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Service matter – more than 10 years of service entitled for permanent appointment – Show cause notice – termination of services of temporary appointed employees after completion of their service for 29 years continuously- who are not appointed with out recommendation of public service commission – in wake of Bifurcation of Jarkhand State from Bihar – challenged – single judge dismissed the writs – D.B. allowed the writs basing o Umadevi case – Apex court held that we are of the opinion that the High Court was correct in reinstating the respondent-employees into their services under the appellants by relying on the legal principles laid down by this Court in the Constitution Bench decision in Uma Devi’s case (supra). We accordingly direct the appellants to implement the orders of the Division Bench of the High Court thereby continuing the respondents in their services and extend all benefits as have been granted by it in the impugned judgment.=STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ……APPELLANTS VS. KAMAL PRASAD & ORS. ………RESPONDENTS= 2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41461

  Service matter – more than 10 years of service entitled for permanent appointment – Show cause notice – termination of services of temporary appointed employees after completion of their service for 29 years continuously- who are not appointed with out recommendation of public service commission – in wake of Bifurcation of Jarkhand State from Bihar – challenged – single judge dismissed the writs – D.B. allowed the writs basing o Umadevi case – Apex court held that   we are of the opinion that  the  High  Court was correct in reinstating  the  respondent-employees  into  their  services under the appellants by relying on the legal principles laid  down  by  this Court in the Constitution Bench decision in  Uma  Devi’s  case  (supra).  We accordingly direct the appellants to implement the orders  of  the  Division Bench of  the  High  Court  thereby  continuing  the  respondents  in  their services and extend all benefits as have been granted by it in the  impugned judgment.=

 

200  posts  have  been  created  by  the  erstwhile  State

Government of  Bihar  in  Rural  Engineering  Organization  of  the   Road

Construction Department and the said posts  have been  advertised  by  the

department in Advertisement No. 13 of 1985 and  against  those  posts  the

respondent-employees and other similarly placed employees  were  appointed

after selection to the posts of Assistant Engineers on ad hoc  basis  with

permission of the BPSC and they continued as such in the  said  posts.  

On

15.11.2000, the State of Jharkhand was created by bifurcation of the State

of Bihar by the Act of Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000. 

It is the  case  of

the respondent-employees that as per Section 72 of the Act  of  2000,  the

persons who were working in the posts falling  in  the  territory  of  the

State of Bihar were to continue in the posts in the State of Jharkhand. 

It

is not in dispute that the said employees continued in the  employment  in

the State of Jharkhand after creation of new State. 

Thereafter,  an  order

was passed by the High Court on 22.3.2010, in the Writ Petition  No.  1001

of 2010 filed by Kamal Prasad &  Ors.  which  is  produced  on  record  as

Annexure-15 in the L.P.As. On the basis  of  the  said  order,  the  State

Government of Jharkhand unilaterally decided that the appointment  of  the

respondent-employees were not valid and accordingly it had  directed  that

they should go back to the State of Bihar. The said action of the State of

Jharkhand was found fault with by the High Court. The High Court,  in  the

case of Ram Swarath Prasad v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.[1] has  held  that

the said power was not available  with the State Government  of  Jharkhand

i.e. to pass unilateral order directing  the  respondent-employees  to  go

back to the State of Bihar, which action of it is not in  consonance  with

Section 72 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000.    =

     

The Division Bench of the High Court after referring

to the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi &  Ors.[2],

has clearly held that if a person has served for 10 years or more, then it

is  the  duty  of  the  State  Government  to  consider   his   case   for

regularization in the post.  The said conclusion came  to  be  reached  by

relying on Articles 309, 14, 16 of the Constitution of India. Relying upon

Umadevi & Ors. (supra),  the  High  Court  has  further  referred  to  the

judgment in the State of Karnataka & Ors. v. M.L. Kesari & Ors.[3]   which

is considered by this Court and this Court has clearly held that the  case

of Umadevi & Ors. (supra) cast a duty upon the State  Government  to  take

steps  to  regularize   the  services  of  those   irregularly   appointed

appointees, who had served for more than 10 years without the  benefit  or

protection of any interim order

 

Conclusion

we

are of the opinion that the decision of the High  Court  does  not  fall  in

either of the categories mentioned above which calls for  our  interference.

The Division Bench of the High Court having  regard  to  the  glaring  facts

that the respondent-employees have continuously worked in  their  posts  for

more than 29 years discharging permanent nature  of  duties  and  they  have

been paid their salaries and  other  service  benefits  out  of  the  budget

allocation,  no  objection  was  raised  by  the  CAG  in  this  regard  and

therefore, it is not open for the appellants to contend that  the  law  laid

down in  Uma Devi’s case (supra)  has no application to the fact  situation.

The action of the appellants in terminating the services of the  respondent-

employees who  have  rendered  continuous  service  in  their  posts  during

pendency of the Letters Patent Appeals was quashed by the High  Court  after

it has felt that the action is not only arbitrary but shocks  its  conscious

and therefore it has rightly exercised its discretionary power  and  granted

the  reliefs  to  the  respondent-employees  which  do  not  call  for   our

interference. 

Therefore, we are of the opinion  that  this  Court  will  not

interfere with the opinion of the High Court and on the  contrary,  we  will

uphold the decision of the High Court both on factual and legal  aspects  as

the same is legally correct and it  has  done  justice  to  the  respondent-

employees.

