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Dowry death – three dying declarations. – clouds of doubts surrounded – Acquittal justified – One was made before the Executive Magistrate on 14th July, 2003, the second alleged to have been made by the deceased Archana before her father, Dilip (PW-5)-complainant on 15th July, 2003 and the third dying declaration was made in a format before the Executive Magistrate on 16th July, 2003. The complainant, Dilip (PW-5), father of the deceased in his FIR dated 16th July, 2003 had not stated that her daughter Archana alleged that the accused was asking for intercourse second time on 14th July, 2003, and when she refused the accused sprinkled kerosene on her and put her on fire. The prosecution could not explain as to why the second dying declaration was taken on 16th July, 2003, though in the said declaration the deceased Archana had stated that she had not called for the second dying declaration. All this aspect has been discussed by the Sessions Judge who acquitted the appellant.In the present case, the view taken by the Sessions Judge is neither unreasonable nor perverse. It is possible reasonable view based on the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the order of acquittal.= SURYAKANT DADASAHEB BITALE … APPELLANT VERSUS DILIP BAJRANG KALE & ANR. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41727

 Dowry death –    three dying declarations. – clouds of doubts surrounded – Acquittal justified –  One was made before the Executive Magistrate on  14th  July,  2003,  the  second alleged to have been made by the deceased Archana before her  father,  Dilip (PW-5)-complainant on 15th July, 2003 and the third  dying  declaration  was made in a format before the Executive Magistrate on  16th  July,  2003.  The complainant, Dilip (PW-5), father of the deceased  in  his  FIR  dated  16th July, 2003 had not  stated  that  her  daughter  Archana  alleged  that  the accused was asking for intercourse second time on 14th July, 2003, and  when she refused the accused sprinkled kerosene on her and put her on  fire.  The prosecution could not explain as to why the  second  dying  declaration  was taken on 16th July, 2003,  though  in  the  said  declaration  the  deceased Archana  had  stated  that  she  had  not  called  for  the   second   dying declaration. All this aspect has been discussed by the  Sessions  Judge  who acquitted the appellant.In the present case, the view taken by the Sessions Judge  is  neither unreasonable nor perverse. It is  possible  reasonable  view  based  on  the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the High Court was  not  justified in setting aside the order of acquittal.=

the deceased Archana  married  to  the

appellant-accused on 6th June, 2003. Satyanarayan Puja was performed on  8th

June, 2003. As per family  traditions,  Archana  returned  to  her  father’s

house on 9th June, 2003 and, thereafter, she went back to  matrimonial  home

on 11th June, 2003.

3.    On 14th July, 2003 the deceased Archana sustained  95%  burn  injuries

in her matrimonial house. Her husband, appellant-accused was present in  the

house at the relevant point of time. She was  admitted  in  Civil  Hospital,

Satara, where the  Special  Executive  Magistrate  had  recorded  her  dying

declaration on 14th July, 2003 (first dying declaration).

4.    The message of the burn injuries suffered by Archana was  received  by

her maternal uncle on 15th July, 2003. He along with his wife, went  to  see

Archana and found that she was under medical treatment in Civil Hospital  at

Satara.

5.    On 16th July, 2003,  Special  Executive  Magistrate  recorded  another

dying declaration  of  Archana  at  Civil  Hospital,  Satara  (second  dying

declaration).

6.    Dilip Bajrang Kale (in short Dilip), father of the  deceased  Archana,

thereafter lodged an FIR  on  16th  July,  2003  with  the  Pusegaon  Police

Station, District Satara against  the  appellant-accused  alleged  that  the

accused had given mental and physical harassment  to  Archana,  since  dowry

demand was not fulfilled and that, ultimately, Archana was  made  to  suffer

burn injuries.

7.    On 17th July, 2003 inquest panchnama on the body of the  deceased  was

carried  at  Civil  Hospital,  Satara  and  the  dead  body  was  sent   for

postmortem. The postmortem report suggested that death is caused due to  90%

superficial and deep burn injuries.

8.    The appellant-accused was arrested and  initially  proceeded  for  the

charges under Section 498A and 307 IPC. After the death of Archana,  he  was

charged for the offence punishable under Section 302 and 498A IPC.=

In State of Punjab vs. Parveen Kumar, (2005) 9  SCC  769,  this  Court

noticed different versions of incident in three several  dying  declarations

which created doubt about their  truthfulness.  One  dying  declaration  was

made  by  the  deceased  before  the  uncle,  second  before  the  Executive

Magistrate and third before the SI, Police. This Court  having  noticed  the

inconsistency with each other,  since  versions  disclosed  in  those  dying

declarations were quite different, affirmed the order of acquittal  recorded

by the High Court.

22.   In the present case, in fact, there are three dying declarations.  One

was made before the Executive Magistrate on  14th  July,  2003,  the  second

alleged to have been made by the deceased Archana before her  father,  Dilip

(PW-5)-complainant on 15th July, 2003 and the third  dying  declaration  was

made in a format before the Executive Magistrate on  16th  July,  2003.  The

complainant, Dilip (PW-5), father of the deceased  in  his  FIR  dated  16th

July, 2003 had not  stated  that  her  daughter  Archana  alleged  that  the

accused was asking for intercourse second time on 14th July, 2003, and  when

she refused the accused sprinkled kerosene on her and put her on  fire.  The

prosecution could not explain as to why the  second  dying  declaration  was

taken on 16th July, 2003,  though  in  the  said  declaration  the  deceased

Archana  had  stated  that  she  had  not  called  for  the   second   dying

declaration. All this aspect has been discussed by the  Sessions  Judge  who

acquitted the appellant.

23.   In the present case, the view taken by the Sessions Judge  is  neither

unreasonable nor perverse. It is  possible  reasonable  view  based  on  the

evidence on record. In the circumstances, the High Court was  not  justified

in setting aside the order of acquittal.

24.   For the reasons aforesaid, we set  aside  the  impugned  judgment  and

order dated 18th October, 2007 passed in Criminal Revision  Application  No.

321 of 2004 and affirm the order passed by the Sessions  Court.  The  appeal

is allowed.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41727-for full text – LAW FOR ALL

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