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Evidence Act, 1872-ss. 58 and 145-Document without signature-Admitted by executor-Document has bearing effect on limitation-Not considered by High Court-Hence matter remitted back for reconsideration- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order. 41 r. 31. Pleadings-Necessity of-On jurisdictional facts-Held: A jurisdictional fact need not necessarily be pleaded. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (plaintiffs) filed a suit against the appellants (defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 5 to 7) and respondent No. 3 (defendant No. 1) claiming 2/3rd share in the property described in Schedule A to the plaint and 4/9th share in the property described in Schedule B to the plaint and seeking direction to defendants 1 to 3 to render fair and proper accounts, in respect of the poultry business which was being run in Schedule B property, from the year 1968 and for future profits thereon. Plaintiffs claimed the properties as members of Hindu undivided family. Defendant No. 1 – respondent No. 3 was the ‘Karta’ of the family. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that their father (defendant No. 1 – respondent No. 3) had made investments for the poultry business started by the appellant Nos. 1 and 2. Arrangement was entered into between the parties that profits of the said business was to be shared by their grandfather on one hand and their father and appellant No. 1 on the other hand equally after giving due credit to the expenditure and interest to investments. Land was purchased in the name of the grandfather and appellant No. 1 from the money advanced. Poultry business was started on that. With the profits from the poultry business a tube manufacturing plant was installed. On death of their grandfather they inherited 2/3rd undivided interest in the two business. Defendant No. 1 (father of the plaintiffs) supported their case. Appellants (defendant Nos. 2 and 3) denied the allegations in the suit. They also took the plea that the suit was barred by limitation. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 pleaded that the busineses were exclusively theirs. They had started the same after taking loan from Bank. They filed Exhibit B-8 showing that the accounts had been settled by and between the parties on 30.05.1979. They averred that even if allegations of the plaintiffs were correct, they were entitled to only 1/2 share in the land. Defendant No. 1 had admitted its execution by him. Trial Court by a preliminary decree directed partition of the schedule properties and rendering proper accounts in respect of 1968 onwards. High Court dismissed the appeal. It did not take into consideration Exbt B.8 on the ground that the same did not bear anyone’s signature. In appeal to this Court, appellants contended that High Court in having failed to take into consideration the effect to Exhibit B-8 committed serious error; that even though no averment was made with regard to this document in the Written Statement, but in view of the fact that defendant No. 1 admitted the execution thereof, the same should have been taken into consideration and that there was nothing to show as to how High Court came to a conclusion that plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 had 2/3rd share in the business venture. =Partly allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to High Court, the Court HELD: 1. In the fact situation of this case, particularly when the limitation issue required determination, Ex. B-8, should have received serious consideration at the hands of the courts below. [Para 26] [211-C, D] 2. The reasoning of the High Court in regard to Ex. B-8 cannot be accepted. Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 and 2) were claiming the property as members of the Hindu undivided family. Admittedly, the interest of the Hindu undivided family was being looked after by grand father of the plaintiffs and after his death by defendant No.1 (Respondent No.3). Correspondences were exchanged by and between Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 only with the grandfather and defendant No.1 (Respondent No.3). Yet again admittedly, defendant No.1 (Respondent No.3) was the manager of the Hindu undivided family. His dealing with the appellant in regard to the affairs of the business will have a direct bearing in the matter of determination of the issues raised before this court. [Para 21] [209-G, H; 210-A, B] 3. An admission made by a party can be used against him. When such admission is made by a Karta of the Hindu undivided family, who is managing the family property as well as family business affairs, the same would be a relevant fact. When a claim was made by the plaintiffs for rendition of accounts in the lis, issuance of a document purported to have been