 

Answer to Point No. 4

 

24. As already mentioned above, we are of the opinion that  the  High  Court

was correct in reinstating  the  respondent-employees  into  their  services

under the appellants by relying on the legal principles laid  down  by  this

Court in the Constitution Bench decision in  Uma  Devi’s  case  (supra).  We

accordingly direct the appellants to implement the orders  of  the  Division

Bench of  the  High  Court  thereby  continuing  the  respondents  in  their

services and extend all benefits as have been granted by it in the  impugned

judgment.

 

25. The Civil Appeals are dismissed accordingly.

2014 ( April.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41461

GYAN SUDHA MISRA, V. GOPALA GOWDA

REPORTABLE

 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4809 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) 266 OF 2012)

 
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ……APPELLANTS

VS.

KAMAL PRASAD & ORS. ………RESPONDENTS
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4837 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 21936 of 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4810 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 34437 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4811 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 36515 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4812 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37628 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4813 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37701 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4814 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37702 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4815 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37740 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4816 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37819 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4817 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37834 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4818 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37850 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4819 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37864 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4820 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37930 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4821 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37952 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4822 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 37981 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4823 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38012 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4824 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38039 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4825 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38044 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4826 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38053 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4827 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38224 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4828 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38237 of 2012)

 

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4829 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38242 of 2012)

 

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4830 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38267 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4831 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38323 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4832 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38341 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4833 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38404 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4834 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 38408 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4835 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 39206 of 2012)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4836 OF 2014
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 93 of 2013)
J U D G M E N T
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

 
Leave granted in all the Special Leave Petitions.

2. These Civil Appeals are filed by the appellant-State of Jharkhand
questioning the legality of the impugned judgment and order dated
08.11.2011 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand in Letters Patent Appeal
No. 256 of 2011 and connected cases which allowed the appeals of the
respondent-writ petitioners by setting aside the judgment dated 25.07.2011
passed by the learned single Judge whereby the writ petitions of the
respondent-employees were dismissed and the Interlocutory Application No.
3223 of 2011 was allowed after quashing the show cause notices issued and
orders of termination of services of the respondent-employees. The Division
Bench of the High Court by framing certain substantial questions of law has
held that the respondents herein shall be entitled to all the consequential
benefits. The appellants being aggrieved of the impugned judgment and
orders have filed these Civil Appeals by urging various facts and legal
grounds in support of the same and prayed to set aside the impugned
judgment and orders by allowing the Civil Appeals.

3. Certain relevant facts are stated for the purpose of appreciating the
rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties with a view to
examine the correctness of the findings and reasons recorded by the
Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment and further to
find out as to whether the impugned judgment and orders warrant
interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in
these Civil Appeals.

4. The respondent-employees (the writ petitioners before the High
Court), were initially appointed in the year 1981 in the posts of Junior
Engineers in the Rural Development Department in the erstwhile State of
Bihar in respect of which the recommendation of the Bihar Public Service
Commission (for short “the BPSC”) was not required. It is the case of the
respondent-employees that they have continuously discharged their duties in
the above posts honestly and diligently to the satisfaction of their
employer. They were subsequently appointed on ad-hoc temporary basis as
Assistant Engineers in the pay-scales of [pic]1000-50-1700 P.Ro-10-1820/-,
with certain conditions on the basis of recommendation made by the BPSC
against temporary posts from the date of notification. Their services as
Assistant Engineers on ad-hoc basis were entrusted to work in the Road
Construction Department where they were required to contribute their work
within the stipulated period. The relevant condition No. 2 in the said
notification No. Work/G/1-402/87,248/(S) Patna dated 27.6.1987 is extracted
hereunder:-

“1. XXX XXX XXX

2. This ad-hoc appointment shall be dependent on approval of
Bihar Public Service Commission.

3. XXX XXX XXX ……”

It is their further case that they have been working in the said posts for
more than 29 years from the date of first appointment as Junior Engineers
and 23 years from the appointment in the posts of Assistant Engineers on ad-
hoc basis. Neither the BPSC nor Bihar State Government nor Jharkhand State
Government had intention to dispense with the services of these employees.
Therefore, they did not take steps to dispense with their services from
their posts. The employees approached the High Court when they were issued
the show cause notices dated 20.4.2010 by the appellant No.3. After taking
substantial work from the respondent-employees they have been harassed by
issuing show cause notices asking them to show cause as to why their
services should not be terminated on the ground of their appointment to the
posts as illegal/invalid. Their appointments were, however, not held to be
invalid either by the orders of the High Court or Supreme Court in spite of
the fact that 199 posts filled up by advertisement No.128/1996 issued by
the BPSC dated 2.9.1996 as the same would not affect the respondent-
employees who otherwise have been in continuous service for more than 23
years in the substantial posts of Road Construction Department and not of
Rural Engineering/Rural Works Department. Therefore, it was pleaded by them
that the impugned notices issued to them was an empty formality with
preconceived decision and the same is also not only discriminatory but also
suffers from legal malafides, arbitrariness, unreasonableness and is in
utter transgression of the interim order dated 22.3.2010 passed in W.P. (S)
No. 1001 of 2010 amounting to overreaching the majesty of the High Court.

