//
you're reading...
legal issues

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act- whether the deemed vesting of surplus land under Section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 [for short ‘the Act’] would amount to taking de facto possession depriving the land holders of the benefit of the saving Clause under Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 [for short ‘the Repeal Act’]. = The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.3.1999. State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under subsection (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under subsection (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The State Government in this appeal could not establish any of those situations and hence the High Court is right in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed so also the other appeals. No documents have been produced by the State to show that the respondents had been dispossessed before coming into force of the Repeal Act and hence, the respondents are entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. However, there will be no order as to costs.

Page 1

English: "Appeal of Minin." Русский:...

English: “Appeal of Minin.” Русский: “Минин на площади Нижнего Новгорода, призывающий народ к пожертвованиям” Polski: “Przemówienie Minina” (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 2326 OF 2013
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) NO.12960 OF 2008]
State of U.P. .. Appellant
Versus
Hari Ram .. Respondent
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2327 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.10625/2006
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2328 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.10626/2006
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2329 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.10627/2006
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2330 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.5484/2006
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2331 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.5721/2006
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2332 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.19154/2007
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2333 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11553/2007
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2334 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.1947/2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2335 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.17580/2006
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2336 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.18486/2006
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2337 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.12955/2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2338 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.12956/2008 Page 2
2
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2339 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.12963/2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2340 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.12965/2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2341 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.12966/2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2342 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.12959/2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2343 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25495/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2344 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25093/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2345 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25094/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2346 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25095/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2347 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25096/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2348 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25097/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2349 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25098/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2350 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25099/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2351 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25100/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2352 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25101/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2353 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25102/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2354 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25103/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2355 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25105/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2356 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25106/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2357 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25107/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2358 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.25109/2009
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2359 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.26106/2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2360 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.12171/2009 Page 3
3
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2361 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.9591/2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2362 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.13767/2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2363 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.21601/2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2364 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.24977/2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2365 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.34749/2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2366 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.34754/2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2367 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.34758/2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2368 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.18337/2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2369 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.1108/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2370 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.1110/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2371 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3738/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2372 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3741/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2373 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3743/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2374 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3744/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2375 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3745/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2376 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3748/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2377 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3747/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2378 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3750/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2379 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3751/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2380 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3752/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2381 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3753/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2382 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3754/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2383 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3755/2012 Page 4
4
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2384 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.3756/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2385 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.5759/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2386 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.9529/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2387-2388 OF 2013 arising out of
SLP(C)Nos.8553-8554/2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2389 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.8305/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2390 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.8307/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2391 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.8308/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2392 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.8309/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2393 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.8310/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2394 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.8311/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2395 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.8312/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2396 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6636/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2397 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6637/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2398 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6638/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2399 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6639/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2400 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6640/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2401 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6641/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2402 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6642/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2403 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6643/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2404 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6644/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2405 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6645/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2406 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6646/2012 Page 5
5
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2407 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6647/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2408 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6648/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2409 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6649/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2410 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6650/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2411 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6651/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2412 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6652/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2413 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6653/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2414 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6654/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2415 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6655/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2416 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6656/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2417 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.6657/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2418 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11098 of 2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 5655/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2419 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11100 of 2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 6734/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11101 of 2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 7526/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2421 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11308/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2422 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.17721/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2423 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.17723/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2424 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.17722/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2425 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.17720/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2426 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.29997/2008
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2427 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.14601/2011 Page 6
6
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2428 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.15614/2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2429 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.27471/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2430 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.27472/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2431 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.27473/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2432 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.34453/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2433 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.34569/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2434 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.34570/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2435 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11102 of 2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 22402/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2436 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.18840/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2437 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.22406/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2438 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.22409/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2439 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.22410/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2440 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.22411/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2441 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.20770/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2442 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.20775/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2443 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.20776/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2444 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.20777/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2445 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.20778/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2446 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.20773/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2447 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.20774/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2448 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.13048/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2449 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.13414/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2450 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.13415/2012 Page 7
