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Section 148(1) indicates that it is the discretion of a Court in appeal to direct deposit of the amount since the word ‘may’ is used before the words ‘order the appellant to deposit’ and it is only if it decides to direct deposit of the amount, it is mandatory to direct 20% of the compensation amount. Whenever a court exercises discretion, reasons for the decision taken shall be recorded. Therefore, before passing any order under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the 2024:APHC:891 6 BSB, J Crl.P.No.3048 of 2023 appellate Court is required to indicate the reasons for exercise of its discretion.

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

MONDAY ,THE EIGHTH DAY OF JANUARY

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

PRSENT

THE HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE B S BHANUMATHI

CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3048 OF 2023

Between:

1. Inaganti Gandhi, S/o Sambasiva Rao, Hindu, aged about 61 years,

R/o AppikatlaVillage, Bapatla Mandal, Guntur District.

...PETITIONER(S)

AND:

1. Mullapati Malkondaiah, S/o Rangaiah, Hindu, aged about 68 years,

R/o Chinna Pavani, Lingasamudram Mandal, Prakasam District.

2. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of

A.P. At Amaravathi, Guntur District.

...RESPONDENTS

Counsel for the Petitioner(s): NARASIMHA RAO GUDISEVA

Counsel for the Respondents: ANCHA PANDURANGA RAO

The Court made the following: ORDER

2024:APHC:891

THE HONBLE Ms. JUSTICE B.S.BHANUMATHI

Criminal Petition No. 3048 of 2023

ORDER:

 This criminal petition under Section 482 CrPC is filed to quash

the order, dated 27.03.2023, passed in Crl.M.P.No.22 of 2023 in

Criminal Appeal No.66 of 2023 on the file of the Court of IV

Additional Sessions Judge, at Nellore.

2. Heard Sri Narasimha Rao Gudiseva, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Sri Ancha Panduranga Rao, learned counsel for the

1

st respondent/complainant.

3. The facts leading to filing of the petition, are briefly as

follows:

 The petitioner is the accused in C.C.No.402 of 2017 on the file

of the Court of II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nellore,

filed by the 1st respondent herein under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Pending the case, the accused

filed petition in Crl.M.P.No.135 of 2022 to send exhibits P1 to P5,

cheques, to a handwriting expert for opinion. The petition was

dismissed by order, dated 16.12.2022. Aggrieved by the order, the

accused preferred criminal revision in C.R.P.No.3 of 2023 on the file

2024:APHC:891

2

BSB, J

Crl.P.No.3048 of 2023

of the Court of IV Additional Sessions Judge, Nellore. The petition

was dismissed on 20.02.2023.

4. Aggrieved by the said order, criminal petition in Crl. Petition

No.1504 of 2023 was filed before this Court. An interim order was

passed by this Court on 27.02.2023 granting stay of all further

proceedings including appearance of the petitioner before the trial

Court in C.C.No.402 of 2017 for a period of eight (8) weeks.

According to the petitioner/accused, the said order was informed to

the trial Court and a memo was filed on 01.03.2023 along with

‘online daily status information’ which indicated in column of ‘Short

Order’ – 01 Notice stay’. On the said memo, the trial Court passed

an order on 01.03.2023 which reads as follows:

“Heard both sides. Perused the record. The matter in

C.C.No.402/2017 was posted for judgment on 25-01-2023, but

this Court received official memo on 24-01-2023 from the

Hon’ble IV Additional District & Sessions Court, Nellore asked

entire record in Crl.M.P.No.135/2022 in this case. Hence, this

Court not pronounced judgment and posted time to time.

Finally, this Court received record on 27-02-2023 and posted

today for judgment as the matter is of 2017. On perusing the

memo filed by the petitioner/accused that he preferred revision,

but no stay granted by Hon’ble High Court of A.P., hence this

Court felt that it is not necessary to stop the proceedings and

inclined to go further. Accordingly, the memo is closed/

answered in the interest of justice.”

2024:APHC:891

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BSB, J

Crl.P.No.3048 of 2023

5. In spite of information regarding the stay granted by this

Court, the trial Court pronounced the judgment on 01.03.2023 by

convicting the petitioner. Hence, the accused preferred an appeal,

vide Criminal Appeal No.66 of 2023 along with which he also filed

Crl.M.P.No.22 of 2023 seeking to suspend the operation of the

sentence imposed in C.C.No.402 of 2017. The appellate Court, vide

order dated 27.03.2023, suspended the operation of the sentence

alone subject to condition of depositing 20% of Rs.70,00,000/- on

or before 27.04.2023.

6. Aggrieved by the condition to deposit 20% of the amount, the

petitioner/accused filed this petition contending that the said

condition is onerous and it ought not to have been ordered.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted mainly that

the condition to deposit is not mandatory and is discretionary as can

be seen from the language of Section 148 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act and it is only if the Court decides to impose such

condition, the minimum amount to be ordered for deposit is 20%,

but the appellate Court failed to exercise its discretion in the light of

the facts and circumstances in this case, because the judgment of

the trial Court is unsustainable in view of the order of stay granted

by this Court.

2024:APHC:891

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BSB, J

Crl.P.No.3048 of 2023

8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent

submitted that a judgment passed in the absence of communication

of the order of stay is valid and placed reliance on the decision in

Seva Singh Vs. State1

. He further submitted that there is no

communication of order of stay in the present case as is evident

from the order on the memo and therefore, the appellate Court is

not in error in directing to deposit 20% of the compensation

amount.

9. Since this petition is against the order directing deposit of the

amount by exercising jurisdiction under Section 148 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, this Court is not inclined to examine

the prayer whether the judgment passed by the trial Court is legal

or not.

10. Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 reads as

under:

“148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment

pending appeal against conviction.---(1) Notwithstanding

anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2

of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under

Section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to

deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty percent

of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court.


1

[1953] THE INDIAN LAW REPORTS 206

2024:APHC:891

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BSB, J

Crl.P.No.3048 of 2023

 Provided that the amount payable under this subsection shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by

the appellant under Section 143A.

 (2) The amount referred to in sub-section (1) shall be

deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within

such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be

directed by the Court on sufficient case being shown by the

appellant.

 (3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the

amount deposited by the appellant to the complainant at any

time during the pendency of the appeal.

 Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court

shall direct the complainant to repay to the appellant the

amount so released, with interest at the bank rate as published

by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the

relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the

order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as

may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown

by the complainant.”

11. A perusal of the above provision in Section 148(1) indicates

that it is the discretion of a Court in appeal to direct deposit of the

amount since the word ‘may’ is used before the words ‘order the

appellant to deposit’ and it is only if it decides to direct deposit of

the amount, it is mandatory to direct 20% of the compensation

amount. Whenever a court exercises discretion, reasons for the

decision taken shall be recorded. Therefore, before passing any

order under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the

2024:APHC:891

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BSB, J

Crl.P.No.3048 of 2023

appellate Court is required to indicate the reasons for exercise of its

discretion.

12. In the present case, since there is a serious dispute about the

legality of the judgment passed by the trial Court while the order of

stay was in force and the same is yet to be decided, the appellate

Court is expected to give reasons as to why in spite of such ground

taken in appeal, it is required to deposit the amount under Section

148 of the Act. But, the appellate Court in its brief order, merely by

referring to Section 148(1) of the Act, directed the petitioner to

deposit 20% of the compensation amount ordered by the trial

Court. It is pertinent to mention the relevant portion of the order at

paragraphs No.6 & 7 which are as follows:

“6. In view of Amendment of Negotiable Instruments

(Amendment) Act, 2018 (No.20 of 2018), dated 2.8.2018,

Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act No.26 of

2015) (w.e.f 15.6.2015) under Section 148(1), Appellate Court

has power to order payment pending appeal against conviction,

since section reads “Not withstanding anything contained in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in an appeal by the drawer

against conviction under Section 138, appellate Court may order

appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of

twenty percent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial

Court.” Considering the same, sentence alone imposed by trial

Court is suspended.

7. In the result, petition is allowed by suspending the

operation of sentence alone till disposal of the main appeal as

2024:APHC:891

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BSB, J

Crl.P.No.3048 of 2023

imposed by the trial Court subject to deposit of 20% of the

compensation amount into trial Court i.e.,20% out of

Rs.70,00,000/- on or before 27-04-2023. Failing which, the

appellate Court will proceed as per law. “

13. Therefore, it is apparent that the appellate Court has failed to

give reasons in support of its order and probably under the

impression that it is mandatory to direct deposit of amount, passed

the impugned order. Time and again, the Constitutional courts

held that giving reasons is the backbone of an order for its

sustenance. Yet, there are many instances where Courts fail to

record reasons making the order under challenge vulnerable for

interference.

14. As such, for the above reasons, the impugned order needs to

be set aside directing the appellate Court to dispose of the petition

afresh.

15. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed. The order,

dated 27.03.2023, passed in Crl.M.P.No.22 of 2023 in Criminal

Appeal No.66 of 2023 is set aside and the appellate Court is

directed to dispose of the petition afresh giving reasons.

 Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.

__________________

 B.S.BHANUMATHI, J

08-01-2024

RAR

2024:APHC:891

„soon before‟ is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straightjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. No definite period has been indicated. Soon before death is not defined. The Court has to decide as to what is soon before death, basing on the proximity test. 44) Now, coming to the case on hand the allegations were such that after the deceased and accused were blessed with two children, accused used to demand for additional amounts. The evidence of P.W.1 means that the so-called harassment meted out by the deceased in the hands of the accused was continuing one. It is to be noted that the evidence of P.W.1 means that accused used to beat the deceased and ultimately he beaten the deceased and made her to consume pesticide resulting her death. Her evidence means that she found injury on the back side of the head of the deceased. As this Court already pointed out the medical officer who conducted autopsy testified about the presence of the injury. P.W.5, the Mandal Executive Magistrate also testified the same. It was not healed injury according to the evidence available on record. 2024:APHC:4 34 Before the medical officer who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased, accused did not challenge his testimony disputing the presence of the injury. So, the very existence of a cut injury present on left temporial region of skull size 1 x 2 cms., seize with bone deep was prior to the death of the deceased. Though the causing of such an injury and consumption of pesticide was not at one but the same time, the injury on the dead body of the deceased must have been caused just on the date of death of the deceased or prior to the date. The prosecution let in cogent evidence that the deceased and accused were alone residing together in a separate portion, though the in-laws were there in the same roof. It is not the case of the accused that he was not present when the deceased committed suicide. There was specific evidence of P.W.1 that when she found the dead body of the deceased by going to her house on hearing the news neither accused nor any other of the inmates were found. So, it is a case where the accused absconding after the episode. Some facts which are within the exclusive knowledge of the accused have to be explained by the accused.

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

TUESDAY ,THE SECOND DAY OF JANUARY

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

PRSENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A V RAVINDRA BABU

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1225 OF 2009

Between:

1. MAMIDI MARIADASU, S/o Nanaiah

Coolie,

R/o Lachannagudipudi Village,

Tadikonda Mandal,

Guntur District.

...PETITIONER(S)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF AP REP BY ITS PP HYD., rep. by its Public Prosecutor,

High Court of A.P., at Hyderabad.

...RESPONDENTS

Counsel for the Petitioner(s): MD SALEEM

Counsel for the Respondents: PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)

The Court made the following: ORDER

2024:APHC:4

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

****

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1225 OF 2009

Between:

Mamidi Mariadasu, S/o Nanaiah, aged about

27 years, Coolie, R/o Lachannagudipudi Village,

Tadikonda Mandal, Guntur District. ... Appellant/Accused.

 Versus

The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by Public Prosecutor,

High Court of A.P. ... Respondent/Complainant.

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 02.01.2024

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

 may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes/No

2. Whether the copy of judgment may be

 marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the

 Fair copy of the judgment? Yes/No



 ______________________

 A.V.RAVINDRA BABU, J

2024:APHC:4

2

* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU

+ CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1225 OF 2009

% 02.01.2024

# Between:

Mamidi Mariadasu, S/o Nanaiah, aged about

27 years, Coolie, R/o Lachannagudipudi Village,

Tadikonda Mandal, Guntur District. ... Appellant/Accused.

 Versus

The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by Public Prosecutor,

High Court of A.P. ... Respondent/Complainant.

! Counsel for the Appellant:

 Sri Shaik Meeravalli, learned counsel,

 representing Sri Md. Saleem.



^ Counsel for the Respondent : Public Prosecutor

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

(2008) 12 Supreme Court Cases

(2004) 4 SCC 470

This Court made the following:

2024:APHC:4

3

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. RAVINDRA BABU

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1225 OF 2009

JUDGMENT:-

Challenge in this Criminal Appeal is to the judgment, dated

12.10.2009 in Sessions Case No.628 of 2008, on the file of I

Additional District & Sessions Judge, Guntur (“Additional

Sessions Judge” for short), whereunder the leaned Additional

Sessions Judge, found the accused guilty of the charge under

Sections 304-B as well as 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”

for short), convicted him under Section 235(2) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure (“Cr.P.C.” for short) and after questioning

him about the quantum of sentence, sentenced him to suffer

rigorous imprisonment for 7 years for the charge under Section

304-B of IPC and further sentenced him to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for 2 years and to pay a fine of Rs.100/- in default

to suffer simple imprisonment for 15 days for the charge under

Section 498-A of IPC and that both the sentences shall run

concurrently.

2) The parties to this Criminal Appeal will hereinafter

be referred to as described before the learned Additional

Sessions Judge for the sake of convenience.

3) The Sessions Case No.628 of 2008 arose out of a

committal order in PRC.No.77 of 2008, on the file of Additional

2024:APHC:4

4

Junior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, pertaining to Crime No.12 of

2007 of Tadikonda police station.