5. They further sought for declaration that since the services of the
respondent-employees fortuitously fall in the territory of Jharkhand State
with effect from 15.11.2000 and no final cadre division of their services
has been made till date after tentative allocations were made vide order
dated 20.12.2006 by the Central Advisory Committee within the meaning of
Section 72 read with Section 73 of the Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000, it
is pleaded that the appellant-State of Jharkhand and its instrumentalities
have no unilateral power and jurisdiction to take any such decision to
their disadvantage as they were appointed before the date of establishment
of Jharkhand State. Therefore, the impugned notices issued unilaterally by
the appellant-State to the respondent-employees declaring their services as
illegal is not only a colourable exercise of its power but also whimsical,
discriminatory and thereby its action is in violation of Articles 14, 16,
19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

6. Further, direction was sought by the respondent-employees from the
High Court in the Writ Petitions to treat them equally at par with
similarly situated 120 persons appointed along with them who fortuitously
remained working in the territory of successor State of Bihar namely, after
the Jharkhand State was formed w.e.f. 15.11.2000 without any disturbance
and consider their claim for regularization along with them in terms with
the conscious Policy decision taken by it vide notification No. 10113(s)
dated 11.09.2009 by the Cadre Controlling State of Bihar and in pursuance
thereof the respondent-employees have also applied for the same and which
is in active consideration of the State of Jharkhand and further they
sought for issuance of a writ of prohibition restraining the appellants
from termination of their services from their posts in pursuance of the
impugned show cause notices as they had seriously apprehended in the light
of pre-decisive and prejudicial findings and reasons recorded in the
impugned notices in the garb of order dated 22.3.2010 passed in W.P.(S) No.
1001 of 2010, that their services might be terminated. However, the fact
remains that they are discharging their regular service to the appellants
(although their posts are termed as ad-hoc in nomenclature) for more than
29 years from the initial appointment as Junior Engineers since the year
1981 after following due procedure of Advertisement etc. and their services
have been upgraded to the posts of Assistant Engineer again on temporary
basis in 1987 pursuant to Cabinet decision of the erstwhile State of Bihar
Government with the permission of BPSC who had recognized their
qualification of degree and experience. Therefore, their appointment to the
posts is legal and valid from their date of inception of their original
appointment as Junior Engineers in the erstwhile State Government of Bihar.

7. The said writ petitions were opposed by the appellants herein urging
various facts and legal contentions in justification of their claim and the
reasons assigned in the show cause notices and opposed the prayers of the
respondent-employees, which case of them is not accepted by the learned
single Judge and consequently dismissed their writ petitions by judgment
dated 25.7.2011. Aggrieved by the said judgment and orders, they filed
Letters Patent Appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court urging
various grounds.

8. The correctness of the same was challenged by the appellants before
the Division Bench in the Letter Patent Appeal No. 256 of 2011 and other
connected LPAs. The learned senior counsel for the parties were heard at
length. After considering the rival legal contentions and noticing the
relevant facts of these cases it was held by the Division Bench of the
High Court that 200 posts have been created by the erstwhile State
Government of Bihar in Rural Engineering Organization of the Road
Construction Department and the said posts have been advertised by the
department in Advertisement No. 13 of 1985 and against those posts the
respondent-employees and other similarly placed employees were appointed
after selection to the posts of Assistant Engineers on ad hoc basis with
permission of the BPSC and they continued as such in the said posts. On
15.11.2000, the State of Jharkhand was created by bifurcation of the State
of Bihar by the Act of Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000. It is the case of
the respondent-employees that as per Section 72 of the Act of 2000, the
persons who were working in the posts falling in the territory of the
State of Bihar were to continue in the posts in the State of Jharkhand. It
is not in dispute that the said employees continued in the employment in
the State of Jharkhand after creation of new State. Thereafter, an order
was passed by the High Court on 22.3.2010, in the Writ Petition No. 1001
of 2010 filed by Kamal Prasad & Ors. which is produced on record as
Annexure-15 in the L.P.As. On the basis of the said order, the State
Government of Jharkhand unilaterally decided that the appointment of the
respondent-employees were not valid and accordingly it had directed that
they should go back to the State of Bihar. The said action of the State of
Jharkhand was found fault with by the High Court. The High Court, in the
case of Ram Swarath Prasad v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.[1] has held that
the said power was not available with the State Government of Jharkhand
i.e. to pass unilateral order directing the respondent-employees to go
back to the State of Bihar, which action of it is not in consonance with
Section 72 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000. This aspect was also
observed by the learned single Judge in his judgment impugned in the LPAs
filed by the respondent employees. However, it was observed that it is
open to the appropriate authorities having power to take reasonable
decision after issuing show-cause notices to the employees with regard to
the final allocation of the cadre to the State of Jharkhand in accordance
with law. The State Government of Jharkhand had interpreted the order
dated 22.3.2010 as a direction to it and it had proceeded to terminate the
services of these employees. The State Government took a decision to
terminate the services of all such engineers including the respondent-
employees in these appeals and notices were issued to them and the same
were stayed in the interlocutory application filed by the respondent-
employees and status-quo order dated 9.9.2010 was passed as per Ann.-18 in
the Writ Petition(S)No.2087 of 2010. Finding the said situation,
the State Government submitted that they are keeping the order of
termination of services of the respondent-employees and similarly situated
employees in abeyance. The State Government rejected the representations
of the respondent-employees and terminated their services vide separate
but similar orders dated 24.8.2011. The orders of termination were
questioned by the respondent–employees by filing interlocutory application
in the Letters Patent Appeals questioning their propriety, correctness and
legality of the orders of termination passed against them and action taken
by the State Government of Jharkhand against them. In the Letters Patent
Appeals, the Division Bench of High Court on 13.9.2011 passed an interim
order directing the appellants to maintain status-quo and the respondent-
employees were allowed to work in the posts. The Division Bench accepted
the factual and legal submissions urged on behalf of the employees that
they were appointed as back as in the year 1981 in the posts of Junior
Engineers which were not illegal or even irregular and they are qualified
persons and eligible to hold the posts. They rendered their services
satisfactorily and therefore, the State Government of Bihar has appointed
them in the posts of Assistant Engineers by the order of the Government
dated 27.6.1987 and continued them in their services as such till the
orders of termination passed against them on 24.08.2011, that too during
pendency of the Letters Patent Appeals before the Division Bench of the
High Court. It is observed by the Division Bench that the respondent-
employees have been in service independent of any interim order passed by
the court. The State Government was in need of Junior Engineers,
therefore, the State Government of Bihar allowed the services of the
respondent-employees in the posts. Thereafter, the State Government of
Bihar has decided to appoint them in the posts of Assistant Engineers and
it was under the impression that their names will be recommended by the
BPSC. After accepting the case of the respondent-employees that since 1987
till 2011 when the orders of termination of service were passed, they
continued in service and their salaries were paid with other service
benefits including increments and they were duly transferred from the
State of Bihar to the State of Jharkhand when it was formed and they were
treated as regular appointees for which the Jharkhand State Government did
not object their continuance in their services. The Order dated 22.3.2010
passed by the High Court in the writ petitions referred to supra seems to
have been interpreted by the officers of the Jharkhand State Government as
a direction to it to proceed with to terminate the services of the
respondent-employees. The Division Bench of the High Court after referring
to the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi & Ors.[2],
has clearly held that if a person has served for 10 years or more, then it
is the duty of the State Government to consider his case for
regularization in the post. The said conclusion came to be reached by
relying on Articles 309, 14, 16 of the Constitution of India. Relying upon
Umadevi & Ors. (supra), the High Court has further referred to the
judgment in the State of Karnataka & Ors. v. M.L. Kesari & Ors.[3] which
is considered by this Court and this Court has clearly held that the case
of Umadevi & Ors. (supra) cast a duty upon the State Government to take
steps to regularize the services of those irregularly appointed
appointees, who had served for more than 10 years without the benefit or
protection of any interim order. Further in the said case, this Court has
declared that it has been clearly ordered that one time settlement/measure
should be taken within six months i.e. from 10.04.2006. With reference to
the aforesaid decision the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent-employees placed reliance upon Article 142 of the
Constitution in support of the submission that order of the Supreme Court
be respected and implemented by its true meaning and spirit. Therefore,
the Division Bench of the High Court accepted the same and came to the
conclusion that the claims of the respondent-employees for regularization
in their posts are fit cases and they became unfortunate only because of
the creation of the State of Jharkhand over which the employees had no
control and could not have prevented creation of the State of Jharkhand
and because of that reason only, one State cannot take a different stand
with respect to the employees appointed by same process. The State
Government cannot throw the employees jobless after 30 years of their
continuous service in public employment guaranteed under Article 16 of the
Constitution, which would result in great injustice since their source of
income will be taken away and thereby the employees and their families
will suffer due to the arbitrary action of the State Government of
Jharkhand which deprived a person of life and liberty guaranteed under
Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

