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Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – ss.163A and 166 r/w 168; Second Schedule – Bus carrying school children met with accident and fell into river from bridge – Death of 29 children – Most of them were in the age group of 10 to 18 years – Claim for compensation by parents of deceased children – Courts below awarded pecuniary compensation, on basis of Second Schedule and relevant multiplier under the Act, which in majority of the cases ranged from Rs.1,55,000/- to Rs.1,65,000/- – Though Tribunal did not award any non-pecuniary compensation, the High Court awarded non-pecuniary damages of Rs.75,000/- – On appeal, held: Pecuniary damages seeks to compensate losses which can be translated into money terms like loss of earnings, actual and prospective earning and other out of pocket expenses – On facts, no reason to differ with Courts below in respect of award of pecuniary compensation – As regards non-pecuniary damages, the same include immeasurable elements such as pain, suffering, loss of amenity and enjoyment of life and on facts, High Court rightly enhanced compensation in this category by Rs.75,000/- – However, compensation must also be granted with regard to future prospects of the children, which aspect was overlooked by both the Courts below – The records showed that the children were good in studies and studying in a reasonably good school and naturally, their future prospect was presumably good and bright and hence, it would be appropriate to grant further amount of Rs.75,000/- (which is roughly half the pecuniary compensation) as compensation for future prospects of the children. A bus carrying school children met with accident and fell into the Yamuna river from the bridge. Consequent to the accident, 29 children died. The parents of the deceased children i.e. the appellants filed claim petitions on account of fault liability and sought for payment of compensation under section 163A r/w Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal held that the accident took place due to negligence of the driver (respondent no.1) and, therefore, he alongwith the owner and the insurer (respondent nos.2 and 3) were jointly and severally liable to pay compensation and thereafter awarded a sum of Rs.1,55,000/- in case of children between age group of 10 to 15 years and Rs.1,65,000/- in case of children between 15 to 18 years. In case of children aged less than 10 years, Rs.1,05,000/- was awarded in one case and in two other cases Rs.1,30,000/- and Rs.1,31,000/- respectively was awarded. Additional Rs.1,000/- was awarded in case of the third child aged less than 10 years, as in some other cases, for loss of books. The compensation figure included Rs. 5,000/- each towards funeral and last rites. As per the Second Schedule of the Act, the balance amount was awarded for loss of dependency that was calculated on notional income of Rs. 15,000/- per annum of which Rs. 5,000/- was deducted towards personal living expenses. The Tribunal applied multiplier of 15 for children below 15 years and multiplier of 16 for children between 16 and 18 years respectively. It awarded interest @ 6% for four years. On appeal, the High Court, by the impugned judgment, held that the appellants were entitled to enhancement of compensation in all the cases by Rs.75,000/- and Rs.1000/- (if not already awarded by the Tribunal) and interest @ 7.5% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim petition till payment. =Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. Compensation in law is paid to restore the person, who has suffered damage or loss in the same position, if the tortuous act or the breach of contract had not been committed. The law requires that the party suffering should be put in the same position, if the contract had been performed or the wrong had not been committed. The law in all such matters requires payment of adequate, reasonable and just monetary compensation. [Para 10] [99-F-G] 1.2. In cases of motor accidents the endeavour is to put the dependents/claimants in the pre-accidental position. Compensation in cases of motor accidents, as in other matters, is paid for reparation of damages. The damages so awarded should be adequate sum of money that would put the party, who has suffered, in the same position if he had not suffered on account of the wrong. Compensation is therefore required to be paid for prospective pecuniary loss i.e. future loss of income/dependency suffered on account of the wrongful act. [Para 11] [99-H; 100-A-B] 1.3. However, no amount of compensation can restore the lost limb or the experience of pain and suffering due to loss of life. Loss of a child, life or a limb can never be eliminated or ameliorated completely. Pecuniary damages cannot replace a human life or limb lost. Therefore, in addition to the pecuniary losses, the law recognises that payment should also be made for non pecuniary losses on account of, loss of happiness, pain, suffering and expectancy of life etc. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for payment of “just compensation” vide section 166 and 168. It is left to the courts to decide what would be “just compensation” in facts of a case. [Para 12] [100-B-D] 1.4. For calculating pecuniary loss or loss of dependency, it is the multiplier method which should be applied. The said method is based upon the principle that the claimant must be paid a capital sum, which would yield sufficient interest to provide material benefits of the same standard and duration as the deceased would have provided for the dependents, if the deceased had lived and earned. The multiplier method is based upon the assessment that yearly loss of dependency should be equal to interest that could be earned in normal course on the capital sum invested. The capital sum would be the compensation for loss of dependency or the pecuniary loss suffered by the dependents. Uniform application of the multiplier method ensures consistency and certainty and prevents different amounts being awarded in different cases. [Para 13] [100-D-G] 1.5. For calculating the yearly loss of dependency the starting point is the wages being earned by the deceased, less his personal and living expenses. This provides a basic figure. Thereafter, effect is given to the future prospects of the deceased, inflation and general price rise that erodes value and the purchasing power of money. To the multiplicand so calculated, multiplier is to be applied. The multiplier is decided and determined on the basis of length of dependency, which must be estimated. This has to be necessarily discounted for contingencies and uncertainties. [Para 14] [100-H; 101-A-B] Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav (1996) 3 SCC 179; Managing Director TNSTC Ltd. v. K. T. Bindu (2005) 8 SCC 473; T. N. State Transport Corp. Ltd. v. S. Rajapriya (2005) 6 SCC 236; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie (2005) 10 SCC 720 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patrica Jean Mahajan (2002) 6 SCC 281 – relied on. 2.1. The real problem that arises in the cases of death of children is that they are not earning at the time of the accident. In most of the cases they were still studying and not working. However, under no stretch of imagination it can be said that the parents, who are appellants have not suffered any pecuniary loss. In fact, loss of dependency by its very nature is awarded for prospective or future loss. [Para 15] [101-D-E] 2.2. Under the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in case of a non-earning person, his income is notionally estimated at Rs.15,000/- per annum. The Second Schedule is applicable to claim petitions filed under Section 163A of the Act. The Second Schedule provides for the multiplier to be applied in cases where the age of the victim was less than 15 years and between 15 years but not exceeding 20 years. Even when compensation is payable under Section 166 read with 168 of the Act, deviation from the structured formula as provided in the Second Schedule is not ordinarily permissible, except in exceptional cases. [Para 16] [101-H; 102-A-B] Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India (2003) 3 SCC 148; United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan (2002) 6 SCC 281 and UP State Road Transport Corp. v. Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362, relied on. Taff Vale Rly. Co. v. Jenkins (1911-13) All England Reporter 160, referred to. 3. In factual position of the present case, the date of accident is 18.11.1997. Prior to this, the Second Schedule of the Act was already introduced w. e. f. 14.11.1994. Thus, the notional income mentioned in the Second Schedule and the multiplier specified therein can form the basis for the pecuniary compensation for the loss of dependency in the present cases. No fact and reason was highlighted during the arguments why the Second Schedule should not apply in the present cases. The Second Schedule also provides for deduction of 1/3rd consideration towards expenses; which the victim would have incurred on himself if he had lived. As compensation for loss of dependency is to be calculated on the basis of notional income because the deceased was a child. It by necessary implication takes into account future prospects, inflation, price rise etc. Therefore keeping in view of Second Schedule of the Act, this Court do not see any reason to differ with the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court in so far as award of pecuniary compensation to the dependents/claimants is concerned. [Paras 17 and 18] [102-D-G] 4.1. As regards non-pecuniary compensation, it is extremely difficult to quantify the same as it is to a great extent based upon the sentiments and emotions. But, the same could not be a ground for non-payment of any amount whatsoever by stating that it is difficult to quantify and pinpoint the exact amount payable with mathematical accuracy. Human life cannot be measured only in terms of loss of earning or monetary losses alone. There are emotional attachments involved and loss of a child can have a devastating effect on the family which can be easily visualized and understood. Perhaps, the only mechanism known to law in this kind of situation is to compensate a person who has suffered non-pecuniary loss or damage as a consequence of the wrong done to him by way of damages/monetary compensation. When a victim of a wrong suffers injuries he is entitled to compensation including compensation for the prospective life, pain and suffering, happiness etc., which is sometimes described as compensation paid for “loss of expectation of life”. This head of compensation need not be restricted to a case where the injured person himself initiates action but is equally admissible if his dependant brings about the action. [Para 24] [105-G-H; 106-A-D] 4.2. The injury inflicted by deprivation of the life of a child is extremely difficult to quantify. In view of the uncertainties and contingencies of human life, what would be an appropriate figure, an adequate solatium is difficult to specify. The courts have therefore used the expression “standard compensation” and “conventional amount/sum” to get over the difficulty that arises in quantifying a figure as the