7
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2451 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11103/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 21689/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2452 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11104/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12038/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2453 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11105/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12095/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2454 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11106/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12202/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2455 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11121/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12448/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2456 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11122/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12457/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2457 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11123/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12496/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2458 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11124/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12660/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2459 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11125/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12848/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2460 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11127/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12857/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2461 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11128/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12980/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2462 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11129/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 13047/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2463 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11130/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 13059/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2464 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11131/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 13215/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2465 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11132/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 13546/2012 Page 8
8
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2466 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11133/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 13640/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2467 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11134/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 13756/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2468 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11135/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 13787/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2469 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11137/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 13828/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2470 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11138/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 13998/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2471 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11139/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 14030/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2472 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11140/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 14052/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2473 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11141/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 14664/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2474 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11142/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 14745/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2475 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11143/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 14944/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2476 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11144/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 15061/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2477 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11147/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 10477/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2478 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11149/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 10646/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2479 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11150/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 9156/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2480 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11151/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 9225/2012 Page 9
9
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2481 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11152/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 9516/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2482 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11153/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 9527/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2483 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11154/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 9686/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2484 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11155/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 9798/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2485 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11156/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 9860/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2486 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11157/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 9910/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2487 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11158/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 9970/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2488 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11159/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 10186/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2489 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11160/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 10239/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2490 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11161/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 10306/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2491 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11163/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 10318/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2492 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11164/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 10460/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2493 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11166/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 21133/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2494 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11168/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 12544/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2495 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11169/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 7206/2012 Page 10
10
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2496 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11170/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 7216/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2497 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11171/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 8910/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2498 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11172/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 18507/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2499 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11174/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 21729/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2500 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11175/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 6830/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2501 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11176/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 17398/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2502 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11177/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 17723/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2503 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.11178/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 20717/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2504 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11179/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 873/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2505 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11182/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 1684/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2506 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11183/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 2553/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2507 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11184/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 20722/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2508 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11185/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 20781/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2509 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No. 11186/2013 @
SLP(C)…CC NO. 15358/2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2510 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.31015/2012 Page 11
11
J U D G M E N T
K. S. Radhakrishnan, J
1. Leave granted.
2. We are, in these batch of cases, called upon to decide the
question whether the deemed vesting of surplus land under
Section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 [for short ‘the Act’] would amount to taking de facto
possession depriving the land holders of the benefit of the saving
Clause under Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
Repeal Act, 1999 [for short ‘the Repeal Act’].
FACTS:
3. Hari Ram, respondent herein, had filed a statement on
28.9.1976 giving details of the vacant land he was holding in
excess of ceiling limit prescribed under the Act, as provided under
Section 6 of the Act. The competent authority under the ActPage 12
12
surveyed the land and the respondent was served with a draft
statement under Section 8(3) of the Act on 13.5.1981, calling for
objection to the draft statement within thirty days. No objection
was preferred by the respondent and it was found that he was
holding excess land measuring 52,513.30 sq. meters and an order
to that effect was passed by the competent authority under
Section 8(4) of the Act, vide his proceeding dated 29.6.1981.
4. The competent authority later issued a notification dated
12.6.1982 under Section 10(1) of the Ceiling Act, which was
published in the Government Gazette on 12.6.1982 giving the
particulars of the vacant land held by the respondent. The
competent authority then issued a notification dated 22.11.1997,
which was published on the same date, stating the land shall be
deemed to have been vested with the Government from
12.6.1982, free from all encumbrances. On 10.6.1999, the
competent authority vide its letter dated 10.6.1999 informed the
Bandobast Chakbandi Adhikar that the surplus land declared as
per the Notification stood vested in the State Government. On
19.6.1999, the prescribed authority issued a notice under SectionPage 13
13
10(5) of the Act directing the respondent to hand over possession
of the land declared as surplus to a duly authorized person.
Aggrieved by the same, the respondent preferred an appeal No.29
of 1999 before the District Judge, Varanasi under Section 33 of the
Act, contending that before passing the order under Section 8(4)
of the Act, no notice, as contemplated under Section 8(3) of the
Act, was served on him. The appeal was allowed and the order
dated 29.06.1981 was quashed, vide judgment dated 14.12.1999.
5. Aggrieved by the said order, State of U.P., through the
competent authority, preferred Civil Misc. Petition No. 47369 of
2000 before the High Court of Allahabad under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, and the High Court, after elaborately
considering the various contentions, took the view that subsection (3) of Section 10 does not envisage, taking physical and
de facto possession of the surplus land, for which proceedings
under sub-section (5) of Section 10 have to be followed. On facts
also, the Division Bench found no reason to interfere with the
order of the District Judge, and the appeal was dismissed, against
which this appeal has been preferred. Following the judgment inPage 14
14
Writ Petition No.47369 of 2000, several writ petitions were
disposed of by the High Court against which appeals are pending
before this Court.
