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In view of my findings on issue No.4, the election petition cannot succeed, because the High Court cannot form an opinion that the 8th respondent was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat on the date of his election or that his nomination has been improperly accepted or that any non-compliance with the Constitution or the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or any Rules or Orders made under the Act has been committed within the meaning of Section 100(1) of the Act and consequently, an order has to be made dismissing the election petition under Section 98(a) of the Act, while leaving the costs to be borne by the parties respectively under Section 99(1)(b) of the Act. 64. Accordingly, the election petition is dismissed without costs. A copy of this order be communicated to the Election Commission of India and the Speaker of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly in terms of Section 103 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. _____________________

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD

Great Yarmouth Town Hall, Hall Quay, Great Yar...

Great Yarmouth Town Hall, Hall Quay, Great Yarmouth (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Election Petition No.7 of 2009

21/08/2012

S.A.K. Mynoddin

The Chief Election Commissioner,Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad and others

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: Sri V. Mallik

COUNSEL FOR 1 TO 7 RESPONDENTS: — (R.1 to R.7 deleted from the array of
respondents)

^COUNSEL FOR 8TH RESPONDENT: Sri B. Adinarayana Rao

COUNSEL FOR 9TH RESPONDENT: Sri V.R. Avula

<Gist :

? CITATIONS:

1. AIR 2001 SC 3689
2. AIR 1995 SC 2284
3. AIR 2000 SC 153
4. AIR 2001 SC 2992
5. (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 466
6. AIR 2000 SC 256
7. (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 341
8. (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 236
9. AIR 1999 SC 1347
10.AIR 2000 SC 2306
11.AIR 2001 SC 1877
12.AIR 1996 SC 540
13.AIR 2005 SC 565
14.AIR 2006 SC 898
15.(2008) 9 SCC 24
16.AIR 1995 SC 705
17.(2007) 2 SCC 481
18.(2003) 8 SCC 673
19.(2006) 2 SCC 682
20.(2001) 4 SCC 661
21.AIR 1963 SC 1685
22.1962(2) SCR 880
23.AIR 1962 SC 779
24.AIR 1972 SC 915
25.AIR 1964 SC 152
26.AIR 1977 SC 2149
27.AIR 1962 SC 110
28.AIR 1963 SC 1811
29.AIR 1965 SC 40
30.1964 (7) SCR 17
31.AIR 1979 SC 1628
32.(1985) 3 SCC 267
33.(2001) 10 SCC 305
34.AIR 1962 SC 1810
35.(2000) 8 SCC 560
36.AIR 1993 SC 212
37.(2002) 7 Supreme 148
38.2011 STPL (Web) 376 SC
39.AIR 2009 AP 117
40.(2002) 5 SCC 568
41.(2006) 2 SCC 682
42.(2006) 10 SCC 96
43.AIR 1969 SC 872
44.AIR 1969 SC 604
45.AIR 2001 P&H 86

ORDER:

An election petition under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 (for short “the Act”) to declare the inaction of respondents 1 to 7 to
check the malpractices of the 8th respondent during 2009 assembly elections and
disqualify the 8th respondent as Member of Legislative Assembly, as illegal,
arbitrary and contrary to law and declare his election from Giddalur Assembly
Constituency No.231 as illegal and void.

2. The 9th respondent was impleaded on his application in E.P.M.P. No.922 of
2009 on 22-01-2010.

3. On Application No.213 of 2010 being allowed on
16-07-2010, respondents 1 to 7 were deleted from the array of respondents.

4. E.P.M.P. No.1047 of 2009 under Sections 83 and 86 of the Act read with
Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was
allowed on merits on contest on 03-09-2010, due to which the pleadings in paras
3(b), (c), (d) and (f) to (i) of the election petition were struck off.

5. The election petition and the affidavit of the election petitioner in
support thereof stated in the remaining contents that the 8th respondent is a
registered contractor of public works attending to Government works and kept
such public works pending at Dupadu, Kandukuru, Alampur, Giddalur and K.S.
Palli, in spite of which he was permitted to file his nomination. On that date,
the 8th respondent was a partner of his firm taking up the public works on
contract basis and the subsisting contracts on the date of filing nomination
disqualified the 8th respondent under Section 9A of the Act and his election is
liable to be set aside. The petitioner also claimed to have made a
representation to respondents 3 and 6 to permit three autos with electric mikes
for canvassing and the permission was withheld in spite of paying the fee,
whereas ten vehicles were allowed for the 8th respondent, which was illegal,
discriminatory, arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. Hence, the election petition.

6. The written statement of the 8th respondent in so far as the above
allegations are concerned, claimed that it is true that the respondent was a
registered contractor, who entered into contracts in his individual capacity for
executing certain works of the Government, but he has no subsisting contracts on
the date of scrutiny of nominations on 06-04-2009. The 8th respondent was never
a partner of any firm taking up public works and his registration as a special
contractor was from 2005 to March, 2009. On 21-03-2009 he gave a declaration
transferring all the pending works, including his experience as a special class
contractor, in favour of A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited, a private limited
company registered on 22-07-2008 under the Indian Companies Act. The company
also gave a declaration on the same day taking over all the assets, liabilities,
pending works, obligations and experience of the 8th respondent as an
individual. Both the individual and the company submitted an application on 21-
03-2009 along with a draft, dated 19-03-2009 for Rs.10,000/- on ING Vysya Bank
Limited, Markapur to the Engineer-in-Chief to transfer all the subsisting
works, assets, liabilities and obligations, etc., from the individual to the
company. The application was referred to the committee of engineers who passed
a resolution on consideration as per the proceedings, dated 25-03-2009 agreeing
to so transfer, which was intimated by the Engineer-in-Chief in his proceedings,
dated
30-03-2009. The committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders
passed a resolution in their 68th meeting held on 25-03-2009 and approved and
recognized that all the existing works, experience, assets, liabilities and
obligations of the individual stood transferred to the company and all the
Directors of the company shall be responsible for discharging all the
liabilities due to the department that arise in future from the works done by
the 8th respondent. The resolution was communicated by the proceedings, dated
30-03-2009. Subsequently, the 8th respondent tendered his resignation to the
office of the Managing Director of the private limited company on 31-03-2009,
which was also intimated to the Registrar of Companies in Form No.32. Thus, the
8th respondent as individual contractor did not have any subsisting contracts
with the Government and was not disqualified from contesting the election to the
Legislative Assembly in April, 2009. The 8th respondent transferred all his
shares in the private limited company in favour of A. Durga Kumari, which was
accepted by the Board of Directors in its meeting on 31-03-2009. Hence, there
is no disqualification under Section 9A of the Act. The 8th respondent also
denied any knowledge about the representation of the petitioner to respondents 3
and 6 and their withholding permission for use of three autos with electric
mikes by the petitioner. The 8th respondent claimed to have been permitted to
use only three autos for canvassing. The 8th respondent also contended that the
9th respondent cannot be added as a respondent to the election petition, as the
implead petition is not filed within a period of 14 days from the date fixed for
trial of the election petition on 10-09-2009 as stipulated by Section 86(4) of
the Act. The 9th respondent also cannot seek a declaration that he was validly
elected, after the period of limitation and in the absence of all the contesting
candidates, the election petition is liable to be dismissed under Section 82
read with Section 86(1) of the Act for not impleading all the contesting
candidates and the petitioner, who secured only 618 votes as against 55,282
votes secured by the 8th respondent, filed the election petition with false and
frivolous allegations and oblique motives. Hence, the 8th respondent desired
the election petition to be dismissed with exemplary costs.

7. The 9th respondent reported that he has no written statement.

8. After E.P.M.P. No.1047 of 2009 was allowed on
03-09-2010, it was ordered that the trial of the election petition shall be
proceeded with in respect of the remaining contents of the election petition
(after paras 3(b),(c),(d) and (f) to (i) of the petition stood struck off) and
only on such of those issues still relevant for such enquiry.

9. Therefore, the trial of the election petition has to be confined to only
the following issues out of those settled on
25-06-2010.
(1) Whether the election petition is not maintainable due to not impleading all
the contesting candidates ?
(4) Whether the 8th respondent has any subsisting interest in Government works
as a contractor, as an individual or as a partner in a firm ?
(6) Whether the election of the 8th respondent is liable to be set aside ?
(7) Whether the 9th respondent is entitled to be declared as elected ?
(8) To what relief ?

10. P.Ws.1 to 9 and R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.P.1 to P.7, R.1
to R.27 and X.1 to X.7 were marked.

11. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the election petitioner, Sri B.
Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel for the 8th respondent and Sri V.R. Avula,
learned counsel for the 9th respondent are heard.
12. The allegation in para 3(j) of the election petition about the
discriminatory treatment meted out to the petitioner, who was permitted to use
only three autos with electric mikes as against permitting the 8th respondent to
use ten such vehicles for canvassing, was denied by the 8th respondent in the
written statement claiming that he was also permitted to use only three autos
for such purpose, but there was absolutely no reference to the said aspect in
the evidence adduced by the parties. In so far as the said allegation is
concerned, therefore, the election petition should fail due to total lack of any
reference to such aspect in the evidence.