same ensures consistency and uniformity in awarding compensations. [Para 25] [106-E-F] 4.3. While quantifying and arriving at a figure for “loss of expectation of life”, the Court have to keep in mind that this figure is not to be calculated for the prospective loss or further pecuniary benefits that has been awarded under another head i.e. pecuniary loss. The compensation payable under this head is for loss of life and not loss of future pecuniary prospects. Under this head, compensation is paid for termination of life, which results in constant pain and suffering. This pain and suffering does not depend upon the financial position of the victim or the claimant but rather on the capacity and the ability of the deceased to provide happiness to the claimant. This compensation is paid for loss of prospective happiness which the claimant/victim would have enjoyed had the child not died at the tender age. [Para 26] [106-G-H; 107-A-B] R. D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. (1995)1 SCC 551 and Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 667, relied on. Ward v. James (1965) I All E R 563, referred to. Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edition, Vol. 12, page 446, referred to. 5.1. In addition to awarding compensation for pecuniary losses, compensation must also be granted with regard to the future prospects of the children. It is incumbent upon the Courts to consider the said aspect while awarding compensation. [Para 31] [108-G-H; 109-A] 5.2. In the present case, the claim with regard to future prospect should have been addressed by the courts below. While considering such claims, child’s performance in school, the reputation of the school etc. might be taken into consideration. In the present case, records shows that the children were good in studies and studying in a reasonably good school. Naturally, their future prospect would be presumed to be good and bright. Since they were children, there is no yardstick to measure the loss of future prospects of these children. But they were performing well in studies, natural consequence supposed to be a bright future. Therefore, denying compensation towards future prospects seems to be unjustified. Keeping this in background, facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be appropriate to grant compensation of Rs. 75,000/- (which is roughly half of the amount given on account of pecuniary damages) as compensation for the future prospects of the children, to be paid to each claimant within one month of the date of this decision. This amount i.e. Rs. 75,000/- is over and above what has been awarded by the High Court. [Para 32] [109-B-G] General Manager, Kerala S.R.T.C. v. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176; Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav (1996) 3 SCC 179; Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC 197; M.S.Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood (2001) 8 SCC 151 and State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, (2003) 7 SCC 484, relied on. 6. Pecuniary damages seeks to compensate those losses which can be translated into money terms like loss of earnings, actual and prospective earning and other out of pocket expenses. In contrast, non-pecuniary damages include such immeasurable elements as pain and suffering and loss of amenity and enjoyment of life. In this context, it becomes duty of the court to award just compensation for non-pecuniary loss. It is difficult to quantify the non-pecuniary compensation, nevertheless, the endeavour of the Court must be to provide a just, fair and reasonable amount as compensation keeping in view all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration. The High Court in present case rightly enhanced the compensation in this category by Rs. 75,000/-. [Para 34] [110-H; 111-A-E] 7. With respect to the interest, the Tribunal had directed for payment of interest for only four years at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the award and in case payment was not made within 30 days then further interest at the rate of 6% from the date of award till payment. In appeal, the High Court awarded 7+ % per annum from the date of filing of the petition till payment. The interest awarded by the High Court is just and proper, so the same need not be disturbed. [Para 35] [111-F-G] Case Law Reference: (2001) 8 SCC 197 relied on Para 9 (1996) 3 SCC 179 relied on Para 14 (2005) 8 SCC 473 relied on Para 14 (2005) 6 SCC 236 relied on Para 14 (2005) 10 SCC 720 relied on Para 14 (2002) 6 SCC 281 relied on Para 14 (1911-13) All Eng.Reporter 160 referred to Para 15 (2003) 3 SCC 148 relied on Para 16 (2002) 6 SCC 281 relied on Para 16 (1996) 4 SCC 362 relied on Para 16 (1965) I All E R 563 referred to Para 21 (1995) 1 SCC 551 relied on Para 22 (1999) 6 SCC 667 relied on Para 23 (2001) 8 SCC 151 relied on Para 29 (1994) 2 SCC 176 relied on Para 31 (1996) 3 SCC 179 relied on Para 31 (2003) 7 SCC 484 relied on Para 33 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3608 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 17.5.2006 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi MACT Nos. 194, 195, 196, 167, 199, 200, 201-202, 203-204, 207-208, 209-210, 213, 214, 215, 217, 221, 222, 228-229, 231-232, 233-234 and 742-743 of 2005. WITH C.A. Nos. 3609 & 3607 of 2009. Kailash Vasdev, T. Harish Kumar, Yudhister Singh, Ashok Mathur (NP) and Rohit Minocha for the Appellants. Pankaj Bala Verma (for Kiran Suri), P.R. Sikka, Dhiraj, Reeta Dewan Puri, Mohd. Wasi (for P.N. Puri), Ravi Kumar Tomar, (for Jitendra Kumar), and Vipin Gogia (for Jaspreet Gogia) for the Respondents.