authored by one of the parties was required to be taken into consideration. In terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a thing admitted need not be proved. [Paras 22 and 23] [210-B, C, D] Shreedhan Govind Kamerkar v. Yesahwant Govind Kamerkar and Anr., [2006] 14 SCALE 174, referred to. 4. It is also a trite law that when in cross-examination a witness accepts the correctness of a document, the same would be relevant. A pleading in regard to existence of a document may be necessary for advancing the case of a party, but when a witness admits a document to be in his own handwriting without anything more, the effect thereof may have to be considered having regard to the provisions contained in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act in terms whereof the only requirement would be that his attention is drawn before a writing can be proved. These relevant facts have not been considered by the High Court. The High Court merely proceeded on the basis that Ex.B-8 did not contain anybody’s signature. If defendant No.1 accepted the contents of the said document, which, according to him were noted by him from the books of accounts, authenticity thereof is not in question, and, thus, even in absence of books of accounts, relevant pages whereof were found to have been torn, the High Court ought to have taken the same into consideration as well as the admission on the part of defendant No.1 and the effect thereof. Such an admission could be taken into consideration both for the purpose of arriving at a finding in regard to the fact as to whether a full and final settlement of accounts had been arrived at, which was a relevant fact as also for determining the question of limitation. [Para 24] [210-D-G] 5. There is no document in writing to prove partnership. Accounts had not been demanded by the plaintiffs or the defendant no.3 for a long time. Even an oral partnership had not been proved. What was the subject matter of the partnership had also not been considered by the High Court. A share in a joint venture, in absence of any document in writing, must be determined having regard to the conduct of the parties. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the plaintiffs and defendant no.1 had 1/2 share in the property in terms of Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the said immovable property formed assets of the joint venture, the same would be an indicia to determine the shares held by the parties thereto. Ordinarily, the extent of an involvement made shall be the criteria for determining the share of the co-entrepreneurs. In absence of terms and conditions of the joint venture having not been reduced to writing, conduct of the parties how they dealt with affairs of the business would be relevant. [Para 25] [210-H; 211-A, B, C] 6. If the contents of Ex. B-8 were accepted, it was not for the High Court to consider the consequences flowing therefrom, and, thus, but the fact whether the figure(s) contained therein could be verified from the books of account might not be very relevant. Whether, it would be in consonance with the pleadings of appellants was again of not much significance if it can be used for demolishing the case of plaintiffs and defendant No.1. If the figures contained in Ex. B-8 were accepted, it was for defendant No.1 to explain the same and not for appellants. The High Court thus committed a manifest error in not taking into consideration the contents of Ex. B-8 in its proper perspective. [Para 27] [211-E, F, G] 7. In terms of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is for the court to determine the question as to whether the suit is barred by limitation or not irrespective of the fact that as to whether such a plea has been raised by the parties. Such a jurisdictional fact need not, thus, be pleaded. [Para 27] 8. It was for the High Court to frame appropriate points for its determination in the light of the submissions made on behalf of appellants in terms of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. Thus, apart from Issues regarding settlement of accounts under Exbt. B-8 and limitation, other points which for its consideration including the extent of the share of plaintiffs and defendant No.1 were required to be specifically gone into particularly in view of the fact that such a contention had been considered by the Trial Judge. Issue regarding Exbt. B-8 and limitation. therefore, require fresh consideration at the hands of the High Court. It may also be necessary for the High Court to consider the applicability of the relevant articles of the Limitation Act. [Paras 28, 29 and 30] [212-H; 213-A, B] A. Subba Rao for the Appellant. T.L.V. Viswanatha Iyer, Sr .Adv., P.S. Narasimha, Sridhar Polaraju, D. Julius Riamei, Avijeet Kr. Lala, Dr. K.P. Kaylash Nath Pillai and P.V. Dinesh for the Respondents.