4) The case of the prosecution, in brief, according to the

contents of charge sheet filed by the State, represented by the

Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Guntur Rural Police Station, is as

follows:

(i) One Mamidi Mariamma (hereinafter will be called as

“deceased”) is the wife of the accused. Their marriage took

place about five years back. The accused and the deceased lived

happily for about two years and they have begotten two

children. Thereafter the accused got addicted to alcohol and

started harassing the deceased by subjecting her to both

physically and mentally for additional dowry. The deceased

informed her parents, P.W.1 and P.W.9, who on the first

occasion gave a ceiling fan and cash of Rs.5,000/- to the

accused. The accused was not satisfied and continued harassing

the deceased on one pretext or the other. About three months

prior to the date of offence, the deceased and the accused came

to the house of P.W.1 and P.W.9 at Nidumukkala Village. As per

the demand of the accused, P.W.1 and P.W.9 purchased a shebuffalo worth about Rs.9,500/- and gave it to the accused. Still

the accused continued to harass the deceased in spite of his

parents‟ reprimanding him.

2024:APHC:4

5

(ii) On 01.12.2007 at about 7-00 p.m., a quarrel took

place between the deceased and the accused as the deceased

intended to present clothes to her sister which was refused by

the accused on the ground that he had no money. Then the

deceased questioned the accused how he has got money for

consuming alcohol. Then the accused beat the deceased in the

presence of his mother and P.W.2 who reprimanded the

accused, and sent him away. The mother of the accused along

with the son of the accused left the house for prayers leaving

the deceased alone in the house. The deceased having got

vexed with the attitude of her husband, committed suicide by

consuming poison.

(iii) On a report given by P.W.1 on 02.02.2007, P.W.7

registered the crime and P.W.8 took up the investigation.

Inquest was held over the body of the deceased by P.W.5, the

Mandal Revenue Officer and other panch witnesses. The body of

the deceased was sent for postmortem examination. The doctor,

who conducted autopsy, opined that the deceased appears to

have been died due to Organo Phosphorous poison. During the

course of investigation, P.W.8 visited the scene of offence,

observed the scene, seized the material objects available at the

scene of offence, prepared a rough sketch and recorded the

statements of the witnesses. The material objects were sent to

2024:APHC:4

6

the RFSL for analysis. During the course of investigation, the

accused was arrested on 06.02.2007 and sent for remand. After

completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed before the

Additional Junior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri.

5) The learned Additional Junior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri,

took cognizance of the case under Sections 304-B and 498-A of

IPC. After appearance of the accused and on compliance of the

provisions contemplated under Section 207 of Cr.P.C., the

learned Additional Junior Civil Judge, committed the case to the

Court of Sessions, thereupon it was numbered the same as

Sessions Case and made over to the Court of learned I

Additional District & Sessions Judge, Guntur, for disposal, in

accordance with law.

6) On appearance of the accused before the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, charge under Section 304-B as well

as 498-A of IPC were framed and read and explained to the

accused in Telugu for which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to

be tried.

7) In order to establish the guilt against the accused, on

behalf of the prosecution, P.W.1 to P.W.12 were examined and

Ex.P.1 to P.9 were marked. After closure of the evidence of

prosecution, accused was examined under Section 313 of

Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating circumstances

2024:APHC:4

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appearing in the evidence let in by the prosecution, for which he

denied the same and stated that he has no defence witnesses.

8) The learned Additional Sessions Judge on hearing

both sides and on considering the oral as well as documentary

evidence, found the accused guilty of the charge under Sections

304-B as well as 498-A of IPC and after questioning him about

the quantum of sentence, sentenced him as above. Felt

aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful accused filed the

present appeal.

9) Now, in deciding the present criminal appeal, the

points for determination are as follows:

(1) Whether the prosecution proved that on

01.02.2007 accused caused the death of deceased

by subjecting her to cruelty both mentally and

physically with a demand to bring money as

additional dowry?

(2) Whether the prosecution proved the charge

under Sections 304-B as well as 498-A of IPC

beyond reasonable doubt?

(3) Whether the judgment, dated 12.10.2009 of the

learned Additional Sessions Judge is sustainable

under law and facts and whether there are any

grounds to interfere with the same?

2024:APHC:4

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Point Nos.1 to 3:

10) P.W.1 was no other than the defacto-complainant

being the mother of the deceased. According to her, her third

daughter was Mariamma, who was given in marriage to the

accused about seven years ago prior to her evidence. Her

daughter died about more than two years ago. The deceased

and accused lived together happily for few years. Later, the

accused started harassing the deceased demanding to get more

dowry. They were blessed with one son and daughter. The

accused was demanding more money and she paid. She was

giving an amount of Rs.2,000/- whenever accused was

demanding. She paid an amount of Rs.10,000/- on one occasion

and further an amount of Rs.10,000/- to purchase a she-buffalo

at another occasion. Her daughter was beaten and she was

made consumption of pesticide resulting her death. In the

month of February during midnight her daughter consumed

pesticide. Then she along with neighbours went to the house of

accused and found the dead body of her deceased daughter.

Neither the accused nor any of his inmates were found when

they reached there. They went to the police station and gave a

report. Ex.P.1 is the report. She is an illiterate. They found

injury on the head of the deceased. There was one injury on the

back side of the head. Though she observed the other injuries,

2024:APHC:4

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the Sub-Inspector of Police objected her. The deceased died due

to harassment of the accused. The Mandal Revenue Officer and

police examined her.

11) P.W.9 was father of deceased, who spoke about the

marriage between the deceased and accused about five years

ago prior to the incident and that they lived together happily for

some time. Thereafter, the accused started to harass his

daughter to get more money. He paid Rs.5,000/- at one

occasion and Rs.10,000/- at another occasion. Accused informed

to the Pastor of their village that their daughter died. On receipt

of the information, he went to the house of accused and found

the deceased at the house of the accused with an injury on her

head. He was present at the time of inquest held over the dead

body of the deceased.

12) P.W.10 was brother of the deceased and he

supported the case of the prosecution. According to him, on

receiving a phone call from the Pastor they went to the house of

accused and found the dead body of the deceased. By then none

were present. Accused was given cash of Rs.16,000/-, gold

studs and silver anklets. They gave Rs.5,000/- at one occasion

and Rs.9,500/- at another occasion to purchase a she-buffalo on

demand made by the accused. Accused beat the deceased and

2024:APHC:4

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murdered her for money. He was present at the time of inquest

over the dead body of the deceased.

13) P.W.11 was a hearsay witness and according to him,

the deceased died about three years back in connection with the

demand for additional dowry.

14) P.W.12, cousin of the deceased, was such that the

deceased was married to the accused five years prior to the date

of her death. By the time they went to the house of accused,

they were told that the deceased was done to death. The

deceased and her husband were cordial. Whenever they asked

P.W.1 was giving some money.

15) Apart from the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.9 to P.W.12,

the kith and kin of the deceased, prosecution examined P.W.2,

who supported to a certain extent about the case of the

prosecution. The evidence of P.W.2 is that she is a coolie worker

and she knows the accused, who is their villager. She knows the

deceased-Mariamma, who died three years back by consuming

pesticide. She does not know why the deceased consumed

pesticide. The deceased and accused used to live cordially. She

did not witness the deceased consuming pesticide. Neither the

accused nor his parents were present in the house. The

prosecution got declared her as hostile and during cross

2024:APHC:4

11

examination she denied that she stated before police as in

Ex.P.2.

16) P.W.3 was the inquest panchayatdar, who supported

the case of the prosecution. According to him, originally he was

a Panchayat Secretary to Ravela village and in February, 2007,

he was in-charge Panchayat Secretary of Lachannagudipudi. He

was present at the time of inquest over the dead body of the

deceased which was held during mid-day. Surpanch and ExSurpanch were also present by then. They were of the opinion

that the deceased committed suicide by consuming pesticide

due to family disputes in connection with additional amounts.

Ex.P.3 is Inquest panchanama prepared by the police.

17) P.W.4, mediator for observation of the scene of

offence, deposed that at request of police he was present at the

time of observation of the scene of offence on 02.02.2007. He

had seen the dead body of the deceased. Ex.P.4 is the scene of

observation report. He signed on it.

18) Turing to the evidence of P.W.5, the Mandal

Executive Magistrate, he testified that at the request of Station

House Officer, Tadikonda, he conducted inquest over the dead

body of the deceased on 02.02.2007 at 11-00 a.m. He could

complete it by 1-00 p.m. They found some injuries on the head

and left side above ear of the dead body. He examined P.W.1,

2024:APHC:4

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P.W.2, L.W.2-Akkaiah, L.W.3-Jojibabu, L.W.4-Vijayaraju and

L.W.5-Gunti Vijaya Raju. They were of the view about the

injuries found on the dead body of the deceased and opined that

she died due to harassment. After inquest, the dead body was

sent for postmortem examination.

19) P.W.6 was Medical Officer, who conducted autopsy

over the dead body of the deceased. According to him, on

02.02.2007 he conducted postmortem examination over the

dead body of Mamidi Mariamma at about 4-30 p.m. and found a

cut injury present on left temporial region of skull size 1 x 2

cms., size with bone deep. He further spoke of the internal

findings and his evidence with regard to the opinion is that the

cause of death is due to consumption of Organo Phosphorous

insecticide poison. Ex.P.5 is the postmortem report and Ex.P.6 is

the RFSL report.

20) P.W.7 was Sub-Inspector of Police, who registered

FIR, basing on Ex.P.1 and he spoke of the registration of FIR on

receipt of report from P.W.1 on 02.02.2007 at 6-00 a.m. and

issued Ex.P.7 original FIR. He informed to SDPO, Guntur Rural,

about the registration of FIR. As per the instructions of SDPO,

he went to the scene of offence and made arrangements for

guarding the scene of offence. SDPO took up investigation in

this case.

2024:APHC:4

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21) P.W.8 was SDPO, who was the investigating officer.

According to him, on 02.02.2007 at 6-50 a.m., he received

information from the Sub-Inspector of Police, Tadikonda Police

Station, about the registration of subject matter of FIR. He

instructed the Sub-Inspector of Police to give requisition to

Mandal Revenue Officer to conduct inquest. He also instructed

the Sub-Inspector of Police to proceed to the scene of offence

and to take measures to guard the same. At 8-30 p.m., he

visited Lachannagaudipadu village and met P.W.7 at the scene

of offence. He has gone through the FIR handed over by P.W.7.

He secured the presence of P.W.3 and T. Usha Rani, Surpanch of

the village and inspected the scene of offence and prepared

Ex.P.4-observation report. After inquest was conducted by the

Mandal Executive Magistrate, he examined P.W.1, Akkaiah,

Jogipababu, Anjaneyulu, Vijaybabu and Sudersanam Seetha. He

prepared rough sketch which is Ex.P.7. On 03.02.2007 he

received information from known source about an empty poison

tin used by the deceased which was lying in bushes near to the

house of Tumannapalli Prabhudasu. He went there and found an

empty tin containing a label Suvidha, a Bio fertilizer for weed

killing. He seized it under the cover of Ex.P.9 seizure mahazar.

On 06.02.2007 he arrested the accused at 2-00 p.m. near

Tadikonda cross roads and sent him to the remand. He visited

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14

Lachannagudipadu Village and secured Ghantasala Koteswara

Rao and Sudarshanam Nageswara Rao and examined them. On

20.02.2007 he sent a letter of advice to the FSL along with

visera preserved by the medical officer. After receipt of FSL

report and the final opinion of the Doctor, he filed charge sheet.

22) Sri Shaik Meeravalli, learned counsel, representing

Sri Md. Saleem, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,

would contend that P.W.1, P.W.9 to P.W.12 were the kith and

kin of the deceased. Their evidence was interested in nature.

P.W.2 did not support the case of the prosecution and she

turned hostile to the case of the prosecution. As the deceased

was not interested in attending agricultural operations and

having vexed with the life, in which she had to work as collie,

she took extreme step of commission of suicide for which the

accused cannot held liable. Though FIR speaks of alleged role of

in-laws, investigating officer deleted their names during

investigation. Ex.P.1 was with falsity. The learned Additional

Sessions Judge did not appreciate the evidence in proper

perspective. The prosecution did not prove the allegations of

demand for additional dowry. The deceased family was not

afforded to pay any amount to the accused. They had no

financial capacity to meet with any demand of dowry, as such,

their contention that they paid the amounts does not arise.

2024:APHC:4

15

There was no demand to purchase a she-buffalo and in fact the

she-buffalo was purchased with the amount of the accused. By

any stretch of imagination, the demand, if any, for purchasing a

she-buffalo, cannot be taken as a demand for additional dowry.

When there was no support to the evidence of interested

witnesses from independent source, the conviction of the

accused for the allegations under Sections 304-B and 498-A of

IPC is not at all sustainable. With the above submissions, he

would contend that the appeal is liable to be allowed.

23) Sri N. Sravan Kumar, learned counsel, representing

the learned Public Prosecutor, would contend that it is a case

where the death was occurred within seven years from the date

of marriage in the house of in-laws other than in normal

circumstances. There was presence of an injury on the neck

portion of the deceased. The evidence would prove that prior to

the death, the deceased was subjected to physical torture, as

such, she committed suicide. There was consistent evidence

with regard to the demand made by the accused for additional

dowry amounts which is by virtue of evidence of P.W.1, P.W.9 to

P.W.12. In support of his contention, the learned counsel,

representing the learned Public Prosecutor, would rely upon a

decision in State of Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram1

. The learned


1

(2008) 12 Supreme Court Cases 51

2024:APHC:4

16

Additional Sessions Judge rightly appreciated the evidence on

record, found the accused guilty of the charges, as such, there

are no grounds to interfere with the judgment of conviction.

With the above submissions, he would argue that the appeal is

liable to be dismissed.