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 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL No. 3608 OF 2009
 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 17525 of 2006)

R. K. Malik & Anr. .....Appellants

 Versus

Kiran Pal & Ors. .....Respondents

 With

 CIVIL APPEAL No. 3609 OF 2009
 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1686 of 2007)

 And

 CIVIL APPEAL No. 3607 OF 2009
 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 13397 of 2007)

 JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in these appeals is made to the legality and validity of

 the judgment and order dated 17.05.2006 rendered by a Single

 Judge of Delhi High Court in a bunch of motor accident claims

 1
 petitions bearing MACT Nos. 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201-

 202, 203-204, 207-208, 209-210, 213, 214, 215, 217, 221, 222,

 228-229, 231-232, 233-234 and 742-743 of 2005, whereby and

 whereunder the High Court was pleased to dispose of the claim

 petitions of the appellants herein.

3. In order to decide these appeals, it would be necessary to state few

 basic facts. The appellants herein are claimants whose children

 were studying in school. On 18.11.1997 when these children were

 proceeding to the school in a bus bearing No. DL IP-1644, the bus

 after overrunning the road and breaking the railing got drowned in

 Yamuna river at Wazirabad Yamuna Bridge. Consequent to the

 accident, 29 children died.

4. The bus was being driven by Mr. Karan Pal (respondent No.1

 herein) and was owned by Mr. Hari Kishan (respondent No.2) and

 was insured with National Insurance Company Ltd. (respondent No.

 3). It was alleged that the driver was driving the bus in a rash and

 negligent manner and at a very fast speed. It was further alleged

 that the bus driver lost control of the bus and after breaking the

 railing of the bridge on left side, the same fell into the river

 Yamuna.

 2
5. The appellants filed claim petitions individually on account of fault

 liability and sought for payment of compensation under Section

 163-A read with Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (in

 short `the Act'). It was pleaded that the deceased-children would

 have earned good amount per month in future and would have

 provided financial assistance and pecuniary help to their parents-

 appellants. The claim petitions of the appellants were heard

 together by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Delhi (in short `the

 Tribunal').

6. During the course of trial before the Tribunal, several witnesses

 were examined in support of the respective claims. The appellants

 also examined themselves as witnesses. The Tribunal by award

 dated 06.12.2004 held that the accident had taken place due to the

 negligence of the driver (respondent No. 1) and, therefore, the said

 respondent along with respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were jointly and

 severally liable to pay compensation. The Tribunal by its common

 award awarded a sum of Rs. 1, 55,000/- to the dependents of

 children between age group of 10 to 15 years and Rs. 1, 65,000/-

 between 15 to 18 years. Three of the children namely Kailash

 Rathi, Neena Jain and Jatish Sharma were less than 10 years. In

 the case of Kailash Rathi, compensation of Rs. 1, 05,000/- was

 awarded and in the cases of Neena Jain and Jatish Sharma,

 3
 compensation of Rs. 1, 30,000/- and Rs. 1, 31,000/- respectively

 was awarded. Additional Rs. 1000/- was awarded in the case of

 Jatish Sharma, as in some other cases, for loss of books. The

 figures mentioned above include Rs. 5,000/- each towards funeral

 and last rites. It awarded interest @ 6% for four years. As per the

 Second Schedule of the Act, the balance amount was awarded for

 loss of dependency that was calculated on notional income of Rs.

 15,000/- per annum. Rs. 5,000/- was deducted towards personal

 living expenses. The Tribunal applied multiplier of 15 for children

 below 15 years and multiplier of 16 for children between 16 and 18

 years respectively.

7. Against the said order of the Tribunal, appeals were filed before the

 High Court by the appellants who were heard together by the High

 Court. It was submitted before the High Court that the amount

 awarded by the Tribunal was not just and reasonable and the

 Tribunal erred in not awarding interest from the date of petition till

 realization.

8. The High Court by its common order held that the appellants are

 entitled to enhancement of compensation in all the cases by Rs.

 75,000/- and Rs. 1000/- (if not already awarded by the Tribunal)

 and interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filling of the claim

 4
 petition till payment. It was further held that 50% of the enhanced

 compensation with interest shall be paid and the balance 50% shall

 be kept in the form of fixed deposit or in the post office for a period

 of six years. The High Court directed that the dependents would be

 entitled to interest but would not withdraw the principal amount

 during the lock-in period of six years without the permission of the

 Tribunal.

9. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have preferred the present special

 leave petition contending that the High Court ought to have applied

 the ratio of Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197 to

 the facts of the case and also that it failed to award a fair and

 reasonable compensation. It was submitted that the High Court

 ought to have awarded compensation of Rs. 10, 00,000/-. It was

 the further contention that the High Court erred in applying notional

 income of deceased child as Rs. 15,000/- per annum only. It was

 further contended that the Tribunal ought to have enhanced the

 income considering the rise in cost of living as well as inflation.

10.Undoubtedly, the compensation in law is paid to restore the person,

 who has suffered damage or loss in the same position, if the

 tortuous act or the breach of contract had not been committed.

 The law requires that the party suffering should be put in the same

 5
 position, if the contract had been performed or the wrong had not

 been committed. The law in all such matters requires payment of

 adequate, reasonable and just monetary compensation.

