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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – FIR – Quashing of – FIR against husband and his parents u/s.406/420 IPC alleging dowry demand and misappropriation of dowry articles – Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. – Dismissal of, by High Court – Held: Not correct – Parties were living in Canada – FIR was lodged in Jalandhar and offence, if any, was committed in Canada – Alleged demand was made after period of five years from marriage – Offence for criminal breach of trust and/or cheating not made out – Allegation in FIR have been made with an ulterior motive to harass the applicants – Continuance of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process of Court – Thus, order of High Court set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 406/420. The question which arose or consideration was whether High Court was justified in dismissing an application praying for quashing FIR u/s. 406/420 IPC in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Parties were married in May 2000. Parties admittedly live at Ontario in Canada. Disputes between the parties arose for the first time in the year 2003. Respondent no.3-wife, however, on an application filed by appellant no.1-husband apprehending danger to his life, categorically admitted her fault and guilt. Even at that point of time no allegations of cheating and/or non-return of the Stridhan were made. It is only after a period of three years when the disputes and differences between the parties wrecked up once again and on filing of an application for divorce, the father of the respondent No.3 came from Canada to Jalandhar to lodge FIR. Offence, if any, had been committed in Canada. FIR, however, has been lodged at Jalandhar only after the divorce application was filed. No allegation has been made in the FIR that appellants at the time of marriage or thereafter demanded any dowry. The demand of a sum of Rs.5 lakhs allegedly was made only in Canada and that too after the appellant nos. 2 and 3 arrived in Canada in March 2006, i.e., almost after a period of five years from the date of marriage. The Superintendent of Police recommended `cancellation’ of the FIR for one reason or the other. However, the said recommendation had not been accepted. A charge-sheet has been filed. [Paras 8 and 10] [573-B-D; 577-A-C] 1.2 The facts pleaded in the application for quashing of FIR before the High Court are not denied or disputed. In fact, most of the documents relied on by the appellant are annexed to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No.3 herself. Therefore, any document which the appellant intends to place by way of defence is not to be considered. It is also not a case where this court has to undertake a difficult task of appreciating the evidence brought on record by the parties. [Para 10] [577- C-D] 1.3 The Submission that the marriage between the appellant no.1 and respondent No.3 was solemnized only for the purpose of getting the family settled at Canada is far fetched. For the purpose of constituting an offence for criminal breach of trust and/or cheating, the ingredients thereof as contained in ss. 405 and 415 respectively must be borne out from the records. [Para 10] [577-E-F] 1.4 For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under section 420 IPC can be said to have been made out. One of the ingredients of cheating as defined in section 415 IPC is existence of an intention of making initial promise or existence thereof from the very beginning of formation of contract.[Paras 12 and 13] [578-G-H; 579-A-B] Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. 2003 (3) SCC 11; Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI 2003 (5) SCC 257; Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. 2006 (6) SCC 736; Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal 2007 (7) SCC 373; All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhanesh Bardarmal Jain & Anr. 2007 (12) SCALE 391; Sharon Michael & Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. 2009 (1) SCALE 627 – referred to 1.5 The element of wrongful intention should ordinarily exist from the inception of the contract. FIR does not satisfy the aforementioned test. So far as the allegation in regard to criminal breach of trust is concerned, it related to the dowry articles. No allegation has been made that the appellants are guilty of commission of offence punishable under Section 3 and/or 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. If any dowry has been given, the same would attract the provisions of the special act in preference to the general statute. Furthermore, if any article is given by way of dowry, the question of entrustment thereof for or on behalf of the bride would not arise. [Para 14] [582-H; 583-A-B] 1.6 Allegations made in the FIR merely disclose that at the time of leaving the house, appellants had taken with them certain articles. The said articles ought to be in lawful possession of the respondent No.3. The offence of theft might have been committed. But when they are in joint possession, even no offence of theft would also be made out. Furthermore, the larger part of offence, if any, has been committed only in Canada. Why the father of respondent No. 3 had to come from Canada to Jalandhar to lodge an FIR is difficult to comprehend. Respondent no.3 and the first informant do not say that the inquiry report submitted by the Superintendent of Police on the representation made by the appellant No.2 was incorrect. It has also not been stated that as to on what material, the charge-sheet had been submitted. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, there is absolutely no doubt that the allegations contained in the FIR had been made with an ulterior motive to harass the appellants. Continuance of the criminal proceeding against them would, therefore, amount to abuse of process of the court.[Para 14] [583-C-F] 1.7 Upon taking a holistic view of the matter vis-a-vis the statutory provisions, the appellants had made out an exceptional case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 of the Code. It was obligatory on the part of the High Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of process of the court. Thus, the judgment and order of High Court is set aside. [Paras 15 and 16] [584-F-G] All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain & Anr.2007 (12) SCALE 391; V.Y. Jose & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. 2008 (16) SCALE 167; Hira Lal & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. 2009 (5) SCALE 418; State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa 2002 (3) SCC 89; R Kalyani vs. Janak C. Mehta & Ors. 2009 (1) SCC 516; State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 – referred to Case Law Reference 2002 (3) SCC 89 Referred to Para 9 2009 (1) SCC 516 Referred to Para 9 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 Referred to Para 9 2003 (3) SCC 11 Referred to Para 13 2003 (5) SCC 257 Referred to Para 13 2006 (6) SCC 736 Referred to Para 13 2007 (7) SCC 373 Referred to Para 13 2007 (12) SCALE 391 Referred to Para 13 2009 (1) SCALE 627 Referred to Para 13 2007 (12) SCALE 391 Referred to Para 14 2008 (16) SCALE 167 Referred to Para 14 2009 (5) SCALE 418 Referred to Para 14 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 908 of 2009 From the Judgement and Order dated 13.12.2007 of the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Misc. No. M-40020 of 2007. Rajiv K. Gupta (For Annam D.N. Rao), for the Appellant. Vineet Dhandra, J.P. Dhanda, Gagan Deep Sharma (for Ajay Pal Kuldip Singh), for the Respondent.