9. The said legal contention urged on behalf of the respondent-employees
has been vehemently opposed by the learned Advocate General appearing on
behalf of the appellant-State before the High Court who sought to
distinguish the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case to the facts
situation in the present case and he further contended that the said
decision has no application to the cases on hand which contention is
rejected by the Division Bench of the High Court.

10. It is contended by the learned Advocate General that jurisdiction of
the High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal is limited to the extent of the
scope of writ petitions. Therefore, the same cannot be enlarged by the
Division Bench of the High Court. It is further submitted by him that the
respondent-employees in the writ petitions have not prayed for
regularization of their services, and therefore, they are not entitled to
any relief in the Letters Patent Appeals.

11. With reference to the aforesaid rival contentions, the Division
Bench, by recording its finding at paras 21, 22 and 31 of the impugned
judgment, has accepted the case of the respondent-employees and allowed
their letters patent appeals by setting aside the judgment and order dated
25.7.2011 of the learned single Judge.

12. During pendency of the Letters Patent Appeals, the State Government
rejected their representations and terminated the services of the
respondent-employees vide separate but similar orders dated 24.8.2011
against each one of them. Therefore, they have submitted interlocutory
application in the letters patent appeals before the Division Bench of the
High Court HHigHquestioning the propriety and legality of their orders of
termination passed by the State Government. In the Letters Patent Appeals
on 13.9.2011, an interim order was passed directing the State Government of
Jharkhand to maintain status quo that is, to allow the respondent-employees
to work in the posts by it. The court also set aside the orders of
termination by allowing the interlocutory application and also quashed the
show cause notices and further held that the respondent-employees are
entitled to the consequential benefits.

13. The correctness of the judgment and orders is challenged by the
appellants in these Civil Appeals by framing various questions of law and
urging grounds in support of the same and praying to set aside the same.
The learned senior counsel, Mr. P.P. Rao appearing on behalf of the
appellants submitted that the order of termination of services of the
respondent-employees – ad hoc Assistant Engineers in the instant case, is
the necessary consequence of implementation of the judgment and order dated
8.4.1996 of this Court in C.A. No. 7516-20 of 1996 – Bihar State Unemployed
Civil Engineers Association & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. Etc.[4] as the
respondents have failed to get selected by BPSC. Therefore, they have no
legal right to challenge implementation of the said judgment dated 8.4.1996
as modified by subsequent order dated 23.10.1996 in IA No. 327/1996
permitting the State Government to relax the age of the respondent-
employees. In support of the first submission, he contends that the cut-off
date for consideration of case of ad-hoc employees who have worked for 10
years or more in the duly sanctioned posts, but under the cover of orders
of the court, is not covered by the case of Uma Devi & Ors. (supra) which
was decided on 10.4.2006 and the time granted to the State Government for
setting in motion the process of regularisation of ad hoc employees is
“within six months from the date” i.e. till 9.10.2006.