13. Issue No.4:
The election petition in para 3 (e) stated the 8th respondent to be a registered
contractor of public works and again stated that on the date of filing
nomination, the 8th respondent was a partner of his firm taking up public works
on contract basis. The evidence, however, made no reference to any partnership,
in which the 8th respondent was a partner at any time and the whole emphasis was
on the legality, permissibility and truth of the transfer of pending public
works undertaken by the 8th respondent as an individual contractor to M/s. A.V.
Ram Babu Infra Private Limited, a private limited company. While the 8th
respondent being a partner of a firm taking up public works on contract basis on
the date of filing nomination was, thus, not even remotely repeated in the
evidence, the admissibility of any evidence in relation to the works of the
individual contractor being transferred to a private limited company and the
irregularities or illegalities in the same making the works to be open to
consideration as pending with the individual himself, was claimed by the learned
counsel for the 8th respondent to be impermissible, as the material facts or
particulars relating to the same were never pleaded in the election petition.
Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel relied on Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia
Gandhi1, wherein the Apex Court held that where the averments are bald
allegations without any basis thereof, they do not amount to pleading material
facts, which may warrant any enquiry into those allegations. It was held that
when the manner and the enlarged dimension in which the plea has been projected
before the Court does not find reflected in the election petition, no foundation
has been laid in the pleadings by stating all relevant material facts enabling
the Court to enter into examining such a plea of far reaching consequences and
implications. The Apex Court concluded that the election petitions therein do
not satisfy mandatory requirement of pleading material facts as required by
Section 82(1)(a) of the Act, statutorily enacted and judicially explained in
umpteen number of decisions. The petitions were considered to be hopelessly
vague and completely bald in the allegations made, most of which could not
possibly be within the personal knowledge of the petitioners, but verified as
‘true’ to their knowledge, without indicating the source and such pleadings were
held to be not disclosing any cause of action and are required to be
rejected/dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

14. Similarly in Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and another v. Dattaji Raghobaji
Meghe and others2, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court ought not to
have allowed evidence to be led by the election petitioners, which was beyond
the pleadings of the parties for no amount of evidence can cure a defect in the
pleadings, but it was all the more improper for the trial Court to have allowed
the pleadings to be amended so as to be brought in conformity with the evidence
already led in the case. Of course, since evidence was allowed to be led,
though beyond the pleadings without any objections from the opposite side, the
Court could have evaluated and analysed the same to determine the worth of that
evidence, which, in the facts and circumstances of the case, came under a cloud.

15. In T.H. Musthaffa v. M.P. Varghese and others3 also, with reference to the
relief of recount, it was observed that the pleading did not refer to either the
rules or the pamphlet issued by the Election Commission in this regard, nor any
specific allegations are found in the case. How many votes were liable to be
rejected for using wrong instrument was not stated and how many of such votes
had been polled in favour of the 1st respondent therein so as to materially
affect the result of the election, was also not stated. Therefore, the view
that the pleadings were insufficient to order recount, was held to be perfectly
in order.

16. Similarly in Ananga Uday Singh Deo v. Ranga Nath Mishra and others4, there
was no pleading at all, except some vague assertion in the grounds, with regard
to the allegation of corrupt practice relating to alleged bribery indulged by
the 1st respondent. No issue had been framed, but evidence was permitted to be
led during the trial on the allegation. The Apex Court held that no such
evidence could have been permitted to be led and the salutary principle that
evidence can only be permitted to be led on a plea properly raised and issue
framed, was ignored. Irrelevant, impermissible and inadmissible evidence could
not be allowed to be brought on record.

17. To the same effect is Kattinokkula Muralikrishna v. Veeramalla Koteswara
Rao and others5, wherein it was held that it is a settled principle of law that
evidence beyond the pleadings can neither be permitted to be adduced nor can
such evidence be taken into consideration. A bald plea that some irregularities
and illegalities had been committed in counting without any material on record,
was held to be insufficient to order any recount.

18. In Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh Jassi6, it was stated that
material facts and particulars as to commission of corrupt practice are required
to be given in the election petition and such facts and particulars alleged for
the first time in the replication and not forming part of averments made in the
election petition, cannot be tried and cannot be made subject matter of issues
framed by the Court. Such material facts and particulars as to corrupt practice
are required to be supported by an affidavit in the prescribed proforma.

19. In Baldev Singh v. Shinder Pal Singh and another7, it was pointed out that
verification of an election petition must be done strictly in terms of Order VI
Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was, thus, incumbent to
specifically state as to which statements made in the election petition were
true to his knowledge and which were true to his belief and a factual averment
made in the election petition cannot be both true to the knowledge and belief of
the deponent and it was also pointed out that in respect of a recount, there
must be a prima facie case, material facts must be pleaded and there should not
be a roving or fishing inquiry.

20. Likewise in Markio Tado v. Takam Sorang and others8, the Supreme Court
reiterated that in an election petition, one has to plead the material facts at
the outset, and the failure to plead the same is fatal to the election petition
and no evidence can be led on a plea which is not raised in the pleadings and no
amount of evidence can cure the defect in the pleadings.
21. The pleadings in the election petition herein, if tested with reference to
the above principles, do not appear to stand legal scrutiny. In verifying the
contents of the election petition, the election petitioner stated that the
contents of paras 1 to 4 are true and correct to the best of his knowledge,
including the allegation about the 8th respondent being a registered contractor
of public works or a partner of a firm taking up public works on contract basis
with subsisting works on the date of filing nomination. However, in verifying
the contents of his affidavit in support of the election petition, he stated
that the facts stated in paras 5 to 11 of the affidavit are based on information
and advice received and believed to be true and correct with the allegations
about subsisting works of the 8th respondent as an individual contractor or as a
partner of a firm being stated in paragraph No.5 of the affidavit. As held in
Baldev Singh v. Shinder Pal Singh and another (7 supra), such factual averment
cannot be both true to the knowledge and also belief based on any information
and advice. That apart, there was absolutely no allegation and evidence of the
8th respondent being a partner of a firm carrying out public works on contract
basis at any time or on the date of his filing nomination and whether the works
stated in the election petition were undertaken by him as an individual
contractor or as a partner of a firm, was not stated. Which works were pending
on the date of filing of nomination or scrutiny of the same, was not
specifically stated and what were his lapses in completing the public works was
also not elaborated. There was absolutely no reference in the pleadings to what
has been projected in the evidence about the subsisting contracts of the 8th
respondent as an individual, which could not have been legally transferred to a
private limited company before filing or scrutiny of nomination. If so, the
vice of absence of any foundation in the pleading due to absence of relevant
material facts appears to be attracted and it becomes highly doubtful whether
the evidence in this regard beyond the pleadings could have been permitted to
have been let in and can be analysed and evaluated for consideration and
acceptance, more so in the absence of any specifics even regarding the works
referred to in the pleadings.

22. Be that as it may, Section 9A of the Act disqualifies a person if, and for
so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his
trade or business with the appropriate government for the supply of goods to, or
for the execution of any works undertaken by, that Government. The explanation
thereunder states that where a contract has been fully performed by the person
by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate government, the contract
shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the government
has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part. Whether
the evidence on record herein discloses a subsisting contract entered into by
the 8th respondent within the mischief of Section 9A vitiating his nomination,
is the question to be probed into. The election notification herein was on 24-
03-2009. The filing of nomination of the 8th respondent was on 04-04-2009,
while the scrutiny of nominations was on 06-04-2009. The election was held on
23-04-2009 and the results were declared on 16-05-2009. The 8th respondent was
admittedly registered as a special class contractor on 03-05-2005 for a period
of five years, which registration, therefore, would have been in force up to
02-05-2010. The proceedings of the Engineer-in-Chief (Admn. Wing), Irrigation &
CAD Department, dated 03-05-2005 mentioned in the Annexure that the 8th
respondent was registered as a special class contractor as an individual. A.V.
Ram Babu Infra Private Limited was incorporated as a private limited company on
22-07-2008. Under Ex.R.12, the 8th respondent was elected as the Chairman of
the Board of Directors in the meeting, dated
23-07-2008 and was stated to have resigned as Managing Director/Director on 31-
03-2009, which was claimed to have been accepted by the Board of Directors in
its meeting on the same day under Ex.R.13 and Form No.32 was accordingly
submitted to the Registrar of Companies under Ex.R.14. The resignation of the
8th respondent as Director of the private limited company was communicated by
the Director of the company to the Engineer-in-Chief, Public Health and the
Commissioner, Commissionerate of Tenders on 02-04-2009 under Ex.R.15.

23. Even before, the 8th respondent as Managing Director of the private
limited company appeared to have applied to the Commissioner of Tenders on 21-
03-2009 to register the company as a special class contractor enclosing a demand
draft for Rs.10,000/-, dated 19-03-2009, solvency certificate and other required
documents as per Ex.X.5. Ex.X.5 was produced by P.W.3, Engineer-in-Chief,
Public Health and Exs.X.5(a) to (h) were marked to indicate that the experience
certificate, etc., related to the 8th respondent and not the private limited
company requesting to be registered as a special class contractor, but the
submission of the application on 21-03-2009 followed by communications from the
same day for verification of the genuineness of various enclosures, need not be
in doubt, more so, when P.W.3 was not questioned about the same.

