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the expression ‘any person’, contained in Section 8, does not include a joint-owner (hisedar). It has been admitted by the parties that the appellants and their ancestors were hisedars/joint owners/co-sharers in the shamilat deh from a period prior to even 1935-36. The pleadings of the appellants, in fact, begin with such admission by them. 18. Provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act put a complete embargo on a hisedar/joint-owner to claim occupancy rights. There is no agreement between the appellants and Gram Panchyat creating any tenancy in their favour. Granting the relief to the appellants would amount to ignoring the existence of Section 10 itself and it would be against all norms of interpretation which requires that statutory provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any of its provision otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the court to resort to that extreme contingent. 19. Thus, in view thereof, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the High Court impugned before us. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

English: The supreme court of india. Taken abo...

English: The supreme court of india. Taken about 170 m from the main building outside the perimeter wall (Photo credit: Wikipedia)




CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8845-8850  OF 2003

Tara Chand & Ors.



Gram Panchayat Jhupa Khurd & Ors.




1.      These appeals have been preferred against  the  judgments  and

orders dated 18.9.2002, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana

at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition Nos.13985 to 13990  of  2001,  by

way of which, the High Court has dismissed the  said  writ  petitions,

concurring with the judgment and order of the  Financial  Commissioner

dated 29.11.2000, by which while allowing the Revision Petition  filed

by  the  respondent-Gram  Panchayat,  claims  of  the  appellants  for

occupancy rights in the land in dispute were rejected.

2.    The facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are  as


A.     The  appellants/their  predecessors-in-interest  had  been   in

      cultivatory possession of the land in dispute, measuring  78  kanal  5

      marlas situated in the village of Jhupa Khurd,  Tehsil  Loharu  Distt.

      Bhiwani, prior to 1935-36.  Until the year 1954,  the  said  land  was

      recorded as Shamilat deh in the revenue records.  In  the  cultivation

      column, the appellants/their predecessors-in-interest were shown as co-

      sharers.  The appellants/their predecessors-in-interest, filed a  suit

      on 4.7.1989 in the Court  of  the  Assistant  Collector,  First  Grade

      Loharu, District Bhiwani, Haryana for declaration of  their  occupancy

      rights, under Sections 5  and  8  of  the  Punjab  Tenancy  Act,  1887

      (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Tenancy Act’)  in  relation  to  the

      land in dispute.  The suit was contested by the State, as well  as  by

the Gram Panchayat and after the conclusion of  the  trial,  the  same

stood as dismissed, vide judgment and order dated 28.8.1992.

B.      Aggrieved,   the   appellants/their   predecessors-in-interest

preferred an appeal before the District Collector, which  was  allowed

vide order dated 28.6.1993, by way of which  the  appellate  authority

set aside the judgment and  order  of  the  Assistant  Collector,  and

remanded back the case so that the same could be decided afresh.

C.    The Court of First Instance, i.e. the Assistant Collector, after

remand, allowed the case vide judgment  and  order  dated  18.11.1993,

observing :

“Plaintiff has paid the rent to the Gram Panchayat from time  to

           time and when the Panchayat refused to take the  rent  the  same

           was deposited in the court, on courts’ order. Receipts of  which

           are on the file. The plaintiff has been paying the nominal  rent

           since before 12 years before the commencement of Punjab  village

           common lands Act,1961and therefore there is relationship between

           the parties as land lord and tenant.”

It was further held that, as the appellants/plaintiffs fulfilled

all the conditions of Sections 5 and 8 of the Tenancy  Act,  owing  to

the fact that they had been in uninterrupted possession  of  the  land

for a very long time and had  also  been  cultivating  the  said  land

continuously, paying nominal rent to the Gram Panchayat,  much  before

the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation)  Act,

1961, (hereinafter referred to as Act 1961), and hence, the provisions

of Section 7 of the Act 1961 were not attracted and  that  they  were,

therefore, in fact entitled to the declaration as sought by them.