CASE NO.:
The Andhra Pradesh State Legislative Assembly ...

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Appeal (civil) 7318 of 2000

PETITIONER:
Gannmani Anasuya & Ors

RESPONDENT:
Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/05/2007

BENCH:
S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA , J :

1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and decree dated 
29.10.1999 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at 
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad whereby and whereunder an appeal preferred 
by Appellants herein, who were Defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 5 to 7 in the suit, 
from a judgment and decree dated 23.04.1993 in O.S. No. 55 of 1985 passed 
by the Subordinate Judge, Ramchandrapuram, was dismissed.

2. Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein) filed a suit purported to be 
one for partition claiming 2/3rd share in the property described in Schedule 
'A' appended to the plaint, claiming 4/9th share in the property described in 
Schedule 'B' appended thereto, as also for a decree directing the Defendants 
1 to 3 to render fair and proper accounts in respect of the poultry business 
which was being run in the Schedule 'B' property from the year 1968 
onwards as also for future profits thereupon. 

3. Plaintiffs are sons of Defendant No.1 (Respondent No.3 herein). One 
Narasimha Murthy was the father of Defendant No.1. Appellants herein 
admittedly are related to the respondents. Appellant No. 1 is niece of late 
Narasimha Murthy. Her parents died when she was very young and 
unmarried. She was brought up by the said Narasimha Murthy and married 
to Appellant No.2 herein. Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 allegedly were close to the 
said Narasimha Murthy. At the time of marriage, Appellant No. 2 was a 
student of Veterinary Science at Madras. After securing B.V. Sc. Degree, he 
got an appointment in the veterinary department and later on became a 
B.D.O., and subsequently a Project Officer in the Urban Community 
Development of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. They allegedly 
approached Defendant No. 1 and late Narasimha Murthy to invest money in 
poultry business at Hyderabad; pursuant whereto investments were made. 
Allegedly, an arrangement was entered into by and between the parties that 
profits of the said business can be shared by late Narasimha Murthy, on the 
one hand, and Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No.2, on the other, equally 
after giving due credit to the expenditure and interest to investments made @ 
15% p.a. 7 acres and 14 guntas of land was purchased with the moneys 
advanced by late Narasimha Murthy and Defendant No.1 at Attapur near 
Hyderabad in the name of late Narasimha Murthy and the Defendant No.2. 
Poultry business was, thus, started. 

4. Narasimha Murthy died in the year 1971. With the profits from the 
said business going up, a tube manufacturing plant was also installed. 
According to the plaintiffs on the death of the said Narasimha Murthy, they 
inherited 2/3rd undivided interest of the said poultry and tubes manufacturing 
business and Appellant No.2 had the remaining 1/3rd share. The joint family 
and Respondent No.3 herein had no interest in the said business concern.

5. Allegedly, a notice dated 27.08.1985 was served asking the appellants 
herein to render accounts in respect of the said businesses, but no reply 
thereto was given. A suit was thereafter filed on 12.09.1985. The father of 
the Plaintiffs-Respondents Nos.1 and 2, namely, Respondent No.3 herein in 
his written statement for all intent and purport supported the case of the 
plaintiffs alleging that there had been no settlement of accounts in respect of 
the said businesses and after the death of Narasimha Murthy, he was entitled 
to the share to which his father was entitled to from the said business. It was 
alleged that further amounts were also advanced after the death of his father 
by way of advance as well as interest accrued on principal amounts 
advanced. It was further alleged that the infrastructures and the buildings 
referred to in Schedule 'B' appended to the plaint including the residential 
house bearing D. No. 7/26 were constructed with the profit earned from the 
business. It was, therefore, contended that they were entitled to 2/3rd share 
in the business besides the amounts advanced together with interest at the 
rate of 15% p.a. and also to a half share in the properties described in 
Schedule 'B' appended to the plaint together with income thereof. 

6. With his written statement, Defendant No.1 filed a document as an 
annexure thereof showing that a sum of Rs.1,55,535.00 had been advanced 
during the period 23.08.1968 to 29.05.1971. 

7. In her written statement, Defendant No. 3 (Appellant No. 2 herein) 
accepted that during the life time of late Narasimha Murthy, Defendant No. 
1 partitioned the joint family properties under a registered deed of partition 
of the year 1961. But according to him, only landed properties were 
partitioned keeping the family house and vacant sites at Pulagurtha joint. 
The allegation to the effect that Appellants herein approached the Defendant 
No.1 and late Narasimha Murthy for investment of money in the poultry 
business or that they invested any amount on the premise that the profits 
arising out of the said business can be shared by late Narasimha Murthy and 
Defendant No. 1 and the Defendant No.2 equally after giving due credit to 
the expenditure and interest to investments made at 15% p.a. was denied. 
The other allegations made in the plaint were also disputed. A plea that the 
suit was barred by limitation was also taken.

8. There is no document to show that any partnership came into being by 
and between the parties and/or their predecessors in interest. 

9. It is, however, not in dispute that after the suit was filed, an Advocate 
Commissioner was appointed for making an inventory of the poultry farm. 
It was stated that late Narasimha Murthy merely advanced a sum of Rs. 
5,000/- and as a good gesture of goodwill, his name was included as one of 
the vendees along with Defendant No. 2 in the purchase of the property by 
reason of the said deed of sale dated 02.12.1970. According to Appellants, 
Narasimha Murthy had never shown any interest in the said property as a 
result whereof the business became exclusively theirs and the same was 
accepted by late Narasimha Murthy. Even if the said allegations are correct, 
Narasimha Murthy would only have = share in the land covered by the said 
sale deed.

