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In any case, the State Government cannot pass any order amending a procedural law regarding reservation in the matter of selection to posts, with retrospective effect, once the procedure of selection starts. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the G.O.Ms.No.124 dated 7th March, 2002 is prospective and is not applicable to the process of selection started pursuant to Advertisement No.10 of 1999 including the 973 executive posts which were ordered to be filled up by the High Court pursuant to the advertisement. The Tribunal erred in directing the APPSC to re-caste the merit list pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.124 dated 7th March, 2002. The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 27th December, 2004 rightly held that the order passed by the Court will not affect the appointments already made to the executive post between 2001-2002 but erred in holding that the selection is to be made in accordance with G.O.Ms.No.124 dated 7th March, 2002 22. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the orders passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and the impugned common judgment dated 27th December, 2004 and the impugned common order dated 28th December, 2004 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Petition Nos. 20106 of 2004, 21558 of 2004, etc. In view of the foregoing discussions, we direct the respondents to fill up the rest of the posts including the posts of Municipal Commissioners Grade-III, Asstt. Commercial Tax Officers, Asstt. Labour Officers in executive cadre and Asstt. Section Officers in non executive cadre, which are vacant, as per President Order, 1975 and the Government orders in consonance with the Presidential Order which were prevailing in the year 1999 when the Advertisement was issued. The inter se seniority between the persons appointed in the 1st round and the persons appointed afterwards in the same cadre, if any, shall be decided by the appropriate authority in accordance with the rules, depending on the merit ranking obtained by them. 23. We direct the authority to complete the process of selection expeditiously preferably within three months. The appeals are allowed with aforesaid observations and directions.


Section 498A, 306, 201 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code – case of the prosecution that the husband was keen in his extra-marital affair and that had led to more marital discord and bitterness. -The in-laws, as alleged, used to take away the income earned by her. – A time came when she was compelled to stay on the terrace of the house where she committed suicide on 4th of March, 2004 – Apex court held that the accused may have been involved in an illicit relationship with the appellant no.4, but in the absence of some other acceptable evidence on record that can establish such high degree of mental cruelty, the Explanation to Section 498A which includes cruelty to drive a woman to commit suicide, would not be attracted.-the involvement of the other accused persons, that is, appellant nos. 1, 3 and 4, we find that there is no allegation of any kind of physical torture. The evidence brought on record against them with regard to cruelty is absolutely sketchy and not convincing. – It has been alleged that the mother-in-law used to rob her money which she earned as wages. The said fact has really not been established. As far as appellant no. 4, Jesuben, is concerned, there is only one singular allegation that at one public place, i.e. in a ‘mela’, she had threatened the deceased that she would be divorced by her husband. On the basis of the said evidence, it is difficult to sustain the conviction under Sections 306 and 498A IPC. Once we are holding that the accused-appellants are not guilty of the offence under Section 306 and 498A IPC, the conviction under Section 201 IPC is also not sustainable. -2015 SC MSKLAWREPORTS

Section 498A, 306, 201 and 114  of  the Indian Penal Code – case of the prosecution that the husband was keen in his extra-marital affair and that had led  to  more  marital discord and bitterness. –The in-laws, as alleged, used to take away  the income earned by her. – A time came when she was compelled to stay … Continue reading