It is further contended by the learned senior counsel on behalf of
the appellants Mr. P.P. Rao that regularisation were allowed by the High
Court in those cases where appointments could not have been made without
recommendation of the BPSC and in view of the Articles 309 and 16 of the
Constitution of India, no appointment could have been made by the State
Government to any post much less the respondent-employees in violation of
the Recruitment Rules. Therefore, the illegal appointments of the
respondent-employees cannot be regularized by the State Government and the
High Court can not give direction in this regard.

14. In view of the said decisions, according to the learned senior counsel,
two questions would arise for consideration of this Court :-

i) Whether the respondent-employees worked till 10.4.2006
without any interim order of any court?

ii) Were they appointed in duly sanctioned posts?

However, the Division Bench of the High Court instead of addressing these
two questions, posed the question as to whether ad hoc employees who have
served for more than 10 years stand disqualified from regularisation on the
ground that they did not participate in any other appointment process. It
is the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the
repeated finding of the High Court that the respondent-Assistant Engineers
were continuing in service uninterruptedly with the employer for more than
10 years, is factually incorrect statement of fact. Therefore, the finding
recorded in the impugned judgment by the Division Bench of the High Court
at paragraphs 23, 25 and 26 is erroneous and the same cannot be allowed to
sustain by this Court for the reason that they continued in their service
at least following six interim orders passed by the High Court all of which
were prior to 10.4.2006, the cut-off date mentioned in Uma Devi (supra)
for considering the question of regularisation of ad hoc employees and
therefore the said decision does not apply to the present cases. According
to him, the dates on which the interim orders passed in different writ
petitions are mentioned hereunder :-

|S. No. |Date of Order |Case No. |Cause Title |Vol./Pages |
|1. |15.12.1996 |CWJC No. 9420 of |Paras Kumar v. State|Vol. II pp. |
| | |1996 |of Bihar |20-21 |
|2. |20.6.1997 |CWJC No. 11761 of|Sardar Pradeep Singh|Vol.II p.22 |
| | |1996 |v. State of Bihar | |
|3. |4.4.2002 |CWJC No.2606 of |Jawahar Prasad |Vol.1 pp 84 |
| | |2002 |Bhagat v. State of |and 86 |
| | | |Bihar | |
|4. |4.4.2002 |CWJC No.4327 of |Akhilesh Prasad v. | |
| | |2002 |State of Bihar | |
|5. |4.4.2002 |CWJC No.4365 of |Vijay Kumar Sharma | |
| | |2002 |v. State of Bihar | |
|6. |8.1.2003 |CWJC No.2087 of | |Vol.I p.147 |
| | |2010 as noticed | |at |
| | |in the present | |pp.163-164 |
| | |case i.e. W.P No.| | |
| | |2087 of 2010 | | |
15. In support of second legal submission formulated above, the learned
senior counsel has submitted that neither the judgment in Umadevi’s case
(supra) nor in U.P. State Electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey &
Ors.[5] is applicable to the cases in hand in favour of the respondent-
employees. It is further submitted that the Division Bench of the High
Court has erroneously applied to the cases of respondent-employees and the
directions contained at para 53 of Umadevi’s case since the respondents
continued in service with the appellants at the instance of court’s interim
orders passed in writ petitions referred to supra which has been
established by the appellants. He has also placed reliance upon the
judgment of this Court in the case of Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of
Central Excise, New Delhi & Ors.[6] In support of his legal contention that
respondent-employees continued in service with the State Governments of
Bihar and Jharkhand, the learned counsel stated that similarly placed
employees had approached the High Court seeking certain reliefs and they
had obtained interim orders. Hence, the benefit of said interim order
passed by the High Courts of Patna and Jharkhand has been extended to the
respondent-employees and therefore they were continued in services by
applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid case. Therefore,
the finding recorded by the Division Bench accepting the submission on
behalf of the respondent-employees in these appeals that the respondent-
employees continued in service uninterruptedly without the interim orders,
is factually not correct. Therefore, the learned senior counsel for
appellants contends that the said finding is not only erroneous but also
suffers from error in law. Hence, the impugned judgment and orders are
liable to be set aside. He further contends that in view of the above
contentions, the respondent-employees are not entitled for the reliefs
granted by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment
and orders and therefore, he has prayed for setting aside the same by
allowing these Civil Appeals.