D.    Aggrieved, the Gram Panchayat-defendant, filed an appeal  before

the District Collector, Bhiwani, which was allowed vide  judgment  and

order dated 26.2.1996, taking into consideration  the  fact  that  the

Predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, were  in possession of the

land for a period of more than 60 years upon the  payment  of  nominal

rent of 34 paise, however, the  disputed  land  was  always  shown  as

‘shamilat deh’, and all revenue  records  showed  the  status  of  the

appellants/their  predecessors-in-interest  as  co-sharers,  owing  to

which, they could not be termed as tenants.  To create a  relationship

of tenancy, there must be an agreement between the parties, which  was

not  in  existence  in  the  instant  case.   The  possession  of  the

appellants as regards the land in dispute, remained  unauthorised  and

illegal and thus, they could not claim occupancy rights.  In the event

that the land was in illegal possession of any person,  prior  to  the

commencement of the Act, 1961, the same would be deemed to be illegal,

and no occupancy rights over it would be allowed.

E.    The appellants/their predecessors-in-interest  filed  an  appeal

against the said order, before  the  Divisional  Commissioner,  Hisar.

The Divisional  Commissioner,  while  deciding  further  appeals  vide

judgment and order dated 22.8.1996,  held  that  the  predecessors-in-

interest of the appellants, had been in cultivatory possession of  the

land before 1935-1936 as share holders/joint owners, upon the  payment

of nominal rent.  As the appellants had been in cultivatory possession

for more than 12 years, from the date of commencement of the Act 1961,

without the payment of rent, or by payment of  charges  not  exceeding

the land revenue and cesses payable  thereon,  thus  in  view  of  the

provisions of Section 4(3)(ii) of the Act, 1961, it cannot  now,  make

any distinction between a tenant or co-owner of the ‘shamilat deh’ and

therefore, the right of occupancy would be available to  the  tenants,

as well as to the co-sharers for the reason that co-sharers must  have

a superior claim as compared to that of a tenant.

F.     The  said  judgment  dated  22.8.1996  was  challenged  by  the

respondent-Gram Panchayat by filing a revision application before  the

Financial  Commissioner  of  the  State  of  Haryana.  The   Financial

Commissioner vide its judgment and order dated 29.11.2000,  held  that

the provisions of 4(3)(ii) of the Act, l961  which  provide  that  the

rights of persons who have been in continuous  cultivatory  possession

of ‘shamilat deh’, for a period of  more than 12 years from  the  date

of commencement of the said Act,  without payment  of  rent,  or  upon

payment of nominal rent, were not applicable as  the  appellants  were

recorded in the revenue record, as joint owners, to whom the land  was

never leased out by the Gram Panchayat, and thus,  the  provisions  of

the Act 1961 were  not  attracted,  and  as  it  is  a  settled  legal

proposition that occupancy rights cannot be acquired in  shamilat  deh

by a joint-owner, the revision was accepted.

G.    Aggrieved, the appellants challenged the said judgment and order

dated 29.11.2000, by filing writ petitions which have  been  dismissed

by the impugned judgments and orders. The High  Court  held  that  the

      expression, ‘any person’ contained in Section 8 of  the  Tenancy  Act,

      referred only to the person  mentioned  in  Section  5,  which  was  a

      tenant.  This section only provides that any person  can  establish  a

      right of occupancy on any ground other than  the  one’s  specified  in

      Section 5, and that as the appellants  had  never  been  tenants,  the

      question of granting  them  occupancy  rights  could,  therefore,  not

      arise.  The relationship of a landlord  and  tenant  could  not  exist

      between the parties. The appellants had been  joint-owners   prior  to

      the year 1953.   Till date, the revenue record depicts them as  joint-

      owners. Section 10 of the Tenancy Act puts an embargo on  joint-owners

      to claim occupancy rights.

Hence, these present appeals.

3.    Shri Amrendra Sharan, learned Senior counsel appearing  for  the

appellants, has submitted that the suit was filed under Sections 5 and

      8 of the Tenancy Act and that, as the appellants  were  tenants,  they

      were entitled to declaration of their occupancy rights as regards  the

      land in dispute.  Even otherwise, Section 8 of the Tenancy Act enables

      the  appellants  to  attain  the  said  declaration.   The   statutory

authorities committed a grave error in  holding  that  the  appellants

were joint-owners in the shamilat deh, and not tenants. Therefore, the

present appeals deserve to be allowed.