10. M/s Anasuya Poultry Farm or M/s Anasuya Plastics were the business 
concerns started by the Defendant No.2 (Appellant No. 1 herein) with her 
own money and late Narasimha Murthy or Respondent No.3 had no interest 
therein. It was furthermore contended that for carrying out the poultry 
business, a shed had been constructed by Defendant No.2 by obtaining loans 
from the State Bank of India and neither Narasimha Murthy nor the 
Defendant No.1 even objected thereto. The business, therefore, was a 
proprietary concern of the Appellant No.1 herein. Although separate written 
statements were filed by the Defendant No.4 and Defendant Nos. 5 to 7, it 
may not be necessary to consider the same. Defendant No. 4 in her written 
statement relinquished her share.

11. A large number of issues were framed by the learned Trial Judge. The 
learned Trial Judge by reason of his judgment dated 23.04.1993 passed a 
preliminary decree directing partition of the properties described in Schedule 
'A' appended to the plaint into three equal shares by metes and bounds and 
allotted two shares to the plaintiffs and furthermore directed partition of the 
properties described in Schedule 'B' appended to the plaint into nine equal 
shares by metes and bounds and allotted four shares to the plaintiffs. 
Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 herein as also Respondent No. 3 herein were also 
directed to render fair and proper accounts in respect of poultry business 
from 1968 onwards. 

12. Appellants herein (Defendant Nos. 2, 3, 5 to 7) preferred an appeal 
thereagainst before the High Court, which has been dismissed by reason of 
the impugned judgment.

13. The High Court having regard to the contentions raised by parties 
formulated the following questions for its consideration :

1. Whether the poultry business carried on by the 
 appellants is a joint venture?

2. Whether there was a settlement of account under 
 Ex. B8?

3. Whether the respondents are entitled to the share 
 of defendant No. 47?; and

4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation."

14. Mr. A. Subba Rao, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 
appellants, would submit that the learned Trial Judge as also the High Court 
committed a serious error insofar as they failed to take into consideration the 
effect of Ex.B-8, which categorically goes to show that the accounts had 
been settled by and between the parties on 30.05.1979. The learned counsel 
urged that it may be true that no averment was made in the written statement 
in regard to the said document, but in view of the fact that Defendant No. 1 
(Respondent No. 3 herein) having admitted the execution thereof, the same 
should have been taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the 
issue of limitation, if not for other purposes. 

15. The learned counsel would submit that the High Court has also not 
bestowed any consideration in respect of the execution of deed of 
partnership dated 06.03.1978 entered into by and between the appellants 
with her daughter wherein Defendant No.1 (Respondent No.3) is a witness.

16. In any event, the learned counsel argued, there is nothing on record to 
show as to how the High Court came to a conclusion that the plaintiffs and 
Defendant No.1 had 2/3rd share in the business venture. The learned counsel 
submitted that the fact that Defendant No.1 (Respondent No.3) was himself 
an Engineering Graduate, there was absolutely no reason as to why he had 
not asked for an account annually and having regard to the fact that the 
partnership was allegedly entered into in the year 1978, the suit was ex facie 
barred by limitation.

17. Mr. T.L.V. Viswanatha Iyer, the learned counsel appearing on behalf 
of the plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 and 2), on the other hand, submitted that 
although the question in regard to the extent of share had been raised before 
the learned Trial Judge, the same was not done before the High Court and, 
thus, the same should not be permitted to be raised before us. According to 
the learned counsSel as the appellants herein were not in a position to make 
any investment and a total sum of Rs.1,55,535/- was advanced by Defendant 
No.1, towards the joint venture, a suit for rendition of accounts was 
maintainable. The judgment of the trial court, according to the learned 
counsel, was unassailable, in regard to the question of limitation. The 
learned counsel would contend that Ex.B-8 upon which reliance has been 
placed, does not contain any signature of any party nor any amount has been 
paid pursuant thereto in full and final settlement of the accounts wherefor 
the same was drawn up. It was pointed out that Defendant No. 1 was only a 
manager of the Hindu undivided family and the business concerns were 
being run the appellants herein. In view of the fact that profits were being 
reinvested into the partnership business, it is idle to contend that the 
accounts were settled particularly when the business was found to be a 
running one by the learned Trial Judge. Even the notice issued by the 
plaintiffs, it was pointed out, had not been replied by the defendants. The 
learned counsel would contend that Article 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 
would not be applicable in a case of this nature as the same refers to a 
dissolution of partnership and as in this case, the provisions of the Indian 
Partnership Act, 1932 are not attracted, only Article 113 thereof would 
apply.