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 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 908 OF 2009
 [Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 1793 of 2008]

HARMANPREET SINGH AHLUWALIA
& ORS. ... APPELLANTS

 Versus

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. ... RESPONDENTS

 JUDGMENT

S.B. SINHA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Appellants are before us aggrieved by and dissatisfied with a

judgment and order dated 13.12.2007 passed by a learned single judge of the

Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. M-40020 of

2007 dismissing an application praying for quashing FIR No. 141 dated

30.5.2006 under Section 406/420 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC")
 2

in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure (for short, "the Code")

3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.

 Appellant No.1 is the husband of the respondent No.3. The other

appellants are his parents.

 Respondent No. 3 was married with one Ravinder Singh Jaspal in

Canada in the year 1995. A son was born out of the said wedlock on or

about 25.8.1996. As disputes and differences arose between them,

respondent No. 3 filed an affidavit for grant of divorce on or about

30.9.1998. In the said proceedings, a decree for divorce was granted by a

Canadian court on or about 22.4.2000.

 Almost immediately thereafter, that is, on 21.5.2000, respondent No.3

and appellant No.1 got married at Jalandhar as per Sikh rites.

 After a month's stay in India, respondent No. 3 left for Canada. On or

about 6.3.2001, respondent No.3 gave birth to a female child in Canada.

Appellant No.1 went to Canada on the sponsorship of respondent No.3 on

14.4.2001. He got an employment there as a driver.
 3

 Disputes and differences arose between the appellant No.1 and the

respondent No.3 in the year 2003. Allegedly, she left with all her

belongings and withdrew Canadian $ 24500 from the joint account of the

parties.

 It is neither denied nor disputed that she had been contacting lawyers

with regard to her matrimonial disputes and even cancelled the sponsorship

of the application for grant of permanent residence of appellant No.1 as also

his family.

 In those circumstances, Appellant No.1 initiated a divorce

proceedings before the Ontario Court of Justice, inter alia, stating:

 "On 28th August, 2003, when the applicant had
 gone to work, the respondent left the matrimonial
 home to live with her parents. She took with her
 all her personal effects, jewelleries and withdrew
 $23,000.00 from their joint bank account.

 The respondent is threatening to hurt herself
 and get the applicant involved with the police to
 deport him from Canada.

 The applicant is afraid and believes, that if
 she is allowed to come back to his home, she may
 hurt herself or may hurt the applicant.

 The respondent wants the applicant to be
 deported and may do anything to cause physical
 violence.
 4

 Inderpal Singh is the father of the
 respondent, Paramjit Kaur and the father in law of
 the applicant.

 Surinder Singh is the brother of the
 respondent, Paramjit Kaur and the brother-in-law
 of the applicant."