4.    Per contra, Shri Manjit Singh, learned  AAG  appearing  for  the

respondents, has vehemently opposed the appeals  contending  that  the

  appellants/their   predecessors-in-interest   were   in    cultivatory

      possession   of   the   land   as   joint-owners/‘hisedars’   (village

      proprietors), prior to 1935-36, and continued to be  so,  as  per  the

      revenue records even after the year 1954.   Moreover,  the  appellants

      have claimed occupancy rights as provided under Section  2(f)  of  the

      Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary  Rights)  Act,  1952,

      (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1952) and therefore, they  cannot

      be allowed to  claim any benefit under the provisions  of  Sections  5

      and 8 of the Tenancy Act.  They can claim relief only under Section 11

of the Act 1961. The  suit  under  the  Tenancy  Act  itself,  is  not

maintainable and the present  appeals  are  therefore,  liable  to  be


5.    We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel

for the parties and perused the record.

Relevant statutory provisions applicable in the case.

(a)   The Tenancy Act :


           “5. Tenants having right of occupancy. – (1) A tenant –



           (a)    who at the commencement of this Act has for more than two

           generations in the male line of descent through a grandfather or

           grand-uncle and for a period of not less than twenty years, been

           occupying land paying no rent therefore beyond the amount of the

           land-revenue thereof and the rates and cesses for the time being

           chargeable thereon; or




           (2)   If a tenant proves that he has continuously occupied  land

           for thirty years and paid no rent therefore beyond the amount of

           the land-revenue thereof and the rates and cesses for  the  time

           being chargeable  thereon,  it  may  be  presumed  that  he  had

           fulfilled the conditions of clause (a) of sub-section (1).


                 xx               xx               xx


           8.      Establishment of right of  occupancy  on  grounds  other

           than those expressly stated in Act – Nothing  in  the  foregoing

           sections  of  this  Chapter  shall  preclude  any  person   from

           establishing a right of occupancy on any ground other  than  the

           grounds specified in those sections.”


           10.   Rights of occupancy not to be acquired by joint  owner  in

           land held in joint ownership – In the absence of a custom to the

           contrary, no one of several joint owners of land shall acquire a

           right of occupancy under the Chapter in land  jointly  owned  by



      (b)   The Act 1952 :


                 Section 2(f) of the Act, 1952 defines “Occupancy  Tenancy”

           as under:-


           “occupancy tenant” means a tenant who,  immediately  before  the

           commencement of this Act, is recorded as an occupancy tenant  in

           the revenue records  and  includes  a  tenant  who,  after  such

           commencement, obtains a right of occupancy  in  respect  of  the

           land held by him whether  by  agreement  with  the  landlord  or

           through a court of  competent  jurisdiction  or  otherwise,  and

           includes also the predecessors and successors in interest of  an

           occupancy tenant.”


           Section 3- Vesting of proprietary rights  in  occupancy  tenants

           and extinguishment of corresponding rights of landlords:-


           (a)   all rights, title and interest (including  the  contingent

           interest, if any, recognised by any law, custom or usage for the

           time being in force and including the share in the Shamilat with

           respect to the land concerned) of the landlord in the land  held

           under him by an occupancy tenant,  shall  be  extinguished,  and

           such rights, title and interest shall be deemed to vest  in  the

           occupancy tenant free from all encumbrances, if any, created  by

           the landlord.


      (c)   Act 1961 :


           “Section 4 -Vesting of rights in Panchayats and Non-Proprietors:


                 xx         xx          xx         xx


            (3)(ii) rights of persons in cultivating possession of Shamilat

           deh, for more  than  twelve  years  [immediately  preceding  the

           commencement of this Act] [Inserted by the Punjab Act  No.19  of

           1976, Section 3] without  payment  of  rent  or  by  payment  of

           charges not  exceeding  the  land  revenue  and  cesses  payable



                 xx               xx               xx

           7.  Power to put panchayat in possession of Shamilat deh-

           (1)   The collector shall, on an application  made to him  by  a

           panchayat, or by an officer, duly authorised in this  behalf  by

           the state government by a general or special order, after making

           such enquiry, as he may think fit and in  accordance  with  such

           procedure as may be prescribed put the panchayat  in  possession

           of the land or other immovable  property in the Shamilat deh  of

           that village which vests or is deemed to have been vested in  it

           under this Act and for so doing the collector  may exercise  the

           powers of a revenue court in relation to execution of  a  decree

           for possession  of land under the Punjab Tenancy Act,1887.




