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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES =During petitioner Greene’s trial for murder, robbery, and conspiracy, the prosecution introduced the redacted confessions of two of Greene’s nontestifying codefendants. A jury convicted Greene. The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the rule announced in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, did not apply because the confessions were redacted to remove any specific reference to Greene. While Greene’s petition to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was pending, this Court announced in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, that Bruton does apply to some redacted confessions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear Greene’s appeal, and he then sought federal habeas relief. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant such relief to a state prisoner on any claim that has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Here, the District Court concluded that, because the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Gray had not yet been issued when the Pennsylvania Superior Court adjudicated Greene’s claim, the condition for granting habeas relief had not been met. The Third Circuit affirmed. Held: 1. Under §2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” includes only this

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1
The United States Supreme Court.

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Syllabus 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
GREENE, AKA TRICE v. FISHER, SUPERINTENDENT,

STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT

SMITHFIELD, ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 10–637. Argued October 11, 2011—Decided November 8, 2011 
During petitioner Greene’s trial for murder, robbery, and conspiracy, 
the prosecution introduced the redacted confessions of two of 
Greene’s nontestifying codefendants. A jury convicted Greene. The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that
the rule announced in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, did not 
apply because the confessions were redacted to remove any specific 
reference to Greene. While Greene’s petition to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court was pending, this Court announced in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, that Bruton does apply to some redacted confessions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear Greene’s 
appeal, and he then sought federal habeas relief. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal
court may not grant such relief to a state prisoner on any claim that
has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 
U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Here, the District Court concluded that, because 
the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Gray had not yet been
issued when the Pennsylvania Superior Court adjudicated Greene’s 
claim, the condition for granting habeas relief had not been met. The 
Third Circuit affirmed. 
Held: 
1. Under §2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” includes only this 

2 GREENE v. FISHER 
Syllabus 
Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court adjudication on the merits. The Court’s decision last Term in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. ___, established that §2254(d)(1)’s “backwardlooking language requires an examination of the state-court decision
at the time it was made.” Id., at ___. As the Court explained in Cullen, §2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to measure state-court decisions “against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time the state court
renders its decision.’ ” Id., at ___. That reasoning determines the result here. Pp. 3–6.
2. Because the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision—the last
state-court adjudication on the merits of Greene’s claim—predated 
Gray by nearly three months, the Third Circuit correctly held that 
Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” against which it could 
measure the state-court decision. It therefore correctly concluded
that the state court’s decision neither was “contrary to,” nor “involved 
an unreasonable application of,” any “clearly established Federal 
law.” Pp. 6–7. 
606 F. 3d 85, affirmed. 
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 

_________________ 
_________________ 
Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 
Opinion of the Court 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 10–637 
ERIC GREENE, AKA JARMAINE Q. TRICE, PETITIONER v. JON FISHER, SUPERINTENDENT,

STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT

SMITHFIELD, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[November 8, 2011]
 JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner with respect to any claim that
has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state-court adjudication “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 
U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). We consider whether “clearly established Federal law” includes decisions of this Court that 
are announced after the last adjudication of the merits in
state court but before the defendant’s conviction becomes 
final. 
I 
In December 1993, petitioner Eric Greene and four
co-conspirators robbed a grocery store in North Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. During the robbery, one of the men
shot and killed the store’s owner. The five were appre- 
2 GREENE v. FISHER 
Opinion of the Court 
hended, and two of them confessed to taking part in the 
robbery. Greene did not confess, but he was implicated by 
the others’ statements. 
When the Commonwealth sought to try all of the coconspirators jointly, Greene sought severance, arguing, 
inter alia, that the confessions of his nontestifying codefendants should not be introduced at his trial. The trial 
court denied the motion to sever, but agreed to require
redaction of the confessions to eliminate proper names. As 
redacted, the confessions replaced names with words like
“this guy,” “someone,” and “other guys,” or with the word 
“blank,” or simply omitted the names without substitution. 
A jury convicted Greene of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. He appealed to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, arguing that severance of his trial was
demanded by the rule announced in Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), that the Confrontation Clause
forbids the prosecution to introduce a nontestifying codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant in the 
crime. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the 
conviction, holding that the redaction had cured any problem under Bruton. 
Greene filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, raising the same Bruton 
claim. While that petition was pending, we held in Gray v. 
Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 195 (1998), that “considered as a
class, redactions that replace a proper name with an
obvious blank, the word ‘delete,’ a symbol, or similarly 
notify the jury that a name has been deleted are similar 
enough to Bruton’s unredacted confessions as to warrant 
the same legal results.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
granted the petition for allowance of appeal, limited to the 
question whether admission of the redacted confessions
violated Greene’s Sixth Amendment rights. After the 
parties filed merits briefs, however, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011) 3 
Opinion of the Court 
granted.
Greene then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, alleging, inter alia, that the introduction 
of his nontestifying codefendants’ statements violated the 
Confrontation Clause. Adopting the report and recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court denied the petition. It concluded that since our decision in 
Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” when the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court adjudicated Greene’s Confrontation Clause claim, that court’s decision was not 
“contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). 
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit affirmed. Greene v. Palakovich, 606 
F. 3d 85 (2010). The majority held that the “clearly established Federal law” referred to in §2254(d)(1) is the law at
the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Id., 
at 99. The dissenting judge contended that it is the law at
the time the conviction becomes final. Id., at 108. We 
granted certiorari. 563 U. S. ___ (2011). 
II 
Section 2254(d) of Title 28, U. S. C., as amended by
AEDPA, provides: 
“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted with respect to any 
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
claim— 
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States; or 
“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an un- 4 GREENE v. FISHER 
Opinion of the Court 
reasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 
The issue here pertains to the first exception. We have 
said that its standard of “contrary to, or involv[ing] an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law” is “difficult to meet,” because the purpose of AEDPA
is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a 
“ ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 
justice systems,’ ” and not as a means of error correction. 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 
12–13) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 332, 
n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). 
In light of that objective, and relying upon the text of 
the provision, we held last Term, in Cullen v. Pinholster, 
563 U. S. ___ (2011), that review under §2254(d)(1) is
limited to the record that was before the state court that 
adjudicated the prisoner’s claim on the merits. We said 
that the provision’s “backward-looking language requires
an examination of the state-court decision at the time it 
was made.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). The reasoning of 
Cullen determines the result here. As we explained,
§2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to “focu[s] on what a 
state court knew and did,” and to measure state-court 
decisions “against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time 
the state court renders its decision.’ ” Id., at __ (slip op., at
10) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71–72 
(2003); emphasis added).
Greene resists that conclusion by appealing to our decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Teague held 
that, with two exceptions not pertinent here, a prisoner 
seeking federal habeas relief may rely on new constitutional rules of criminal procedure announced before the 
prisoner’s conviction became final. Id., at 310 (plurality 
opinion); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313 
(1989) (affirming and applying Teague rule). Finality Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011) 5 
Opinion of the Court 
occurs when direct state appeals have been exhausted and 
a petition for writ of certiorari from this Court has become 
time barred or has been disposed of. Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987). Greene contends that, 
because finality marks the temporal cutoff for Teague
purposes, it must mark the temporal cutoff for “clearly
established Federal law” under AEDPA. 
The analogy has been rejected by our cases. We have 
explained that AEDPA did not codify Teague, and that 
“the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct.” Horn v. 
Banks, 536 U. S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam). The retroactivity rules that govern federal habeas review on the 
merits—which include Teague—are quite separate from
the relitigation bar imposed by AEDPA; neither abrogates 
or qualifies the other. If §2254(d)(1) was, indeed, pegged 
to Teague, it would authorize relief when a state-court 
merits adjudication “resulted in a decision that became 
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, before the conviction became 
final.” The statute says no such thing, and we see no
reason why Teague should alter AEDPA’s plain meaning.*
Greene alternatively contends that the relevant “decision” to which the “clearly established Federal law” criterion must be applied is the decision of the state supreme
court that disposes of a direct appeal from a defendant’s 
conviction or sentence, even when (as here) that decision
does not adjudicate the relevant claim on the merits. This 
is an implausible reading of §2254(d)(1). The text, we 
repeat, provides that habeas relief 
—————— 
*Whether §2254(d)(1) would bar a federal habeas petitioner from 
relying on a decision that came after the last state-court adjudication 
on the merits, but fell within one of the exceptions recognized in 
Teague, 489 U. S., at 311, is a question we need not address to resolve
this case. 
6 GREENE v. FISHER 
Opinion of the Court 
“shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted 
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 
The words “the adjudication” in the “unless” clause obviously refer back to the “adjudicat[ion] on the merits,” and
the phrase “resulted in a decision” in the “unless” clause 
obviously refers to the decision produced by that same 
adjudication on the merits. A later affirmance of that 
decision on alternative procedural grounds, for example, 
would not be a decision resulting from the merits adjudication. And much less would be (what is at issue here) 
a decision by the state supreme court not to hear the
appeal—that is, not to decide at all. 
III 
The Third Circuit held, and the parties do not dispute, 
that the last state-court adjudication on the merits of 
Greene’s Confrontation Clause claim occurred on direct 
appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 606 F. 3d, at 
92, and n. 1. The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision
predated our decision in Gray by nearly three months. 
The Third Circuit thus correctly held that Gray was not 
“clearly established Federal law” against which it could 
measure the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision. 606 
F. 3d, at 99. The panel then concluded (and the parties do 
not dispute) that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision neither was “contrary to,” nor “involved an unreasonable application of,” any “clearly established Federal law” 
that existed at the time. Id., at 106. Consequently,
§2254(d)(1) bars the federal courts from granting Greene’s 
application for a writ of habeas corpus.
We must observe that Greene’s predicament is an unusual one of his own creation. Before applying for federal Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011) 7 
Opinion of the Court 
habeas, he missed two opportunities to obtain relief under 
Gray: After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed 
his appeal, he did not file a petition for writ of certiorari
from this Court, which would almost certainly have produced a remand in light of the intervening Gray decision. 
“Where intervening developments . . . reveal a reasonable 
probability that the decision below rests upon a premise 
that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity
for further consideration, and where it appears that such a 
redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of 
the litigation, [an order granting the petition, vacating the 
judgment below, and remanding the case (GVR)] is, we
believe, potentially appropriate.” Lawrence v. Chater, 516 
U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam). See, e.g., Stanbridge v. 
New York, 395 U. S. 709 (1969) (per curiam) (GVR in light
of Bruton). Nor did Greene assert his Gray claim in a 
petition for state postconviction relief. Having forgone two
obvious means of asserting his claim, Greene asks us to
provide him relief by interpreting AEDPA in a manner
contrary to both its text and our precedents. We decline to 
do so, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered.

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