24) The charges are under Sections 498-A and 304-B of

IPC.

Section 498-A of IPC runs as follows:

[498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting

her to cruelty.—

Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a

woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and

shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”

means.—

(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to

drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or

danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of

the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a

view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any

unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on

account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet

such demand.]

Section 304-B of IPC runs as follows:

1[304B. Dowry death. - (1) Where the death of a woman

is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise

than under normal circumstances within seven years of her

marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she

was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or

2024:APHC:4

17

any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any

demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry

death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to

have caused her death.

Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry"

shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven

years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.]

25) Apart from the above, there is a presumption under

Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 regarding dowry

death which runs as follows:

 Section 113-B in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

"113-B: Presumption as to dowry death- When the

question is whether a person has committed the

dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon

before her death such woman has been subjected by

such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in

connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court

shall presume that such person had caused the dowry

death.

Explanation - For the purposes of this section 'dowry

death' shall have the same meaning as in Section

304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

26) For better appreciation, it is pertinent to refer here

firstly, the substance of Ex.P.1 lodged by P.W.1. As seen from

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18

Ex.P.1, the allegations in substance were that the marriage of

the accused and deceased took place about five years ago.

Since three years, her son-in-law was harassing her daughter

for getting more dowry. Her daughter told the facts to her. As

they were not in a position to see the harassment physically and

mentally, for the first time, she gave a ceiling fan and cash of

Rs.5,000/- during the month of August. Three months ago, her

daughter came to the house and told to her that her husband

beaten her to get money. She sent back her daughter as she

had no money. One week or ten days later both wife and

husband came together and asked her to purchase a she-buffalo

and she gave it to them an amount of Rs.9,500/- and they

purchased a she-buffalo. Ten days before Christmas also

accused beat her daughter. Having coming to know about the

same, they took her daughter to their house. They sent her on

the first day of January. In one occasion, her daughter came to

their house. There was a big injury on the head of her daughter.

Her daughter number of times told about the harassment and

cruelty towards her made by her husband. Ultimately, on one

day before the report at 11-30 a.m., she came to know that her

daughter is in serious condition and they went to

Lachannagudipadu village and found her died. The husband and

2024:APHC:4

19

in-laws of deceased were not there by then. This is the sum and

substance of the report.

27) As seen from the evidence of P.W.1 as referred to

above, she supported the case of the prosecution undoubtedly.

Her evidence has support from the contents of Ex.P.1.

28) There is no dispute during cross examination of

P.W.1 that the death of the deceased was occurred within seven

years from the date of her marriage. This fact was not at all in

dispute. Place of death of the deceased was in the in-laws

house. The cause of death was due to consumption of insecticide

poison. Apart from this, there was evidence of inquest

panchayatdar-P.W.3 and P.W.5-the Mandal Executive Magistrate

that cause of death of the deceased was due to consumption of

poison and she committed suicide. There was evidence of P.W.1

to the effect that she found injury on the back side of the head

of the deceased. P.W.5, the Mandal Executive Magistrate,

deposed that they found some injuries on the head and left side

of the above ear of the dead body. There was also evidence of

P.W.6-medical officer, noting a cut injury present on left

temporial region of skull size 1 x 2 cms., with bone deep. The

accused did not dispute the presence of the injury, as spoken to

by P.W.6. What he elicited from P.W.6 is that consumption of

poison is only the reason for death. It is no doubt true that the

2024:APHC:4

20

injury which was found on left temporial region of skull size 1 x

2 cms., was not the reason for her death according to P.W.6,

but the presence of such injury was not at all in dispute. All

these go to show that the death of the deceased was otherwise

than in normal circumstances within a period of seven years

from the date of marriage. The prosecution quietly satisfied the

ingredients that were within seven years and that it was

otherwise than in normal circumstances.

29) Now, the Court has to look into as to whether the

prosecution proved the allegations of cruelty within the meaning

of Section 498-A of IPC and that the deceased died on account

of harassment made against her soon before her death.

30) The sum and substance of the case of the

prosecution is that the deceased committed suicide on account

of physical and mental harassment from the part of the accused

demanding her to bring additional amounts towards dowry.

Now, this Court has to look whether the evidence on record

would prove such allegations. P.W.1 spoke of the so-called

demands made by the accused literally in her evidence.

Similarly, P.W.9-the father of the deceased, spoke of the above

and there is also evidence of P.W.10 and P.W.12 to that effect.

Now, it is a matter of appreciation to decide as to whether the

evidence of kith and kin of the deceased in this regard is

2024:APHC:4

21

believable. To decide the same, it is pertinent to look into the

defence of the accused in the light of their cross examination.

31) Turning to the evidence of P.W.1 during cross

examination she deposed that accused was living separately in a

portion of his parents‟ house. The deceased was coming to their

house twice or thrice in a year for festivals. At one occasion,

the deceased came after the quarrel with the accused.

Deceased came to their house on two or three occasions prior to

her death due to disputes with the accused. She does not know

that the deceased was in the habit of watching TV in the house

of her mother-in-law. The deceased did not intimate to her that

she intends to purchase gold for her ornaments. The accused

was attending coolie works. She denied a suggestion that the

deceased was interested in luxurious life and she was not

attending agricultural works. She paid all the amounts to the

accused at her house. She was not informed by the deceased

that she insisted the accused for money to present a saree to

her elder sister. The deceased elder sister presented a saree to

her. The deceased did not present a saree to her elder sister.

She deposed in cross examination that as the accused was

beating the deceased on her head frequently the deceased got

head ache and she purchased glasses on examination. She

denied that the deceased was not attending agricultural works.

2024:APHC:4

22

The injury on the body of the deceased was found to be fresh,

but it is old one. She denied that the accused was looking after

the deceased and she (P.W.1) is insisting the accused to

purchase luxurious articles to the deceased. She denied that she

is deposing false.

32) Turning to the evidence of P.W.9, the father of the

deceased, in cross examination he reiterated that accused asked

for dowry and they gave it. He denied that they gave

presentations as per their wish and pleasure. The accused and

his parents resided under the same roof but they have separate

mess. He denied that he got purchased a she-buffalo to the

accused with the money of the accused. He denied that the

deceased does not attend coolie works and that she committed

suicide for the reasons best known to her and that he is

deposing false.

33) According to P.W.10, the accused and deceased

came together to purchase she-buffalo. He denied that shebuffalo was purchased by the money of the accused. He denied

that the accused never demanded for additional dowry and he is

deposing false.

34) According to P.W.12, he does not know the reason

for the death of deceased.

2024:APHC:4

23

35) It is to be noted that the very defence of the

accused is that as the deceased was not willing to do agricultural

works and she was interested to lead a luxurious life, she

committed suicide. As this Court already pointed out that P.W.2

to a certain extent supported the case of the prosecution, but

certain extent she did not support the case of the prosecution.

During cross examination by the learned defence counsel, P.W.2

categorically deposed that the deceased was attending

agricultural coolie works. P.W.1 gave money to the accused and

deceased for purchasing she-buffalo. The very defence of the

accused that the deceased averted to attend agricultural works

was falsified by virtue of the answers elicited during cross

examination of P.W.2. After the prosecution got declared P.W.2

as hostile, the learned defence counsel elicited some answers

from the mouth of P.W.2 which shatters and which falsifies the

defence of the accused. According to the contention of the

accused, the she-buffalo was purchased with the money of the

accused. It is rather improbable to assume that for purchase of

a she-buffalo accused need not come to the house of P.W.1

along with the deceased. The accused elicited from the mouth of

P.W.2 that P.W.1 gave money to the accused and deceased for

purchasing a she-buffalo. The entire evidence of the prosecution

proves that on demand of accused only, P.W.1 gave money to

2024:APHC:4

24

the accused and deceased to purchase a she-buffalo. The

accused has no definite stand. At one hand his contention is that

whatever they were given by P.W.1 were voluntarily. It is very

difficult to accept such a defence of the accused. In my

considered view, there were no abnormalities in the evidence of

P.W.1 and P.W.9. This Court has no reason to disbelieve the

evidence of P.W.1 that on demand made by the accused, she

used to pay some amounts to the accused including the amount

to purchase a she-buffalo.

36) Now, it is a matter of appreciation as to whether

such demands proved by the prosecution would fall under the

purview of dowry harassment. At this juncture, it is pertinent to

look into the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in The

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa and others2

.

It is a case where the learned Sessions Judge found favour with

the case of the prosecution and convicted A-1 to A-3. They filed

an Appeal before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the High

Court reversed the judgment of conviction on the findings that

to constitute dowry, demand should be made directly or

indirectly either at the time of marriage or before the marriage

or at any time after the marriage and that if there was no

agreement between the parties to give or take any property or


2 (2004) 4 SCC 470

2024:APHC:4

25

valuable security and after the marriage if further amounts are

demanded, such demand will not fall within the meaning of

dowry. While holding so, the High Court of A.P. reversed the

judgment of conviction. Then, the State of Andhra Pradesh went

for Appeal in Criminal Appeal No.384 of 1998 before the Hon‟ble

Apex Court. The Hon‟ble Apex Court dealt with the essential

ingredients Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and further looked

into the term dowry as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961 and held that under Section 304-B IPC

demand of dowry itself is punishable and it neither conceives or

conceive of any agreement. If for convicting any offender,

agreement for dowry is to be proved, hardly any offenders

would come under the clutches of law.

37) The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Raj Gopal Asawa (2nd

supra) at Para Nos.6 and 7 dealt with the essential ingredients

of Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and further the definition of

the word „dowry’ in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and

dealt with the issue elaborately at Para Nos.8 to 11. It is

necessary to extract here the observations of the Hon‟ble Apex

Court, as above:

“8. Explanation to Section 304B refers to dowry "as

having the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Act", the

question is: what is the periphery of the dowry as defined

therein? The argument is, there has to be an agreement

2024:APHC:4

26

at the time of the marriage in view of the words "agreed

to be given" occurring therein, and in the absence of any

such evidence it would not constitute to be a dowry. It is

noticeable, as this definition by amendment includes not

only the period before and at the marriage but also the

period subsequent to the marriage. This position was

highlighted in Pawan Kumar and Ors. v. State of Haryana

(1998 CriLJ 1 144) .

9. The offence alleged against the respondents is under

Section 304B IPC which makes "demand of dowry" itself

punishable. Demand neither conceives nor would conceive

of any agreement. If for convicting any offender,

agreement for dowry is to be proved, hardly any offenders

would come under the clutches of law. When Section 304B

refers to "demand of dowry", it refers to the demand of

property or valuable security as referred to in the

definition of "dowry" under the Act. The argument that

there is no demand of dowry, in the present case, has no

force. In cases of dowry deaths and suicides,

circumstantial evidence plays an important role and

inferences can be drawn on the basis of such evidence.

That could be either direct or indirect. It is significant that

Section 4 of the Act, was also amended by means of Act

63 of 1984, under which it is an offence to demand dowry

directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or

guardian of a bride. The word "agreement" referred to in

Section 2 has to be inferred on the facts and

circumstances of each case. The interpretation that the

respondents seek, that conviction can only be if there is

agreement for dowry, is misconceived. This would be

contrary to the mandate and object of the Act. "Dowry"

definition is to be interpreted with the other provisions of

the Act including Section 3, which refers to giving or

2024:APHC:4

27

taking dowry and Section 4 which deals with a penalty for

demanding dowry, under the Act and the IPC. This makes

it clear that even demand of dowry on other ingredients

being satisfied is punishable. It is not always necessary

that there be any agreement for dowry.

10. Section 113B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for

the case at hand. Both Section 304B IPC and Section

113B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by

the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a

view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths.

Section 113B reads as follows:-

"113-B: Presumption as to dowry death- When the

question is whether a person has committed the

dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon

before her death such woman has been subjected

by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in

connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court

shall presume that such person had caused the

dowry death.

Explanation - For the purposes of this section

'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in

Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of

1860)."

The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been

amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st


Report dated 10th August, 1988 on 'Dowry Deaths and

Law Reform'. Keeping in view the impediment in the preexisting law in securing evidence to prove dowry related

deaths, legislature thought it wise to insert a provision

relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain

essentials. It is in this background presumptive Section

2024:APHC:4

28

113B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the

definition of 'dowry death' in Section 304B IPC and the

wording in the presumptive Section 113B of the Evidence

Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in

both the provisions is that the concerned woman must

have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or

harassment "for or in connection with the demand of

dowry". Presumption under Section 113B is a presumption

of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it

becomes obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption

that the accused caused the dowry death. The

presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following

essentials:

(1) The question before the Court must be whether

the accused has committed the dowry death of a

woman. (This means that the presumption can be

raised only if the accused is being tried for the

offence under Section 304B IPC).

(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or

harassment by her husband or his relatives.

(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in

connection with any demand for dowry.

(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before

her death.

11. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act

and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material

to show that soon before her death the victim was

subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to

rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so

as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring

2024:APHC:4

29

otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression

'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113B of the

Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC are pressed into

service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before

the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only

in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard

has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative

term and it would depend upon circumstances of each

case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to

what would constitute a period of soon before the

occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed

period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity

test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well

as for raising a presumption under Section 113B of the

Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used

in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of

the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test.

No definite period has been indicated and the expression

'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression

'soon before' used in Section 114. Illustration (a) of the

Evidence At is relevant. It lays down that a Court may

presume that a man who is in the possession of goods

'soon after the theft, is either the thief has received the

goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account

for his possession. The determination of the period which

can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be

determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and

circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate

that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply

that the interval should not be much between the

concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in

question. There must be existence of a proximate and livelink between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand

2024:APHC:4

30

and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is

remote in time and has become stale enough not to

disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it

would be of no consequence”.