16. The aforesaid submissions made by the learned senior counsel on
behalf of the appellants were rebutted by the learned senior counsel, Mr.
J.P. Cama appearing on behalf of the respondent-employees justifying the
reasons recorded in the impugned judgment contending that the respondent-
employees were appointed as Junior Engineers in the year 1981 in the Rural
Department of the State of Bihar and in the year 1985 when regular
appointments were to be made to the Posts of Assistant Engineers in
pursuant to an advertisement made in the year 1985 itself, the respondents
applied for the same but did not succeed and therefore, they were put in
the waiting list. However, their services were not terminated even after
regular appointments were made to the posts in the year 1985 as contended
by the appellants. Their services were not dispensed with because their
work was good and they were appointed as Assistant Engineers by order of
the Bihar State Government dated 27.6.1987 and thereafter they continued in
service without break in their service till the orders of termination dated
24.8.2011 passed against them. It is further contended that even after
bifurcation of the appellant-State of Jharkhand from State of Bihar on
15.11.2002, the respondent-employees continued in employment without any
break. It is contended that the existence of vacancies of Assistant
Engineers in the Rural Development Department in the erstwhile State of
Bihar is not in dispute. The existence of vacancies in the said posts is
not denied by the appellant-State as there were 207 vacancies as on 2010.
Therefore, they continued in service though they were appointed by order of
the State Government on 27.6.1987 on ad hoc basis but continued as such
till the termination orders were passed against them. They were being paid
regular salary and other service benefits were given to them thereby
treating them as permanent employees by the appellants. He further
contended that the Division Bench in its judgment has held that the State
Public Service Commission merely examined suitability of eligible
candidates for the posts and recommended the names of such suitable
candidates for appointment to the posts. In the case on hand, it is not the
position of the State Government that these employees holding the posts of
Assistant Engineers and rendering their services are not suitable persons
to hold the posts. It is further contended that interim stay was granted by
the High Court in the cases of the respondent-employees for the first time
on 9.9.2010. Therefore, it is not correct to state that they continued in
the service with the intervention of interim orders of the High Courts as
urged by the appellants’ senior counsel and therefore, they are not
entitled to the benefit of the decision of Umadevi’s case (supra). Further,
the learned senior counsel contends the core questions involved in the case
in hand are:-

(1) Whether the services of the respondent-employees should have
been considered for regularization by the State Government even
though in the first instance they did not obtain selection through
the Public Service Commission and on the 2nd occasion they did not
participate in the selection process?

(2) Whether, they were entitled to claim regularization based only
on the fact they had worked for more than 10 years of service
continuously with the appellants?

He further submits that the High Court, considering the law declared in
Umadevi’s case (supra) at para 53 and also keeping in view the justice and
good conscious, has granted the relief to the respondent-employees. The
same cannot be termed either as erroneous or error in law. Further, it is
contended that the Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand has
rightly rejected the contentions urged by the Advocate General to the
effect that the persons who are appointed on ad hoc/temporary basis had an
opportunity to get another appointment in regular selection and they
failed to participate in the selection process, therefore the same would
not be a ground for the appellants to refuse regularization of service of
the respondent-employees, even after they have not availed such
opportunity. The employer State Government did not choose to dispense with
their services though there is no restraint order from the court. In the
cases in hand, both the Government of State of Bihar and Jharkhand have
continued the service of all the respondent-employees for 10 or more
years even after they failed to get appointed to the posts on a regular
basis. Therefore, the principle laid down in Umadevi’s case (supra) would
squarely apply in the case in hand in support of the respondent-employees.
The submission made by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
appellants that the regularization of the respondent-employees in their
service would deprive the other eligible persons from employment is wholly
untenable in law as the same would constitute not only discrimination but
also deprivation of their livelihood, which is not legally permissible in
law. The question is whether the appellants can terminate the services of
the present employees who have served for more than 10 to 30 years, thereby
rendering injustice to the eligible people. Therefore, in any event, it is
doubtful whether the employer, more particularly the State can raise such a
plea to deny employment to the employees and whether the law can be
interpreted in a manner so as to give all benefits to the wrongdoers. The
appointments were given to a large number of engineers by the State
Government of Bihar consciously and there is no allegation of unfairness in
their appointment which can be said to be tainted or as a result of any
nepotism. The error of the State Government of either Bihar or Jharkhand
would not justify to throw away the respondent-employees by making them
unemployed who have been well-settled in their life since the same would
amount to a clear case of discrimination and deprivation of their
livelihood. Further, the Division Bench of High Court has rightly held that
there is duty cast upon the State Government of Jharkhand to consider the
claim of the respondent-employees as one-time regularization of ad-hoc/
temporary employees in their posts. Further, it is contended by the learned
senior counsel that similarly situated employees are continuing in service
in the State Government of Bihar. Therefore, the relief sought by the
respondent-employees’ continuation in service, clearly takes care of all
the hurdles coming in their way. The Division Bench of the High Court is of
the considered opinion that the employees services should have been
regularized, but on the other hand, the appellant-State Government, during
pendency of the Letters Patent Appeals, has terminated their services. The
same cannot be an hurdle for it and it would not come in the way of the
appellant-State Government for grant of relief in favour of the respondent-
employees. Lastly, it is submitted that there is material distinction
between filling up a vacant post by direct recruitment on the one hand and
“regularization” of existing employees in their posts by applying the
decision of Umadevi’s case (supra) who have served for more than 10 years
in the posts with the appellants without the interventions of any interim
orders granted by any court. Further, he urges that the principle which
flows from the mandate of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India
is supported at paragraph 53 of Umadevi’s case (supra). It is further
contended that it is not a case of “appointment” as mentioned hereinbefore
but it is a case of “regularization”. The only qualification for the latter
is continuous service of the employees without intervention of the court
order for a period of 10 years. Once this takes place, the citizen’s right
to livelihood as guaranteed under Article 21 as also his/her right to fair
treatment and against arbitrary action of the appellants is protected by
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That is the ratio of the impugned
judgment of Division Bench of the High Court. The conclusion and the
finding and reasons recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court on
this aspect of the matter in the impugned judgment is squarely covered by
the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Olga Tellis &
Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors.[7] The relevant para’s of the
same will be extracted in the reasoning portion of the judgment. Therefore,
the learned senior counsel has prayed for dismissal of the appeals.

17. All the other learned counsel appearing for the respondent-employees
in the connected Civil Appeals have adopted the submission made by the
learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondent-employees in the Civil
Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 266 of 2012. In view of the above submissions, the
learned counsel for the respondent-employees requested this Court for
dismissal of the Civil Appeals.