 However, differences between them were sorted out and respondent

No.3 affirmed an affidavit on or about 30.9.2003 admitting her mistake,

stating:

 "On September 20, 2003, I decided to return to the
 house of my husband without advising him that I
 was coming back. My husband is reluctant and
 fearful to have me back in the house. I have
 promised my husband that I would not harass him
 any more and that I am very sorry for all the
 problems that I have created for him.

 I am making this affidavit to satisfy the concerns
 and fear of my husband, HARMANPREET
 SINGH AHLUWALIA with respect to my motive
 of returning to his house. Harmanpreet Singh
 Ahluwalia fears that I have voluntarily returned to
 him cause more damage and problems for him. I
 have, however, returned to my husband because I
 have realized that I had made a big mistake by
 taking the steps mentioned above and I am truly
 remorseful for my actions."

 On or about 5.2.2006, parents of appellant No.1 visited Canada as

appellant No.2 developed a heart problem.
 5

 Disputes and differences again arose between the parties in the year

2006 as a result whereof they started living separately with effect from

29.3.2006.

 It is only thereafter, the father of the respondent No. 3, namely Inter

Pal Singh, a retired Police Inspector and permanent resident of Canada,

while on a trip to India, lodged a complaint against the appellants under

Section 406/420 IPC on or about 21.4.2006 along with an affidavit of

respondent No.3 inter alia alleging that the appellants demanded dowry and

misappropriated the dowry articles.

 It was furthermore alleged:

 "11. That the marriage of Harmanpreet Singh
 was conducted with my daughter with preplanned
 ulterior and malafide motive in order to deceive
 and misappropriate and misuse the dowry articles
 which were entrusted to the accused as mentioned
 above and had got pre-planned, ulterior and
 malafide motive. At the time of living home, the
 aforesaid Harmanpreet Singh also withdrawn the
 amount from the bank from the joint account."

 In view of separation between appellant No.1 and respondent No.3,

appellant filed a second divorce petition on or about 1.5.2006 in the Superior

Court of Brampton, Ontario seeking divorce and custody of the child.
 6

 Indisputably, an FIR bearing No. 141 dated 30.5.2006 was registered

under Section 406/420 IPC at Division No. 4, Jalandhar.

 The Superintendent of Police, Jalandhar made an enquiry with regard

to the aforementioned matter. He submitted a report on or about 30.3.2007,

the concluding portion whereof reads as under:

 "From the investigation conducted till now, I have
 reached to this conclusion that although the
 marriage of Paramjit Kaur daughter of Inderpal
 Singh and Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia son of
 Sh. Harbhajan Singh had been solemnized at Hotel
 Raj Mahal, Jalandhar, but the misunderstanding/
 altercation between them had been developed after
 their reaching in Canada. This fact has also been
 proved/clarified here that during the period from
 the year 2000 upto the year 2005, both of them
 (husband-wife) had been living amicably but later
 on again misunderstanding developed between
 them due to calling of his parents by Harmanpreet
 Singh to Canada. But the allegations leveled by
 the plaintiff in the suit/case are baseless and devoid
 of facts which has not been proved and neither
 there are solid proof available in this regard."

 He made recommendations for cancellation of the said suit/case,

stating:

 "From the enquiry till now made into the case
 registered under FIR No. 141 dated 30.5.2006
 under Section 406/420 IPC at P.S. Division No. 4,
 Jalandhar, the allegations leveled by the plaintiff
 have not been proved and neither the offence has
 been found to be done. If approved, then S.H.O.
 7

 P.S. Division No.4 Jalandhar may be advised to
 submit the cancellation report of this suit case."

4. However, despite the same, a charge-sheet was issued. In the mean

time, divorce application filed by the appellant in Canada, were allowed by

the Ontario Superior Court of Justice by its order dated 19.10.2007.

 On receipt of the summons, appellants filed an application under

Section 482 of the Code which by reason of the impugned judgment has

been dismissed.