11.In cases of motor accidents the endeavour is to put the

 dependents/claimants in the pre-accidental position. Compensation

 in cases of motor accidents, as in other matters, is paid for

 reparation of damages. The damages so awarded should be

 adequate sum of money that would put the party, who has

 suffered, in the same position if he had not suffered on account of

 the wrong. Compensation is therefore required to be paid for

 prospective pecuniary loss i.e. future loss of income/dependency

 suffered on account of the wrongful act.

12.However, no amount of compensation can restore the lost limb or

 the experience of pain and suffering due to loss of life. Loss of a

 child, life or a limb can never be eliminated or ameliorated

 completely. To put it simply-pecuniary damages cannot replace a

 human life or limb lost. Therefore, in addition to the pecuniary

 losses, the law recognises that payment should also be made for

 non pecuniary losses on account of, loss of happiness, pain,

 suffering and expectancy of life etc. The Act provides for payment

 of "just compensation" vide section 166 and 168. It is left to the

 6
 courts to decide what would be "just compensation" in facts of a

 case.

13.For calculating pecuniary loss or loss of dependency, this Court has

 repeatedly held that it is the multiplier method which should be

 applied. The said method is based upon the principle that the

 claimant must be paid a capital sum, which would yield sufficient

 interest to provide material benefits of the same standard and

 duration as the deceased would have provided for the dependents,

 if the deceased had lived and earned. The multiplier method is

 based upon the assessment that yearly loss of dependency should

 be equal to interest that could be earned in normal course on the

 capital sum invested. The capital sum would be the compensation

 for loss of dependency or the pecuniary loss suffered by the

 dependents. Needless to say, uniform application of the multiplier

 method ensures consistency and certainty and prevents different

 amounts being awarded in different cases.

14. For calculating the yearly loss of dependency the starting point is

 the wages being earned by the deceased, less his personal and

 living expenses. This provides a basic figure. Thereafter, effect is

 given to the future prospects of the deceased, inflation and general

 price rise that erodes value and the purchasing power of money.

 7
 To the multiplicand so calculated, multiplier is to be applied. The

 multiplier is decided and determined on the basis of length of

 dependency, which must be estimated. This has to be necessarily

 discounted for contingencies and uncertainties. Reference in this

 regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the case of

 Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav, (1996) 3 SCC 179; Managing

 Director TNSTC Ltd. v. K. T. Bindu, (2005) 8 SCC 473; T. N.

 State Transport Corp. Ltd. v. S. Rajapriya, (2005) 6 SCC 236;

 New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie, (2005) 10 SCC 720

 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patrica Jean Mahajan

 (2002) 6 SCC 281.

15. The real problem that arises in the cases of death of children is that

 they are not earning at the time of the accident. In most of the

 cases they were still studying and not working. However, under no

 stretch of imagination it can be said that the parents, who are

 appellants herein, have not suffered any pecuniary loss. In fact,

 Loss of dependency by its very nature is awarded for prospective or

 future loss. In this context, Lord Atkinson aptly observed in Taff

 Vale Rly. Co. v. Jenkins, (1911-13) All England Reporter 160 as

 follows:

 "In case of the death of an infant, there may
 have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its

 8
 parents during the child's lifetime. But this will not
 necessarily bar the parents' claim and prospective loss
 will found a valid claim provided that the parents
 establish that they had a reasonable expectation of
 pecuniary benefit if the child had lived."

16. Then, how does one calculate pecuniary compensation for loss of

 future earnings and loss of dependency of the parents, grand

 parents etc. in the case of non-working student? Under the Second

 Schedule of the Act in case of a non earning person, his income is

 notionally estimated at Rs. 15,000/- per annum. The Second

 Schedule is applicable to claim petitions filed under Section 163 A of

 the Act. The Second Schedule provides for the multiplier to be

 applied in cases where the age of the victim was less than 15 years

 and between 15 years but not exceeding 20 years. Even when

 compensation is payable under Section 166 read with 168 of the

 Act, deviation from the structured formula as provided in the

 Second Schedule is not ordinarily permissible, except in exceptional

 cases. [see Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General,

 Geological Survey of India, (2003) 3 SCC 148); United India

 Insurance Company Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6

 SCC 281 and UP State Road Transport Corp. v. Trilok Chandra,

 (1996) 4 SCC 362].

 9
17. Reverting back to the factual position of the present case, the date

 of accident is 18.11.1997. Prior to this, the Second Schedule of the

 Act was already introduced w. e. f. 14.11.1994. Thus, the notional

 income mentioned in the Second Schedule and the multiplier

 specified therein can form the basis for the pecuniary compensation

 for the loss of dependency in the present cases. No fact and reason

 was highlighted during the arguments why the Second Schedule

 should not apply in the present cases. The Second Schedule also

 provides for deduction of 1/3rd consideration towards expenses;

 which the victim would have incurred on himself if he had lived. As

 compensation for loss of dependency is to be calculated on the

 basis of notional income because the deceased was a child. It by

 necessary implication takes into account future prospects, inflation,

 price rise etc.