As the facts would unfurl after the receipt of the said invoice the appellant-company approached the concerned income tax officer, the first respondent herein, for issuing a ‘No Objection Certificate’ to remit the said sum duly pointing out that the NRC had no place of business in India; that all the services rendered by it were from outside India; and that no part of success fee could be said to arise or accrue or deemed to arise or accrue in India attracting the liability under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) by the NRC. = “By technical services, we mean in this context services requiring expertise in technology. By consultancy services, we mean in this context advisory services. The category of technical and consultancy services are to some extent overlapping because a consultancy service could also be technical service. However, the category of consultancy services also includes an advisory service, whether or not expertise in technology is required to perform it.” 35. In this context, a reference to the decision in C.I.T. V. Bharti Cellular Limited and others[6], would be apposite. In the said case, while dealing with the concept of “consultancy services”, the High Court of Delhi has observed thus: “Similarly, the word “consultancy” has been defined in the said Dictionary as “the work or position of a consultant; a department of consultants.” “Consultant” itself has been defined, inter alia, as “a person who gives professional advice or services in a specialized field.” It is obvious that the word “consultant” is a derivative of the word “consult” which entails deliberations, consideration, conferring with someone, conferring about or upon a matter. Consult has also been defined in the said Dictionary as “ask advice for, seek counsel or a professional opinion from; refer to (a source of information); seek permission or approval from for a proposed action”. It is obvious that the service of consultancy also necessarily entails human intervention. The consultant, who provides the consultancy service, has to be a human being. A machine cannot be regarded as a consultant.” 36. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to the dictionary meaning of ‘consultation’ in Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition. The word ‘consultation’ has been defined as an act of asking the advice or opinion of someone (such as a lawyer). It means a meeting in which a party consults or confers and eventually it results in human interaction that leads to rendering of advice. 37. As the factual matrix in the case at hand, would exposit the NRC had acted as a consultant. It had the skill, acumen and knowledge in the specialized field i.e. preparation of a scheme for required finances and to tie-up required loans. The nature of activities undertaken by the NRC has earlier been referred to by us. The nature of service referred by the NRC, can be said with certainty would come within the ambit and sweep of the term ‘consultancy service’ and, therefore, it has been rightly held that the tax at source should have been deducted as the amount paid as fee could be taxable under the head ‘fee for technical service’. Once the tax is payable paid the grant of ‘No Objection Certificate’ was not legally permissible. Ergo, the judgment and order passed by the High Court are absolutely impregnable. 38. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7796 OF 1997 GVK Industries Ltd. & Anr. … Appellants Versus The Income Tax Officer & Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. The appellant No. 1 is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 … Continue reading

appointment made by the High Court to the post of Direct Recruit District Judges in the unfilled reserve vacancies, to the extent of 34 in number by way of promotion from the ‘in service candidates’ by applying Rule 8(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”).=”No general category candidate can be appointed against a slot in the roster which is reserved for the backward class.” Therefore, when the posts were reserved for the SC, ST, filling up of those posts from the general category candidates would seriously affect the rule of reservation, as once the posts of direct recruit are filled up from other category candidates even the carrying forward of those vacancies as provided under the proviso to Rule 8(2) cannot be operated upon. In other words, by applying Rule 8(2) in the event of vacancies remaining due to non- availability of the candidates of the reserved category and such vacancies were filled up by the ‘in service candidates’ by resorting to promotion, the proviso can be conveniently operated upon by carrying forward those vacancies in the future years in the direct recruit source and by maintaining the rule of reservation to the extent it could not be filled up in the relevant recruitment years. If instead of resorting to promotion of ‘in service candidates’ those unfilled reserved vacancies are filled from the general category candidates there would be no scope for applying the proviso to Rule 8(2). Such a contingency created would run counter to the rule of reservation and, therefore, the same cannot be countenanced.=We have to, therefore, hold that the High Court by adopting the Reservation Act, 1994 adopted the rule of reservation to the full extent provided for and as prescribed under Section 3(1) of the Reservation Act, 1994 and that in respect of any unfilled vacancies of that category, the High Court rightly resorted to the prescription contained in Rule 8(2) by resorting to filling up of such vacancies by special recruitment in that year as directed by this Court and in the absence of not getting such vacancies filled up by resorting to such filling up by promotion of ‘in service candidates’ and also by applying the proviso to Rule 8(2) and thereby carry forward those vacancies in the future years of recruitment. Keeping the said legal principle relating to applicability of Section 3(1) of the Reservation Act, 1994 vis–vis Rules 7 and 8(2) of the High Court Rules in mind, when we consider the last of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants, it must be held that the action of the High Court in having resorted to filling up of the unfilled reserved vacancies by taking umbrage under Rule 8(2) was perfectly justified. The said action of the High Court in having filled up those unfilled reserved vacancies of direct recruitment of the year 2009 was stated to have been made by promoting the in-service candidates. Though we have found that such a course adopted by the High Court was in order, as the proviso to Rule 8(2) specifically mandates that while fixing the number of vacancies to be allotted to the quota of direct recruitment at the next recruitment, it should be raised accordingly. We are of the view, without disturbing whatever promotions already made by resorting to Rule 8(2), the High Court can be permitted to provide that number of vacancies which remained unfilled in the year 2009 in the reserved category of direct recruit source by adding that number of vacancies in the recruitment to be made in the future years until such number of vacancies of unfilled reserved category pertaining to 2009 are filled. With the above limited directions to the High Court, we do not wish to meddle with the promotions already made. We do not find any scope for granting any relief to the appellants, as none of the submissions raised on behalf of the appellants, which were though not considered by the Division Bench of the High Court and which were also dealt with by us in extenso and we find no merit. These appeals, therefore, fail and the same are accordingly dismissed.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1956-1957 OF 2015 (@ SLP (C) Nos.11924-11925 of 2012) Nawal Kishore Mishra & Ors. Etc. …Appellant (s) VERSUS High Court of Judicature at Allahabad …Respondent(s) Through its Registrar General & Ors. Etc. WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1992-1993 OF 2015 (@ SLP (C) … Continue reading