5. Mr. Rajiv K. Garg, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants would submit:

 i. Having regard to the factual backdrop of the matter, it is

 evident that the Jalandhar Court had no territorial jurisdiction to

 make an investigation into the matter.

 ii. The proceedings initiated against the appellant amounts to an

 abuse of the process of law as the FIR was deliberately filed at

 Jalandhar although the offences, if any, had taken place only at

 Ontario in Canada.
 8

6. Mr. Vineet Dhanda, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent, on the other hand, urged:

 i. That the appellants have committed criminal breach of trust in

 respect of the articles which were given in dowry.

 ii. Appellant No.1 married respondent No.3 only for the purpose

 of going to Canada and, thus, an offence under Section 420 of

 IPC must also be held to have been committed.

7. The allegations made in the FIR show that the appellant Nos. 2 and 3

could go to Canada on joint sponsorship of the appellant No.1 as also the

respondent No.3. It is only at Canada that alleged demand of a sum of Rs.5

lakhs was made on the premise that they intended to buy some property. In

the FIR, it was alleged that she left her residence for attending her duties at

about 0630 hrs in the morning on 29.3.2006 leaving behind her husband as

also two kids aged 5 and 9 years. However, when she returned home around

1700 hrs, she found some articles missing. She was admittedly informed by

the concerned police officers telephonically as regards the filing of divorce

petition by the appellant and, thus, she should not bother him anymore. It is

only thereafter the first informant Inder Pal Singh came to India and lodged

the FIR. He is a retired police officer. In his report, he alleged:
 9

 "9. That at the time of departure, the accused
 were fully made aware of the fact that all the
 articles of dowry mentioned above constitutes the
 Streedhan of the daughter of the applicant namely
 Paramjit Kaur and are meant for the exclusive use
 and the same should be given to her for her
 personal use whenever she demands the same from
 them from time to time. After whole incident my
 daughter Smt. Paramjit Kaur is living under
 depression and cruelty.

 10. That when I demanded the dowry articles
 and Streedhan property, the above mentioned
 persons refused to return the dowry articles."

8. Parties admittedly live at Ontario in Canada. Offence, if any, had

been committed in Canada. FIR, however, has been lodged at Jalandhar

only after the divorce application was filed. No allegation has been made in

the FIR that appellants at the time of marriage or thereafter demanded any

dowry. The demand of a sum of Rs.5 lakhs allegedly was made only in

Canada and that too after the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 arrived in Canada in

March 2006, i.e., almost after a period of five years from the date of

marriage. We have noticed hereinbefore the opinion of the Superintendent of

Police. He recommended `cancellation' of the FIR for one reason or the

other. However, the said recommendation had not been accepted. A charge-

sheet has been filed.
 10

9. Mr. Dhanda submits that the jurisdiction of a High Court under

Section 482 of the Code should be used in exceptional cases and very

sparingly. According to the learned counsel, allegation of mala fide against

the first informant cannot be a ground for quashing a criminal proceeding

after a charge-sheet has been filed. Strong reliance in this behalf has been

placed on State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [2002(3) SCC 89].

 In the aforesaid judgment, this Court was considering a case of

quashing of a criminal proceeding for commission of offence punishable

under Section 465, 468, 471 and 420 read with Section 120B of the IPC.

Respondents therein were excise officials. This Court held:

 "9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the
 High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very
 wide and the very plenitude of the power requires
 great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful
 to see that its decision in exercise of this power is
 based on sound principles. The inherent power
 should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
 prosecution. The High Court being the highest
 court of a State should normally refrain from
 giving a prima facie decision in a case where the
 entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when
 the evidence has not been collected and produced
 before the Court and the issues involved, whether
 factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be
 seen in their true perspective without sufficient
 material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be
 laid down in regard to cases in which the High
 Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
 quashing the proceeding at any stage. {See: Janata
 Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305] and
 11

 Raghubir Saran (Dr) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964
 SC 1]}. It would not be proper for the High Court
 to analyse the case of the complainant in the light
 of all probabilities in order to determine whether a
 conviction would be sustainable and on such
 premises arrive at a conclusion that the
 proceedings are to be quashed. It would be
 erroneous to assess the material before it and
 conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded
 with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint,
 exercise of the inherent powers to quash the
 proceedings is called for only in a case where the
 complaint does not disclose any offence or is
 frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the
 allegations set out in the complaint do not
 constitute the offence of which cognizance has
 been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High
 Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent
 powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not,
 however, necessary that there should be
 meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to
 find out whether the case would end in conviction
 or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a
 whole. If it appears that on consideration of the
 allegations in the light of the statement made on
 oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the
 offence or offences are disclosed and there is no
 material to show that the complaint is mala fide,
 frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be
 no justification for interference by the High Court.
 When an information is lodged at the police station
 and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of
 the informant would be of secondary importance.
 It is the material collected during the investigation
 and evidence led in court which decides the fate of
 the accused person. The allegations of mala fides
 against the informant are of no consequence and
 cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the
 proceedings."