6. We intend to take up the appeal filed against the judgment
in Writ Petition No. 47369 of 2000 as the leading case, based on
which other appeals can be disposed of.
7. Shri Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant – State of U.P. submitted that the High Court has
committed an error in interpreting sub-section (3) to Section 10 of
the Act and submitted that the expressions “deemed acquisition”
and “deemed vesting” which find a place in Section 10(3) of the
Act would take in not only de jure possession but also de facto
possession. Learned senior counsel submitted that under Section
10(2) of the Act, the competent authority considers the claims of
the persons interested in vacant land and then determines the
nature and extent of such claims, followed by a declaration under
Section 10(3) of the Act by publication in the Official Gazette
which amounts to absolute vesting. Learned senior counselPage 15
15
submitted that Section 10(3) is a self contained provision and
does not make vesting dependent on any other or further
procedure to be complied with by the competent authority.
Learned senior counsel also submitted that Section 10(5) and
Section 10(6) speak of “hostile possession” and only in cases
where hostile possession is set up by the owner in respect of the
vacant land by growing crops, constructing buildings or other
fixtures etc., the competent authority has to take recourse to the
procedure laid down in those provisions. Referring to the
provisions of the Repeal Act, learned senior counsel submitted
that the wide language used therein envisages various
possibilities such as taking over possession under Section 10(3),
Section 10(5) or Section 10(6) of the Act. Learned senior counsel
submitted that in cases where possession is seen having been
taken over legally, statutorily and by way of presumption in law,
on account of the publication of the notification and the deeming
clause and legal fiction provided under Section 10(3) of the Act,
the requirement of Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act shall stand
satisfied and the land so vested and possessed by the State
Government shall remain intact in the ownership and possessionPage 16
16
of the State Government. Learned senior counsel also submitted
that the procedure laid down under U.P. Urban Land Ceiling
(Taking of Possession, Payment of Amount and Allied Matters)
Directions, 1983 (for short ‘Directions 1983’) would not apply in
view of the plenary character of Section 10(3).
8. Learned counsels appearing for the respondents, on the
other hand, fully supported the judgment of the High Court and
submitted that on a conjoint reading of Sections 10(3), 10(5),
10(6) and Section 3 of the Repeal Act would show that the
expressions “deemed to have been acquired” or “deemed to have
vested” would not comprehend “physical possession” under
Section 10(3) in view of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act.
Learned counsels urged in such situations, the State has
necessarily to follow the procedure laid down under the Directions
1983 issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 35
of the Act. Further, it was submitted that the Object and Reasons
of the Repealing Act would be defeated, if the interpretation
placed by Shri Gupta is accepted, since it being a beneficial
enactment.Page 17
17
Judicial evaluation
9. The Parliament, after having felt the need for an orderly
development of urban areas in view of the growth of population
and increase in urbanization, enacted Act 33 of 1976. The
Parliament also felt that it is necessary to take measures for
exercising social control over the scarce resource of urban land
with a view to ensuring its equitable distribution. To ensure
uniformity in approach, the Government of India had also
addressed various State Governments in this regard. Eleven
States had passed resolutions under Article 252(1) of the
Constitution empowering the Parliament to undertake legislation
in that behalf. Consequently, the Act of 1976 was enacted which
came into force on 17.2.1976. The Object of the Act was to
provide for imposition of ceiling on vacant land in urban
agglomeration, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the
ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such
lands and for matters connected therewith, with a view to
preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of few
persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a viewPage 18
18
to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban
agglomerations to sub-serve the common good.
10. The legislature then put a ceiling on vacant land in Chapter
III of the Act. Section 6 of the Act placed an obligation on persons
holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file statement
before the competent authority. Section 8 of the Act referred to
the preparation of draft statement as regards vacant land held in
excess of ceiling limit. Draft statement prepared has to be served
on the person concerned together with a notice under sub-section
(3) of Section 8 calling for objections, if any, within 30 days to the
service of notice. The competent authority, after considering the
objections has to pass orders under sub-section (4) to Section 8,
after considering the objections filed. The final statement has to
be issued under Section 9 of the Act.
