Doctrine of feeding the estoppel. – Sec.43 of T.P.Act – mother is the owner – but son sold the property to the appellant – pending case first son died and his legal heirs brought on record- next the mother /plaintiff died leaving grand children as her legal heirs – The Appellant now took the shelter of Sec.43 of T.P. Act – Apex court held that We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that in a case where a transferor never acquired by succession, inheritance or otherwise any interest in the property during his life time then the provision of Section 43 will not come into operation as against the heirs who succeeded the stridhan property of their grandmother.we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. =
“43. Transfer by unauthorised person who subsequently acquires interest in
Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents
that he is authorised to transfer certain immoveable property and professes
to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the
option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may
acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer
Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good
faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said
14. The doctrine is based on the principle of law of estoppel.
provides that when a person by fraudulent or erroneous representation
transfers certain immovable property, claiming himself to be the owner of
such property, then such transfer will subsequently operate on any interest
which the transferor may acquire in such property during which the contract
of transfer subsists.
This doctrine known in English law has form part of
Roman Dutch law, according to which where a granter has purported to grant
an interest in the land which he did not at the time possess, but
subsequently acquires, the benefit of his subsequent acquisition goes
automatically to the earlier grantee. In other words, where a vendor sells
without title in the property, but subsequently acquires title then a right
accrues to the purchaser to claim interest in the said property and it
automatically goes in favour of the transferor.=
the appellant would not be entitled to take the benefit of the doctrine of
feeding the estoppel.
The finding of facts recorded by the two courts
based on the records that the original plaintiff was the owner and title
holder of the said property
but by making false and fraudulent
representation by her son that the property belonged to him, transferred
the same in favour of the appellant.
During the pendency of the first
appeal before the district court, the vendor (son of the original
Although on the death, his children did not inherit or
succeeded any interest in the property, through their deceased father, but
they were impleaded as legal representatives in the appeal.
the pendency of this appeal, the original plaintiff, namely, Bannamma died.
After her death, the respondents being the grand children inherited and
acquired interest in the suit property.
Admittedly, the deceased son of
the original plaintiff, namely Nagi Reddy never acquired any interest in
the suit property owned by his mother during his life time.
aforesaid premises, the doctrine of feeding the estoppel would not come
into operation as against the grand children of the original plaintiff.
Section 43 in our considered opinion applies when the transferor having no
interest in the property transfers the same but subsequently acquires
interest in the said property, the purchaser may claim the benefit of such
subsequent acquisition of the property by the transferor.
Had it been a
case where the son Nagi Reddy during his life time succeeded or inherited
the property but- died subsequently, then to some extent it could have been
argued that the heirs of Nagi Reddy who inherited the property on the death
of their father would be bound by the principle of estoppel.
therefore, no doubt in our mind that in a case where a transferor never
acquired by succession, inheritance or otherwise any interest in the
property during his life time then the provision of Section 43 will not
come into operation as against the heirs who succeeded the stridhan
property of their grandmother.
16. For all these reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which
is accordingly dismissed.