 Recently in R. Kalyani vs. Janak C. Mehta & Ors. [(2009) 1 SCC

516], this Court opined:
 12

"15. Propositions of law which emerge from the
said decisions are:

 (1) The High Court ordinarily would not
exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a
criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First
Information Report unless the allegations
contained therein, even if given face value and
taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no
cognizable offence.

 (2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and
except in very exceptional circumstances, would
not look to any document relied upon by the
defence.

 (3) Such a power should be exercised very
sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR
disclose commission of an offence, the court shall
not go beyond the same and pass an order in
favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens
rea or actus reus.

 (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute,
the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that
the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to
continue.

16. It is furthermore well known that no hard
and fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be
considered on its own merits. The Court, while
exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would
not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in
view the purport and object for which the
provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure had been introduced by the
Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its
jurisdiction in appropriate cases. One of the
paramount duties of the Superior Courts is to see
that a person who is apparently innocent is not
 13

 subjected to persecution and humiliation on the
 basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint."

 We must, however, also notice that in State of Haryana & Ors. vs.

Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], this Court inter alia laid down the law

in the following terms:

 "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation
 of the various relevant provisions of the Code
 under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
 enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
 relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
 under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
 Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted
 and reproduced above, we give the following
 categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
 such power could be exercised either to prevent
 abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
 secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
 possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
 and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
 guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
 exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
 such power should be exercised."

 Sub-Para (7) of the said Para reads as under:

 "(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
 manifestly attended with mala fide
 and/or where the proceeding is
 maliciously instituted with an ulterior
 motive for wreaking vengeance on the
 accused and with a view to spite him
 due to private and personal grudge."

 Does this case come within the purview of the aforementioned dicta is

the question.
 14

10. Parties were married in May 2000. Disputes between the parties arose

for the first time in the year 2003. Respondent No.3, however, on an

application filed by the appellant No.1 apprehending danger to his life,

categorically admitted her fault and guilt. Even at that point of time no

allegations of cheating and/or non-return of the Stridhan were made. It is

only after a period of three years when the disputes and differences between

the parties wrecked up once again and on filing of an application for divorce,

the father of the respondent No.3 came from Canada to Jalandhar to lodge

FIR. The facts pleaded in the application for quashing of FIR before the

High Court are not denied or disputed. In fact, most of the documents relied

on by the appellant are annexed to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the

respondent No.3 herself. We, therefore, do not have to consider any

document which the appellant intends to place before us by way of defence.

It is also not a case where this court has to undertake a difficult task of

appreciating the evidence brought on record by the parties.

 Mr. Dhanda's submission that the marriage between the appellant

No.1 and respondent No.3 was solemnized only for the purpose of getting

the family settled at Canada is far fetched. For the purpose of constituting

an offence for criminal breach of trust and/or cheating, the ingredients
 15

thereof as contained in Section 405 and 415 respectively must be borne out

from the records.

11. Criminal breach of trust is defined in Section 405 of IPC. The

ingredients of an offence of the criminal breach of trust are:

 "1. Entrusting any person with property or with
 any dominion over property.
 2. That person entrusted (a) dishonestly
 misappropriating or converting to his own
 use that property; or (b) dishonestly using or
 disposing of that property or willfully
 suffering any other person so to do in
 violation--
 (i) of any direction of law prescribing the
 mode in which such trust is to be
 discharged, or
 (ii) of any legal contract made touching
 the discharge of such trust."

 Section 415 of the IPC defines cheating as under :
 "Section 415.--Cheating--Whoever, by
 deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly
 induces the person so deceived to deliver any
 property to any person, or to consent that any
 person shall retain any property, or intentionally
 induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do
 anything which he would not do or omit if he were
 not so deceived, and which act or omission causes
 or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person
 in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to
 `cheat'."
 16

 An offence of cheating cannot be said to have been made out unless

the following ingredients are satisfied:

 "i) deception of a person either by making a
 false or misleading representation or by
 other action or omission;
(ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to
 deliver any property; or
(iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and
 finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to
 do anything which he would not do or omit."