24. P.W.3 deposed about forwarding the application after due verification for
conversion of contractor Sri A.V. Ram Babu into M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private
Limited to the competent authority/Commissioner of Tenders, which conversion was
accepted in the 68th meeting held on 25-03-2009 by the committee of Engineers-
in-Chief. The approval was stated by P.W.3 to have been communicated to his
department for issuing proceedings, which is valid up to the period of validity
of the original registration. P.W.3 claimed to have issued Ex.P.1 proceedings
accordingly dated
30-03-2009. In Ex.P.1, the decision of the committee of Engineers-in-Chief and
the Commissioner, Commissionerate of Tenders in its 68th meeting held on 25-03-
2009 approving the request of the private limited company to be registered as a
special class contractor for all the engineering departments of the State
Government, was recorded and it was further stated that all the existing works,
experiences, assets and liabilities of Sri A.V. Ram Babu, contractor/8th
respondent stood transferred to the company and all the Directors, including the
Managing Director of the company shall be responsible to personally discharge
all the liabilities due to the departments that arise out of at any time in
future from the works done by Sri A.V. Ram Babu, contractor/8th respondent. The
existing special class registration of the 8th respondent under this category
under proceedings, dated 03-05-2005 stood cancelled in terms of G.O.Ms. No.94 I
& CAD Department, dated 01-07-2003 and the 8th respondent was stated to have
surrendered his original registration proceedings along with contract identity
card with a letter, dated
30-03-2009, which were cancelled. The registration was stated to be valid up to
02-05-2010 i.e. five years from the date of issue of the original proceedings in
the name of the 8th respondent. Copies of proceedings were marked to all the
Engineers-in-Chief of all departments and all the Chief Engineers of all
departments and the Commissioner, Commissionerate of Tenders. Thus, Ex.P.1
proceedings are as though the registration of the private limited company as a
special class contractor, which came into effect on
30-03-2009, also resulted in transfer of all the existing works, experiences,
assets and liabilities of the 8th respondent to the company under the very same
proceedings.

25. P.W.3 admitted that a special class contractor is registered as per the
procedure prescribed by G.O.Ms. No.94 Irrigation and Command Area Development
(PW-COD) Department, dated 01-07-2003/Ex.P.3. While claiming that all the
particulars with reference to the check list have been furnished in the
application, P.W.3 admitted that the application is not as per the prescribed
proforma and that the income tax return of 2008-2009 in the name of the 8th
respondent was not available in the file. Similarly, the income tax assessment
order of the company was also not available and the sales tax clearance
certificate, VAT clearance certificate and the particulars of the works executed
in the last five years also related to the 8th respondent, but not the company.
P.W.3 further admitted that the registration of the 8th respondent was converted
into that of the company in the meeting of the Engineers-in-Chief on 25-03-2009,
in which he participated. He claimed that the application of the 8th
respondent, dated 21-03-2009 was presented on the same day with inward No.5218
in his office, though he did not bring the inward register. While he had to
admit that if the private limited company were to tender for the works
transferred to it in the name of the company, it does not satisfy the
qualification criteria prescribed by Ex.P.3 Government Orders. He claimed that
the opinion of the Government Pleader was also obtained regarding transfer of
pending works, by way of a clarification by the Commissioner of Tenders and the
minutes of the meeting, dated 25-03-2009 were delivered in their office by local
tapal with the Chief Engineer initialing them on 30-03-2009 in token of
receiving the minutes. The terms and conditions of the earlier agreements
entered into by the 8th respondent with the department not being verified at the
time of conversion, was also admitted. But he stated that transfer of works
from individual to partnership firms or from individuals to companies happened
in other cases also. The role of the Engineer-in-Chief was stated to be just
forwarding the application to the Commissionerate of Tenders and registration
proceedings only are issued by the Engineer-in-Chief, which are binding on all
the offices and the departments. The evidence of P.W.3, thus, discloses that
the registration of the private limited company as a special class contractor
was based mainly on the documentation relating to the 8th respondent and the
committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders treated the
issue as conversion of the registration of the 8th respondent into that of the
company, as was done before in number of other cases.

26. That such a procedure was followed earlier in respect of various others,
is sought to be probablised by the 8th respondent as R.W.2 by filing Exs.R.17 to
R.27 copies of the meetings of the committee on the respective dates, which
information was obtained by him under the Right to Information Act through
Ex.R.16 letter. The information furnished shows that on 25-03-2009 during the
68th meeting of the committee itself, similar decisions were taken in respect of
seven more firms/companies and the authority/the rule empowering the committee
to transfer the registration from an individual to a firm or a company and
transfer the existing works, experiences, assets and liabilities from the
individual name to the firm or company, was stated in Ex.R.16 to be Clause
(1)(g)(viii) of Annexure-II of G.O.Ms. No.94 Irrigation and Command Area
Development (PW-COD) Department, dated 01-07-2003.

27. G.O.Ms. No.94, dated 01-07-2003 in Clause (1)(g)(viii) in Annexure-II
stated that the contractor already registered in a particular class can form
partnership firms in the same class and category only by a separate registration
foregoing his individual registration at the time of biennial registration as
mentioned in Clause (1)(g)(i). Clause (1)(g)(ix) refers to cases of
partnership/ companies in requiring any changes in the partners to be reported
to the registering authorities within one month of the date of such change. The
rules in Clause (1)(g) of Annexure-II for registration for every five years
referred in Clause (1)(g)(iii) about the scope for considering the firms or
companies, though newly formed, provided the concerned firms or companies have
recruited or already consist of highly skilled engineers and experts, in their
organization and Clause (1)(g)(v) states that the contractor shall not apply for
registration in his name and also in the name of the partnership/ company, which
runs in his name in the same class or category at a time. All the Clauses read
together, may suggest that a contractor may apply for registration of his name
or in the name of partnership/company, which runs in his name in the same class
or category, but not in both ways and foregoing of individual registration to
have a partnership/company registered in the same class or category, is
contemplated. G.O.Ms. No.130 Irrigation & CAD (PW: Reforms) Department, dated
22-05-2007 incorporated the modifications to the norms stipulated in G.O.Ms.
No.94 with effect from 22-05-2007.

28. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to various
precedents in this regard to contend that illegal benefit conferred cannot be a
precedent. In Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh9, when the
allotments made in favour of some of the respondents were based on wrong
application of reservation made for a local displaced person and those
allotments were contrary to law, the principle of promissory/equitable estoppel
was held not invokable to protect such illegal allotments. It was specifically
stated that if allotments were made wrongly in favour of similarly situated
persons, the same may become liable for cancellation, if permissible in law, but
that will not create an enforceable right on the respondents to claim similar
wrongful allotments in their favour.

29. Similarly, in State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and
another10, it was held that when a judgment in favour of a person was contrary
to law, on the analogy of the said judgment, another is not entitled to any
relief.

30. In Union of India and others v. Rakesh Kumar11 also, it was made clear
that if pensionary benefits are granted to someone by erroneous interpretation
of the rules, it would not mean that the said mistake should be perpetuated by
direction of the Court contrary to the statutory rules and in such cases, there
is no question of application of Article 14 of the Constitution or any estoppel.

31. Likewise, in Smt. Sneh Prabha etc. v. State of U.P. and another12, the
Apex Court held that even if a benefit is wrongly given in favour of one or two,
it does not clothe with a right to perpetrate the wrong and the Court cannot
give countenance to such actions though they are blameworthy and condemnable.
It was made clear that equality clause does not extend to perpetrate wrong nor
can anyone equate a right to have the wrong repeated and benefit reaped
thereunder.

32. In M/s. Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana and others13, it was
pointed out that two wrongs do not make one right and a party cannot claim that
since something wrong has been done in another case, direction should be given
for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be
perpetuating another wrong. In such matters, there is no discrimination
involved and the concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India cannot be pressed into service.

33. Likewise, in K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and others14, the Supreme Court
stated that it is well settled that the equality clause contained in Article 14
of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked for perpetrating an illegality.

34. In Maharaj Krishan Bhatt and another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and
others15, the Apex Court reiterated that if one illegal action is taken, a
person, whose case is similar, cannot invoke Article 14 or 16 and demand similar
relief illegally or against a statute.

35. So was the decision in Chandigarh Administration and another v. Jagjit
Singh and another16, wherein it was pointed out that each case must be decided
on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal
principles and because in one case a particular order has been passed or a
particular action has been taken, the same must not be repeated irrespective of
the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise.

36. Lastly, in National Institute of Technology and others v. Niraj Kumar
Singh17, it was stated that where an order is passed by an authority, which
lacks inherent jurisdiction, the principles of res judicata would not apply, the
same being a nullity.