38) In the light of the above decision of the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court, there need not be any agreement at the time of

marriage with regard to the dowry. As this Court already pointed

out that the death of the deceased was otherwise than in normal

circumstances and was within a period of seven years from the

date of marriage.

39) As this Court already pointed out the prosecution by

virtue of the evidence let in proved to the fact that on demand

made by the accused, P.W.1 used to pay some amounts and

further she paid an amount of Rs.9,500/- or Rs.10,000/- to the

accused so as to purchase a she-buffalo. Apart from this, the

cause set up by the accused that the deceased committed

suicide as she averted to attend the agricultural coolie works

was falsified by virtue of the evidence of P.W.2.

40) Now, it is a matter of appreciation to decide as to

whether the evidence let in by the prosecution would meet the

proximity test to the effect that alleged death of the deceased

was in consequences to the harassment.

41) As seen from the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in Jaggu Ram’s case (1 supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court

2024:APHC:4

31

held that the expression soon before her death as mentioned in

Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act

is to be decided by the Court after analysing facts and

circumstances leading to the death of victim whether there is

any proximate connection between the demand of dowry, the

act of cruelty or harassment or death.

42) Admittedly, in view of the language employed in

Section 304-B IPC as well as Section 113-B of the Evidence Act,

relating to the presumption under dowry deaths, prosecution is

bound to establish that such demands are made soon before her

death. What is „soon before the death‟ is a question to be

considered by this Court. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Raj Gopal

Asawa’s case (2nd supra), had an occasion to deal with how

„soon before death‟ is to be ascertained in view of the provisions

of Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. It

is apposite to extract here the observations of the Hon‟ble Apex

Court at Para No.11, which are as follows:

“11. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence

Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be

material to show that soon before her death the victim

was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has

to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death

so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring

otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression

'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113-B of the

Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into

2024:APHC:4

32

service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before

the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only

in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that

regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a

relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of

each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down

as to what would constitute a period of soon before the

occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed

period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity

test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as

well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of

the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death'

used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section

113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of

proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and

the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to

expression 'soon before' used in Section 114. Illustration

(a) of the Evidence At is relevant. It lays down that a

Court may presume that a man who is in the possession

of goods 'soon after the theft, is either the thief has

received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he

can account for his possession. The determination of the

period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left

to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and

circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate

that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply

that the interval should not be much between the

concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in

question. There must be existence of a proximate and

live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry

demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of

cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough

2024:APHC:4

33

not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman

concerned, it would be of no consequence”.

43) So, by virtue of the above, it is very clear that „soon

before‟ is a relative term and it would depend upon the

circumstances of each case and no straightjacket formula can be

laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before

the occurrence. No definite period has been indicated. Soon

before death is not defined. The Court has to decide as to what

is soon before death, basing on the proximity test.

44) Now, coming to the case on hand the allegations

were such that after the deceased and accused were blessed

with two children, accused used to demand for additional

amounts. The evidence of P.W.1 means that the so-called

harassment meted out by the deceased in the hands of the

accused was continuing one. It is to be noted that the evidence

of P.W.1 means that accused used to beat the deceased and

ultimately he beaten the deceased and made her to consume

pesticide resulting her death. Her evidence means that she

found injury on the back side of the head of the deceased. As

this Court already pointed out the medical officer who conducted

autopsy testified about the presence of the injury. P.W.5, the

Mandal Executive Magistrate also testified the same. It was not

healed injury according to the evidence available on record.

2024:APHC:4

34

Before the medical officer who conducted autopsy over the dead

body of the deceased, accused did not challenge his testimony

disputing the presence of the injury. So, the very existence of a

cut injury present on left temporial region of skull size 1 x 2

cms., seize with bone deep was prior to the death of the

deceased. Though the causing of such an injury and

consumption of pesticide was not at one but the same time, the

injury on the dead body of the deceased must have been caused

just on the date of death of the deceased or prior to the date.

The prosecution let in cogent evidence that the deceased and

accused were alone residing together in a separate portion,

though the in-laws were there in the same roof. It is not the

case of the accused that he was not present when the deceased

committed suicide. There was specific evidence of P.W.1 that

when she found the dead body of the deceased by going to her

house on hearing the news neither accused nor any other of the

inmates were found. So, it is a case where the accused

absconding after the episode. Some facts which are within the

exclusive knowledge of the accused have to be explained by the

accused.

45) In Jaggu Ram’s case (1 supra), the facts were also

that there was presence of injuries on the head of the deceased.

It was also a case of dowry death. The accused concocted a

2024:APHC:4

35

story that deceased was suffering from epilepsy and suffered

head injuries after colluding against door bar during her bout of

fits. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court made adverse comments

against the defence of the accused. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court

held that in view of Section 100 of Cr.P.C. and 106 of the Indian

Evidence Act, burden of proving the facts specially within

knowledge of the accused would lies on him only.

46) Coming to the present case on hand, it was within

the exclusive knowledge of the accused as to how the deceased

received injuries on the back side of the head. There was no

dispute about the cause of death. There was no dispute about

the place of death. The accused and deceased were residing

together in a room in a separate portion. So, the accused had no

probable say whatsoever explaining the circumstances in which

the deceased received injuries. In the absence thereof, the case

of the prosecution was further strengthened to the effect that

the deceased was subjected to physical harassment in

connection with demand for additional amounts. Therefore, the

evidence on record amply proves the fact that soon before her

death, the deceased was subjected to physical and mental

harassment.

47) The embodied statutory presumption under Section

304-B of IPC means that if death of a woman was occurred

2024:APHC:4

36

within seven years in otherwise than under normal

circumstance, it shall be called as a dowry death. The statutory

presumption under Section 113 of the Indian Evidence Act

means that if the prosecution proves that the death was

otherwise than in normal circumstances within seven years from

the date of marriage and that it shown that before her death,

she has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment

in connection with a demand for dowry, the Court shall presume

that such person has caused the dowry death. In my considered

view, the accused miserably failed to prove contrary. The

evidence on record would meet the proximity test i.e., the death

of the deceased was in consequences of the harassment meted

out to her.

48) During cross examination P.W.8-the SDPO deposed

that immediate cause preceding the deceased consuming

pesticide poison was petty quarrel, where the deceased intended

to present clothes to her sister. He volunteers that it was

preceded by series of incidents demanding money and other

articles. So, the above answer elicited from the mouth of P.W.8

during cross examination is not going to help the accused in any

way to contend that the deceased committed suicide on account

of petty quarrels.

2024:APHC:4

37

49) Having regard to the above, this Court is of the

considered view that the prosecution cogently established the

essential ingredients of 498-A as well as Section 304-B of IPC.

In my considered view, the learned Additional Sessions Judge

rightly appreciated the evidence on record and rightly found the

accused guilty of the charge under Sections 304-B as well as

Section 498-A of IPC. Under the circumstances, this Court did

not see any grounds to interfere with the conviction and

sentence imposed against the accused.

50) In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed, as

such, the judgment, dated 12.10.2009 in Sessions Case No.628

of 2008, on the file of I Additional District & Sessions Judge,

Guntur, shall stand confirmed.

51) The Registry is directed to take steps immediately

under Section 388 Cr.P.C. to certify the judgment of this Court

to the trial Court on or before 09.01.2024 and on such

certification, the trial Court shall take necessary steps to carry

out the sentence imposed against the appellant and to report

compliance to this Court.

52) The Registry is directed to forward the copy of the

judgment along with original records to the trial Court on or

before 09.01.2024.

2024:APHC:4

38

Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending, if any,

shall stand closed.

________________________

JUSTICE A.V. RAVINDRA BABU

Dt. 02.01.2024.

PGR

2024:APHC:4

39

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. RAVINDRA BABU

CRL. APPEAL NO.1225 OF 2009

Note:

The Registry is directed to forward

the copy of the judgment along with

original records to the trial Court on

or before 09.01.2024.

Date: 02.01.2024

PGR

2024:APHC:4

Sunday, May 5, 2024

Income Tax Act, 1961 – ss. 147 and 148 – Reopening of a concluded assessment-reassessment u/s. 147 following issuance of notice u/s. 148 – Sustainability:

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 642 : 2024 INSC 53

M/s Mangalam Publications, Kottayam

v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

(Civil Appeal Nos. 8580-8582 of 2011)

23 January 2024

[B. V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan*, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Reopening of a concluded assessment-reassessment u/s. 147 of

the Income Tax Act, 1961 following issuance of notice u/s. 148 of

the Act, legally sustainable or bad in law.

Headnotes

Income Tax Act, 1961 – ss. 147 and 148 – Reopening of a

concluded assessment-reassessment u/s. 147 following

issuance of notice u/s. 148 – Sustainability:

Held: On the basis of the balance sheet submitted by the

assessee before the Bank for obtaining credit, the assessing

officer upon a comparison of the same with a subsequent balance

sheet filed by the assessee for the assessment year 1993-94

concluded that there was escapement of income and initiated

reassessment proceedings – Dehors such balance sheet, there

were no other material in the possession of the assessing officer

to hold that income of the assessee for the assessment years

had escaped assessment – When the assessee had not made

any false declaration, it was nothing but a subsequent subjective

analysis of the assessing officer that income of the assessee for

the assessment years was much higher than what was assessed

and thus, had escaped assessment – This was a mere change

of opinion which cannot be a ground for reopening of assessment

– Returns for the assessment years were not accompanied by

the regular books of account – Such return may be a defective

one but certainly not invalid return – Furthermore, in none of the

assessment years, the assessing officer had issued any declaration

that the returns were defective – Assessee asserted both in the

pleadings and in the oral hearing that though it could not file regular

books of account along with the returns for the assessment years

because of seizure by the department, nonetheless the returns 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 643

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

of income were accompanied by tentative profit and loss account

and other details of income which were duly enquired into by the

assessing officer in the assessment proceedings – Thus, the tribunal

justified in holding that the reassessments for the assessment

years not justified – High Court erred in reversing the findings of

the tribunal – Order of the High Court set aside and that of the

tribunal restored. [Paras 41-45]

Income Tax Act, 1961 – s. 147 – Income escaping assessment

– ‘Full and true disclosure’ – Meaning of:

Held: Word ‘disclosure’ means to disclose, reveal, unravel or

bring to notice –Word ‘true’ qualifies a fact or averment as correct,

exact, actual, genuine or honest – Word ‘full’ means complete –

True disclosure of concealed income must relate to the assessee

concerned – Full disclosure, in the context of financial documents,

means that all material or significant information should be disclosed

– Thus, the meaning of ‘full and true disclosure’ is the voluntary

filing of a return of income that the assessee earnestly believes

to be true – Production of books of accounts or other material

evidence that could ordinarily be discovered by the assessing

officer does not amount to a true and full disclosure. [Para 31]

Income Tax Act, 1961 – s. 147 – Income escaping assessment

– Expression “change of opinion” in terms of assessment

proceedings:

Held: Expression “change of opinion” would imply formulation

of opinion and then a change thereof – In terms of assessment

proceedings, it means formulation of belief by the assessing officer

resulting from what he thinks on a particular question – Thus, before

interfering with the proposed reopening of the assessment on the

ground that the same is based only on a change of opinion, the

court ought to verify whether the assessment earlier made has either

expressly or by necessary implication expressed an opinion on a

matter which is the basis of the alleged escapement of income that

was taxable – If the assessment order is non-speaking, cryptic or

perfunctory in nature, it may be difficult to attribute to the assessing

officer any opinion on the questions that are raised in the proposed

reassessment proceedings. [Para 36]

Income Tax Act, 1961 – s. 139 – Return of income – Obligation

on assessee to disclose all material facts necessary for his

assessment:

644 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Held: s.139 places an obligation upon every person to furnish

voluntarily a return of his total income if such income during

the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not

chargeable to income tax – Assessee is under further obligation

to disclose all material facts necessary for his assessment for

that year fully and truly – While the duty of the assessee is to

disclose fully and truly all primary and relevant facts necessary for

assessment, it does not extend beyond this – Once the primary

facts are disclosed by the assessee, the burden shifts onto the

assessing officer. [Para 41]

s. 139 – Return of income – When to be treated as invalid return:

Held: U/s. 139(9), where the assessing officer considers that the

return of income furnished by the assessee is defective, he may

intimate the defect to the assessee and give him an opportunity

to rectify the defect within fifteen days from the date of such

intimation or within such further period, the assessing officer may

in his discretion allow – Burden is on the assessing officer – If

he does not exercise the discretion, the return of income cannot

be construed as a defective return – If the defect is not rectified

within the specified period or within the further period as may

be allowed, the return shall be treated as an invalid return – In

such an eventuality, it would be construed that the assessee

had failed to furnish the return. [Para 24.1-24.2]

Case Law Cited

Calcutta Discount Company Limited v. Income Tax

Officer, [1961] 2 SCR 241 : (1961) 41 ITR 1991 –

followed.

M/s Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. Income Tax Officer,

[1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 28 : (1993) 4 SCC 77; Srikrishna

Private Limited v. ITO, Calcutta, [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR

627 : (1996) 9 SCC 534; CIT, Delhi v. Kelvinator of India

Limited, [2010] 1 SCR 768 : (2010) 2 SCC 723; CIT v.

Bimal Kumar Damani, (2003) 261 ITR 87 (Cal); Income

Tax Officer v. Lakhmani Mewal Das, [1976] 3 SCR 956 :

1976 (3) SCC 757 : 1976 (103) ITR 437 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals cited

P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, Volume

2, Edition 6 – referred to.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 645

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

List of Acts

Income Tax Act, 1961; Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987

List of Keywords

Income Tax Jurisprudence; Concluded assessment; Reassessment;

Search and seizure operations; Disclosed income; Limitation period;

Reopening the assessment; Omission; Reason to believe; Time

limit; Full and true disclosure; Production of books of accounts;

Change of opinion.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 8580-8582

of 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.10.2009 of the High Court of

Kerala at Ernakulam in ITA Nos.400 and 557 of 2009.

With

Civil Appeal Nos.8599-8603, 8604, 8593-8598, 8583-8587 and 8588-

8592 of 2011.

Appearances for Parties

Raghenth Basant, Ms. Kaushitaki Sharma, Ms. Liz Mathew, Advs.

for the Appellant.

N. Venkataraman, ASG, Shyam Gopal, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Prahlad

Singh, Shashank Bajpai, Suyash Pandey, Prashant Singh Ii, T. S.

Sabarish, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

The perennial question in income tax jurisprudence, whether

reopening of a concluded assessment i.e. reassessment under

Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (briefly “the Act” hereinafter)

following issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act is legally

sustainable or is bad in law, is again confronting us in the present

batch of appeals. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench,

Cochin (‘Tribunal’ hereinafter) had decided in favour of the assessee 

646 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

by setting aside the orders of reassessment. However, the High

Court of Kerala in appeals filed by the revenue under Section 260A

of the Act has reversed the findings of the Tribunal by deciding the

appeals preferred by the revenue in its favour.

2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders passed by the High Court of Kerala

(briefly “the High Court” hereinafter), the assessee had preferred

special leave petitions to appeal before this Court and on leave

being granted, civil appeals have been registered.

3. We have heard Mr. Raghenth Basant, learned counsel for the

appellant/assessee (which would be referred to either as the appellant

or as the assessee) and Mr. Shyam Gopal, learned counsel for

the respondent/revenue (again, would be referred to either as the

respondent or as the revenue).

4. A brief narration of facts is necessary.

5. For the sake of convenience, we may refer to civil appeal Nos. 8580,

8581 and 8582 of 2011 (M/s Mangalam Publications, Kottayam Vs.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam).

6. The above three civil appeals pertain to assessment years 1990-91,

1991-92 and 1992-93.

7. The assessee was a partnership firm at the relevant point of time

though it got itself registered as a company since the assessment

year 1994-95. The assessee is carrying on the business of publishing

newspaper, weeklies and other periodicals in several languages

under the brand name “Mangalam”. Prior to the assessment year

1994-95 including the assessment years under consideration, the

status of the assessee was that of a firm, being regularly assessed

to income tax.

8. For the assessment year 1990-91, assessee filed return of income

on 22.10.1991 showing loss of Rs.5,99,390.00. Subsequently,

the assessee filed a revised computation showing income at

Rs.5,63,920.00. Assessee did not file any balance sheet alongwith

the return of income on the ground that books of account were

seized by the income tax department (department) in the course of

search and seizure operations on 03.12.1995 and that those books

of account were not yet returned. In the assessment proceedings, the

assessing officer did not accept the contention of the assessee and 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 647

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

made an analysis of the incomings and outgoings of the assessee

for the previous year under consideration. After considering various

heads of income and sale of publications, the assessing officer made

a lumpsum addition of Rs. 1 lakh to the disclosed income vide the

assessment order dated 29.01.1992 passed under Section 143 (3)

of the Act.

9. Likewise, for the assessment year 1991-1992, the assessee did not file

any balance sheet along with the return of income for the same reason

mentioned for the assessment year 1990-1991. The return of income

was filed on 22.10.1991 showing a loss of Rs.21,66,760.00. As per the

revised profit and loss account, the sale proceeds of the publications

were shown at Rs.8,21,24,873.00. Assessing officer scrutinised the

net sale proceeds as per the Audit Bureau of Circulation figure and

the certified Performance Audit Report. On that basis assessing

officer accepted the sale proceeds of Rs.8,21,24,873.00 as correct

being in conformity with the facts and figures available in the Audit

Bureau of Circulation report and the Performance Audit Report. After

considering the incomings and outgoings of the relevant previous year

assessing officer reworked the aforesaid figures but found that there

was a deficiency of Rs.29,17,931.00 in the incoming and outgoing

statement which the assessee could not explain. Accordingly, this

amount was added to the total income of the assessee. Further, the

assessee could not produce proper vouchers in respect of a number

of items of expenditure. Accordingly, an addition of Rs.1,50,000.00

was made to the total income of the assessee vide the assessment

order dated 29.01.2022 passed under Section 143 (3) of the Act.

10. For the assessment year 1992-1993 also, the assessee filed the

return of income on 07.12.1992 showing a loss of Rs.10,50,000.00.

However, a revised return was filed subsequently on 28.01.1993

showing loss of Rs.44,75,212.00. Like the earlier years, assessee

did not maintain books of account and did not file the balance sheet

for the same reason. However, the assessee disclosed total sale

proceeds of the weeklies at Rs.7,16,95,530.00 and also advertisement

receipts to the extent of Rs.40 lakhs. The profit was estimated at

Rs.41,63,500.00 before allowing depreciation.

10.1. On scrutiny of the performance certificate issued by the Audit

Bureau of Circulation, the assessing officer observed that total

sale proceeds of the weeklies after allowing sale commission 

648 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

came to Rs.7,22,94,757.00. Following the profit percentage

adopted in earlier years, the assessing officer estimated the

income from the weeklies and other periodicals at 7.50% before

depreciation, adding the estimated advertisement receipts of

Rs.40 lakhs to the total sale receipts of Rs.7,22,94,757.00.

The assessing officer held that the total receipt from sale of

weeklies and periodicals came to Rs.7,62,94,757.00. The profit

earned before depreciation at the rate of 7.50% on the turnover

came to Rs.57,22,106.00. In respect of the daily newspaper,

the assessing officer worked out the loss at Rs.22,95,872.00 as

against the loss of Rs.41,23,500.00 claimed by the assessee.

Taking an overall view of the matter, the assessing officer

estimated the business income of the assessee during the

assessment year 1992-1993 at Rs.10,00,000.00 vide the

assessment order dated 26.03.1993 passed under Section

143(3) of the Act.

11. It may be mentioned that for the assessment year 1993-1994, the

assessee had submitted the profit and loss account as well as the

balance sheet along with the return of income. While examining

the balance sheet, the assessing officer noticed that the balance in

the capital account of all the partners of the assessee firm together

was Rs.1,85,75,455.00 as on 31.03.1993 whereas the capital of the

partners as on 31.12.1985 was only Rs.2,55,117.00. According to

the assessing officer, none of the partners had any other source of

income apart from one of the partners, Smt. Cleramma Vargese, who

had a business under the name and style of “Mangalam Finance”.

As the income assessed for all the years was found to be not

commensurate with the increase in the capital by Rs.1,83,20,338.00

(Rs.1,85,75,455.00 – Rs.2,55,117.00) from 1985 to 1993, it was

considered necessary to reassess the income of the assessee as

well as that of the partners for the assessment years 1988-1989

to 1993-1994. After obtaining the approval of the Commissioner of

Income Tax, Trivandrum, notice under Section 148 of the Act was

issued and served upon the assessee on 29.03.2000.

12. In respect of the assessment year 1990-1991, the assessee informed

the assessing officer that the return of income filed which culminated

in the assessment order dated 29.01.1992 may be considered as the

return in the reassessment proceedings. The assessing officer took

cognizance of the profit and loss account and the balance sheet filed 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 649

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

by the assessee before the South Indian Bank on the basis of which

assessment of income for the assessment years 1988 - 1989 and 1989

- 1990 were completed. Objection of the assessee that the aforesaid

balance sheet was prepared only for the purpose of obtaining loan

from the South Indian Bank and therefore could not be relied upon

for income tax assessment was brushed aside. The reassessment

was made on the basis of the accounts submitted to the South Indian

Bank. By the reassessment order dated 21.03.2002 passed under

Section 144/147 of the Act, the assessing officer quantified the total

income of the assessee at Rs.29,66,910.00 whereafter order was

passed allocating income among the partners.

13. Likewise, for the assessment year 1991-1992, the assessing officer

passed reassessment order dated 21.03.2002 under Section 144/147

of the Act determining total income at Rs.13,91,700.00. Following the

same, allocation of income was also made amongst the partners.

14. In so far assessment year 1992-1993 is concerned, the assessing

officer passed the reassessment order also on 21.03.2002 under

Section 144/147 of the Act determining the total income of the

assessee at Rs.25,06,660.00. Thereafter allocation of income was

made amongst the partners in the manner indicated in the order of

reassessment.

15. At this stage, we may mention that the assessing officer had worked

out the escaped income for the three assessment years of 1990-91,

1991-92 and 1992-93 at Rs.50,96,041.00. This amount was further

apportioned between the three assessment years in proportion to

the sales declared by the assessee in the aforesaid assessment

years as under:

Sr. No. Assessment year Amount

1. 1990-91 Rs.19,05,476.00

2. 1991-92 Rs.16,83,910.00

3. 1992-93 Rs.15,06,655.00

Total Rs.50,96,041.00

rounded off to

Rs.50,96,040.00

16. Against the aforesaid three reassessment orders for the assessment

years 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93, assessee preferred three 

650 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

appeals before the first appellate authority i.e. Commissioner of

Income Tax (Appeals), IV Cochin (briefly “the CIT(A)” hereinafter).

Assessee raised the ground that it had disclosed all material facts

necessary for completing the assessments. The assessments having

been completed under Section 143(3) of the Act, the assessments

could not have been reopened after expiry of four years from the

end of the relevant assessment year as per the proviso to Section

147 of the Act. It was pointed out that the limitation period for the

last of the three assessment years i.e. 1992-93, had expired on

31.03.1997 whereas the notices under Section 148 of the Act were

issued and served on the assessee only on 29.03.2000. Therefore,

all the three reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation. The

assessee also argued that the alleged income escaping assessment

could not be computed on an estimate basis. In the present case,

the assessing officer had allocated the alleged escaped income for

the three assessment years in proportion to the corresponding sales

turnover. It was further argued that as per Section 282(2), notice

under Section 148 of the Act in the case of a partnership firm was

required to be made to a member of the firm. In the present case,

the notices were issued to the partnership firm. Therefore, such

notices could not be treated as valid.

16.1. CIT(A) rejected all the above contentions urged by the

assessee. CIT(A) relied on Section 139(9)(f) of the Act and

thereafter held that the assessee had not furnished the

details as per the aforesaid provisions and therefore fell

short of the requirements specified therein. Vide the common

appellate order dated 26.02.2004, CIT(A) held that, as the

assessee had failed to disclose all material facts necessary

to make assessments, therefore it could not be said that the

reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation in terms

of the proviso to Section 147. The other two grounds raised

by the assessee were also repelled by the first appellate

authority. Thereafter, CIT(A) made a detailed examination of

the factual aspect whereafter it proposed enhancement of

the quantum of escaped income. Following the same, CIT(A)

enhanced the assessment by fixing the unexplained income

at Rs.1,44,02,560.00 for the assessment years 1987-88 to

1993-94 which was thereafter apportioned in respect of the

relevant three assessment years. The pro-rata allotment of 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 651

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

escaped income for the three assessment years as directed

by CIT(A) are as follows:

Sr. No. Assessment year Escaped income

1. 1990-91 Rs.24,98,755.00

2. 1991-92 Rs.23,01,204.00

3. 1992-93 Rs.20,20,895.00

Total Rs.68,20,854.00

16.2. Thus, as against the total escaped income of Rs.50,96,040.00

for the above three assessment years as quantified by the

assessing officer, CIT(A) enhanced and redetermined such

income at Rs.68,20,854.00.

16.3. However, it would be relevant to mention that CIT(A) in the

appellate order had noted that the assessee had filed its balance

sheet as on 31.12.1985 while filing the return of income for

the assessment year 1986-87. The next balance sheet was

filed as on 31.03.1993. No balance sheet was filed in the

interregnum on the ground that it could not maintain proper

books of accounts as the relevant materials were seized by

the department in the course of a search and seizure operation

and not yet returned. CIT(A) further noted that the assessing

officer had taken the balance sheet as on 31.03.1989 filed by

the assessee before the South Indian Bank as the base for

reconciling the accounts of the partners. It was noticed that

CIT(A) in an earlier appellate order dated 26.03.2002 for the

assessment year 1989-90 in the assessee’s own case had

held that the profit and loss account and the balance sheet

furnished to the South Indian Bank were not reliable. CIT(A)

in the present proceedings agreed with such finding of his

predecessor and held that the unexplained portion, if any, of

the increase in capital and current account balance with the

assessee had to be analysed on the basis of the balance

sheet filed before the assessing officer as on 31.12.1985 and

as on 31.03.1993.

17. Aggrieved by the common appellate order passed by the CIT(A)

dated 26.02.2004, assessee preferred three separate appeals before

the Tribunal which were registered as under:

652 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(i) ITA No. 282(Coch)/2004 for the assessment year 1990-91.

(ii) ITA No. 283(Coch)/2004 for the assessment year 1991-92.

(iii) ITA No. 284(Coch)/2004 for the assessment year 1992-93.

17.1. In the three appeals filed by the assessee, revenue also filed

cross objections.

17.2. By the common order dated 29.10.2004, the Tribunal allowed

the appeals filed by the assessee and set aside the orders of

reassessment for the three assessment years as affirmed and

enhanced by the CIT(A). Tribunal held that the re-examination

carried out by the assessing officer was not based on any

fresh material or evidence. The reassessment orders could

not be sustained on the basis of the balance sheet filed by

the assessee before the South Indian Bank because in an

earlier appeal of the assessee itself, CIT(A) had held that

such balance sheet and profit and loss account furnished to

the bank were not reliable. The original assessments were

completed under Section 143(3) of the Act. Therefore, it was not

possible to hold that the assessee had not furnished necessary

details for completing the assessments at the time of original

assessment. In such circumstances, Tribunal held that the

case of the assessee squarely fell within the four corners of

the proviso to Section 147. Consequently, the reassessments

were held to be barred by limitation, thus without jurisdiction.

While allowing the appeals of the assessee, Tribunal dismissed

the cross objections filed by the revenue.

18. Against the aforesaid common order of the Tribunal, the respondent

preferred three appeals before the High Court under Section 260A

of the Act, being IT Appeal Nos. 400, 557 and 558 of 2009 for the

assessment years 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93 respectively. All

the three appeals were allowed by the High Court vide the common

order dated 12.10.2009. According to the High Court, the finding of

the Tribunal that the assessee had disclosed fully and truly all material

facts necessary for completion of the original assessments was not

tenable. Holding that there was no material before the Tribunal to

come to the conclusion that the assessee had disclosed fully and

truly all material facts required for completion of original assessments, 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 653

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

the High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and remanded the

appeals back to the Tribunal to consider the appeals on merit after

issuing notice to the parties.

19. It is against this order that the assessee had filed the special leave

petitions which on leave being granted have been registered as civil

appeals. The related civil appeals have been filed by the partners

of the assessee firm which would be dependent on the outcome of

the present set of civil appeals.

20. Respondent has filed counter affidavit supporting the judgment

under appeal. It is contended that the High Court has correctly

appreciated the facts and the law and thereafter given a reasoned

order as to why the reopening of assessment is valid. High Court

has correctly held that the assessee had not disclosed fully and truly

all the material facts necessary for completion of the assessments.

Adverting to Section 139 (9) of the Act, it is submitted that, it is not

mandatory for the assessing officer to treat a return as invalid even

if the return is defective under any of the sub-clauses of Section

139 (9). It is the discretion of the assessing officer to issue notice.

Since no notice was issued, the return and the assessment made

thereon would be valid.

20.1. It is submitted that the assessee had not even had accounts

pertaining to the advertisement receipts which is a major

source of income of a publication entity; as a matter of fact,

the assessee had shown the income from advertisements on

estimation basis.

20.2. Though the assessee had been claiming that it did not

maintain any books of account from the assessment years

1989- 1990 onwards, an audited balance sheet and profit and

loss account submitted to the South Indian Bank were traced

out and used as evidence against the assessee for reopening

the assessment for the assessment year 1989- 1990. In the

first appellate proceedings, CIT(A) took the view that the profit

shown in the statement was for availing credit facility only and

therefore set aside the reopening of assessment. Though the

Tribunal concurred with the view of CIT(A), the department

filed an appeal before the High Court. The assessing officer

had compared the balance of the partners in their capital

account in the firm in the said balance sheet (filed before the 

654 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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bank) with capital in the balance sheet filed for the assessment

year 1993 – 1994 and thereafter determined the probable

escapement of income which is fully justified and rightly upheld

by the High Court.

20.3. Respondent has contended that in the original assessments the

assessing officer had made the assessments on the basis of

limited information furnished by the assessee. The assessing

officer made the reassessments on the basis of the increase

in the capital in the balance sheets between the years ending

31.03.1989 and 31.03.1993. Respondent has denied that the

reassessments were made on the basis of change of opinion.

An audited balance sheet for the period ending 31.12.1984

was available with the department. Thereafter, no audited

or unaudited balance sheets were furnished on the ground

that books of account could not be maintained. However, an

audited balance sheet for the period ending 31.03.1993 was

furnished in the course of the assessment proceedings for the

assessment year 1993 – 1994. Another balance sheet for the

period ending 31.03.1989 which was claimed by the assessee

to be an account prepared only for submission before the South

Indian Bank for availing loan could be traced out. A perusal of

the balance sheet for the assessment year 1993-1994 revealed

that the increase in capital was not commensurate with the

income assessed on estimation basis by the assessing officer

for the assessment years 1989 – 1990 to 1992-1993. It was

in view of such changed circumstances that notices under

Section 148 were issued. The original assessments for the

assessment years 1990 – 1991, 1991 – 1992 and 1992 – 1993

were completed on 29.01.1992, 29.01.1992 and 26.03.1993

respectively. The balance sheet for the assessment year

1993 – 1994 which was used as the basis for reassessment

was not available with the assessing officer when the original

assessments were made. Facts available with the assessing

officer in the original assessments and in the reassessments

were different. Since facts were different, question of any

change in the opinion did not arise. In the circumstances

respondent sought for dismissal of the special leave petitions

since registered as civil appeals.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 655

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

21. Mr. Raghenth Basant, learned counsel for the appellant at the outset

submits that the High Court fell in error while setting aside the wellreasoned and correct order of the Tribunal. Order of the High Court

should be set aside and the order of the Tribunal restored.

21.1. He submits that the appellant is a partnership firm engaged

in the business of publication of newspaper, weeklies and

other periodicals under the brand name “Mangalam”. Being

an assessee under the Act it was maintaining proper books

of accounts and had filed profit and loss accounts as well

as balance sheets along with the returns of income till the

assessment year 1985 – 1986. A search operation was carried

out by officials of the department under Section 132 of the Act

in the business premises of the appellant on 31.12.1985. In the

said search operation, books of account, registers and ledgers

of the appellant were seized. Because of the aforesaid, the

appellant was unable to maintain proper books of account as it

was not possible for it to obtain ledger balances to be brought

down for the succeeding accounting years. Nonetheless,

appellant maintained primary books of account and used to

prepare profit and loss accounts. It also used to prepare a

statement of source and application of funds in support of the

income returned by it in the returns of income. Being a member

of the Audit Bureau of Circulation, appellant was also required

to maintain exhaustive details regarding printing and sale of

newspaper and other periodicals published by it.

21.2. Learned counsel submits that returns were filed by the appellant

for the three assessment years in question. Those returns were

supported by profit and loss accounts and statements showing

the source and application of funds. Assessments for the three

assessment years were carried out and completed under

Section 143 (3) of the Act after making additions and providing

for certain disallowances. He submits that for the assessment

year 1993–1994, the appellant had maintained complete set of

books of account, audited profit and loss account and balance

sheet which were duly filed before the assessing officer.

Following assessment proceedings, assessing officer passed

the assessment order for the assessment year 1993 – 1994

on 27.01.1994 under Section 143 (3) of the Act. 

656 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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21.3. More than eight to ten years after expiry of the relevant

assessment years, appellant was served with notices dated

29.03.2000 issued under Section 148 of the Act for the

assessment years 1990 – 1991, 1991 – 1992 and 1992 – 1993.

He submits that the basis for reassessment was purportedly

comparison of the current and capital accounts of the partners

of the assessee firm in the balance sheet filed along with the

return for the assessment year 1993 – 1994 with the capital

and current accounts of the partners as on 31.12.1985, which

showed unexplained increase. The revenue also sought to rely

upon the balance sheet for the assessment year 1988 – 1989

obtained by the assessing officer from the South Indian Bank

which was submitted by the assessee to the said bank to avail

credit facility. He submits that on such comparison the assessing

officer came to an erroneous conclusion that the profits for the

assessment years 1990 – 1991, 1991 – 1992 and 1992 -1993

would be Rs.1,86,57,246.00 and as the assessment for the

said years came to Rs.16,64,518.00 only, there was an under

assessment of income to the tune of Rs.1,69,92,728.00.

21.4. Learned counsel submits that during the reassessment

proceedings assessee sought for return of the books seized

by the department. Though some books were returned, the

entire seized materials were not returned. As it was an old

matter assessee had sought for time to look into the old records

and to consult its representative. However, the assessing

officer declined to grant time and went ahead and passed the

reassessment orders ex parte under Section 144/147 of the Act.

He submits that the assessing officer made the reassessment

on a comparison of the increase in the capital and current

accounts of the partners for the period from 1986 to 1993.

According to him, the assessing officer could not have done

that because the balance sheet for the assessment year 1989

– 1990, which was obtained by the assessing officer from the

South Indian Bank, was not prepared on actual and current

accounts; that was prepared on provisional and estimate basis

in the absence of the account books which were seized by the

department, that too, only for the purpose of obtaining credit

facilities from the bank.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 657

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

21.5. It is the submission of learned counsel for the assessee

that the High Court has erred in holding that even in the

absence of the entire books of accounts, the assessee had

not furnished the documents and particulars required under

Section 139 (9) (f) of the Act. According to the High Court

since the original assessment was completed without the

books of account and the details under Section 139 (9) (f)

being furnished, therefore, the assessee had not disclosed

fully and truly all material facts necessary for completion of

assessment. Learned counsel submits that for non-furnishing

of particulars under Section 139 (9) (f) the original assessment

would be rendered invalid. However, the assessing officer did

not adopt the aforesaid course of action but instead proceeded

to complete the assessments under Section 143 (3) of the Act.

In the circumstances, he submits that non furnishing of details

under Section 139 (9) (f) cannot lead to any inference that

material facts had not been disclosed so as to justify reopening

of assessments that too eight to ten years after expiry of the

relevant assessment years.

21.6. Learned counsel asserts that even though the assessee was

not maintaining regular books of accounts, all relevant details

necessary for making the assessments were furnished before

the assessing officer. These included detailed cash flow

statements, profit and loss accounts, statements showing the

source and application of funds reflecting the increase in the

capital and current accounts of the partners of the assessee

firm etc. It was thereafter that assessments were completed not

only in respect of the assessee for the above three assessment

years but also for the partners as well under Section 143(3)

of the Act.

21.7. It is contended by learned counsel for the assessee that

there was no specific information before the assessing officer

wherefrom he could form a reason to believe that income

exigible to income tax had escaped assessment for the three

assessment years. The only reason for initiating reassessment

proceedings was the impression of the assessing officer that

there was an increase in the capital and current accounts of

the partners upon a comparison of the balance sheets for

the assessment year 1985 – 1986 and for the assessment

year 1993 – 1994 which could not be properly explained. The 

658 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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assessing officer also formed the above belief on the basis of

the balance sheet for the assessment year 1989 – 1990 which

was obtained from the South Indian Bank. According to him, on

both counts, the revenue could not have initiated proceedings

for reopening of concluded assessments that too under Section

143 (3) of the Act. He submits that CIT(A), in the appeal of

the assessee for the assessment year 1989 -1990, had clearly

held that such a balance sheet submitted before the bank was

not reliable. Learned counsel asserts that an assessing officer

would get the jurisdiction to reopen an assessment only on

the basis of specific, reliable and relevant information coming

to his possession subsequent to the original assessment and

not otherwise. In support of such submission learned counsel

has relied upon the decisions of this Court in:

(i) M/s Phool Chand Bajrang Lal Vs. Income Tax Officer,

(1993) 4 SCC 77.

(ii) Srikrishna Private Limited Vs. ITO, Calcutta,

(1996) 9 SCC 534.

21.8. Summing up his submissions, learned counsel submits that as

rightly held by the Tribunal, it was the change of view of the

assessing officer upon assessing the comparative accounts

of the partners which led to the reassessments which is not

based on any fresh material or evidence. It is evident that the

assessing officer had only reviewed the original assessments

on the basis of a fresh application of mind to the same set

of facts. Therefore, it is a clear case of change of opinion

leading to reassessment proceedings which is not permissible

in law as held by this Court in CIT, Delhi Vs. Kelvinator of

India Limited, (2010) 2 SCC 723. He therefore submits that

the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and that

of the Tribunal restored.

22. Mr. Shyam Gopal, learned counsel for the respondent at the outset

submits that there is no merit at all in the civil appeals, and therefore,

the civil appeals should be dismissed.

22.1. Adverting to Section 145 (1) of the Act, he submits that income

from the profits of business shall be computed in accordance

with the cash or mercantile or any other system of accounting

regularly employed by the assessee. Since the business income 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 659

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

had to be computed by following the method of accounting

adopted by the assessee and based on the books of accounts

so maintained, the assessee was required to produce the

books of accounts but when the books of accounts were not

available, at least to furnish the particulars in terms of Section

139 (9) (f) of the Act.

22.2. Referring to Section 139 (9) (f) of the Act, he submits that even

in the absence of regular books of accounts, the assessee is

bound to provide the information required under the aforesaid

provision. An assessee who does not disclose the above

information and instead submits returns on estimation basis

cannot claim that it has fully and truly disclosed all material

facts required for assessment.

22.3. According to Mr. Gopal, Tribunal erred in holding that the

assessee had disclosed fully and truly all material facts

necessary for assessment. In fact, Tribunal did not go into

the merit of the case. Rather, Tribunal held that there were

no materials before the assessing officer to take the view that

income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment.

22.4. Learned counsel for the revenue strenuously argued that

assessing officer had made a comparative analysis of the

two balance sheets, one as on 31.12.1985 relevant to the

assessment year 1986-1987 and the balance sheet dated

31.03.1994 relevant to the assessment year 1994–1995

and found therefrom unexplained increase in the capital and

current accounts of the partners. That apart, the assessing

officer also obtained a balance sheet for the assessment year

1988–1989 from the South Indian Bank which also indicated

unexplained profits and gains of the partners. It was thereafter

that reassessment proceedings were initiated. First appellate

authority i.e. CIT(A) not only affirmed the reassessment orders

of the assessing officer but also enhanced the quantum of

escaped income which was restored by the High Court after

setting aside the reversal order of the Tribunal.

22.5. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted a

convenience compilation and drew the attention of the Court

therefrom to the relevant provisions of the Act i.e. Section 139

(9), 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149 and 151 of the Act, both pre 

660 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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01.04.1989 and post 01.04.1989. He submits that there was

admittedly non-disclosure of material facts by the assessee,

and, therefore, the extended period under the proviso to Section

147 of the Act was available to the department. Viewed in the

above context, the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act

as well as the orders of reassessment passed under Section

144/147 of the Act were within limitation.

22.6. Learned counsel has specifically referred to Section 149 of

the Act which deals with the time limit for issuance of notice

under Section 148 of the Act. Post amendment with effect from

01.04.1989, he submits that under Section 149 (1) (b) (iii), the

limitation is, if seven years but not more than ten years had

elapsed from the relevant assessment year unless the income

chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to

or is likely to amount to rupees fifty thousand or more for that

year. In the instant case, the quantum of escaped assessment

is admittedly in excess of rupees fifty thousand. Therefore, the

notices issued under Section 148 of the Act on 29.03.2000 for

the three assessment years of 1990 – 1991, 1991 – 1992 and

1992 – 1993 were well within the limitation period.

22.7. Learned counsel has referred to the decision of this Court in

Calcutta Discount Company Limited Vs. Income Tax Officer,

(1961) 41 ITR 1991 and submits that the duty of disclosing all

the primary facts relevant to assessment before the assessing

authority lies on the assessee. Only when all the primary facts

are disclosed, the burden would shift to the assessing authority.

22.8. Asserting that the order of the High Court is fully justified,

learned counsel seeks dismissal of the civil appeals.

23. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received

the due consideration of the Court.

24. At the outset, we may advert to certain provisions of the Act as

existed at the relevant point of time having a bearing on the present

lis. Chapter XIV of the Act comprising Sections 139 to 158 deals with

procedure for assessment. Section 139 mandates filing of income

tax return. At the relevant point of time, this provision provided that

every person, if his total income or the total income of any other

person in respect of whom he was assessable under the Act during

the previous year had exceeded the maximum amount which is not 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 661

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

chargeable to income tax, he shall on or before the due date furnish

a return of his income or the income of such other person during the

previous year in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed

manner, setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed.

24.1. Since reference was made to sub-section (9)(f) of Section

139, both in the pleadings and in the oral hearing, we may

mention that under sub-section (9) of Section 139, where

the assessing officer considers that the return of income

furnished by the assessee is defective, he may intimate the

defect to the assessee and give him an opportunity to rectify

the defect within a period of fifteen days from the date of such

intimation or within such further period, the assessing officer

may in his discretion allow. If the defect is not rectified within

the specified period or within the further period as may be

allowed, the return shall be treated as an invalid return. In

such an eventuality, it would be construed that the assessee

had failed to furnish the return. There is an Explanation below

sub-section (9) which clarifies that a return of income shall

be regarded as defective unless all the conditions mentioned

thereunder are fulfilled. Clause (f) says that where regular

books of account are not maintained by the assessee but the

return is accompanied by a statement indicating the amounts

of turnover or gross receipts, gross profit, expenses and net

profit of the business or profession and the basis on which

such amounts have been computed and also disclosing the

amounts of total sundry debtors, sundry creditors, stock in

trade and cash balance as at the end of the previous year,

such a return shall not be treated as defective.

24.2. Thus, Section 139 places an obligation upon every person to

furnish voluntarily a return of his total income if such income

during the relevant previous year had exceeded the maximum

amount which is not chargeable to income tax. Under subsection (9), if there are defects in the return which are not

rectified within the stipulated period after being intimated by the

assessing officer, the return of income would be treated as an

invalid return. Of course, it would not be treated as defective

and consequently invalid if in a case, such as, under clause

(f) where regular books of account are not maintained but the

return of income is accompanied by a statement indicating the

amounts of turnover etc.

662 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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25. Section 142 deals with enquiry before assessment. As per sub-section

(1), the assessing officer may issue notice upon an assessee who

has made a return seeking details of such accounts, information or

documents etc. which may be necessary for the purpose of making

an assessment. Sub-section (2) empowers the assessing officer

to make such enquiry as he considers necessary for obtaining full

information and sub-section (3) requires the assessing officer to

provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee in respect of any

material gathered on the basis of the enquiry.

26. This takes us to Section 143 which is the provision for assessment.

As per sub-section (1), where a return is made under Section 139 or

in response to a notice under Section 142(1), the assessing officer

may carry out adjustments in accordance with law and thereafter,

issue intimation to the assessee specifying the sums payable. Such

intimation shall be deemed to be a notice of demand under Section

156 of the Act.

26.1. Sub-section (2) provides that where a return has been furnished

under Section 139 or in response to a notice under sub-section

(1) of Section 142, to ensure that the assessee has not understated the income or has not computed excessive loss or has

not under-paid the tax in any manner, the assessing officer

shall serve on the assessee a notice to produce evidence in

support of the claim made by the assessee.

26.2. As per sub-section (3) of Section 143, after hearing such

evidence as the assessee may produce and such other

evidence as the assessing officer may require on specified

points and after taking into account all relevant material

which he has gathered, the assessing officer shall make an

assessment of the total income or loss of the assessee by an

order in writing. In the said exercise, he shall determine the

sum payable by the assessee or refund of any amount due

to him on the basis of such assessment.

27. Section 144 provides for best judgment assessment. It says that if

any person fails to submit a return under sub-section (1) of Section

139 or fails to comply with the terms of a notice under sub-section

(1) of Section 142 or having made a return fails to comply with all

the terms of a notice issued under sub-section (2) of Section 143,

the assessing officer after taking into account all relevant materials 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 663

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

and after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard make

the assessment to the best of his judgment and determine the sum

payable by the assessee on the basis of such assessment.

28. This brings us to the pivotal section i.e. Section 147. Prior to the

Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Section 147 read as under:

147. Income escaping assessment.—If

(a) the Income Tax Officer has reason to believe that,

by reason of the omission or failure on the part of

an assessee to make a return under Section 139 for

any assessment year to the Income Tax Officer or to

disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for

his assessment for that year, income chargeable to

tax has escaped assessment for that year, or

(b) notwithstanding that there has been no omission or

failure as mentioned in clause (a) on the part of the

assessee, the Income Tax Officer has in consequence

of information in his possession reason to believe that

income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment

for any assessment year,

he may, subject to the provisions of Sections 148 to 153,

assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss

or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for

the assessment year concerned (hereafter in Sections

148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).

28.1. This provision was amended by the Direct Tax Laws

(Amendment) Act, 1987 with effect from 01.04.1989. Post such

amendment, Section 147 read as under:

147. Income escaping assessment.—If the assessing

officer, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is

of the opinion that any income chargeable to tax has

escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may,

subject to the provisions of Sections 148 to 153, assess

or reassess such income and also any other income

chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and

which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of

the proceedings under this section, or recompute the loss

or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as 

664 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

the case may be, for the assessment year concerned

(hereafter in this section and in Sections 148 to 153

referred to as the relevant assessment year).

28.2. As can be seen from the above, prior to 01.04.1989, the income

tax officer was required to have reason to believe that by reason

of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to make a

return under Section 139 for any assessment year or to disclose

fully and truly all material facts necessary for such assessment,

income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for that

assessment year or the income tax officer had in consequence

of information in his possession reason to believe that income

chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for any assessment

year, the income tax officer could reopen an assessment. But

with effect from 01.04.1989, the requirement of law underwent

a change. It was sufficient if the assessing officer for reasons

to be recorded by him in writing was of the opinion that any

income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment for any

assessment year, he could assess or reassess such income

chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment and which

came to his notice subsequently. Therefore, post 01.04.1989,

the power to reopen an assessment became much wider.

28.3. It appears that a number of representations were received

against the omission of the words “reason to believe” from

Section 147 and their substitution by the word “opinion” of the

assessing officer. It was pointed out by the representationists

that the meaning of the expression “reason to believe” was

explained in a number of judgments and was well settled.

Omission of such an expression from Section 147 would

give arbitrary powers to the assessing officer to reopen

past assessments. To allay such apprehensions, Parliament

enacted the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 again

amending Section 147 by re-introducing the expression “reason

to believe”. Section 147 after the amendment carried out by

the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 reads as under:

147. Income escaping assessment.—If the assessing

officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable

to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year,

he may, subject to the provisions of Sections 148 to 153,

assess or reassess such income and also any other 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 665

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment

and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course

of the proceedings under this section, or recompute the

loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance,

as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned

(hereafter in this section and in Sections 148 to 153 referred

to as the relevant assessment year).

28.4. Thus, Section 147 as it stood at the relevant point of time

provides that if the assessing officer has reason to believe

that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment

for any assessment year, he may assess or re-assess such

income and such other income which has escaped assessment

and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of

proceedings under Section 147.

29. Section 148 says that before making an assessment, re-assessment

etc. under Section 147, the assessing officer is required to issue and

serve a notice on the assessee calling upon the assessee to file a

return of his income in the prescribed form etc., setting forth such

particulars as may be called upon.

30. Such a notice is subject to the time limit prescribed under Section

149. Under sub-Section (1)(b), no notice under Section 148 shall

be issued in a case where an assessment under sub-section (3) of

Section 143 or Section 147 has been made for such assessment year

if seven years but not more than 10 years have elapsed from the

end of the relevant assessment year unless the income chargeable

to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to

amount to Rs. 50,000 or more for that year.

31. At this stage, we deem it necessary to expound on the meaning of

disclosure. As per the P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon,

Volume 2, Edition 6, ‘to disclose’ is to expose to view or knowledge,

anything which before was secret, hidden or concealed. The word

‘disclosure’ means to disclose, reveal, unravel or bring to notice,

vide CIT Vs. Bimal Kumar Damani, (2003) 261 ITR 87 (Cal). The

word ‘true’ qualifies a fact or averment as correct, exact, actual,

genuine or honest. The word ‘full’ means complete. True disclosure

of concealed income must relate to the assessee concerned. Full

disclosure, in the context of financial documents, means that all

material or significant information should be disclosed. Therefore,

the meaning of ‘full and true disclosure’ is the voluntary filing of a 

666 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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return of income that the assessee earnestly believes to be true.

Production of books of accounts or other material evidence that could

ordinarily be discovered by the assessing officer does not amount

to a true and full disclosure.

32. Let us now discuss some of the judgments cited at the bar. First

and foremost is the decision of a constitution bench of this Court in

Calcutta Discount Company Limited (supra). That was a case under

Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 which is in parimateria to Section 147 of the Act. The constitution bench explained

the purport of Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 and

highlighted two conditions which would have to be satisfied before

issuing a notice to reopen an assessment beyond four years but

within eight years (as was the then limitation). The first condition

was that the income tax officer must have reason to believe that

income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax had been underassessed. The second condition was that he must have also reason

to believe that such under-assessment had occurred by reason of

either (i) omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a

return of his income under Section 22, or (ii) omission or failure on

the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts

necessary for his assessment for that year. It was emphasized that

both these were conditions precedent to be satisfied before the

income tax officer could have jurisdiction to issue a notice for the

assessment or re-assessment beyond the period of four years but

within the period of eight years from the end of the year in question.

The words used in the expression “omission or failure to disclose

fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that

year” would postulate a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and

truly all material facts necessary for his assessment though what

facts are material and necessary for assessment would differ from

case to case. On the above basis, this Court came to the conclusion

that while the duty of the assessee is to disclose fully and truly all

primary facts, it does not extend beyond this. This position has been

reiterated in subsequent decisions by this Court including in Income

Tax Officer Vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das, 1976 (3) SCC 757; 1976 (103)

ITR 437. The expression “reason to believe” has also been explained

to mean reasons deducible from the materials on record and which

have a live link to the formation of the belief that income chargeable

to tax has escaped assessment. Such reasons must be based on

material and specific information obtained subsequently and not on 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 667

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

the basis of surmises, conjectures or gossip. The reasons formed

must be bona fide.

33. In Phool Chand Bajrang Lal (supra), this Court examined the purport

of Section 147 of the Act and observed that the object of Section 147

is to ensure that a party cannot get away by willfully making a false

or untrue statement at the time of original assessment and when

that falsity comes to notice, to turn around and say “you accepted

my lie, now your hands are tied and you can do nothing”. This Court

opined that it would be a travesty of justice to allow an assessee

such latitude. After adverting to various previous decisions, this

Court held that an income tax officer acquires jurisdiction to reopen

an assessment under Section 147(a) read with Section 148 of the

Act only if on the basis of specific, reliable and relevant information

coming to his possession subsequently, he has reasons, which he

must record, to believe that due to omission or failure on the part of

the assessee to make a true and full disclosure of all material facts

necessary for his assessment during the concluded assessment

proceedings, any part of his income, profit or gains chargeable to

income tax has escaped assessment. In the above context, Supreme

Court has held as under:

25. …...He may start reassessment proceedings either

because some fresh facts come to light which were not

previously disclosed or some information with regard to

the facts previously disclosed comes into his possession

which tends to expose the untruthfulness of those facts. In

such situations, it is not a case of mere change of opinion

or the drawing of a different inference from the same facts

as were earlier available but acting on fresh information.

Since, the belief is that of the Income Tax Officer, the

sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief, is not for the

Court to judge but it is open to an assessee to establish

that there in fact existed no belief or that the belief was not

at all a bona fide one or was based on vague, irrelevant

and non-specific information. To that limited extent, the

Court may look into the conclusion arrived at by the Income

Tax Officer and examine whether there was any material

available on the record from which the requisite belief

could be formed by the Income Tax Officer and further

whether that material had any rational connection or a 

668 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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live link for the formation of the requisite belief. It would

be immaterial whether the Income Tax Officer at the time

of making the original assessment could or, could not

have found by further enquiry or investigation, whether

the transaction was genuine or not, if on the basis of

subsequent information, the Income Tax Officer arrives at a

conclusion, after satisfying the twin conditions prescribed in

Section 147(a) of the Act, that the assessee had not made

a full and true disclosure of the material facts at the time

of original assessment and therefore income chargeable

to tax had escaped assessment.……

34. This Court in the case of Srikrishna Private Limited (supra) emphasized

that what is required of an assessee in the course of assessment

proceedings is a full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary

for making assessment for that year. It was emphasized that it is the

obligation of the assessee to disclose the material facts or what are

called primary facts. It is not a mere disclosure but a disclosure which

is full and true. Referring to the decision in Phool Chand Bajrang

Lal (supra), it has been highlighted that a false disclosure is not a

true disclosure and would not satisfy the requirement of making a

full and true disclosure. The obligation of the assessee to disclose

the primary facts necessary for his assessment fully and truly can

neither be ignored nor watered down. All the requirements stipulated

by Section 147 must be given due and equal weight.

35. Kelvinator of India Limited (supra) is a case where this Court examined

the question as to whether the concept of “change of opinion”

stands obliterated with effect from 01.04.1989 i.e. after substitution

of Section 147 of the Act by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act,

1987. This Court considered the changes made in Section 147 and

found that prior to the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987,

reopening could be done under two conditions i.e., (a) the Income

Tax Officer had reason to believe that by reason of omission or failure

on the part of the assessee to make a return under Section 139 for

any assessment year or to disclose fully and truly all material facts

necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax

had escaped assessment for that year, or (b) notwithstanding that

there was no such omission or failure on the part of the assessee,

the Income Tax Officer had in consequence of information in his 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 669

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

possession reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had

escaped assessment for any assessment year. Fulfilment of the

above two conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the assessing

officer to make a re-assessment. But with effect from 01.04.1989,

the above two conditions have been given a go-by in Section 147

and only one condition has remained, viz, that where the assessing

officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment,

that would be enough to confer jurisdiction on the assessing officer

to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post 01.04.1989, power to

reopen assessment is much wider. However, this Court cautioned that

one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason

to believe”, otherwise Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to

the assessing officer to reopen assessments on the basis of “mere

change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to reopen.

35.1. This Court also referred to Circular No.549 dated 31.10.1989

of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) to allay the

apprehension that omission of the expression “reason to

believe” from Section 147 and its substitution by the word

“opinion” would give arbitrary powers to the assessing officer

to reopen past assessments on mere change of opinion and

pointed out that in 1989 Section 147 was once again amended

to reintroduce the expression “has reason to believe” in place

of the expression “for reasons to be recorded by him in writing,

is of the opinion”. This Court thereafter explained as under:

6. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference

between power to review and power to reassess. The

assessing officer has no power to review; he has the

power to reassess. But reassessment has to be based

on fulfilment of certain precondition and if the concept of

“change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf

of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the

assessment, review would take place.

7. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as

an in-built test to check abuse of power by the assessing

officer. Hence, after 1-4-1989, the assessing officer has

power to reopen, provided there is “tangible material”

to come to the conclusion that there is escapement

of income from assessment. Reasons must have a 

670 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets

support from the changes made to Section 147 of the

Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws

(Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted

the words “reason to believe” but also inserted the

word “opinion” in Section 147 of the Act. However, on

receipt of representations from the companies against

omission of the words “reason to believe”, Parliament

reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word

“opinion” on the ground that it would vest arbitrary

powers in the assessing officer.

36. Elaborating further on the expression “change of opinion”, this Court

in Techspan India Private Limited (supra) observed that to check

whether it is a case of change of opinion or not one would have

to see its meaning in literal as well as legal terms. The expression

“change of opinion” would imply formulation of opinion and then

a change thereof. In terms of assessment proceedings, it means

formulation of belief by the assessing officer resulting from what he

thinks on a particular question. Therefore, before interfering with

the proposed reopening of the assessment on the ground that the

same is based only on a change of opinion, the court ought to verify

whether the assessment earlier made has either expressly or by

necessary implication expressed an opinion on a matter which is the

basis of the alleged escapement of income that was taxable. If the

assessment order is non-speaking, cryptic or perfunctory in nature, it

may be difficult to attribute to the assessing officer any opinion on the

questions that are raised in the proposed reassessment proceedings.

37. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed before the Court in

the convenience compilation the reasons recorded by the assessing

officer for initiating reassessment proceedings. The same is extracted

as under:

Reasons for the belief that income has escaped assessment.

As per the last balance sheet of the assessee for AY

1989-90 obtained from the South Indian Bank, the capital

of the assessee is as under:-

Fixed capital of partners. Rs. 20,50,000/-

Investment allowance. Rs. 41,47,873/-

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 671

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

Current a/c of partners. Rs. 44,28,597/-

 ________________

Total Rs. 1,06,26,470/-

 ________________

The B/S/P & L a/c for the intervening period is not available.

But the balance sheet/P&L a/c for AY 1993-94 shows

increase in capital which is as under:

Fixed capital of partners. Rs. 20,50,000/-

Investment allowance. Rs. 40,02,614/-

Current a/c of partners. Rs. 1,65,25,455/-

 ________________

Total Rs. 2,25,78,069/-

 ________________

The difference of Rs. 1,19,51,599/- is obviously the profit

of the assessee during the AY 1990-91 to 1993-94. The

profit of AY 1993-94 as per the accounts is Rs. 5,08,548/-.

If this is excluded, the profit for the three years i.e. 1990-

91, 1991-92 and AY 1992-93 is Rs. 1,14,43,051/-. The

profit will be more, if the drawings during the period of

the partners are included. The drawings and taxes paid is:

drawings taxes paid

1990-91 Rs.20,30,584/- Rs.2,48,287/-

1991-92 Rs.18,87,648/-

1992-93 Rs.29,12,038/- Rs.2,72,212/-

1993-94

(Figures not available from

assessment records.)

Rs.68,30,270/- Rs.3,83,925/-

Thus, the profit for the three years would be Rs. 1,86,

57, 246/- (1,14,43,051 + 68,30,270 + 3,83,925). Under

assessment of income for the three years is, therefore,

Rs.1,69,92,728 i.e., (18657246 – 1664518).

The sales estimated by AO for each of the 3 years less

depreciation for each year is taken as the basis for

determining the proportion in which the under-assessment

has been made.

672 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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AY Sales

estimated

by AO

Depreciation Balance UnderAssessment

1990-91 90079199 4329815 85749384 6324989

1991-92 82124877 6222432 75902441 5598817

1992-93 72294757 3575079 68719678 5068892

Total under-assessment 16992728

In view of the above, I have reason to believe that by

reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee

to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for

his assessment, income as determined above, chargeable

to tax has escaped assessment.

38. Thus, from a reading of the reasons recorded by the assessing officer

leading to formation of his belief that income of the assessee had

escaped assessment for the assessment years under consideration,

it is seen that the only material which came into possession of

the assessing officer subsequently was the balance sheet of the

assessee for the assessment year 1989-90 obtained from the

South Indian Bank. After obtaining this balance sheet, the assessing

officer compared the same with the balance sheet and profit loss

account of the assessee for the assessment year 1993-94. On such

comparison, the assessing officer noticed significant increase in the

current and capital accounts of the partners of the assessee. On that

basis, he drew the inference that profit of the assessee for the three

assessment years under consideration would be significantly higher

which had escaped assessment. The figure of under assessment was

quantified at Rs.1,69,92,728.00. Therefore, he recorded that he had

reason to believe that due to omission or failure on the part of the

assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the

assessments, incomes chargeable to tax for the three assessment

years had escaped assessment.

39. Assessee did not submit regular balance sheet and profit and loss

account for the three assessment years under consideration on the

ground that books of account and other materials/documents of the

assessee were seized by the department in the course of search and

seizure operation which were not yet returned to the assessee. In 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 673

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

the absence of such books etc., it became difficult for the assessee

to maintain yearwise regular books of account etc. However, regular

books of account and profit and loss account were filed by the

assessee along with the return of income for the assessment year

1993-94. What the assessing officer did was to cull out the figures

discernible from the balance sheet for the assessment year 1989-90

obtained from the South Indian Bank and compared the same with

the balance sheet submitted by the assessee before the assessing

officer for the assessment year 1993-94 and thereafter arrived at

the aforesaid conclusion.

40. It may be mentioned that the assessee had filed its regular balance

sheet as on 31.12.1985 while filing the return of income for the

assessment year 1986-87. The next balance sheet filed was as on

31.03.1993 for the assessment year 1993-94. No balance sheet

was filed in the interregnum as according to the assessee, it could

not maintain proper books of account as the relevant materials were

seized by the department in the course of a search and seizure

operation and not yet returned. It was not possible for it to obtain

ledger balances to be brought down for the succeeding accounting

years. As regards the balance sheet as on 31.03.1989 filed by the

assessee before the South Indian Bank and which was construed by

the assessing officer to be the balance sheet of the assessee for the

assessment year 1989-90, the explanation of the assessee was that

it was prepared on provisional and estimate basis and was submitted

before the South Indian Bank for obtaining credit and therefore could

not be relied upon in assessment proceedings. It appears that this

balance sheet was also relied upon by the assessing officer in the

re-assessment proceedings of the assessee for the assessment year

1989-90. In the first appellate proceedings, CIT(A) in its appellate

order dated 26.03.2002 held that such profit and loss account and

the balance sheet furnished to the South Indian Bank were not

reliable and had discarded the same. That being the position, the

assessing officer could not have placed reliance on such balance

sheet submitted by the assessee allegedly for the assessment year

1989-90 to the South Indian Bank for obtaining credit. Dehors such

balance sheet, there were no other material in the possession of

the assessing officer to come to the conclusion that income of the 

674 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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assessee for the three assessment years had escaped assessment.

41. It is true that Section 139 places an obligation upon every person to

furnish voluntarily a return of his total income if such income during

the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not

chargeable to income tax. The assessee is under further obligation

to disclose all material facts necessary for his assessment for that

year fully and truly. However, as has been held by the constitution

bench of this Court in Calcutta Discount Company Limited (supra),

while the duty of the assessee is to disclose fully and truly all primary

and relevant facts necessary for assessment, it does not extend

beyond this. Once the primary facts are disclosed by the assessee,

the burden shifts onto the assessing officer. It is not the case of

the revenue that the assessee had made a false declaration. On

the basis of the “balance sheet” submitted by the assessee before

the South Indian Bank for obtaining credit which was discarded

by the CIT(A) in an earlier appellate proceeding of the assessee

itself, the assessing officer upon a comparison of the same with

a subsequent balance sheet of the assessee for the assessment

year 1993-94 which was filed by the assessee and was on record,

erroneously concluded that there was escapement of income and

initiated reassessment proceedings.

42. We may also mention that while framing the initial assessment

orders of the assessee for the three assessment years in question,

the assessing officer had made an independent analysis of the

incomings and outgoings of the assessee for the relevant previous

years and thereafter had passed the assessment orders under

Section 143(3) of the Act. We have already taken note of the fact

that an assessment order under Section 143(3) is preceded by

notice, enquiry and hearing under Section 142(1), (2) and (3) as

well as under Section 143(2). If that be the position and when the

assessee had not made any false declaration, it was nothing but a

subsequent subjective analysis of the assessing officer that income

of the assessee for the three assessment years was much higher

than what was assessed and therefore, had escaped assessment.

This is nothing but a mere change of opinion which cannot be a

ground for reopening of assessment.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 675

M/S Mangalam Publications, Kottayam v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Kottayam

43. There is one more aspect which we may mention. Admittedly, the

returns for the three assessment years under consideration were not

accompanied by the regular books of account. Though under subsection (9)(f) of Section 139, such returns could have been treated

as defective returns by the assessing officer and the assessee

intimated to remove the defect failing which the returns would

have been invalid, however, the materials on record do not indicate

that the assessing officer had issued any notice to the assessee

bringing to its notice such defect and calling upon the assessee to

rectify the defect within the period as provided under the aforesaid

provision. In other words, the assessing officer had accepted the

returns submitted by the assessee for the three assessment years

under question. At this stage, we may also mention that it is the case

of the assessee that though it could not maintain and file regular

books of account with the returns in the assessment proceedings

for the three assessment years under consideration, nonetheless it

had prepared and filed the details of accounts as well as incomings

and outgoings of the assessee etc. for each of the three assessment

years which were duly verified and enquired into by the assessing

officer in the course of the assessment proceedings which culminated

in the orders of assessment under sub-section (3) of Section 143.

Suffice it to say that a return filed without the regular balance sheet

and profit and loss account may be a defective one but certainly not

invalid. A defective return cannot be regarded as an invalid return.

The assessing officer has the discretion to intimate the assessee

about the defect(s) and it is only when the defect(s) are not rectified

within the specified period that the assessing officer may treat the

return as an invalid return. Ascertaining the defects and intimating

the same to the assessee for rectification, are within the realm

of discretion of the assessing officer. It is for him to exercise the

discretion. The burden is on the assessing officer. If he does not

exercise the discretion, the return of income cannot be construed

as a defective return. As a matter of fact, in none of the three

assessment years, the assessing officer had issued any declaration

that the returns were defective.

44. Assessee has asserted both in the pleadings and in the oral hearing 

676 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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that though it could not file regular books of account along with the

returns for the three assessment years under consideration because

of seizure by the department, nonetheless the returns of income

were accompanied by tentative profit and loss account and other

details of income like cash flow statements, statements showing the

source and application of funds reflecting the increase in the capital

and current accounts of the partners of the assessee etc., which

were duly enquired into by the assessing officer in the assessment

proceedings.

45. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above, we are

therefore of the view that the Tribunal was justified in coming to the

conclusion that the reassessments for the three assessment years

under consideration were not justified. The High Court has erred in

reversing such findings of the Tribunal. Consequently, we set aside

the common order of the High Court dated 12.09.2009 and restore

the common order of the Tribunal dated 29.10.2004.

46. The above conclusions reached by us would cover the other civil

appeals of this batch as well. Resultantly, all the civil appeals filed

by the assessee and its partners are hereby allowed. No costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeals allowed.