18. Dr. K.P. Kaylash Nath Pillai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf 
of Defendant No. 1 (Respondent No.3), would submit that the question as to 
whether the business was a joint venture or not being a question of fact, this 
Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of 
the Constitution of India. 

19. So far as issue No. 1 is concerned, we are satisfied that the business 
was a joint venture and not the sole proprietary concern of the Appellant No. 
1, as urged by Mr. Subba Rao. 

20. We may furthermore notice that a concession was made before the 
High Court that so far as the immovable property is concerned, having 
regard to the provisions contained in Section 45 of the Transfer of Property 
Act, 1894, Narasimha Murthy had = share therein. It is, thus, not necessary 
for us to go into the said question as correctness or otherwise of the said 
concession is not in question before us. 

21. However, it is difficult for us to accept the reasonings of the High 
Court in regard to Ex. B-8. Plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 and 2) were 
claiming the property as members of the Hindu undivided family. 
Admittedly, the interest of the Hindu undivided family was being looked 
after by Narasimha Murthy and after his death by Defendant No.1 
(Respondent No.3). Correspondences were exchanged by and between 
Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 only with Narasimha Murthy and Defendant No. 1 
(Respondent No.3). Yet again admittedly, Defendant No. 1 (Respondent 
No.3) was the manager of the Hindu undivided family. His dealing with the 
appellant in regard to the affairs of the business will have a direct bearing in 
the matter of determination of the issues raised before us.

22. An admission made by a party can be used against him. When such 
admission is made by a Karta of the Hindu undivided family, who is 
managing the family property as well as family business affairs, the same 
would be a relevant fact. When a claim was made by the plaintiffs for 
rendition of accounts in the lis, issuance of a document purported to have 
been authored by one of the parties, in our opinion, was required to be taken 
into consideration.

23. In terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a thing 
admitted need not be proved. [See Shreedhar Govind Kamerkar v. 
Yesahwant Govind Kamerkar & Anr.  2006 (14) SCALE 174]
24. It is also a trite law that when in cross-examination a witness accepts 
the correctness of a document, the same would be relevant. A pleading in 
regard to existence of a document may be necessary for advancing the case 
of a party, but when a witness admits a document to be in his own 
handwriting without anything more, the effect thereof may have to be 
considered having regard to the provisions contained in Section 145 of the 
Indian Evidence Act in terms whereof the only requirement would be that 
his attention is drawn before a writing can be proved. These relevant facts 
have not been considered by the High Court. The High Court merely 
proceeded on the basis that Ex. B-8 did not contain anybody's signature. If 
the Defendant No. 1 accepted the contents of the said document, which, 
according to him, were noted by him from the books of accounts, 
authenticity thereof is not in question, and, thus, even in absence of books 
of accounts, relevant pages whereof were found to have been torn, the High 
Court ought to have taken the same into consideration as well as the 
admission on the part of the Defendant No. 1 and the effect thereof. Such an 
admission could be taken into consideration both for the purpose of arriving 
at a finding in regard to the fact as to whether a full and final settlement of 
accounts had been arrived at, which was a relevant fact as also for 
determining the question of limitation.
25. There is no document in writing to prove partnership. Accounts had 
not been demanded by the plaintiffs or the defendant no. 3 for a long time. 
Even an oral partnership had not been proved. What was the subject-matter 
of the partnership had also not been considered by the High Court. A share 
in a joint venture, in absence of any document in writing, must be 
determined having regard to the conduct of the parties. The High Court 
proceeded on the basis that the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 had = share in 
the property in terms of Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the 
said immovable property formed assets of the joint venture, the same would 
be an indicia to determine the shares held by the parties thereto. Ordinarily, 
the extent of an involvement made shall be the criteria for determining the 
share of the co-entrepreneurs. In absence of terms and conditions of the 
joint venture having not been reduced to writing, conduct of the parties how 
they dealt with affairs of the business would be relevant. 

26. The High Court does not say that the concession made by the learned 
counsel appearing on behalf of Appellants was incorrect. In a situation of 
this nature, particularly when the limitation issue required determination, Ex. 
B-8, in our opinion, should have received serious consideration at the hands 
of the courts below. 