37. The principles laid down in these precedents relied on by Sri V. Mallik,
learned counsel are unexceptionable, but the question is whether the parameters
of G.O.Ms. No.94 as amended from time to time prohibit any transfer of
registration from an individual to a partnership or a company, as sought to be
canvassed. The language of G.O.Ms. No.94, more particularly in Annexure-II, is
suggestive of the possibility of a contractor registering in a class or category
in his name or in the name of a firm or a company in his name, which
registration is mutually exclusive and any such conversion of registration has
to be preceded by foregoing the individual registration and while no specific
provision or principle of any statute or case law prohibiting such conversion or
registration has been brought to notice, if the administrative instructions in
G.O.Ms. No.94, though not explicitly worded so, envisage a situation of such
conversion or at any rate, did not prohibit such conversion, the administrative
jurisdiction or competence of the Committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the
Commissioner of Tenders to effect such conversion may not be open to be
considered to be lacking or at least, to be prohibited. Even if such conversion
does not strictly adhere to the letter of G.O.Ms. No.94, the same may be open to
be construed as an irregularity, but not an illegality going to the root of such
conversion being permitted and such transfer of works being made, from
individual registration to the registration of a firm or a company. As such,
the argument that Exs.R.17 to R.27 are of no avail and cannot be a basis for
perpetrating an illegality, may not hold good and the accepted practice of the
State Government in doing so, may indicate no undue preference or positive
discrimination being shown to favour the 8th respondent.
38. When P.W.2 applied under the Right to Information Act in Ex.P.6 for the
relevant information, the same was furnished in Ex.P.7, dated 28-07-2009 stating
that Smt. A. Durga Kumari, wife of the 8th respondent informed the office of the
Chief Engineer, Public Health on 02-04-2009 about the resignation of the 8th
respondent as Director and furnished Form No.32 issued by the Registrar of
Companies duly accepting cessation of the 8th respondent as a Director of the
company with effect from 31-03-2009 vide letter, dated 02-04-2009. The
Commissioner of Tenders was stated to be the competent authority to approve the
registration of special class contractor and the company was stated to have
applied with new Directors as per the registration proceedings, dated 30-03-2009
with fresh solvency certificate, demand draft, etc., and after verification of
the same, the application was submitted to the Commissioner of Tenders for
further action on 28-07-2009. P.W.2, who attempted to claim Exs.P.6 and P.7 not
to disclose substitution of any new contract, admittedly had no personal
knowledge or information about the incorporation of the private limited company
or the subject of his application and has no knowledge whether the 8th
respondent was disqualified from contesting the election. Exs.P.6 and P.7 do
not, in any manner, suggest that the transfer of all the subsisting contracts
from the 8th respondent to the private limited company on
30-03-2009 under Ex.P.1 did not take effect in law or in fact.

39. The petitioner as P.W.1 claimed that the 8th respondent had subsisting
contracts on the date of filing his nomination on
04-04-2009 till the date of declaration of the result. He contended that Ex.P.1
proceedings of the Engineer-in-Chief, Public Health and Medical, Engineering
Department, Hyderabad, dated 30-03-2009 did not result in substitution of any
new contracts in the absence of following the prescribed procedure. He also
relied on Ex.P.2 copy of the letter, dated 25-05-2010 from the Deputy Chief
Engineer (Public Health) in response to his application under the Right to
Information Act about the works undertaken by the 8th respondent along with an
enclosed statement to show that the works were in progress. The petitioner
further relied on Ex.P.5 letter from the Deputy Chief Engineer, Public Health,
dated 24-07-2010 in response to the application under the Right to Information
Act about the 8th respondent being registered as a special class (civil)
contractor. While he admitted that he did not raise any objection to the
acceptance of nomination of the 8th respondent at the time of scrutiny of
nominations, he attributed the same to his ignorance by then about the 8th
respondent being a contractor carrying on contract works with the Government.
He also admitted that he did not verify with the Registrar of Companies as to
when M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited was incorporated, which may be on
22-07-2008. While admitting the information covered by Exs.P.2 and P.5 to be
different, he asserted that the private limited company was not given a status
as a special class contractor, but admitted that he did not challenge Ex.P.1
proceedings in any other legal proceedings. He claimed the information
furnished in Ex.P.1 by the Public Information Officer to be false and claimed
that the procedure prescribed by Ex.P.3 was not followed in transferring the
subsisting works.

40. The evidence of P.W.1 also like that of P.W.2 is not based on any personal
knowledge, but on the contents of the documents obtained by P.Ws.1 and 2 and
P.W.1 mainly relied on the prescribed procedure not being followed in
substituting the old contract with a new contract from individual status to that
of a corporate entity. Contending that personal qualifications could not have
been transferred from the individual to the company, the petitioner claimed to
be knowing the distinction between a partnership firm and a private limited
company, but did not explain as to why in the election petition, he referred the
8th respondent as a partner in a firm. Though he claimed the information
furnished by the Public Information Officer under Ex.P.5 to be false, he
admittedly did not take any action regarding the same.

41. Ex.P.2 from the Deputy Chief Engineer, Public Health/Public Information
Officer, dated 25-05-2010 mentions five works to be in progress, one work to be
started and five works to have been completed. While all agreements between
2006 and 2008 were in the name of the 8th respondent, the agreement, dated 02-
03-2009 and LOA issued on 22-04-2010 are in the name of M/s. A.V. Rambabu Infra
Private Limited. However, Ex.P.5 information from the same officer, dated 24-
07-2010 mentions 11 works specified therein to have been transferred to M/s.
A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited. The information furnished in Ex.P.5 stated
about the original registration of the 8th respondent on 03-05-2005, his
subsequent application, dated 21-03-2009, the resolution at the meeting of the
Engineers-in-Chief, dated 25-03-2009, the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 and the
resignation of the 8th respondent as Director of the company on 31-03-2009,
which changes were approved vide proceedings, dated 28-07-2009. The
registration of the 8th respondent was stated to have been cancelled in the
proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 and the works were stated to have been transferred
to the private limited company. Significantly, the contents of Exs.P.2 and P.5
are not identical, maybe in view of the specification of the information sought
for in different ways, as admittedly, the works were originally sanctioned to
the 8th respondent as contractor up to Ex.P.1 proceedings. There is nothing
which is inconsistent with the claims of the 8th respondent in Exs.P.2 and P.5
and Ex.P.5 is in tune with his defence.

42. The Commissioner of Tenders as P.W.4 explained the process of registration
of a special class contractor and stated that on 25-03-2009, 28 applications
were considered including that of the 8th respondent, who applied for conversion
as a contractor from individual to firm, which application was forwarded by the
concerned department. While admitting that G.O.Ms. No.94 did not speak about
any conversion or transfer, P.W.4 stated about the concerned Engineer-in-Chief
issuing proceedings after clearance of the committee. P.W.4 also stated about
the experience certificate and the sales tax clearance certificate being in the
name of the 8th respondent. The minutes of the meeting, dated 25-03-2009 were
stated by P.W.4 to have not been communicated to the Panchayat Raj and Rural
Water Supply Department and the Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Water Supply did not
participate in the meeting on
25-03-2009, though invited. The witness also claimed that as per the legal
opinion obtained in 2007 in another case, the experience possessed by the 8th
respondent stood transferred to the private limited company as per the Companies
Act. While he stated that the tenders quoted by the Engineer-in-Chief, Rural
Water Supply did not come to the Commissionerate of Tenders like those of the
agreements relating to Public Health Department, he explained that the
Commissionerate of Tenders has nothing to do with the agreements and it only
evaluates the bids referred to it. He stated that if a registered contractor
converts himself into a firm or a company and makes a request, then they will
advise the concerned Engineer-in-Chief to register the new entity and cancel the
old registration simultaneously and also direct obtaining of undertaking from
the new entity to complete the remaining works with the erstwhile registered
contractor. They were allowing individuals to form firms or companies and
convert the registration and transfer the works earlier also and the application
of the 8th respondent was stated by him to be for conversion to that of a
company.
43. P.W.5 was speaking about Exs.R.4 to R.11 agreements and supplemental
agreements entered into with the 8th respondent and he stated that the
Commissionerate of Tenders had nothing to do with the works under Exs.R.4 to
R.11. He admitted that Ex.R.5 specified either the Engineer-in-Chief or the
Chief Engineer, Rural Water Supply as the employer and terminating authority.
He also admitted about the various restrictions against joint ventures under
different agreements and stated that while entering into the agreements, the 8th
respondent entered into them with the responsibility to execute them by himself
and not along with any other legal entity or through any other legal entity.
Ex.R.4, dated
25-03-2009 was, in fact, subsequent to the request of the 8th respondent on 21-
03-2009, but it is a supplemental agreement in pursuance of the original
agreement, dated 07-06-2007. P.W.5, of course, stated that the Commissionerate
of Tenders has power to transfer the works, assets and liabilities also by
virtue of Clause (viii) of Annexure-II (g) of G.O.Ms. No.94, apart from Clause
(v) thereof. Though his evidence suggests that the proceedings, dated
30-03-2009 under Ex.P.1 were received by him only on 13-04-2009, while there
were seven on-going works of their department relating to the 8th respondent, he
was ignorant of the deliberations of the meeting held on 25-03-2009 by the
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, which he did not attend. The private limited
company of the 8th respondent was stated to have not executed any works of the
department of P.W.5, but when he admitted that the Commissionerate of Tenders is
the final authority concerning the procedures relating to the registration of
all engineering departments, it is obvious that Ex.P.1, dated 30-03-2009 binds
the department of P.W.5 also. P.W.5 stated that they will follow whatever
proceedings are given by the Commissionerate of Tenders. The jurisdiction of
the Commissionerate of Tenders concerning registration of the contractors and
transfer of the works, assets and liabilities over the department of P.W.5 also,
is thus, admitted. P.W.5, of course, had to check whether the proceedings,
dated 30-03-2009 were delivered through local tapal in their office on 30-03-
2009 itself. He had any how stated that though the proceedings were
communicated on 21-04-2009 to all the Superintending Engineers by him, they were
given effect to from
01-04-2009 itself. P.W.5 claimed that the 8th respondent gave a copy of Ex.P.1
along with a covering letter on 13-04-2009 and in any view, the evidence of
P.W.5 discloses that his department is bound by Ex.P.1 proceedings and had given
effect to it from 01-04-2009 itself and even assuming that various conditions in
Exs.R.4 to R.11 agreements and supplemental agreements do not permit any joint
ventures or do not contemplate any transfer of works, either Ex.P.1 proceedings
or their being given effect to by P.W.5, were not shown to be non-est in the eye
of law under any provision or principle of law and even if they were irregular,
if the contracting parties abide by such change, accept it and implement it, how
the factual and legal effect of the same can be ignored for any purpose, is not
evident.
44. The evidence of P.W.6 about the communication spoken to by P.W.5 not being
the subject of any further action due to the 8th respondent having no work with
them, except the work being done by him in 2007, leaves nothing relevant for the
present purpose, though no formal orders of termination of agreement are passed.
P.W.6 stated that the work was stopped, as grant was not released and P.W.7 also
spoke about the communication of Ex.P.1 proceedings to them with an endorsement,
dated 21-04-2009 and he stated that since 01-04-2009 either the supplemental
agreements or payments were given only in the name of the private limited
company and not in the name of the 8th respondent, as the 8th respondent
submitted to them on 31-03-2009 itself that he transferred all his works, assets
and liabilities to the private limited company and that his registration of
special class contractor was cancelled. While P.W.5 spoke about seven on-going
works of the 8th respondent as on 01-04-2009, P.W.7 spoke about 11 on-going
works of the 8th respondent as on 30-03-2009. The evidence of P.W.7 may show
that though P.W.5 communicated Ex.P.1 proceedings only on 21-04-2009, the 8th
respondent submitted the information about Ex.P.1 on 31-03-2009 itself, which
was acted upon. While P.W.7 had no knowledge about M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra
Private Limited or its existence prior to the communication on 28-04-2009, he
stated the letter of the 8th respondent dated
31-03-2009 to have been entered in their inward register with No.235, dated 15-
04-2009, a copy of which is Ex.X.2. P.W.7 also admitted about the restrictions
on joint ventures in Exs.R.5 to R.8 and P.W.7 was not sure whether any request
by the 8th respondent for transfer of his tenders in favour of the private
limited company can be considered at the stage of consideration of tenders.
P.W.7 also has no idea whether the other Chief Engineers or Engineers-in-Chief
or the Commissioner of Tenders have no power to transfer tenders, but he stated
about the payment of bills only to the private limited company since 01-04-2009.
He produced Ex.X.1 copy of proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 along with Ex.X.2, the
originals of which are produced by P.W.9 as Exs.X.6 and X.7, and he stated that
in respect of the works in which the 8th respondent was the contractor, they
were being executed by the private limited company since 01-04-2009, which was
issuing the bills and receiving the cheques. He also stated that if any defect
is found in execution of the works, a notice will be given to the company and
not the 8th respondent and from 01-04-2009, the 8th respondent had no
contractual obligations under the agreement.