           Section 11 – Decision of claims of right, title or  interest  in

           Shamilat Deh – (1) [Any person or a Panchayat]  [Substituted  by

           Act No. 25 of 1993] claiming right, title  or  interest  in  any

           land vested or deemed to have been vested in a  Panchayat  under

           this Act, or claiming that any land  has  not  so  vested  in  a

           Panchayat, may submit to the Collector, within such time as  may

           be prescribed, statement of his claim in writing and signed  and

           verified in the prescribed manner and the Collector  shall  have

           jurisdiction to decide such claim  in  such  manner  as  may  be



                 xx         xx          xx         xx”





      6.    It has been canvassed on behalf of the appellants that Section 8

      of the Tenancy Act contains the expression, ‘any person’ and not,  the

      ‘tenant’. Therefore, the expression ‘any person’ cannot be  restricted

      to mean a ‘tenant’, for the reason that had this been the intention of

      the legislature, the expression ‘tenant’ itself could have  been  used

      under Section 8. Therefore, all together, a different meaning is to be

      given to the said expression.


?7.    This  Court  in  Kailash  Nath  Agarwal  &  Ors.  v.  Pradeshiya

Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. & Anr., AIR  2003  SC

1886, held that :

 “As a general rule when two different words are  used  by  a

               statute, prima facie one has to construe different words  as

               carrying different meanings.  But  sometimes  two  different

               words are used in one and the same  statute  to  convey  the

               same meaning, but that is exception rather than the rule”


(See also: Tej Mohammed Hussainkhan Pathan v. V.J. Raghuvanshi &  Anr.

AIR 1993 SC 365; Bipin Chandra Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat

(2003) 4 SCC 642; D.L.F Qutab Enclave Complex  Educational  Charitable

Trust v. State of Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622; and  K.S.L Industries Ltd.

v. Arihant Threads Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 763).

8.    In Pallawi Resources Ltd. v.  Protos  Engineering  Company  Pvt.

Ltd., (2010) 5 SCC 196, it was held by this Court:

  “Further, it is a well established principle  of  statutory

               interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and

               careful in its choice of  language.  Thus,  if  a  statutory

               provision is enacted by the legislature in a certain manner,

               the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted  to

               by the  courts  is  that  such  was  the  intention  of  the

               legislature and that the provision was  consciously  enacted

               in that manner.”

9.    In Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of  Customs,  Bombay  AIR

2002 SC 1706, this court observed :

 “That different expressions like ‘similar’ and ‘other’  have

               not been used without any basis.  No  words  or  expressions

               used  in  any  statute  can  be  said  to  be  redundant  or

               superfluous. Every provision and every word must  be  looked

               at generally and in the context in which it is used.  It  is

               said that every statute is an edict of the legislature.  The

               elementary  principle  of  interpreting   any   word   while

               considering a statute is to gather the  mens  or  sentential

               legis of the legislature. Where  the  words  arc  clear  and

               there is no obscurity, and there is  no  ambiguity  and  the

               intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed,  there  is

               no scope for the Court to  take  upon  itself  the  task  of

               amending or alternating the statutory  provisions.  Wherever

               the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to

               be gathered from the language used. While doing so what  has

               been said in the statute as also what has not been said  has

               to be noted. The construction which requires for its support

               addition or  substitution  of  words  or  which  results  in

               rejection of words has to be avoided”.

10.   The word, ‘any person’ has to be understood in the context  that

was intended by the legislature  with  respect  to  the  tenancy  Act,

keeping in mind the purpose for which, the statute  was  enacted.  The

provisions of the Act, thus, have  to  be  construed  to  achieve  the

purpose of its enactment.  The  Court  has  to  adopt  a  constructive

approach not contrary to attempted objective  of  the  enactment.  The

Court must examine and give meaning to the said words, in view of  the

statute of which it is a part, considering the context and the subject

of the said statute. (Vide: Shri Balaganesan Metal v. M.N.  Shanmugham

Chetty  & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1668; and Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. v.