18. With reference to the above said rival legal contentions, urged on
behalf of the parties the following points would arise for consideration in
these Civil Appeals :-

 

1) Whether the impugned judgment is correct in holding
that the respondents-employees are entitled for the
benefit of Umadevi’s case (supra) as they rendered
more than 10 years of service in the State Government
of Jharkhand without intervention of the court?

2) Whether the impugned judgment passed by the Division
Bench of High Court is vitiated on account of
erroneous finding or suffers from error in law?

3) Whether the impugned judgment warrants interference
by this Court in exercise of power under Article 136
of the Constitution of India on the grounds urged in
these appeals?

4) What orders?

 
Answer to Point Nos. 1 & 2:

These points are answered together as they are inter related with each
other.

19. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
argued that there have been repeated findings of the High Court that the
respondents have been continued in service voluntarily by the employer for
more than 10 years. Correctness of the same is disputed by the learned
senior counsel for the appellants by placing reliance upon at least six
interim orders passed by the High Court all of which are prior to 10-4-
2006, the dates of these Orders are as follows:

i) Order dated 15-12-1996 in CWJC NO. 9420 of 1996- Param Kumar v.
State of Bihar.
ii) Order dated 20-6-1997 in CWJC No. 11761 of 1996- Sardar Pradeep
Singh v. State of Bihar.
iii) Order dated 4-4-2002 in CWJC No. 2606 of 2002- Jawahar Prasad
Bhagat v. State of Bihar.

iv) Order dated 4-4-2002 in CWJC No. 4327 of 2002- Akhilesh Prasad
v. State of Bihar.

v) Order dated 4-4-2002 in CWJC No. 4365 of 2002- Vijay Kumar
Sharma v. State of Bihar.
vi) Order dated 8-1-2003 in CWJC No. 2087 of 2010.

Further, two stay orders have also been passed by the High Court
subsequent to 10-4-2006, which are (1) Order dated 9-9-2007 of the
learned single Judge and (2) Order dated 13-9-2011.

Further, in the case of Uma Devi (supra) it has been held by the
Constitution Bench of this Court that:

“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where
irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained
in S.V.Narayanappa (supra), R.N.Nanjundappa
(supra),and B.N.Nagarajan (supra),and referred to in paragraph 15
above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts
might have been made and the employees have continued to work for
ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts
or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of
such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of
the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred
to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union
of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should
take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of
such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more
in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts
or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular
recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts
that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees
or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in
motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that
regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not
be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further
by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or
making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the
constitutional scheme.”

(Emphasis laid by this Court)

 

The learned senior counsel for the appellants placing reliance upon the
aforesaid paragraph of the decision submits that the respondents do not
fulfil the requirement of 10 years of uninterrupted service which is sine
qua non for regularization of the services of the employees in their posts.
Hence, the legal principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid case
cannot apply in the present case, therefore, the respondents are not
entitled for regularization.

20. We have heard the factual and legal contentions urged by the learned
senior counsel for both the parties and carefully examined the findings and
reasons recorded in the impugned judgment with reference to the evidence
produced on behalf of the respondent-employees. The evidence on record
produced by the respondent-employees would clearly go to show that they
have been rendering services in the posts as ad-hoc Engineers since 1987
and have been discharging their services as permanent employees with the
appellants. Additional 200 posts were created thereafter by the State
Government of Bihar. However, the respondents continued in their services
as ad hoc employees without any disciplinary proceedings against them which
prove that they have been discharging services to their employers to their
satisfaction.

The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants have failed to
show as to how the interim orders upon which he placed strong reliance are
extended to the respondents which is not forthcoming except placing
reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Amrit Lal Berry
(supra), without producing any record on behalf of both the State
Governments of Bihar and Jharkhand to substantiate the contention that the
interim orders obtained by the similarly placed employees in the writ
petitions referred to supra were extended to the respondent-employees to
maintain parity though they have not obtained such interim orders from the
High Court. Therefore, the learned senior counsel has failed to prove that
the respondents have failed to render continuous services to the appellants
at least for ten years without intervention of orders of the court, the
findings of fact recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court is based
on record, hence the same cannot be termed as erroneous in law. In view of
the categorical finding of fact on the relevant contentious issue that the
respondent-employees have continued in their service for more than 10 years
continuously therefore, the legal principle laid down by this Court in Uma
Devi’s case (supra) at paragraph 53 squarely applies to the present cases.
The Division Bench of the High Court has rightly held that the respondent-
employees are entitled for the relief, the same cannot be interfered with
by this Court.

21. In fact, the Division Bench of the High Court by regularizing the
respondent-employees vide its impugned order has upheld the constitutional
principle laid down by this Court in the case of Olga Tellis (supra), the
relevant para of which reads as under :-

“32. As we have stated while summing up the petitioners’ case, the
main plank of their argument is that the right to life which is
guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and
since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are
evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is
tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence
unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the
factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are
evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their
livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to
consider is whether the right to life includes the right to
livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that
it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is
wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be
extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and
execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure
established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life.
An equally important facet of that right is the right to
livelihood because, no person can live without the means of
living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to
livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to
life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life
would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of
abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its
effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life
impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be
in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right
to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life.
That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what
makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of
the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and
you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the
massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They
migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages.
The motive force which propels their desertion of their hearths
and homes in the village is the struggle for survival, that is,
the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the
nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat
to live: only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat.
That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of
livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas,
J. in Baksey that the right to work is the most precious liberty
that man possesses. It is the most precious liberty because, it
sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a
precious freedom. “Life”, as observed by Field, J. in Munn v.
Illinois means something more than mere animal existence and the
inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those
limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation
was quoted with approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. State of
U.P.”
(Emphasis laid by this Court)

 

In view of the foregoing reasons which we have assigned in this
judgment and in upholding the findings and reasons recorded by the Division
Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment, it cannot be said that
the findings and reasons recorded by the High Court in arriving at the
conclusions on the contentious issues that arose for its consideration can
be termed either as erroneous or error in law.