11. We are, in this case primarily concerned, with the scope of
Section 10 of the Act, which reads as follow:
10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling
limit.- (1) As soon as may be after the service of thePage 19
19
statement under section 9 on the person concerned, the
competent authority shall cause a notification giving the
particulars of the vacant land held by such person in
excess of the ceiling limit and stating that-
(i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned
State Government; and
(ii) the claims of all persons interested in such vacant
land may be made by them personally or by their
agents giving particulars of the nature of their interests
in such land, to be published for the information of the
general public in the Official Gazette of the State
concerned and in such other manner as may be
prescribed.
(2) After considering the claims of the persons
interested in the vacant land, made to the competent
authority in pursuance of the notification published
under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall
determine the nature and extent of such claims and
pass such orders as it deems fit.
(3) At any time after the publication of the notification
under sub-section (1), the competent authority may, by
notification published in the Official Gazette of the State
concerned, declare that the excess vacant land referred
to in the notification published under sub-section (1)
shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in
the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by
the State Government and upon the publication of such
declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested
absolutely in the State Government free from all
encumbrances with effect from the date so specified.
(4) During the period commencing on the date of
publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and
ending with the date specified in the declaration made
under sub-section (3)–
(i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage,
gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant landPage 20
20
(including any part thereof) specified in the notification
aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention
of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void;
and
(ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use
of such excess vacant land.
(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State
Government under sub-section (3), the competent
authority may, by notice in writing, order any person
who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver
possession thereof to the State Government or to any
person duly authorised by the State Government in this
behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order
made under sub-section (5), the competent authority
may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be
given to the concerned State Government or to any
person duly authorised by such State Government in
this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as
may be necessary.
Explanation.-In this section, in sub-section (1) of
section 11.and in sections 14 and 23, “State
Government”, in relation to-
(a) any vacant land owned by the Central Government,
means the Central Government;
(b) any vacant land owned by any State Government
and situated in a Union territory or within the local limits
of a cantonment declared as such under section 3 of the
Cantonments Act, 1924, (2 of 1924.) means that State
Government.”
12. Before examining the scope of sub-section (3) to Section 10
as well as sub-sections (5) and (6) to Section 10, reference may bePage 21
21
made to the Repeal Act 1999 and its Object and Reasons which
are as follow:
Statement of Object and Reasons:
“1. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976 was passed when Proclamation of emergency was
in operation with a laudable objective in mind. The said
Act was passed pursuant to resolution passed by the
State Legislature under clause (1) of Article 252.
Unfortunately public opinion is nearly unanimous that
the Act has failed to achieve what was expected of it. It
has on the contrary pushed up land prices to
unconscionable levels, practically brought the housing
industry to a stop and provided copious opportunities
for corruption. There is wide spread clamour for
removing this most potent clog on housing.
2. Parliament has no power to repeal or amend the
Act unless resolutions are passed by two or more state
legislatures as required under clause (2) of Article 252.
3. The Legislature of Haryana and Punjab have passed
resolutions empowering Parliament to repel the act in
those States. The Act, in the first instance will be
repealed in those States and in the Union Territories
and subsequently if any State Legislature adopts this
Act by resolution, then from the date of its adoption the
Act will stand repealed in that State.
4. The proposed repeal, along with some other
incentives and simplification of administrative
procedures is expected revive the stagnant housing
industry and provide affordable living accommodation
for those who are in a state of underserved want and
are entitled to public assistance. The repeal will not
however, affect land on which building activity has
already commenced. For that limited purposePage 22
22
exemption granted under Section 20 of the Act will
continue to be operative. Amounts paid out by the
State Government will become refundable.
5. The bill seeks to achieve the above purpose.”
13. The Act 36 of 1976 was repealed by Section 2 of the Repeal
Act, 1999 and the Repeal Act was adopted in the State of U.P. on
March 18, 1999. The Repeal Act contains a saving clause vide
Section 3 which reads as follow:
3. Saving.-
(I) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect-
(a) The vesting of any vacant land under sub-section 10,
possession of which has been taken over by the state
government or any person duly authorized by the state
government in this behalf or by the competent
authority;
(b The validity of any order granting exemption under
sub-section (I) of section 20 or any action taken there
under, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to
the contrary;
(c) Any payment made to the state government as a
condition for granting exemption under sub-section (I)
of section 20.