18.Therefore keeping in view of Second Schedule of the Act, this Court

 do not see any reason to differ with the view taken by the Tribunal

 as well as the High Court in so far as award of pecuniary

 compensation to the dependents/claimants is concerned. We must

 point out here that the learned counsel for the appellants had

 argued that the notional sum of Rs. 15,000/- should be enhanced

 and increased as the legislature has not amended the Second

 Schedule and the same continues to be in existence since it was

 10
 enacted on 14.11.1994. We are not examining and going into this

 aspect as the accident had taken place in the present case nearly

 three years after the enactment of the Second Schedule. The time

 difference between the date of the enactment and the date of

 accident is not substantial.

19.The other issue is with regard to non-pecuniary compensation to

 the appellants-dependents on the loss of human life, loss of

 company, companionship, happiness, pain and suffering, loss of

 expectation of life etc.

20. In the Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 12, page 446, it

 has been stated with regard to non-pecuniary loss as follows:

 "Non-pecuniary loss: the pattern.
 Damages awarded for pain and suffering and loss
 of amenity constitute a conventional sum which is
 taken to be the sum which society deems fair,
 fairness being interpreted by the Courts in the light
 of previous decisions. Thus there has been evolved
 a set of conventional principles providing a
 provisional guide to the comparative severity of
 different injuries, and indicating a bracket of
 damages into which a particular injury will currently
 fall. The particular circumstance of the plaintiff,
 including his age and any unusual deprivation he
 may suffer, is reflected in the actual amount of the
 award.

 The fall in the value of money leads to
 a continuing reassessment of these awards and to
 periodic reassessments of damages at certain key
 points in the pattern where the disability is readily

 11
 identifiable and not subject to large variations in
 individual cases."

21. In the case of Ward v. James, (1965) I All E R 563, it was
 observed:

 "Although you cannot give a man so
 gravely injured much for his `lost years', you can,
 however, compensate him for his loss during his
 shortened, span, that is, during his expected `years
 of survival'. You can compensate him for his loss
 of earnings during that time, and for the cost of
 treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can
 you compensate him for being rendered a helpless
 invalid? He may, owing to brain injury, be
 rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or,
 owing to a back injury, be unable to rise from his
 bed. He has lost everything that makes life
 worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet Judges
 and juries have to do the best they can and give
 him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it
 well nigh insoluble. They are being asked to
 calculable. The figure is bound to be for the most
 part a conventional sum. The Judges have worked
 out a pattern, and they keep it in line with the
 changes in the value of money."

22. The Supreme Court in the case of R. D. Hattangadi v. Pest

 Control (India) (P) Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 551, at page 556, has

 observed as follows in para 9:

 "9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount
 of compensation payable to a victim of an accident,
 the damages have to be assessed separately as
 pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary
 damages are those which the victim has actually
 incurred and which are capable of being calculated
 in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary

 12
 damages are those which are incapable of being
 assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to
 appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may
 include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i)
 medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up
 to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far
 non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may
 include (i) damages for mental and physical shock,
 pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be
 suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for
 the loss of amenities of life which may include a
 variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the
 claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii)
 damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on
 account of injury the normal longevity of the
 person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience,
 hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration
 and mental stress in life."

In this case, the Court awarded non-pecuniary special damages of Rs.

3, 00,000/- to the claimants.

23. In Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India,

 (1999) 6 SCC 667 @ page 738, it was observed:

 "128. The object of an award of damages is to give
 the plaintiff compensation for damage, loss or
 injury he has suffered. The elements of damage
 recognised by law are divisible into two main
 groups: pecuniary and non-pecuniary. While the
 pecuniary loss is capable of being arithmetically
 worked out, the non-pecuniary loss is not so
 calculable. Non-pecuniary loss is compensated in
 terms of money, not as a substitute or replacement
 for other money, but as a substitute, what
 McGregor says, is generally more important than
 money: it is the best that a court can do. In
 Mediana, Re87 Lord Halsbury, L.C. observed as
 under:
 "How is anybody to measure pain and
 suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest
 that you can by arithmetical calculation establish
 what is the exact sum of money which would

 13
 represent such a thing as the pain and suffering
 which a person has undergone by reason of an
 accident.... But nevertheless the law recognises
 that as a topic upon which damages may be given."

24.It is extremely difficult to quantify the non pecuniary compensation

 as it is to a great extent based upon the sentiments and emotions.