45. P.W.8 is the Pay and Accounts Officer, who was called to speak about
Ex.X.3 demand draft and Ex.X.4 schedules and he could not say why the demand
draft addressed to the Pay and Accounts Officer, Ranga Reddy District was
received in the Hyderabad office, but he tried to explain that mistakes occur in
issuing the demand drafts. P.W.8 received the demand draft as sent by the
Engineer in Public Health and any discrepancy probably could not have been
explained by him.
46. The 9th respondent as R.W.1 spoke about the information obtained by his
employee A. Mohana Krishna concerning the pending works of the 8th respondent as
on
06-04-2009 and he relied on the proximity of time of various agreements and
supplemental agreements under Exs.R.4 to R.11 with the filing and scrutiny of
nominations, the last supplemental agreement being only on 25-03-2009, which
works must be pending. Exs.R.1 and R.2 show Mohana Krishna obtaining such
information and also Ex.R.3 copy of certificate of incorporation of M/s. A.V.
Ram Babu Infra Private Limited. R.W.1, while admitting that he did not file any
separate written statement in the election petition, also admitted that he did
not raise any objection against receiving or accepting the nomination of the 8th
respondent before the Returning Officer. He does not know when the registration
of the 8th respondent as a special class contractor was withdrawn and has no
personal knowledge about the private limited company or when the company was
registered as a special class contractor. He also admitted that the papers
obtained by him show the transfer of the works entrusted to the 8th respondent
to the company on 30-03-2009 and like the election petitioner, R.W.1 also did
not take recourse to any legal proceedings questioning the transfer of the
works. He also does not know whether the company raised the bills from 01-04-
2009 and the Government also made payments to it. It was his impression that
transfer of such works or experience is not permissible and he does not know
whether the Government is, in fact, effecting a number of such transfers. He
also stated that Ex.P.1 specified the existing special class registration of the
8th respondent to have been cancelled and the 8th respondent to have resigned as
Director of the company with effect from 31-03-2009, which was accepted by the
Board of Directors and communicated to the Registrar of Companies on 31-03-2009
itself. The information obtained by R.W.1 admittedly referred to the 8th
respondent transferring all his shares in the company to Smt. A. Durga Kumari on
31-03-2009 and he also does not know whether the supplemental agreements under
Exs.R.4, R.6 and R.8 were executed much later to the completion of the works,
including the original works only to enabling billing and payment for the
additional works.

47. The 8th respondent examined himself as R.W.2 and reiterated the defence
that the 8th respondent was a registered special class contractor from 2005 to
March, 2009, having entered into Government contracts in his individual
capacity, while his being a partner of any firm taking up public works was
denied. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited was claimed to have been registered
as a private limited company under the Companies Act on 22-07-2008, on which day
the company gave a declaration taking over all the assets, liabilities, pending
works and obligations, including the experience of the 8th respondent as an
individual. The 8th respondent claimed to have submitted a declaration on 21-
03-2009 to the same effect and both the individual and the private limited
company were claimed to have submitted an application on
21-03-2009 to the Engineer-in-Chief along with a draft, dated
19-03-2009 for Rs.10,000/- for transferring all the subsisting works, assets,
liabilities and obligations from the individual to the private limited company.
The Committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders was claimed
to have passed a resolution in its 68th meeting on 25-03-2009 approving the
request and recognizing such transfer making the Directors of the private
limited company responsible for discharging all the liabilities due to the
department from the works. The same was claimed to have been communicated by
proceedings, dated 30-03-2009. The 8th respondent was claimed to have resigned
as Managing Director of the private limited company on 31-03-2009, which was
accepted by a resolution of the company on the same date and intimated to the
Registrar of Companies in Form No.32. The transfer of all the shares of the
individual to Smt. A. Durga Kumari was also claimed to have been accepted by the
Board of Directors on 31-03-2009. The disqualification under Section 9A of the
Act was, hence, claimed to be not applicable.

48. R.W.2 claimed that supplemental agreements were executed to cover the
works not provided for by the original agreements to regularize the additional
work and the allegation that any works of the 8th respondent were pending on the
date of the nominations or scrutiny, was denied. He claimed to have taken a
decision to contest to the Legislative Assembly on 27th or 28th of March, 2009.
While he had no idea about the difference between a partnership firm and a
company, R.W.2 denied G.O.Ms. No.94 not contemplating transfer of entrusted
works from one contractor to another. He was cross-examined at length about the
private limited company being ineligible and not qualified for the class and
category of registration of the contractor sought for and he admitted that he
did not address any letters to any of the employers under Exs.R.4 to R.11 to
terminate the contracts. He also does not know whether the minutes of the
meeting were communicated to the Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Water Supply. He
admitted further that they approached only the Registration Authority for
transferring the works, but not individual Engineers-in-Chief or Chief Engineers
and he denied continuing his contractual relationship in respect of the works
worth Rs.250.00 crore and that no employer in any of the subsisting works was
informed or communicated by 04-04-2009 or 06-04-2009 about the proceedings,
dated 30-03-2009.

49. While the evidence of R.W.2, R.W.1 and P.W.1 is necessarily tainted with
interestedness, which becomes acceptable only on satisfactory corroboration from
the other material on record, R.W.2 reiterated his defence of having no
subsisting Government contracts as on the date of filing his nomination or
scrutiny of nominations either as an individual or as a Director or the Managing
Director or the Chairman of the private limited company or a shareholder therein
based on the cancellation of his registration as a special class contractor and
transfer of all works, assets, liabilities and experience to the private limited
company by the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 and his subsequent resignation as
the Director of the Company and transfer of his shares to his wife. Though it
is true that it is only his wife and son that remained in the private limited
company after he quit the same, which may be, in effect and substance, retaining
all the assets and works with the family, in so far as the legal status of the
8th respondent as on the date of filing his nomination and the scrutiny thereof
is concerned, he cannot be considered to be having any subsisting interest in
any Government contracts within the meaning of Section 9A of the Act, if the
transfer of the existing works, assets and liabilities of the individual
contractor to the private limited company under proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 is
not illegal and non-est. While the petitioner or the 9th respondent or for that
matter, anybody else was not stated to have challenged the legality and validity
of Ex.P.1 proceedings in any other manner, any deviations from the procedure
prescribed by G.O.Ms. No.94, as amended from time to time, or departure from the
terms and conditions of the individual agreements are not shown to go to the
root of the permission accorded by the 68th meeting of the Engineers-in-Chief
and Commissioner of Tenders on 25-03-2009, in implementation of which, the
proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 were issued, nor is the disconnection of the 8th
respondent with the private limited company by 31-03-2009 by his resignation as
Director and transfer of his shares to his wife, open to any suspicion or
rejection.