12. For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the

complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest

intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case

where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to

keep his promise, in absence of a culpable intention at the time of making

initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Indian

Penal Code can be said to have been made out.

13. We may reiterate that one of the ingredients of cheating as defined in

Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code is existence of an intention of making

initial promise or existence thereof from the very beginning of formation of

contract.
 17

In Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. (2003) 3 SCC 11, this Court held:

 15. Section 420 IPC says that
 "whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
 induces the person deceived to deliver any
 property to any person ... shall be punished with
 imprisonment ...".
 Cheating has been defined in Section 415 IPC and
 it says that:
 "415. Whoever, by deceiving any person,
 fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person
 so deceived to deliver any property to any
 person, or to consent that any person shall
 retain any property, or intentionally induces the
 person so deceived to do or omit to do anything
 which he would not do or omit if he were not so
 deceived, and which act or omission causes or
 is likely to cause damage or harm to that person
 in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to
 `cheat'."
 16. A guilty intention is an essential ingredient
 of the offence of cheating. In other words "mens
 rea" on the part of the accused must be established
 before he can be convicted of an offence of
 cheating. (See Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v.
 State of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 574). In Mahadeo
 Prasad v. State of W.Bi [AIR 1954 SC 724] it was
 held as follows: (AIR paras 4-5)
 Where the charge against the accused is
 under Section 420 in that he induced the
 complainant to part with his goods, on the
 understanding that the accused would pay for
 the same on delivery but did not pay, if the
 accused had at the time he promised to pay cash
 against delivery an intention to do so, the fact
 that he did not pay would not convert the
 transaction into one of cheating. But if on the
 other hand he had no intention whatsoever to
 pay but merely said that he would do so in
 order to induce the complainant to part with the
 goods then a case of cheating would be
 established."
 18

 In Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI [(2003) 5 SCC 257], this Court

held :

 "40. It is settled law, by a catena of decisions, that
 for establishing the offence of cheating, the
 complainant is required to show that the accused
 had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of
 making promise or representation. From his
 making failure to keep promise subsequently, such
 a culpable intention right at the beginning that is at
 the time when the promise was made cannot be
 presumed. It is seen from the records that the
 exemption certificate contained necessary
 conditions which were required to be complied
 with after importation of the machine. Since the
 GCS could not comply with it, therefore, it rightly
 paid the necessary duties without taking advantage
 of the exemption certificate. The conduct of the
 GCS clearly indicates that there was no fraudulent
 or dishonest intention of either the GCS or the
 appellants in their capacities as office-bearers right
 at the time of making application for exemption."
 {See also Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. [(2006)

6 SCC 736]}

 In Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal [(2007) 7 SCC 373],

noticing, inter alia, the aforementioned decision, this Court held:

 "8. The dispute between the parties herein is
 essentially a civil dispute. Non-payment or
 underpayment of the price of the goods by itself
 does not amount to commission of an offence of
 cheating or criminal breach of trust. No offence,
 having regard to the definition of criminal breach
 19

 of trust contained in Section 405 of the Penal Code
 can be said to have been made out in the instant
 case."
It was furthermore opined:
 "13. The ingredients of Section 420 of the Penal
 Code are as follows:
 (i) Deception of any persons;
 (ii) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any
 person to deliver any property; or
 (iii) To consent that any person shall retain any
 property and finally intentionally inducing
 that person to do or omit to do anything
 which he would not do or omit.
 No act of inducement on the part of the appellant
 has been alleged by the respondent. No allegation
 has been made that he had an intention to cheat the
 respondent from the very inception.
 14. What has been alleged in the complaint
 petition as also the statement of the complainant
 and his witnesses relate to his subsequent conduct.
 The date when such statements were allegedly
 made by the appellant had not been disclosed by
 the witnesses of the complainant. It is really absurd
 to opine that any such statement would be made by
 the appellant before all of them at the same time
 and that too in his own district. They, thus, appear
 to be wholly unnatural.
 15. In law, only because he had issued cheques
 which were dishonoured, the same by itself would
 not mean that he had cheated the complainant.
 Assuming that such a statement had been made,
 the same, in our opinion, does not exhibit that
 there had been any intention on the part of the
 20

 appellant herein to commit an offence under
 Section 417 of the Penal Code.
 16. Furthermore, admittedly, their residences are in
 different districts. Whereas the appellant is a
 resident of the district of Ajamgarh, the respondent
 is a resident of the district of Rampur. Cheques
 were admittedly issued by the appellant at his
 place. There is nothing on record to show that any
 part of the cause of action arose within the
 jurisdiction of the court concerned. Even if such
 statements had been made, the same admittedly
 have been made only at the place where the
 appellant resides. The learned Magistrate,
 therefore, had no jurisdiction to issue the
 summons."