Collector of Central Excise, Pune, (2003) 3 SCC 506).

11.       In Union of India & Ors v. Brigadier P.S Gill, (2012) 4  SCC

497, this Court following its earlier decisions held:

“Every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference

to the context and other provisions of the  Act  to  make  a

consistent and harmonious meaning of the statute relating to

the subject-matter. The interpretation of the words will  be

by looking at the context, the collocation of the words  and

the object of the words relating to the mattes……..It  is  an

elementary rule of  construction  that  no  provision  of  a

statute should be construed in isolation but  it  should  be

construed with reference to the context and in the light  of

other provisions of the Statute so as, as far  as  possible,

to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute…”

(See also: Sri Ram Saha v. State of West Bengal  (2004)  11  SCC  497;

Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala (2009)  4  SCC  94;  Offshore

Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. (2011)  3

SCC 139;  Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 729; Head  Master,

Lawrence School, Lovedale v. Jayanthi Raghu & Anr. (2012) 4 SCC 793 )

12.   Generally, the phrase, ‘any person’ should be given  the  widest

possible import, and the words may  cover  persons  other  than  those

mentioned in various other provisions of  the  statute.  But,  if  the

statutory provisions suggest, that the legislature itself has intended

to give a restricted meaning to the phrase, ‘any person’, then  it  is

not  open to the court to give a wide or un-restricted meaning to  the

words, ‘any person’. (Vide: Sita Ram v. State of Madhya  Pradesh,  AIR

1962 SC 1146; Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami  Temple  v.  Induru

Pattabhirami Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 781; New India Assurance Co.  Ltd.  v.

Asha Rani & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 607; and National Insurance Co. Ltd.  v.

Baljit Kaur & Ors., (2004) 2 SCC 1).

13.    In  Commissioner  of  Income-Tax,  Bhubaneshwar   &   Anr.   v.

Parmeshwari Devi Sultania & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1276, while interpreting

the provisions of Section 132(11) of the Income Tax  Act,  1961,  this

Court interpreted the expression, ‘any person’, as not  confined to  a

person searched,  or  against  whom  an  order  is  passed,  but  such

expression would include, even a third party giving  reasons  for  its

objections to an order and, hence, seeking appropriate relief  in  the


14.   A similar view was re-iterated in Balkrishna Chhaganlal Soni  v.

State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 120, by this Court, interpreting the

provisions of Sections 107 and 135  (b)  of  the  Customs  Act,  1962,

observing that the words, ‘any person’ as  contained  in  Section  107

cannot be given a restricted meaning  so  as  to  exclude  from  their

ambit, persons who may subsequently be put up for trial.   (See  also:

The Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. The  Premier  Automobiles  Ltd.,

AIR 1981 SC 1982).

15.   The instant case is required to be  examined  in  light  of  the

aforesaid statutory provisions and settled legal propositions.

This Court in Puran & Ors. v. Gram Panchayat, Faridabad,  (2006)

2 SCC 433, dealt with an identical  case  and  examined  most  of  the

statutory provisions involved in  this  case.   The  court  held  that

      Section 4(3)(ii) of the Act, 1961  would  be  attracted  only  if  the

      following three conditions are satisfied:


              i) The person must be cultivating land which is  part  of  the

                 shamilat deh of a village;