50. The approach to be adopted in matters of elections has been laid down in
the two precedents relied on by Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the
petitioner and in Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar18, the Apex Court held that the
Election Tribunal, while determining an issue of this nature has to bear in mind
that Article 173 of the Constitution of India provides for the same and a person
cannot be permitted to occupy an office for which he is disqualified under the
constitution. The endeavour of the Court, therefore, should be to see that a
disqualified person should not hold the office, but should not, at the same
time, unseat a person qualified therefor. The Apex Court mandated that the
Court is required to proceed cautiously in the matter and thus, while seeing
that an election of the representative of the people is not set aside on flimsy
grounds, but would also have a duty to see that the constitutional mandate is
fulfilled.

51. Similarly, dealing with disqualification under Section 9A of the Act, the
Supreme Court pointed out in Shrikant v. Vasantrao and others19 that the object
and intent of Section 9A of the Act is to maintain the purity of the legislature
and to avoid conflicts between duty and interest of Members of the Legislative
Assembly and the Legislative Council. The said object is sought to be achieved
by ensuring that a person, who has entered into a contract with the State
Government and therefore, liable to perform certain obligations towards the
State Government, is not elected as a Member of the Legislative Assembly or
Legislative Council, lest he should use his influence as an elected member of
the legislature to dilute the obligations or to seek and secure undue advantages
and benefits in respect of the subsisting contracts. The Supreme Court referred
to Kartar Singh Bhadana v. Hari Singh Nalwa20 about the six requirements for
application of disqualification under Section 9A, that (1) there should be a
contract entered into by the candidate, (2) such contract should be entered into
by him in the course of his trade or business, (3) the contract should be
entered into with the appropriate Government, (4) the contract should subsist,
(5) the contract should relate to the works undertaken by the appropriate
Government, and (6) the contract should be for execution of such works. The
note of caution in Kartar Singh Bhadana v. Hari Singh Nalwa (20 supra) is that a
citizen may be disqualified only if the facts of his case squarely fall within
the conditions prescribed by Section 9A. While the approach in the present
adjudication should, thus, present a cautious balance as advised in Sushil Kumar
v. Rakesh Kumar (18 supra), the other five requirements stated in Kartar Singh
Bhadana v. Hari Singh Nalwa (20 supra) are, undoubtedly, answered by the nature
of the works in question and it is only the sixth requirement that the contract
should subsist that needs to be examined in depth on the evidence herein.

52. With that background, the efficacy of Ex.P.1 proceedings is questioned not
only with reference to the alleged deviations from G.O.Ms. No.94, but also with
reference to failure to comply with Article 298 and Article 299 of the
Constitution. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a
series of precedents and in Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram21, the Apex Court
held that every contract to bind the Government must comply with the
requirements of Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. So is the
decision in Seth Bikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India22, wherein it was laid down
that Section 175(3) providing for the form of contract between the Government
and the private individual, is mandatory and not merely directory and public
interest implies a prohibition against a contract being effectively made
otherwise than in the manner prescribed. In State of W.B. v. M/s. B.K. Mondal
and sons23, it was pointed out that failure to comply with the mandatory
provisions of Section 175(3) makes the contracts invalid and the word ‘shall’
used in making the provision, is intended to make the provision itself
obligatory and not directory. In an exhaustive consideration, the Supreme Court
recognized that sometimes officers may have to act in emergency and on many
occasions in the pursuit of welfare policy of the State Government, officers may
have to enter into contract orally or through correspondence without strictly
complying with the provisions of Section 175(3), in which cases, if what is done
in pursuance of the contracts is for the benefit of the Government and for their
use and enjoyment and is otherwise legitimate and proper, Section 70 of the
Contract Act would step in and support a claim for compensation made by the
contracting parties notwithstanding the fact that the contracts had not been
made as required by Section 175(3). Union of India and others v. N.K. Private
Limited and another24 is also about there being no valid or binding contract,
because the letter of acceptance is not by a person authorized to execute the
contracts for and on behalf of the President of India under Article 299 of the
Constitution. Similarly, in New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) Private Limited v. The
Union of India25, it was stated that a contract in contravention of Section
175(3) is void and unenforceable, but, if in pursuance of void contract, the
party has performed his part and the Government of India has received its
benefit, Section 70 of the Contract Act would justify the claim against the
Government. In The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd.
v. Sipahi Singh and others26 also, the provisions of Article 299 of the
Constitution were held mandatory and failure to comply with the conditions
nullifies the contract and renders it void and unenforceable. Lastly, in State
of Bihar v. M/s. Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers Ltd.27, it was pointed out that
Section 175(3) does not prescribe any particular mode, in which authority must
be conferred.

53. Interpreting G.O.Ms. No.94 as alien to any concept of transfer of
registration or works, Ex.P.1 proceedings were contended to be untenable with
reference to Articles 298 and 299 of the Constitution of India. But the
question herein is not about Ex.P.1 answering the mandate of Articles 298 and
299, but about the 8th respondent being relieved of being subjected to any
subsisting contracts with the State Government after the Committee of Engineers-
in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders cancelled his registration as a special
class contractor, which, they are, undoubtedly, competent to do and transferred
the works, assets and experience of the individual contractor to the private
limited company, which is attempted to be claimed to be beyond their competence.
While the agreements themselves are entered into by the respective Engineers-in-
Chief or Chief Engineers, the competence of the Committee to consider
registration of the contractors is not in doubt, while transferability or
conversion of registration of an individual to a firm or a company that is
attempted to be rendered doubtful. The prescriptions of Article 299 of the
Constitution of India (Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935)
about the manner in which such contracts should be expressed and executed, do
not appear to directly fall for consideration and the exercise of power on
behalf of the Governor will be by persons directed or authorized to do so in the
prescribed manner and the constitution of the Committee for the purpose for
which it was intended, reflects such direction or authorization to be executed
in such prescribed manner for that purpose.

54. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the
principles governing the juristic personality of a company and its members. In
State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer and
others28, relied on by the learned counsel, the Supreme Court clearly pointed
out that a corporate company has separate existence and is a legal person,
separate and distinct from its members. The members, who form the incorporated
company, do not pool their status or their personality and the personality of
the members has little to do with the persona of the incorporated company. It
was stated that the persona that comes into being is not the aggregate of the
personae either in law or in metaphor. The experience, the income, the taxes
paid and the other eligibility or qualifying criteria of the 8th respondent
being considered for registering the company as a special class contractor in
lieu of the 8th respondent, is sought to be assailed with reference to the
observation that the members, who form the incorporated company, do not pool
their status or their personality in forming the personality of the company. It
is true that the company and the members maintain their distinct legal
personalities in law, but the individual members of the company providing their
support with reference to their own experiences or resources or assets for
giving effect to the memorandum of association and objects of the company,
cannot be equated to aggregating the personae of the members in law or in
metaphor to make up or constitute the persona of the company. Pooling of the
status of the 8th respondent or his personality in the new legal person
functioning as an entity, did not happen in the manner in which it was attempted
to be projected. In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. The State of
Bihar and others29, the Supreme Court was dealing with doctrine of lifting the
veil to examine the face of the Corporation in substance. In such cases, the
shareholders are held to be the persons who actually work for the corporation
and even if the doctrine were to be applied to the facts of the present case,
firstly, the members of the private limited company were openly stated to be the
8th respondent, his wife and son originally, for whose benefit alone the company
came into being. The 8th respondent resigning as Director of the company and
transferring all his shares to his wife on 31-03-2009, even if it were for the
purpose of enabling him to contest in the election, left nothing further to
examine the face of the company in substance after lifting of the veil. If
formation of a firm or a company by an individual contractor is an accepted and
recognized form of change in the constitution of the person dealing with the
Government even as indicated in G.O.Ms. No.94, nothing illegal can be considered
to have been disclosed by lifting the veil. In Andhra Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation v. The Income-Tax Officer and another30, a corporation,
though statutory, was noted to have a personality of its own, distinct from that
of the State or other shareholders and the doctrine that a corporation has a
separate legal entity of its own, is firmly rooted from notions drafted from
common law. The principle no way offends the attempt of the 8th respondent to
have the transfer of experience, works and assets to the company from him.

55. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the
precedents governing the distribution of State largesse and in Ramana Dayaram
Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others31, the Apex
Court held that the power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant
of largesse, including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences, etc., must be
confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or
norm and if the Government departs from its standard or norm in any particular
case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down.
Similarly, in Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and others32, the
Supreme Court referred to public property being squandered for a song by persons
in power who hold the position of trust and how judicial intervention can serve
larger public interest. It was laid down that the Government cannot, for
example, give a contract or sell or lease out its property for a consideration
less than the highest that can be obtained for it. Application of minimum
principles of natural justice was held to be obligatory to result in fair play
in action. In V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India and others33, it was pointed
out that the disposal of a public property, undoubtedly, partakes the character
of a trust and therefore, there should not be any suspicion of a lack of
principle in the matter of such disposal. It is in that context when the Court
was examining each and every individual case of discretionary allotment, the
Court was trying to find out whether there existed some materials, on which the
subjective satisfaction could have been arrived at for exercise of discretion in
favour of the party. The principles are unexceptionable. But in the present
case, the procedure adopted with reference to the 8th respondent and his private
limited company is not peculiar to them alone. It is shown that in similar
cases, similar procedure has been adopted. The procedure prescribed by G.O.Ms.
No.94, as amended from time to time, was not claimed to have resulted in any
violation of the principles governing distribution of State Largesse. Apart
from the 8th respondent or his private limited company being not shown to have
received any unique treatment, different from all others similarly situated, the
proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 by following the same procedure as adopted in all
such cases, cannot be considered to be, ex facie, vitiated under the
circumstances.

56. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel also referred to Khardah Company Ltd. v.
Raymon and Co. (India) Private Ltd.34 about the obligations under a contract
being not assignable except with the consent of the promisee, which consent is
only a novation resulting in substitution of liabilities. The rights under a
contract are otherwise assignable, unless the contract is personal in its nature
or the rights are incapable of assignment either under the law or under an
agreement between the parties. In the present case, no legal prohibition
against any assignment has been made out, while the consent of the promisee and
the agreement between the parties is evident from the very proceedings, dated
30-03-2009. The learned counsel also referred to Bihar State Electricity Board
and another v. Umi Special Steel Limited35, wherein it was held that the
obligations of the parties continue till the contract is determined according to
its terms. The issue involved herein is not about the obligations of the
parties under the contracts, but the substitution of one of the parties with
another, which is not shown to be, in any manner, impermissible. The
obligations of the contractor continue till the respective contracts are
determined with the private limited company, which entered into the shoes of the
8th respondent after the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 under Ex.P.1.

57. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner then referred to the
precedents with reference to disqualification under Section 9A of the Act.
Sewaram v. Sobaran Singh36 is a case where the High Court found on evidence in
the election petition that abandonment of works in respect of three contracts in
question by Sewaram was not established. Sewaram Gupta continued to be
associated with these contracts, even after writing his letters, dated 30-01-
1990 withdrawing himself from the contracts/works. The Supreme Court also found
that Patiram Gupta continuing the contracts is the real brother and member of
joint Hindu family with Sewaram and the power of attorney holder of Sewaram
during the relevant period. The Supreme Court also found that the
correspondence even after 30-01-1990 was made in the name of Sewaram, though
signed by Patiram. Sewaram did not go personally to the Executive Engineer to
put an end to the contract mutually and did not end the contract unilaterally by
breach taking the risk of damages. As Sewaram continued with the contract
through the proxy of his real brother, he was held to have incurred the
disqualification under Section 9A. Obviously, the conclusion was due to Sewaram
Gupta alone participating in the execution of the contract much after the filing
of nomination. The Apex Court made it clear that the question of subsistence of
a contract with the appropriate Government making it a disqualification under
Section 9A, is a question of fact depending on the facts and circumstances of
each case. Noting that a contract would have come to an end by breach, the Apex
Court considered that the contract can come to an end by performance or by
express agreement or under the doctrine of frustration or by breach. The facts
in the present case in contrast present an absolutely opposite setting not
showing the transfer of contracts to be only faked. In Rajeshekar Basavaraj
Patil v. Subash Kallur and others37, the burden of proof was held to squarely
lay on the respondent, which he could have discharged by rebuttal evidence and
on facts, the Apex Court concluded that there is neither unilateral nor mutual
termination of subsisting contract by the 1st respondent therein. The letter in
question was found not to contain any intention to terminate the contract and
the respondent also miserably failed to explain the deviation from normal office
procedure in the submission and receipt of the letter and in proving that the
letter was formally tendered or officially received in the office of the
Executive Engineer. It was again a factual failure that led to the failure of
the respondent. In P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian v. Mr. P. Veldurai38, the opinion
expressed by Government officials, who are expected to have sufficient knowledge
and experience as to how a Government Order should be operated and/or
implemented, was opined to be capable of being relied on and if so, the evidence
of P.Ws.3 to 9 herein does not strengthen the claim of the election petitioner.
On facts in that case, the contract was found to have not been terminated
earlier than 01-06-2006 and to be subsisting by that date, a date beyond the
last date of filing of nomination papers and scrutiny thereof and consequently,
the contracts were held to be subsisting disqualifying the elected candidate.
In Chalimeda Lakshmi Narasimha Rao v. Chennadi Sudhakar Rao39, a learned Judge
of this Court was referring to Sewaram v. Sobaran Singh (36 supra) and
Rajeshekar Basavaraj Patil v. Subash Kallur and others (37 supra) and observed
that the 1st respondent before His Lordship did not intimate his retirement from
the partnership to the Government, leave alone take steps to put an end to the
contract mutually or unilaterally. Again it was the factual matrix that led to
the failure of the elected candidate and the application of the principles in
the above cited precendents to the facts of the present case does not appear to
favour any conclusion in favour of the election petitioner.

58. Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel for the 8th respondent referred to
Prakash Khandre v. Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre and others40, wherein also the
Supreme Court pointed out that the question whether contracts were subsisting or
not, is always a question of fact to be determined upon the evidence on record.
In that case, the first letter written by the appellant to the Chief Engineer
was about the cancellation of his registration as a Class I contractor with the
department putting an end to any sort of subsisting contractual relationship
between him and the Government. It was also pointed out that the objects and
reasons of Section 9A of the Act provide that an unduly strict view about the
Government contract should not be taken, as it might lead to disqualification of
a large number of citizens, many of whom may prove to be able or capable Members
of Parliament or State Legislatures. Even subsequent payment by the Government
for the work done, which was payable at the time of termination of contract, was
held not to mean the contract to be subsisting. In the case before Their
Lordships, not following certain departmental procedures prescribed for grant of
contract to the other contractor was also a ground of challenge and it was
positively held that not following the procedure prescribed under the rules
would hardly be a ground for holding that the contract was subsisting. If it
were so, any deviation from G.O.Ms. No.94 herein, which may, at the worst,
amount to irregularity and not illegality, will not make the contracts to be
subsisting, when the transfer of the contracts to the private limited company
was effected by the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 and the evidence on record
does not suggest applicability of Section 9A of the Act.

59. Sri Adinarayana Rao also relied on Shrikant v. Vasantrao and others41,
wherein the Supreme Court, while holding that a contract subsists till the
rights and obligations thereunder are finally performed, recognized the effect
of assignment coupled with novation creating a new contract between the assignee
and the contractor, which can apply with equal force to the employer and the
assignee of the contractor.

60. Sri V. Mallik also referred to A. Jithendernath v. Jubilee Hills Coop.
House Building Society and another42, wherein it was held that the statutory
rules and bye-laws of a cooperative society must be strictly and scrupulously
followed and where there was an order passed by the authority without
jurisdiction, it need not even be set aside being a nullity in the eye of law.
The Committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders cannot be
considered herein to be acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
and its proceedings cannot be considered a nullity nor is any deviation from
G.O.Ms. No.94, is such as would vitiate their decision, more so in the light of
the principle laid down about any deviation from the prescribed procedure and
the rules being hardly a ground for holding a contract to be subsisting as held
in Prakash Khandre v. Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre and others (40 supra).

61. Any delayed communication of the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 to any
department cannot dilute its legal effect and when the contracting parties can
contract out of the contract even when one of the contracting parties is the
Government, the disqualification under Section 9A of the Act cannot be
considered attracted to the 8th respondent and the issue has to be answered that
it was not probablised that the 8th respondent had any subsisting interest in
the Government works as a contractor, as an individual or as a partner in a firm
by the time of filing his nomination or scrutiny of the nominations.

62. Issues 1 and 7:
On this question, Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel for the 8th respondent
referred to K. Venkateswara Rao and another v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddy and
others43, wherein apart from holding that the trial of an election petition is
not the same thing as the trial of a suit, the Supreme Court pointed out that no
addition of parties is possible, except under Section 86(4) and if an election
petition does not comply with Sections 81 and 82, such election petition should
be dismissed under Section 86(1). The Representation of the People Act, 1951
was held to be a complete and self-contained Code and Sri V.R. Avula, learned
counsel for the 9th respondent referred to Vishwanatha Reddy v. Konappa Rudrappa
Nadgouda and another44, wherein it was held that when in an election there are
only two candidates and the returned candidate is found to be under statutory
disqualification existing at the date of filing of the nomination paper, the
votes cast in favour of the disqualified candidate may be regarded as thrown
away and the candidate securing the next highest number of votes will be
declared elected. That contingency does not arise in this case, as there are
more than two contesting candidates in this election. The learned counsel also
referred to Hari Singh Nalwa v. Kartar Singh Bhadana45, (claimed by Sri B.
Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel to have been overruled in AIR 2001 SC 1556),
wherein the High Court refused to decide a case on preliminary issue when the
questions involved are mixed questions of fact and law, on which evidence has to
be recorded. In the present case, in E.P.M.P. No.922 of 2009, the 9th
respondent stated in his affidavit that he is reserving his right to file a
detailed counter and also to file a petition praying to declare him as elected
as a Member of Legislative Assembly from the subject constituency. After being
impleaded, he neither filed any written statement nor filed any petition for
declaration of his being elected till now. Section 81 of the Act requires
presentation of election petition within forty-five days from the date of
election of the returned candidate. Section 82 requires all the contesting
candidates to be necessary parties in the event of any declaration being claimed
about any other candidate than the returned candidate having to be declared as
duly elected. Though all the contesting candidates are not indispensable
parties for the election petition as framed and filed by the election
petitioner, if the 9th respondent desires to be considered to be declared
elected, he is debarred from doing so both by his approaching the Court beyond
45 days prescribed by Section 81(1) and further due to absence of all the
contesting candidates as prescribed by Section 82. Hence, while the election
petition as framed cannot be considered to be not maintainable due to not
impleading all the contesting candidates, the 9th respondent is not entitled to
be declared as elected, even if the election of the 8th respondent is found to
be liable to be set aside and these issues are answered accordingly. The
position is so, is also evident from the observations of the Supreme Court in
Prakash Khandre v. Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre and others (40 supra), wherein it was
stated that there is no specific provision under which the person, who has
secured the next highest number of votes, could be declared as elected, when the
elected candidate is declared to be disqualified and there are more than two
contesting candidates. Observing that if disqualified candidate was not
permitted to contest the election, then how the voters would have voted in
favour of the candidate who has secured more votes than the other remaining
candidates, would be a question in the realm of speculation and
unpredictability, the Supreme Court held that such situation would not entitle
the election petitioner or any other candidate to be declared elected.