(2) Where-
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the state
government under sub section (3) of section 10 of the
principal Act but possession of which has not beenPage 23
23
taken over by the state government or any person duly
authorized by the state government in this behalf or by
the competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the state government
with respect to such land,
then such land shall not be restored unless the amount
paid, if any, has been refunded to the state
government.”
14. We notice even after the coming into force of the Repeal Act,
the competent authority under the Act 33 of 1976 vide its letter
dated 10th June, 1999 informed the Bandobast Chakbandi Adhikar
that the surplus land declared as per the notification issued under
the Act had vested in the State Government free from all
encumbrances and, therefore, in the revenue records the name of
State Government be entered and name of the respondent be
mutated. The competent authority vide its notice dated
19.6.1999 issued under Section 10(5) of the Act directed the
respondent to handover possession of the land declared as
surplus to duly authorized persons on behalf of the Collector. Page 24
24
15. Before examining the impact of the Repeal Act on Act 33 of
1976, particularly, Section 3 of the Repeal Act on sub-section (3)
to Section 10 of the Act, let us examine whether possession could
be taken following the procedure laid down in sub-section (3) to
Section 10 of the Act. Section 6 casts an obligation on every
person holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file a
statement before the competent authority and after following all
the statutory procedures, the competent authority has to pass the
order under Section 8(4) on the draft statement. Following that, a
final statement has to be issued under Section 9 on the person
concerned. Sub-section (1) to Section 10 states that after the
service of statement, the competent authority has to issue a
notification giving particulars of the land held by such person in
excess of the ceiling limit. Notification has to be published for the
information of the general public in the Official Gazette, stating
that such vacant land is to be acquired and that the claims of all
the persons interested in such vacant land be made by them
giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such land. Page 25
25
16. Sub-section (2) of Section 10 states that after considering
the claims of persons interested in the vacant land, the competent
authority has to determine the nature and extent of such claims
and pass such orders as it might deem fit. Sub-section (3) of
Section 10 states that after the publication of the notification
under sub-section (1), the competent authority has to declare that
the excess land referred to in the Notification published under
sub-section (1) of Section 10 shall, with effect from such date, as
might be prescribed in the declaration, be deemed to have been
acquired by the State Government. On publication of a declaration
to that effect such land shall be deemed to have been vested
absolutely in the State Government, free from all encumbrances,
with effect from the date so specified.
Legal Fiction
17. Legislature is competent to create a legal fiction, for the
purpose of assuming existence of a fact which does not really
exist. Sub-section (3) of Section 10 contained two deeming
provisions such as “deemed to have been acquired” and “deemedPage 26
26
to have been vested absolutely”. Let us first examine the legal
consequences of a ‘deeming provision’. In interpreting the
provision creating a legal fiction, the Court is to ascertain for what
purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining this, the Court
is to assume all those facts and consequences which are
incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the
fiction. This Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company
Limited v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 449 held that what
can be deemed to exist under a legal fiction are facts and not
legal consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands.
18. James Lords Justice in Ex-parte, Walton, In re, Levy
(1881) 17 Chance. D. 746 speaks on deeming fiction as:
“When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed
to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not
done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for
what purposes and between what persons the statutory
fiction is to be resorted to”.
19. In Szoma v. Secretary of State for the Department of
Work and Pensions (2006) 1 All E.R. 1 (at 25), court held, it
would be quite wrong to carry this fiction beyond its originallyPage 27
27
intended purpose so as to deem a person in fact lawfully here not
to be here at all. The intention of a deeming provision, in laying
down a hypothesis is that the hypothesis shall be carried so far as
necessary to achieve the legislative purpose but no further. (see
also DEG Deutsche Institutions and another v. Kosby (2001)
3 All E.R. 878.
20. Let us test the meaning of the expression “deemed to have
been acquired” and “deemed to have been vested absolutely” in
the above legal settings. The expression “acquired” and “vested”
are not defined under the Act. Each word, phrase or sentence
that we get in a statutory provision, if not defined in the Act, then
is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act. As
held by this Court in Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of
India (1979) 4 SCC 573 that a bare mechanical interpretation of
the words and application of a legislative intent devoid of concept
of purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficial
legislation to futility. Reference may also be made to the
Judgment of this Court in Directorate of Enforcement v.