The appellant has deposited Rs.3,25,365/- i.e. the principal amount with the Labour Court/Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Rajkot on 18.2.2014. The matter was listed before the Supreme Court Lok Adalat on 6.12.2014 wherein the appellant was directed to deposit the balance amount. The 1st respondent-insurance company shall deposit the balance compensation being 15% penalty and the interest at the rate of 12% after one month from the date when the compensation amount fell due and also 15% penalty with the Labour Court/Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation within a period of six weeks from today. On such deposit, the same shall be disbursed to respondents No.2 to 4. The amount of Rs.3,25,365/- already deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation shall also be disbursed to respondents No. 2 to 4 if not already disbursed. After disbursing the amount to the dependents No.2 to 4, the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Rajkot shall submit a report to this Court regarding compliance at an early date preferably not exceeding four months from today. The 1st respondent-insurance company shall pay the amount of Rs.3,25,365/- to the appellant which it has already deposited towards compensation within a period of six weeks. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed in terms of the above directions. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1970 OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 28265/2014) Praveenbhai S. Khambhayata …Appellant Versus United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T R. BANUMATHI, J. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is preferred against the … Continue reading

In our opinion, respondent no.1 was rightly not promoted to the higher group because he was not in the highest grade of group D. Respondent no.1 was in a lower grade whereas respondent nos.2 and 3 were in the highest grade of group D. Without getting promotion to the highest grade in his own group D, the said respondent could not have claimed promotion to a higher group, i.e. group C. Respondent no.1 was working as a substitute Porter, which is the lowest grade in group D, whereas respondent nos.2 and 3 were working in the grade which was much above than the grade in which respondent no.1 was working, though they had been appointed later in a point of time than respondent no.1 in the railway service. As stated hereinabove, seniority list for employees working in different grades should be different and there cannot be any common seniority list for all the employees working in one particular group. 25. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment affirming the order of the Tribunal and also direct that according to the provisions of the aforestated paras contained in the Manual, the appellants shall prepare different seniority lists for employees working in different grades.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2532 OF 2010 Union of India & Ors. … Appellants Versus V.K. Krishnan & Ors. … Respondents WITH C.A. Nos. 1972-1973 of 2015 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos.10172-10173 of 2012) WITH C.A. Nos. 1974-1975 of 2015 (@ S.L.P. (C) Nos.14651-14652 of 2012) WITH C.A. … Continue reading