 The said principle has been reiterated in All Cargo Movers (I) Pvt.

Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain & Anr. [2007 (12) SCALE 391], stating:

 "For the said purpose, allegations in the complaint
 petition must disclose the necessary ingredients
 therefor. Where a civil suit is pending and the
 complaint petition has been filed one year after
 filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of
 finding out as to whether the said allegations are
 prima facie cannot notice the correspondences
 exchanged by the parties and other admitted
 documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at
 this juncture would not consider the defence of the
 accused but it is another thing to say that for
 exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it
 is impermissible also to look to the admitted
 documents. Criminal proceedings should not be
 encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or
 otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.
 Superior Courts while exercising this power should
 also strive to serve the ends of justice."
 21

 (See also Sharon Michael & ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.

[2009 (1) SCALE 627]

14. It is, therefore, evident that the element of wrongful intention should

ordinarily exist from the inception of the contract. FIR does not satisfy the

aforementioned test. So far as the allegation in regard to criminal breach of

trust is concerned, it related to the dowry articles. No allegation has been

made that the appellants are guilty of commission of offence punishable

under Section 3 and/or 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. If any dowry has

been given, the same would attract the provisions of the special act in

preference to the general statute. Furthermore, if any article is given by way

of dowry, the question of entrustment thereof for or on behalf of the bride

would not arise.

 Allegations made in the FIR merely disclose that at the time of

leaving the house, appellants had taken with them certain articles. The said

articles ought to be in lawful possession of the respondent No.3. The

offence of theft might have been committed. But when they are in joint

possession, even no offence of theft would also be made out.

 Furthermore, the larger part of offence, if any, has been committed

only in Canada. Why the father of respondent No. 3 had to come from
 22

Canada to Jalandhar to lodge an FIR is difficult to comprehend. Respondent

No.3 and the first informant do not say that the inquiry report submitted by

the Superintendent of Police on the representation made by the appellant

No.2 was incorrect. It has also not been stated that as to on what material,

the charge-sheet had been submitted. We, in the peculiar facts and

circumstances of this case, have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the

allegations contained in the FIR had been made with an ulterior motive to

harass the appellants. Continuance of the criminal proceeding against them

would, therefore, amount to abuse of process of the court.

 In All Carogo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain & Anr.

[2007 (12) SCALE 391], this Court held:

 "For the said purpose, allegations in the complaint
 petition must disclose the necessary ingredients
 therefor. Where a civil suit is pending and the
 complaint petition has been filed one year after
 filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of
 finding out as to whether the said allegations are
 prima facie cannot notice the correspondences
 exchanged by the parties and other admitted
 documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at
 this juncture would not consider the defence of the
 accused but it is another thing to say that for
 exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it
 is impermissible also to look to the admitted
 documents. Criminal proceedings should not be
 encouraged, when it is found to be mala fide or
 otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.
 23

 Superior Courts while exercising this power should
 also strive to serve the ends of justice."

 {See also V.Y. Jose & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. [2008 (16)

SCALE 167]}

 In Hira Lal & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [2009 (5) SCALE 418],

this Court held:

 "10. The parameters of interference with a
 criminal proceeding by the High Court in exercise
 of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
 are well known. One of the grounds on which
 such interference is permissible is that the
 allegations contained in the complaint petition
 even if given face value and taken to be correct in
 their entirety, commission of an offence is not
 disclosed. The High Court may also interfere
 where the action on the part of the complainant is
 mala fide."

15. Upon taking a holistic view of the matter vis-`-vis the statutory

provisions, we are of the opinion that the appellants had made out an

exceptional case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under

Section 482 of the Code. It was, in our opinion, obligatory on the part of the

High Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of

process of the court.
 24

16. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment and order of

the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed.

 .....................................J.
 [S.B. Sinha]

 .....................................J.
 [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]New Delhi;
May 5, 2009
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