Deepak Mahajan (1994) 3 SCC 440. Words and phrases,Page 28
28
therefore, occurring in the statute are to be taken not in an
isolated or detached manner, it is associated on the context but
are read together and construed in the light of the purpose and
object of the Act.
21. This Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC
596 held:
“it is well known rule of interpretation of statutes that
the text and the context of the entire Act must be
looked into while interpreting any of the expressions
used in a statute. The Courts must look to the object,
which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting
any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach
for interpreting the Act is necessary…….”
22. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. M/s Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.
AIR 1955 SC 376, Justice S.R. Das stated:
“The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read
the statute literally that is, by giving to the words used
by legislature their ordinary natural and grammatical
meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity
and the words are susceptible of another meaning the
Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative
construction is possible, the Court must adopt the
ordinary rule of literal interpretation.”Page 29
29
23. The expression “deemed to have been acquired” used as a
deeming fiction under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can only mean
acquisition of title or acquisition of interests because till that time
the land may be either in the ownership of the person who held
that vacant land or to possess such land as owner or as a tenant
or as mortgagee and so on as defined under Section 2(1) of the
Act. The word “vested” has not been defined in the Act, so also
the word “absolutely”. What is vested absolutely is only the land
which is deemed to have acquired and nothing more. The word
“vest” has different meaning in different context; especially when
we examine the meaning of vesting on the basis of a statutory
hypothesis of a deeming provision which Lord Hoffmann in
Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Zielinski Baker and
Partners (2004) 2 All E.R. 141 (at 11) described as “heroic piece
of deeming”.
24. The word “vest” or “vesting” has different meaning. Legal
Glossary, published by Official Language (Legislative) Commission
1970 Edition at Page 302:Page 30
30
“Vest: 1. To give a person a legally fixed, immediate
right or personal or future enjoyment of (an estate), to
grant, endow, clothe with a particular authority, right of
property, 2. To become legally vested; (T.P. Act.)
“Vesting order: An order under statutory authority
whereby property is transferred to and vested, without
conveyance in some person or persons;
Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) 1990 at page 1563:
“Vested: Fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete;
Having the character or given the rights of absolute
ownership; not contingent, not subject to be defeated
by a condition precedent. Rights are “vested” when
rights to enjoyment present or prospective has become
property of some particular persons or persons as
present interest; mere expectancy or future or
contingent interest in property founded on anticipated
continuance of existing laws does not continue “vested
right” Vaughan v. Nadel; 228 Kan. 469, 618 p. 2d 778,
783. See also Accrue Vest and specific typed of vested
interest infra.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, of the English
Language unabridged, Volume III S to Z at page 2547 defines the
word “vest” as follow:
“vest” vest …… To place or give into the possession
or discretion of some person or authority (the regulation
of the waterways …. to give to a person a legally fixed
immediate right of present or future enjoyment of (as
an estate) (a deed that vests a title estate in thePage 31
31
grantee and a remainder in his children), b. to grant
endow, or clothe with a particular authority right or
property ….. to put ( a person) in possession of land by
the feudal ceremony of investiture ….. to become
legally vested (normally) title to real property vests in
the holder of a property executed deed.)”
25. Vest/vested, therefore, may or may not include
“transfer of possession” the meaning of which depends on
the context in which it has been placed and the
interpretation of various other related provisions.
26. What is deemed “vesting absolutely” is that “what is deemed
to have acquired”. In our view, there must be express words of
utmost clarity to persuade a court to hold that the legislature
intended to divest possession also, since the owners or holders of
the vacant land is pitted against a statutory hypothesis.
Possession, there is an adage “nine points of law” In Beedall v.
Maitland (1881) 17 Ch. D. p.183 Sir Edward Fry, while speaking
of a Statute which makes a forcible entry an indictable offence,
stated as follows:
“this statute creates one of the great differences
which exist in our law between the being inPage 32
32
possession and the being out of possession of land,
and which gave rise to the old saying that possession
is nine points of the law. The effect of the statute is
this, that when a man is in possession, he may use
force to keep out a trespasser; but if a trespasser has
gained possession, the rightful owner cannot use force
to put him out, but must appeal to the law for
assistance.”
27. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but
deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what
they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession
unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in
construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the
legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on
vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit
thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent
concentration of urban lands in hands of few persons, so as to
bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object,
various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and
vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the
provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10,
the words ‘acquired’ and ‘vested’ have different meaning and
content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jurePage 33
33
possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we
are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an
hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve
the legislative intent.
Voluntary Surrender
28. The ‘vesting’ in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view,
means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though
nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or
delivering possession. The court in Maharaj Singh v. State of
UP and Others (1977) 1 SCC 155, while interpreting Section
117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 held
that ‘vesting’ is a word of slippery import and has many meaning
and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme
project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The
court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (dead) by Lrs. (2000) 8
SCC 99 held as follows:
“We do find some contentious substance in the
contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a
“vesting” certain. “To vest, generally means to give aPage 34
34
property in.” (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton.
Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in
favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts
on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50
years without any authorization cannot however but be
termed to be a contingent event. To “vest”, cannot be
termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however,
that “vested” does not necessarily and always mean
“vest in possession” but includes “vest in interest” as
well.”
29. We are of the view that so far as the present case is
concerned, the word “vesting” takes in every interest in the
property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is
always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver
possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act.
30. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of
Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section (4) of
Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period
commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1),
ending with the day specified in the declaration made under subsection (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift
or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification
and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall bePage 35
35
deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person
shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant
land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the notification
under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the
declaration made in sub-section (3), there is no question of
disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore,
continues to be with the holder of the land.
Peaceful dispossession
31. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of
“possession” which says where any land is vested in the State
Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10, the competent
authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be
in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State
Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State
Government.
32. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State
Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3)Page 36
36
to Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression “where
any land is vested” under sub-section (5) to Section 10.
Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to
Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the
compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early.
Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession,
necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing
under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver
possession. Subsection (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation of
surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while subsection (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful
dispossession.
Forceful dispossession
33. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a
person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section
(5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) to Section 10 again speaks of
“possession” which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply
with the order made under sub-section (5), the competentPage 37
37
authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to
the State Government and for that purpose, force – as may be
necessary – can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates
a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order
under sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent
authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible
dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted only in a
situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under subsection (5) to Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take
care of both the situations, i.e. taking possession by giving notice
that is “peaceful dispossession” and on failure to surrender or give
delivery of possession under Section 10(5), than “forceful
dispossession” under sub-section (6) of Section 10.
34. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6)
of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word ‘may’ has been
used therein, the word ‘may’ in both the sub-sections has to be
understood as “shall” because a court charged with the task of
enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the
legislature intended to follow from failure to implement thePage 38
38
requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or
sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result the land holder
being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has
to be read as ‘shall’.
35. Above reasoning is in consistence with the Directions 1983
which has been issued by the State Government in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 35 of the Act. Directions clearly
indicate that the procedure for taking possession of the vacant
land in excess of the prescribed ceiling limit, which reads as
under:
The Uttar Pradesh Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of
Possession payment of amount and Allied Matters)
Directions, 1983 (Directions issued by the State
Government under Section 35 of the Act, 1976):
“In exercise of the powers under Section 35 of the Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act No.33 of
1976), the governor is pleased to issue the following
directions relating to the powers and duties of the
Competent Authority in respect of amount referred to in
Section 11 of the aforesaid Act to the person or persons
entitled thereto:
1. Short title, application and Commencement –These
directions may be called the Uttar Pradesh Urban LandPage 39
39
Ceiling (Taking of Possession Payment of Amount and
Allied Matters Directions, 1983)
2. The provisions contained in this direction shall be
subjected to the provisions of any directions or rules or
orders issued by the Central Government with such
directions or rules or orders.
3. They shall come into force with effect from the date of
publication in the Gazette.
2. Definitions:-
3. Procedure for taking possession of vacant Land in
excess of Ceiling Limit-(1) The Competent Authority
will maintain a register in From No.ULC -1 for each
case regarding which notification under sub-section
(3) of Section 10 of the Act is published in the Gazette.
4. (2) an order in Form No.ULC-II will be sent to each
land holder as prescribed under sub-section (5) of
Section 109 of the Act and the date of issue and
service of the order will be entered in Column 8 of
Form No.ULC-1.