             ii) He should be cultivating such land for a period of 12 years

                 immediately preceding the commencement of the Act; and


            iii) He should be cultivating such land without payment of  rent

                 or payment of charges in excess of  the  land  revenue  and



           While dealing with the provisions of Section 8  of  the  Tenancy

      Act, the court held that nothing contained in Sections 5 to  7,  shall

      preclude any person from establishing a  right  of  occupancy  on  any

      ground other than the  grounds  that  have  been  specified  in  these


The contention of the appellants therein, that  their  right  of

occupancy was based on a ground  other  than  the  ones  mentioned  in

Section 5 of the Tenancy Act, was based on Section 3(a)  of  the  Act,

1952. However, while dealing with the same, the Court held as under:

“Section 3 of the Act  relates  to  vesting  of  proprietary

               rights  in   occupancy   tenants   and   extinguishment   of

               corresponding rights of landlords. It is  evident  therefrom

               that the right, title and interest shall be deemed  to  vest

               only in an “occupancy tenant”. Occupancy tenant  is  defined

               under Section 2(f) as  meaning  a  tenant  who,  immediately

               before the commencement of the Proprietary  Rights  Act,  is

               recorded as an occupancy tenant in the revenue  records  and

               includes a tenant who, after such  commencement,  obtains  a

               right of occupancy in  respect  of  the  land  held  by  him

               whether by agreement with the landlord or through a court of

               competent jurisdiction or otherwise, and includes  also  the

               predecessors  and  successors-in-interest  of  an  occupancy

               tenant.  Admittedly,  neither  the  appellants   nor   their

               predecessors were  recorded  as  occupancy  tenants  in  the

               revenue records immediately before the commencement  of  the

               Proprietary Rights Act, nor  did  they  obtain  a  right  of

               occupancy in respect of the said land  either  by  agreement

               with  the  landlord  or  through  a   court   of   competent

               jurisdiction or otherwise after the commencement of the Act.

               The appellants, therefore, do not answer the  definition  of

               “occupancy  tenant”  under  the  Proprietary   Rights   Act.

               Consequently, they cannot derive any benefit under Section 3

               of the said Act.



                     If  Section  3  of  the  Proprietary  Rights  Act   is

               inapplicable, the question that remains for consideration is

               whether they  are  entitled  to  the  relief  sought  merely

               because the names  of  Sarjeet  and  Jivan  Lal  (father  of

               Appellants  1  to  3  and  father  of  Appellants  4  and  5

               respectively) were shown as cultivating the lands  for  some

               years from 1966-67. To get excluded from the  vesting  under

               Section 4(1) of the Common Lands Act, by relying on  Section

               4(3)(ii), the appellants should prove that  they  and  their

               ancestors were cultivating such land  for  a  period  of  at

               least 12 years prior to the commencement of the Common Lands


16.   If the aforesaid test laid down by this Court, is applied to the

case at hand, then undoubtedly, all the conditions  specified  therein

have been satisfied by the appellants, and their case  is  also  fully

supported by the Gram Panchayat. The contents of its counter affidavit

filed before this Court, read:

 “It is, however, not denied that the petitioners  have  been

               in cultivating possession of the lands as per entries in the

               revenue records from the time of their forefathers  for  the

               past over seventy years or so and paying   nominal  rent  to

               the Gram Panchayat from time to time and when the  Panchayat

               refused to take rent the same was deposited  in  the  court.

               Their possession  has  remained  uninterrupted.  Though  the

               possession  has  been  unauthorised,  the  Panchayat   never

               admitted the petitioners as its tenants.”

17.   In view of the above, the appellants may have a valid case.  But

in the said case, the provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act, not

attracted and thus, the facts herein become distinguishable.  However,

the High Court found them non-suited on the anvil of Section 10 of the

Tenancy Act, observing that the expression ‘any person’, contained  in

      Section 8, does not include  a  joint-owner  (hisedar).  It  has  been

      admitted by the parties that the appellants and their  ancestors  were

      hisedars/joint owners/co-sharers in the shamilat  deh  from  a  period

      prior to even 1935-36. The pleadings of the appellants, in fact, begin

      with such admission by them.


      18.   Provisions of Section 10 of  the  Tenancy  Act  put  a  complete

      embargo on a hisedar/joint-owner to claim occupancy rights.  There  is

      no agreement between the appellants and  Gram  Panchyat  creating  any

      tenancy in their favour. Granting the relief to the  appellants  would

      amount to ignoring the existence of Section 10 itself and it would  be

      against all norms of  interpretation  which  requires  that  statutory

      provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as not to  render  any

      of its provision otiose unless there are compelling  reasons  for  the

      court to resort to that extreme contingent.


      19.   Thus, in view thereof, we  do  not  see  any  cogent  reason  to

      interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the High  Court  impugned

      before us.  The appeals lack  merit  and  are  dismissed  accordingly.

      However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no

      order as to costs.

………………………………..……………………..J.    (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)



New                                                             Delhi,

November 6, 2012



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