22. In view of the foregoing reasons, we are inclined to conclude that
the High Court was legally correct in extending the benefits of Uma Devi’s
case to the respondent-employees. Therefore, we answer point nos. 1 and 2
in favour of the respondent-employees.

 

Answer to Point No. 3

23. Though, point Nos. 1 and 2 have been answered in favour of the
respondents, the question raised regarding the requirement of interference
by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India requires
separate and independent consideration by us. In the case of Jamshed
Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai & Anr.[8], this Court
observed as under:

“33.The discretionary power of the Supreme Court is plenary
in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself
qualifying that power. The very conferment of the
discretionary power defies any attempt at exhaustive
definition of such power. The power is permitted to be
invoked not in a routine fashion but in very exceptional
circumstances as when a question of law of general public
importance arises or a decision sought to be impugned before
the Supreme Court shocks the conscience. This overriding and
exceptional power has been vested in the Supreme Court to be
exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of the cause of
justice in the Supreme Court in exceptional cases only when
special circumstances are shown to exist.”

(Emphasis laid by this Court)

 
This position was reaffirmed and further elucidated in the case of Mathai @
Joby v. George & Anr.[9], wherein the two judge Bench of this Court held as
follows:

“21. Mr. Venugopal has suggested the following categories of
cases which alone should be entertained under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
(i) All matters involving substantial questions of law relating
to the interpretation of the Constitution of India;

(ii) All matters of National or public importance;

(iii) Validity of laws, Central and State;

(iv) After Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 217, the judicial
review of Constitutional Amendments; and

(v) To settle differences of opinion of important issues of law
between High Courts.
22. We are of the opinion that two additional categories of
cases can be added to the above list, namely (i) where the Court
is satisfied that there has been a grave miscarriage of
justice and (ii) where a fundamental right of a person has prima
facie been violated. However, it is for the Constitution Bench
to which we are referring this matter to decide what are the
kinds of cases in which discretion under Article 136 should be
exercised.
23. In our opinion, the time has now come when an authoritative
decision by a Constitution Bench should lay down some broad
guidelines as to when the discretion under Article 136 of the
Constitution should be exercised, i.e., in what kind of cases a
petition under Article 136 should be entertained. If special
leave petitions are entertained against all and sundry kinds of
orders passed by any court or tribunal, then this Court after
some time will collapse under its own burden.
24. It may be mentioned that in Pritam Singh v. The State  AIR
1950 S.C. 169 a Constitution Bench of this Court observed (vide
para 9) that “a more or less uniform standard should be adopted
in granting Special Leave”. Unfortunately, despite this
observation no such uniform standard has been laid down by this
Court, with the result that grant of Special Leave has become,
as Mr. Setalvad pointed out in his book ` My Life’, a gamble.
This is not a desirable state of affairs as there should be some
uniformity in the approach of the different benches of this
Court. Though Article 136 no doubt confers a discretion on the
Court, judicial discretion, as Lord Mansfield stated in classic
terms in the case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2528 “means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not
humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful”

 

In view of the legal principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, we
are of the opinion that the decision of the High Court does not fall in
either of the categories mentioned above which calls for our interference.
The Division Bench of the High Court having regard to the glaring facts
that the respondent-employees have continuously worked in their posts for
more than 29 years discharging permanent nature of duties and they have
been paid their salaries and other service benefits out of the budget
allocation, no objection was raised by the CAG in this regard and
therefore, it is not open for the appellants to contend that the law laid
down in Uma Devi’s case (supra) has no application to the fact situation.
The action of the appellants in terminating the services of the respondent-
employees who have rendered continuous service in their posts during
pendency of the Letters Patent Appeals was quashed by the High Court after
it has felt that the action is not only arbitrary but shocks its conscious
and therefore it has rightly exercised its discretionary power and granted
the reliefs to the respondent-employees which do not call for our
interference. Therefore, we are of the opinion that this Court will not
interfere with the opinion of the High Court and on the contrary, we will
uphold the decision of the High Court both on factual and legal aspects as
the same is legally correct and it has done justice to the respondent-
employees.

Answer to Point No. 4

24. As already mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the High Court
was correct in reinstating the respondent-employees into their services
under the appellants by relying on the legal principles laid down by this
Court in the Constitution Bench decision in Uma Devi’s case (supra). We
accordingly direct the appellants to implement the orders of the Division
Bench of the High Court thereby continuing the respondents in their
services and extend all benefits as have been granted by it in the impugned
judgment.

25. The Civil Appeals are dismissed accordingly.

 

 

………………………………………………………………………J.
[GYAN SUDHA MISRA]

 

………………………………………………………………………J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]
New Delhi,
April 23, 2014.

———————–
[1] 2002 (1) J.C.R. 106

[2] (2006) 4 SCC 1
[3] (2010) 9 SCC 247
[4] (1996) 8 SCC 615
[5] (2007) 11 SCC 92

[6] (1975) 4 SCC 714

[7] (1985) 3 SCC 545

[8] (2004) 3 SCC 214

[9] (2010) 4 SCC 358

 

———————–
51

 

 

 

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