(3) On possession of the excess vacant land being
taken in accordance with the provisions of sub-section
(5) or sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Act, entries
will be made in a register in Form ULC-III and also in
Column 9 of the Form No.ULC-1. The Competent
Authority shall in token of verification of the entries,
put his signatures in column 11 of Form No.ULC-1 and
Column 10 of Form No.ULC-III.
Form No.ULC-1
Register of Notice u/s 10-(3) and 10(5)Page 40
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
S.
No
Serial No.
of Register
of Receipt
Sl. No. of
Register of
Taking
Possession
Case
Number
Date
of
Notification
u/s
10(3)
Land
to be
acquir
eed
village
Mohali
Date
of
taking
over
possession
Remarks
Signature of
Compe
-tent
Authority
Form NO. ULC-II
Notice order u/s 10(5)
(See clause (2) of Direction (3)
In the Court of Competent Authority
U.L.C. ……………
No………………… Date ………………
Sri/Smt………………………….T/o ………………………………….
In exercise of the powers vested un/s 10(5) of the Urban
Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 (Act No.33 of
1976, you are hereby informed that vide Notification
No……. dated ….. under section 10(1) published in Uttar
Pradesh Gazette dated …… following land has vested
absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances as a
consequence Notification u/s 10(3) published in Uttar
Pradesh Gazette dated ……. Notification No……… dated
…. With effect from ………. you are hereby ordered to
surrender or deliver the possession of the land to the
Collector of the District Authorised in this behalf under
Notification No.324/II-27-U.C.77 dated February 9, 1977,
published in the gazette, dated March 12, 1977, within
thirty days from the date of receipt of this order
otherwise action under sub-section (6) of Section 10 of
the Act will follow.
Description of Vacant Land
Location Khasra number
identification
Area Remarks
1 2 3 4Page 41
41
Competent Authority
………………………….
………………………….
Dated..………………………..
No.
Copy forwarded to the Collector ………… with the
request that action for immediate taking over of the
possession of the above detailed surplus land and its
proper maintenance may, kindly be taken an intimation
be given to the undersigned along with copy of
certificate to verify.
Competent Authority
………………………….
..………………………..”
36. Above-mentioned directives make it clear that sub-section
(3) takes in only de jure possession and not de facto possession,
therefore, if the land owner is not surrendering possession
voluntarily under sub-section (3) of Section 10, or surrendering or
delivering possession after notice, under Section 10(5) or
dispossession by use of force, it cannot be said that the State
Government has taken possession of the vacant land.
37. The scope of Act 33 of 1976 came up for consideration before
this Court on few occasions, reference may be made to certainPage 42
42
judgments, even though there has been no elaborate discussion of
the provision of the Act and its impact on the Repeal Act.
Reference may be made to Pt. Madan Swaroop Shrotiya
Public Charitable Trust v. State of U.P. and Others (2000) 6
SCC 325, Ghasitey Lal Sahu and Another v. Competent
Authority, Under the Urban (Ceiling and Regulation Act,
1976), U.P. and Another (2004) 13 SCC 452, Mukarram Ali
Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2007) 11 SCC 90
and Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector and
Competent Authority and Others (2012) 4 SCC 718.
Effect of the Repeal Act
38. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of the Repeal Act
15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) to Section 10 of the Act. The Repeal
Act 1999 has expressly repealed the Act 33 of 1976. The Object
and Reasons of the Repeal Act has already been referred to in the
earlier part of this Judgment. Repeal Act has, however, retained a
saving clause. The question whether a right has been acquired or
liability incurred under a statute before it is repealed will in eachPage 43
43
case depend on the construction of the statute and the facts of
the particular case.
39. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section
10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have
de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a
voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.3.1999. State has to
establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land
or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under subsection (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under subsection (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those
situations, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of
Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The State Government in this appeal
could not establish any of those situations and hence the High
Court is right in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the
benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act.
40. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment of the High
Court and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed so also the other
appeals. No documents have been produced by the State to showPage 44
44
that the respondents had been dispossessed before coming into
force of the Repeal Act and hence, the respondents are entitled to
get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. However, there will
be no order as to costs.
……………………………..J.
(K.S. Radhakrishnan)
……………………………..J.
(Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
March 11, 2013

About advocatemmmohan

ADVOCATE

Discussion

Comments are closed.

Blog Stats

  • 2,897,195 hits

ADVOCATE MMMOHAN

archieves

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,907 other followers
Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com
%d bloggers like this: