring Judge is furnished to
him.

14. When this Court queried as to how there was conspiracy or criminal
conspiracy among the respondents 1 to 7 to commit offences against the
petitioner, the petitioner contended that the facts that factual misstatements
and factual distortions contained in the petition filed by the 2nd respondent on
behalf of the 1st respondent in Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003 were repeated
in order passed by the 3rd respondent therein, charges framed by the High Court
at the instance of the 4th respondent and enquiry proceedings and report of the
5th respondent, evidence of the 6th respondent as D.W-1 in the departmental
enquiry against the petitioner and also in acceptance of report of the enquiring
Judge by the Disciplinary Committee under the leadership of the seventh
respondent, undoubtedly go to show that there is criminal conspiracy of all the
respondents 1 to 7 against the petitioner and that there is meeting of minds of
all the respondents 1 to 7. In my opinion, criminal conspiracy among the
respondents 1 to 7 cannot be inferred from the above contention put forward by
the petitioner. Among the respondents 1 to 7, there are different levels of
Ministerial Staff, Advocate, Subordinate Judicial Officer, Judges and Chief
Justices of the High Court. Simply because certain alleged factual
misstatements are repeated in further proceedings, one cannot jump to the
conclusion that there was criminal conspiracy among them. Order dated 19-04-
2006 in Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003 is admittedly on record and till now
it is not set aside. It is stated by the petitioner that he took the matter by
way of Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court and that it is pending in the
Supreme Court. Till order in Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003 is not set aside
and is on record, naturally all further proceedings would quote the said order
and would be based on the said order. From that fact, inference of criminal
conspiracy cannot be made. Further, there is no material placed by the
petitioner to show that there was any abetment by any of the respondents to any
other respondents or circumstances to infer the same. In that view of the
matter, Sections 109 and 120-B IPC could not be prima facie, made out by the
petitioner.

15. It is contended that order in Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003 passed by
the 3rd respondent contained defamatory remarks made against the petitioner
behind his back and that in subsequent official memos issued by the High Court
to the petitioner and the enquiry proceedings before the 5th respondent repeated
those defamatory remarks against the petitioner. It is further contended by the
petitioner that application of any exceptions to Section 499 IPC would arise
only if any of the respondents 1 to 7 in their defence plead such exceptions and
that then it would be a matter for trial, as burden to prove the exceptions is
on those respondents who take shelter under any of the said exceptions. No
doubt, any consideration of exceptions to Section 499 IPC at this stage would be
premature. It has to be seen whether there are any prima facie defamatory
statements made by any of the respondents 1 to 7 against the petitioner. In
order to constitute defamation, there must be imputation harming reputation of
the petitioner. Simply because there are certain alleged wrong statement of
facts or distortion of events in a judicial pronouncement and in certain
official memos and departmental proceedings initiated on the basis of the said
judicial pronouncement, such factual misstatements or distortions would not
amount to defamation, as there are no imputations as such against the petitioner
much less harming reputation of the petitioner. Harming future career of the
petitioner cannot be synonymous to harming reputation of the petitioner.
Therefore, this court finds that the petitioner has failed to make out offence
of defamation punishable under Section 500 IPC as against any of the respondents
1 to 7. Adverse remarks if any passed against the petitioner and contained in
order dated 19.04.2006 in Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003, are subject-matter
of the proceedings before the Apex Court as the said order is questioned in
that court and which proceedings before that court are stated to be pending.

16. It is contended by the petitioner that order dated 19.04.2006 passed in
Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003 is the result of offence of cheating as
defined in Section 415 Cr.P.C and punishable under Section 420 Cr.P.C committed 
by the respondents 1 to 3. When admittedly the said order is pending in appeal
before the Supreme Court and when that order has not become final and when the
matter is subjudice before the Supreme Court, it cannot be contended that the
said order is the result of alleged cheating committed by the respondents 1 to
3.

17. In so far as offence punishable under Section 506 IPC is concerned, there
is absolutely no allegation by the petitioner that any of the respondents 1 to 7
personally intimated the petitioner much less there was any criminal
intimidation by any of them against the petitioner personally. There were
absolutely no threats directly by any of the respondents 1 to 7 to the
petitioner. In that view of the matter, the petitioner could not make out
offence under Section 506 IPC prima facie in this case.

18. In Dabendra Nath Bhattacharyya v. State of W.B,6 the Supreme Court 
considered scope of enquiry under Section 203 Cr.P.C and laid down as follows:-

"( 7 ) IT has to be remembered that an order of dismissal of a complaint under
Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code has to be made on judicially sound grounds.
It can only be made where the reasons given disclose that the proceedings cannot
terminate successfully in a conviction. It is true that the Magistrate is not
debarred, at this stage, from going into the merits of the evidence produced by
the complainant. But, the object of such consideration of the merits of the
case, at this stage, could only be to determine whether there are sufficient
grounds for proceedings further or not. The mere existence of some grounds which
would be material in deciding whether the accused should be convicted or
acquitted does not generally indicate that the case must necessarily fail. On
the other hand, such grounds may indicate the need for proceeding further in
order to discover the truth after a full and proper investigation. If, however,
a bare perusal of a complaint or the evidence led in support of it show that
essential ingredients of the offence alleged are absent or that the dispute is
only a civil nature or that there are such patent absurdities in evidence
produced that it would be a water of time to proceed further the complaint could
be properly dismissed under Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------
What the Magistrate had to determine at the stage of issue of process was not
the correctness or the probability or improbability of individual items of
evidence on disputable grounds, but the existence or otherwise of a prima facie
case on the assumption that what was stated could be true unless the prosecution
allegations were so fantastic that they could not reasonably be held to be
true."

19. No doubt, it cannot be relevant for the Magistrate to consider at the
initial stage of taking cognizance whether the facts alleged and evidence
proposed to be let in by the complainant would necessarily lead to conviction
of the respondents/accused; and it has to be seen whether the facts alleged and
the evidence/statements let in by the complainant/prosecution make out prima
facie case of existence of ingredients/statutory facts relating to the offence
or offences alleged in the complaint. After considering material placed by the
petitioner on record and contents of the complaint as well as sworn statements
of the petitioner, this court is of the view that the petitioner has not made
out prima facie case for taking cognizance of the case for the offences alleged
by the petitioner against the respondents 1 to 7. This court is of the further
view that the complaint is fantastic in nature and also illusory and that it
would be a waste of time to proceed further in this matter. Simply because
there is no law providing protection for criminal prosecution and Article 361(2)
of the Constitution confers immunity from criminal prosecution only to the
President of India and Governors of the States and no others, as laid down by
the Supreme Court in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India7, it cannot be said that
judicial pronouncements made by Judges and Judicial Officers can be subjects for
prosecuting those Judges or Judicial Officers in discharge of their judicial
functions, particularly in any private complaint filed by the aggrieved party
whether such aggrieved party is a party to those proceedings in which judicial
pronouncements were rendered. 

20. Section 77 IPC reads as follows:

"77. Act of Judge when acting judicially.- Nothing is an offence which is done
by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or
which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law."

Under this provision, no judicial act performed by a Judge can be an offence.
For applicability of Section 77, the following ingredients are necessary:
a) that the act was done by a Judge
b) that the said act was done by the Judge when acting judicially and
c) that it was done in exercise of any power which is given to the Judge by law
(or) the said act was done by the Judge in good faith believing that the power
was given to him by law.

In the case on hand, the 3rd respondent delivered order dated 19.4.2006 in
Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003 on judicial side in exercise of power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. He exercised the power given to him by law; and he did not
exercise that power believing in good faith that such power was given to him by
law. It is not the petitioners case that the 3rd respondent had no power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C to pronounce the said order. Thus, act of 3rd respondent is
protected by Section 77 IPC.

21. Further, Section 78 IPC protects acts done pursuant to any judgment or
order of a court. Section 78 IPC reads as follows:
"78. Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of Court.- Nothing which is
done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by the judgment or order of a Court
of Justice; if done whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an
offence, notwithstanding the court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such
judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that
the court had such jurisdiction."

22. In A.P.Civil Liberties Committee v. The Government of A.P8 5 Judges Bench
of this Court termed Sections 77 and 78 IPC as public policy defences
recognising judicial immunity. I am of the opinion that the following
observations therein are eminently relevant herein:
"Non exculpatory public policy defences include Statute of limitation (Sec.468
Cr.P.C); double jeopardy (Art.20(2) of the Constitution r/2 Sec.300 Cr.P.C);
diplomatic immunity; testimonial immunity (Art.20(3) of the Constitution); plea
bargained immunity (Chpt.XXI A, Cr.P.C); Judicial, Legislative and Executive
immunity (Sec.77 and 78 IPC. Art.361(2) and (3) of the Constitution);
incompetence defences (Sec.82 and 83 IPC) 

Defences of this class are not based on the lack of culpability of the actor.
They are pure public policy arrangements. The immunity from conviction flows not
on account of established non-culpability of the actor or the innocence of the
defendant but on account of the countervailing public policy interests
recognized, accommodated and provided by the legislature."

Thus, though there is no constitutional immunity for prosecution of Judges while
acting judicially, there is legal immunity in respect thereof as indicated
above.

23. Disciplinary proceedings, framing of charges, report of the Enquiring
Judge, resolutions of the disciplinary committee of the High Court, are all
protected by Section 78 IPC because they are stated to be based on order dated
19.04.2006 passed by the High Court on judicial side in Criminal Petition
No.2627 of 2003. Remedy of the petitioner is to question the said order in
Criminal Petition No.2627 of 2003 in higher court and to question departmental
enquiry proceedings and result therein if any, before the constitutional courts.
The petitioner cannot question them in collateral proceedings but has to
question them in higher courts. This court is of the opinion that remedy chosen
by the petitioner under criminal law is a misdirected one.

24. Having regard to the above view taken by this court on facts as well as on
law, this court finds that order passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Hyderabad dismissing private complaint filed by the petitioner under Section 203
Cr.P.C after enquiry, is not liable to be set aside.

25. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed.?1 AIR 1966 Supreme Court 523 
2 AIR 1914 Lahore 433 
3 AIR 1920 Bombay 99 
4 AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2102 
5 2009 AIR SCQ 861=AIR 2009 SC 404 
6 AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1607 
7 1991 (3) Supreme Court Cases 655 
8 2009(1) ALD (Crl.) 291


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