 But, the same could not be a ground for non-payment of any

 amount whatsoever by stating that it is difficult to quantify and

 pinpoint the exact amount payable with mathematical accuracy.

 Human life cannot be measured only in terms of loss of earning or

 monetary losses alone. There are emotional attachments involved

 and loss of a child can have a devastating effect on the family which

 can be easily visualized and understood. Perhaps, the only

 mechanism known to law in this kind of situation is to compensate

 a person who has suffered non-pecuniary loss or damage as a

 consequence of the wrong done to him by way of

 damages/monetary compensation. Undoubtedly, when a victim of a

 wrong suffers injuries he is entitled to compensation including

 compensation for the prospective life, pain and suffering, happiness

 etc., which is sometimes described as compensation paid for "loss

 of expectation of life". This head of compensation need not be

 restricted to a case where the injured person himself initiates action

 but is equally admissible if his dependant brings about the action.

 14
25.That being the position, the crucial problem arises with regard to

 the quantification of such compensation. The injury inflicted by

 deprivation of the life of a child is extremely difficult to quantify. In

 view of the uncertainties and contingencies of human life, what

 would be an appropriate figure, an adequate solatium is difficult to

 specify. The courts have therefore used the expression "standard

 compensation" and "conventional amount/sum" to get over the

 difficulty that arises in quantifying a figure as the same ensures

 consistency and uniformity in awarding compensations.

26.While quantifying and arriving at a figure for "loss of expectation of

 life", the Court have to keep in mind that this figure is not to be

 calculated for the prospective loss or further pecuniary benefits that

 has been awarded under another head i.e. pecuniary loss. The

 compensation payable under this head is for loss of life and not loss

 of future pecuniary prospects. Under this head, compensation is

 paid for termination of life, which results in constant pain and

 suffering. This pain and suffering does not depend upon the

 financial position of the victim or the claimant but rather on the

 capacity and the ability of the deceased to provide happiness to the

 claimant. This compensation is paid for loss of prospective

 happiness which the claimant/victim would have enjoyed had the

 child not been died at the tender age.

 15
27. In the case of Lata Wadhwa (supra), wherein several persons

 including children lost their lives in a fire accident, the Court

 awarded substantial amount as compensation. No doubt, the Court

 noticed that the children who lost their lives were studying in an

 expensive school, had bright prospects and belonged to upper

 middle class, yet it cannot be said that higher compensation

 awarded was for deprivation of life and the pain and suffering

 undergone on loss of life due to financial status. The term

 "conventional compensation" used in the said case has been used

 for non pecuniary compensation payable on account of pain and

 suffering as a result of death. The Court in the said case referred to

 Rs.50, 000/- as conventional figure. The reason was loss of

 expectancy of life and pain and suffering on that account which was

 common and uniform to all regardless of the status. Unless there is

 a specific case departing from the conventional formula, non-

 pecuniary compensation should not be fixed on basis of economic

 wealth and background.

28. In Lata Wadhawa case (supra), wherein the accident took place

 on 03.03.1989, the multiplier method was referred to and adopted

 with approval. In cases of children between 5 to 10 years of age,

 compensation of Rs.1.50 lakhs was awarded towards pecuniary

 16
 compensation and in addition a sum of Rs.50, 000/- was awarded

 towards `conventional compensation". In the case of children

 between 10 to 18 years compensation of Rs.4.10 lakhs was

 awarded including "conventional compensation". While doing so the

 Supreme Court held that contribution of each child towards family

 should be taken as Rs.24, 000/- per annum instead of Rs.12, 000/-

 per annum as recommended by Justice Y. V.Chandrachud

 Committee. This was in view of the fact that the company in

 question had an un-written rule that every employee can get one of

 his children employed in the said company.

29. In the case of M. S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, (2001) 8 SCC

 151, wherein 14 students of a public school got drowned in a river

 due to negligence of the teachers. On the question of quantum of

 compensation, this Court accepted that the multiplier method was

 normally to be adopted as a method for assigning value of future

 annual dependency. It was emphasized that the Court must ensure

 that a just compensation was awarded.

30. In Grewal case (supra), compensation of Rs.5 lakhs was awarded

 to the claimants and the same was held to be justified. Learned

 Counsel for the respondent no.3, however, pointed out that in the

 said case the Supreme Court had noticed that the students

 17
 belonged to an affluent school as was apparent from the fee

 structure and therefore the compensation of Rs.5 lakhs as awarded

 by the High Court was not found to be excessive. It is no doubt

 true that the Supreme Court in the said case noticed that the

 students belonged to an upper middle class background but the

 basis and the principle on which the compensation was awarded in

 that case would equally apply to the present case.