27. In terms of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is for the court to 
determine the question as to whether the suit is barred by limitation or not 
irrespective of the fact that as to whether such a plea has been raised by the 
parties. Such a jurisdictional fact need not, thus, be pleaded. In any event, 
the said evidence was admissible for the purpose of contradicting a witness, 
which being a relevant fact should have been considered in its proper 
perspective. If the contents of Ex. B-8 were accepted, it was not for the 
High Court to consider the consequences flowing therefrom, and, thus, but 
the fact whether the figure(s) contained therein could be verified from the 
books of account might not be very relevant. Whether, it would be in 
consonance with the pleadings of Appellants was again of not much 
significance if it can be used for demolishing the case of Plaintiffs and 
Defendant No.1 If the figures contained in Ex. B-8 were accepted, it was for 
Defendant No. 1 to explain the same and not for Appellants. The High 
Court, in our opinion, thus, committed a manifest error in not taking into 
consideration the contents of Ex. B-8 in its proper perspective.

28. At the cost of repetition, we may state that the effect of the said 
document at least should have received serious consideration at the hands of 
the High Court. We cannot accept the contention of Mr. Iyer that such a 
question had not been raised. From the impugned judgment of the High 
Court, it appears that the said such question had specifically been raised. The 
High Court noticed the arguments of the learned Advocate in the following 
terms :

"Therefore, they have no objection for giving the half 
share in the property in spire of 1st respondent expressing 
his intention to relinquish his right in the half share of 
landed property admeasuring Ac. 7-14 guntas in Atapur 
covered by Ex. B-15. After the settlement of accounts 
under Ex. B-8 the appellants obtained loans from various 
banks for the purpose of reviving the poultry business 
and also setting up of business in plastics. In all the loan 
transactions, the 1st respondent signed the loan 
documents as a guarantor. If really he is interested in the 
business, he would have been one of the principal debtors 
and not a guarantor. That indicates that the respondents 
have no interest in the poultry business carried on by the 
1st appellant. Further the 1st respondent got himself 
examined on commission as he does not want to face the 
Court since his case is false.

 As regards the share of the 4th defendant who is the 
daughter of late Narasimha Murthy is concerned, the 
respondents are not entitled to her share as relinquishment 
of her share in the property is not evidenced by any 
document except Ex.B9 which is not a registered 
document. Therefore, the respondents cannot claim the 
share of the 4th respondent. Since neither late Narasimha 
Murthy nor respondent No. 1 obstructed the 1st appellant 
from carrying on the business in the half share of Ac.7.14 
guntas of land, the appellants are not liable to account for 
profits earned by them by their own labour. If really the 
case of the respondents is that the poultry business carried 
on by the appellants is not the exclusive business of the 1st 
appellant, at the time of Ex. B8 they would have demanded 
for accounting of the profits. As regards the building 
constructed in the site, it is constructed with the money 
belonging to the 1st appellant and therefore, the 
respondents are not entitled for a share in the said building. 
At the most the value of the site on which the building is 
constructed may be awarded to the member of the joint 
family on which the corners constructs a building. The 
suit for accounts is barred by limitation as the business was 
closed in 1973. At the most the respondents are entitled 
for profits 3 years prior to the filing of the suit" 

29. It was for the High Court to frame appropriate points for its 
determination in the light of the submissions made on behalf of Appellants 
in terms of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High 
Court failed to address itself on the said issue. Thus, apart from Issues Nos. 
2 and 4, other points which for its consideration including the extent of the 
share of Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 1 were required to be specifically gone 
into particularly in view of the fact that such a contention had been 
considered by the learned Trial Judge. Issue Nos. 2 and 4, in our opinion, 
therefore, require fresh consideration at the hands of the High Court. 30. For the aforementioned purpose, it may also be necessary for the High 
Court to consider the applicability of the relevant articles of the Limitation 
Act. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned judgment to the 
extent aforementioned cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly in part 
and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration of the matter 
afresh on the said issues, inter alia, in the light of the observations made 
hereinbefore. The High Court shall also formulate appropriate points for its 
consideration in terms of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
and proceed to hear the appeal on merits on the relevant issues apart from 
Issue Nos.2 and 4. This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. In 
the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to 
costs.

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