The Appellate Authority has completely ignored the undisputed pleadings and material documents on record in favour of the respondents and the said finding of the Appellate Authority is erroneous in law and patently perverse as it has ignored the correct findings of the Land Tribunal, on the relevant contentious issues which have been rightly questioned before the High Court by the respondents under Section 103 of the Act. The High Court has rightly reversed the decision of the Appellate Authority after careful examination of the divergent findings of fact recorded by it as the same are contrary to both the documentary and oral evidence on record, particularly Ext.B1. Thus, in the light of all the material evidence on record and the statutory provisions under Sections 74 and 75 of the Act, the relevant and glaring error on fact and in law committed by the Appellate Authority has been rightly interfered with by the High Court, after it had satisfied itself that the divergent findings of the Appellate Authority are not only erroneous but also error in law and it has exercised its revisional jurisdiction and set aside the divergent findings of the Appellate Authority. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in Mammu v. Hari Mohan[1], which reads thus:- “13……it is manifest that the power of revision vested in the High Court is wide and it is not limited only to the question of law or jurisdiction. It hardly needs to be emphasised that the revisional power to disturb findings of fact or law recorded by the Land Tribunal or the Land [pic]Board or the Taluk Land Board as the case may be, (sic) only in appropriate cases in which the Court is satisfied that such interference is necessary in the interest of justice and for proper adjudication of the dispute raised by the parties. In the case on hand, the High Court, as the impugned order shows, has taken note of the exception to the order of the Land Tribunal on the ground that it failed to take note of relevant factors like the facts and circumstances under which the structure was allowed to be constructed……” Thus, we are of the considered view that the power exercised by the High Court under Section 103 of the Act has been rightly exercised by it in setting aside the judgment and order of the Appellate Authority, as the same is not only erroneous but also error in law for the aforesaid reasons. The appeals are dismissed.

NON REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos.1942-1943 OF 2015 (Arising out of S.L.P (C) Nos.26832-26833 of 2009) N.M.KRISHNAKUMARI & ORS. ….APPELLANTS Vs. THALAKKAL ASSIYA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted. These appeals have been filed by the appellants … Continue reading

Since local police is allegedly involved as per the statement of the petitioner recorded under Section 164, there may not be fair investigation. In R.S. Sodhi vs. State of U.P., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 143, this Court in such a case observed that however faithfully the local police may carry out the investigation, the same may lack credibility since the allegations are against them. 16. Taking into consideration the entire facts of the case and very serious allegations made against all the respondents including police officers, it is a fit case where the investigation has to be handed over to an independent agency like CBI for the purpose of fair and unbiased investigation.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (Crl.) NO. 218 OF 2013 Rashmi Behl …..Petitioner(s) versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others …..Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T M.Y.Eqbal, J. Petitioner, a young girl of 22 years who hails from the State of Uttar Pradesh, has filed … Continue reading

It has not been disputed by the appellant that the Bombay High Court while passing the order of attachment was not aware about the fact that the vessel was seized by the Madras High Court much prior to the filing of the suit by the appellant in Bombay High Court. The Division Bench in the impugned order has recorded the finding that Madras High Court while deciding the issues in the suit filed under admiralty jurisdiction had considered the interest and also priorities of all interveners and also parties to the suit. It was held that the appellant ought to have made claim under Order XLII Rule 11 of the OS Rules. The Division Bench rightly held that no court is so prestige conscious that it will stand in the way of legitimate legal proceedings for redressal or relief sought for by the litigant. The Court also took notice of the fact that the necessary parties who had led their claims had not been impleaded by the appellant in the proceedings. 30. In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the law settled, so far the admiralty jurisdiction of the Court is concerned, we do not find any reason to differ with the findings recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned order. For the reason aforesaid, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed, however with no order as to costs.

‘REPORTABLE’ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6156 OF 2005 Petromarine Products Ltd. …Appellant (s) versus Ocean Marine Services Company Ltd. and others …Respondent(s) JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J.: This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27.11.2003 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras … Continue reading

Whether seasonal workers of the sugar factories stopped crushing years back would be entitled to retaining allowance

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3937-3938 OF 2011 Warsaliganj Sahkari Chini Mill Mazdoor Union … Appellant (s) Versus State of Bihar and others … Respondent (s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4201 OF 2011 South Bihar Sugar Mills Workers Union and others … Appellant (s) Versus State of Bihar … Continue reading

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