63. Issues 6 and 8:
In view of my findings on issue No.4, the election petition cannot succeed,
because the High Court cannot form an opinion that the 8th respondent was
disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat on the date of his election or that
his nomination has been improperly accepted or that any non-compliance with the
Constitution or the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or any Rules or
Orders made under the Act has been committed within the meaning of Section
100(1) of the Act and consequently, an order has to be made dismissing the
election petition under Section 98(a) of the Act, while leaving the costs to be
borne by the parties respectively under Section 99(1)(b) of the Act.

64. Accordingly, the election petition is dismissed without costs. A copy of
this order be communicated to the Election Commission of India and the Speaker
of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly in terms of Section 103 of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951.
_____________________
G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J
APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE

WITNESSES EXAMINED

FOR PETITIONER: FOR RESPONDENTS:

P.W.1: S.A.K. Mynoddin R.W.1: B. Chandrasekhar
P.W.2: K. Ravi R.W.2: A.V. Rambabu
P.W.3: B. Chandrasekhar
P.W.4: K. Ashok Kumar
P.W.5: B. Rajeswararao
P.W.6: K.K. Kishore Kumar
P.W.7: V. Gopala Krishna
P.W.8: V. Yesubu
P.W.9: R.M.R. Dayal

DOCUMENTS MARKED

FOR PETITIONER:

Ex.P.1/30-03-2009/Copy of the Proc.No.130/Regn/AVRB/T1/2009
issued by the Engineer-in-Chief, Public Health,
Hyderabad to M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private
Limited, Hyderabad.

Ex.P.2/25-05-2010/Letter No.8/T9/RTI/2010 of the Deputy Chief
Engineer (P.H.), Public Information Officer,
P.H.&M.E. Department, Hyderabad to P.W.1.

Ex.P.3/01-07-2003/G.O.Ms. No.94 Irrigation and CAD (PW-COD)
Department.

Ex.P.4/22-05-2007/G.O.Ms. No.130 Irrigation & CAD (PW: Reforms)
Department.

Ex.P.5/24-07-2010/Copy of the Letter No.8/T9/RTI/2010 from
Deputy Chief Engineer (P.H.), Public Information
Officer, Municipal Engineering Department,
Hyderabad to P.W.1.

Ex.P.6/25-07-2009/Copy of Application by P.W.2 for information
under Section 6(1) of RTI Act submitted to the
Public Information Officer, office of the
Engineer-
in-Chief, Public Health, Hyderabad.

Ex.P.7/28-07-2009/Letter No.1756/T9/RIA/2005/COR from the
Deputy Chief Engineer, Public Health,
Hyderabad to P.W.2.
FOR RESPONDENTS:

Ex.R.1/10-05-2010/Letter from Public Information Officer & Deputy
Executive Engineer, RWS & Sanitation
Engineering Department, Ongole to A. Mohan
Krishna, Ongole.

Ex.R.2/24-04-2010/Letter from Superintending Engineer, RWS &
Sanitation Engineering Department, Ongole to
A. Mohan Krishna, Ongole.

Ex.R.3/ — /Copy of Form 1 Certificate of Incorporation of
A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited

Ex.R.4/25-03-2009/Copy of supplemental agreement No.4-2/2008-
09 of R.W.S.& Sanitation Circle, Ongole,
Government of Andhra Pradesh, Panchayat Raj
Department.

Ex.R.5/24-12-2008/Copy of agreement No.77/2008-09 of
Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water
Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department,
Prakasam District.

Ex.R.6/11-11-2008/Copy of supplemental agreement No. /2008-
09 of R.W.S.& Sanitation Circle, Ongole,
Government of Andhra Pradesh, Panchayat Raj
Department.

Ex.R.7/02-03-2009/Copy of agreement No.89/2008-09 of
Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water
Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department,
Prakasam District.

Ex.R.8/28-01-2009/Copy of supplemental agreement No. /2008-
09 of R.W.S.& Sanitation Circle, Ongole,
Government of Andhra Pradesh, Panchayat Raj
Department.

Ex.R.9/04-12-2008/Copy of agreement No.67/2008-09 of
Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water
Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department,
Prakasam District.

Ex.R.10/24-12-2008/Copy of agreement No.76/2008-09 of
Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water
Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department,
Prakasam District.

Ex.R.11/18-6-2008/Copy of agreement No.29/2008-09 of
Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water
Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department,
Prakasam District.

Ex.R.12/ — /Form 1 Certificate of Incorporation of
A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited.

Ex.R.13/31-3-2009/Minutes of the meeting of Board of Directors of
M/s. A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited,
Hyderabad.

Ex.R.14/ — /Form 32 copy-appointment of Managing Director,
directors, manager and secretary etc., for A.V.
Rambabu Infra Private Limited.
Ex.R.15/02-04-2009/Letter from the Director, A.V. Rambabu Infra
Private Limited, Hyderabad to the Engineer-in-
Chief, Public Health, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.16/12-11-2010/Letter from the Commissioner,
Commissionerate of Tenders, Hyderabad to
R.W.2.

Ex.R.17/30-04-2008/True copy of minutes of the 57th Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.18/28-05-2008/True copy of minutes of the 58th Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.19/30-06-2008/True copy of minutes of the 59th Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.20/21-07-2008/True copy of minutes of the 61st Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.21/30-08-2008/True copy of minutes of the 62nd Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.22/14-11-2008/True copy of minutes of the 64th Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.23/11-12-2008/True copy of minutes of the 65th Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.24/30-01-2009/True copy of minutes of the 66th Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.25/24-02-2009/True copy of minutes of the 67th Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.26/25-03-2009/True copy of minutes of the 68th Meeting of
Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad.

Ex.R.27/18-10-2003/Copy of draft minutes of the Fourth meeting of
the Committee of Engineers-in-Chief and
Commissioner, COT, Hyderabad.

BY WITNESSES:

Ex.X.1/30-03-2009/Copy of the proceedings No.130/Regn/ AVRB/
T1/2009 from Engineer-in-Chief (PH) to M/s.
A.V.Ram Babu Infra Private Limited, Hyderabad.

Ex.X.2/31-03-2009/Xerox copy of letter from R.W.2 to the
Superintending Engineer, RWS&S Circle,
Ongole.

Ex.X.3/19-03-2009/Copy of demand draft No.902104 on ING Vysya
Bank Ltd. for Rs.10,000/-.

Ex.X.4/ — /Copy of Treasury Challan No. 1/8.10.09 for
Rs.10,000/-

Ex.X.5/21-03-2009/Application submitted by M/s. A.V. Rambabu
Infra Private Limited to the Commissioner of
Tenders, Hyderabad.

Ex.X.5(a)/ — /Copy of experience certificate of R.W.2 given by
the Executive Engineer (PH), Spl. Divn. Nellore.

Ex.X.5(b)/18-3-’03/Copy of Commercial Tax Certificate of R.W.2.

Ex.X.5(c)/ — /Copy of income tax clearance certificate of R.W.2
in five sheets .

Ex.X.5(d)/19-3-’09/Copy of demand draft No.902104 for Rs.10,000/-.

Ex.X.5(e)/ — /Copy of bio-date of M/s. A.V. Rambabu Infra
Private Limited, Hyderabad in 13 sheets.

Ex.X.5(f)/ — /Self declaration given by A.V.Rambabu, Managing
Director, M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private
Limited.

Ex.X.5(g)/ — /Declaration given by A.V. Rambabu, Special
Contractor, Markapur.

Ex.X.5(h)/ — /Declaration given by Anna Krishna Chaitanya and
Anna Durga Kumari.

Ex.X.6/30-03-2009/Proceedings No.130/Regn/AVRB/T1/ 2009 from
the Engineer-in-Chief (PH) to M/s. A.V. Ram
Babu Infra Private Limited, Hyderabad. (Original
of Ex.X.1)

Ex.X.7/31-03-2009/Letter from R.W.2 to the Superintending
Engineer, RWS&S Circle, Ongole. (Original of
Ex.X.2)
_____________________
G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J
Date: 21-08-2012

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