31. A forceful submission has been made by the learned counsels

 appearing for the claimants-appellants that both the Tribunal as

 well as the High Court failed to consider the claims of the appellants

 with regard to the future prospects of the children. It has been

 submitted that the evidence with regard to the same has been

 ignored by the Courts below. On perusal of the evidence on record,

 we find merit in such submission that the Courts below have

 overlooked that aspect of the matter while granting compensation.

 It is well settled legal principle that in addition to awarding

 compensation for pecuniary losses, compensation must also be

 granted with regard to the future prospects of the children. It is

 incumbent upon the Courts to consider the said aspect while

 awarding compensation. Reliance in this regard may be placed on

 the decisions rendered by this Court in General Manager, Kerala

 S. R. T. C. v. Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176; Sarla Dixit

 18
 v. Balwant Yadav, (1996) 3 SCC 179; and Lata Wadhwa case

 (supra).

32. In view of discussion made hereinbefore, it is quite clear the claim

 with regard to future prospect should have been be addressed by

 the courts below. While considering such claims, child's

 performance in school, the reputation of the school etc. might be

 taken into consideration. In the present case, records shows that

 the children were good in studies and studying in a reasonably good

 school. Naturally, their future prospect would be presumed to be

 good and bright. Since they were children, there is no yardstick to

 measure the loss of future prospects of these children. But as

 already noted, they were performing well in studies, natural

 consequence supposed to be a bright future. In the case of Lata

 Wadhwa (supra) and M. S. Grewal (supra), the Supreme Court

 recognised such future prospect as basis and factor to be

 considered. Therefore, denying compensation towards future

 prospects seems to be unjustified. Keeping this in background, facts

 and circumstances of the present case, and following the decision in

 Lata Wadhwa (supra) and M. S. Grewal (supra), we deem it

 appropriate to grant compensation of Rs. 75,000/- (which is

 roughly half of the amount given on account of pecuniary damages)

 as compensation for the future prospects of the children, to be paid

 19
 to each claimant within one month of the date of this decision. We

 would like to clarify that this amount i.e. Rs. 75,000/- is over and

 above what has been awarded by the High Court.

33. Besides, the Courts have been awarding compensation for pain and

 suffering and towards non-pecuniary damages. Reference in this

 regard can be made to R. D. Hattangadi case (supra). Further,

 the said compensation must be just and reasonable. This Court has

 observed as follows in State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, (2003) 7

 SCC 484, at 486:

 "7. It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted
 under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to
 make an award determining the amount of compensation
 which is to be in the real sense "damages" which in turn
 appears to it to be "just and reasonable". It has to be
 borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life
 can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same
 time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is
 not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory
 provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be
 "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit;
 but the same should not be a pittance. The courts and
 tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and
 quantify the amount of compensation, which should be
 just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed
 question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all
 cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb.
 Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
 mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the
 particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar
 or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted
 for assessing compensation has to be considered in the
 background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal
 consideration. Though by use of the expression "which
 appears to it to be just" a wide discretion is vested in the
 Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done
 by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims,

 20
 wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression "just"
 denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and
 non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just."

34.So far as the pecuniary damage is concerned we are of the

 considered view both the Tribunal as well as the High Court has

 awarded the compensation on the basis of Second Schedule and

 relevant multiplier under the Act. However, we may notice here that

 as far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, the Tribunal does

 not award any compensation under the head of non-pecuniary

 damages. However, in appeal the High Court has elaborately

 discussed this aspect of the matter and has awarded non-pecuniary

 damages of Rs. 75,000. Needless to say, pecuniary damages seeks

 to compensate those losses which can be translated into money

 terms like loss of earnings, actual and prospective earning and

 other out of pocket expenses. In contrast, non-pecuniary damages

 include such immeasurable elements as pain and suffering and loss

 of amenity and enjoyment of life. In this context, it becomes duty

 of the court to award just compensation for non-pecuniary loss. As

 already noted it is difficult to quantify the non-pecuniary

 compensation, nevertheless, the endeavour of the Court must be to

 provide a just, fair and reasonable amount as compensation

 keeping in view all relevant facts and circumstances into

 consideration. We have noticed that the High Court in present case

 21
 has enhanced the compensation in this category by Rs. 75, 000/- in

 all connected appeals. We do not find any infirmity in that regard.

35.With respect to the interest, the Tribunal had directed for payment

 of interest for only four years at the rate of 6% per annum from the

 date of filing of the claim petition till the award and in case of

 payment was not made within 30 days then further interest at the

 rate of 6% from the date of award till payment. In appeal, the High

 Court awarded 7 and = % per annum from the date of filing of the

 petition till payment. We find the interest awarded by the High

 Court as just and proper, so the same need not be disturbed.

36.The appeals are disposed of in terms of aforesaid order.

 ...............................J.
 [S.B. Sinha]

 ................................J.
 [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]
New Delhi
May 15, 2009 22

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