advocatemmmohan
Allahabad High Court
Payment of interest on the refund of amount after cancellation of auction sale -Apex court held that But for the reasons mentioned by the High Court the sale has been cancelled. It has been ordered to refund amount in favour of the auction purchaser-appellant(s). We find no reason as to why on equitable grounds the appellants should not get interest on the said amount. Taking into consideration the aforesaid factor while working out equities, it would, therefore, be appropriate to direct the State to pay interest at the rate of 6% on the amount to be refunded as per the High Court’s order with effect from 27th April, 2001 and 3rd September, 2001, the day, the High Court passed the impugned order. The concerned respondents are directed accordingly.= STATE OF U.P. & ORS. … APPELLANTS VERSUS M/S. JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD. & ORS.ETC. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – June. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41730
Payment of interest on the refund of amount after cancellation of auction sale -Apex court held that But for the reasons mentioned by the High Court the sale has been cancelled. It has been ordered to refund amount in favour of the auction purchaser-appellant(s). We find no reason as to why on equitable grounds the appellants should not get interest … Continue reading
Contempt of court – High court imposed fine of Rs.20,000/- Apex court held that Section 12(1) of the Act provides that if the court is satisfied that contempt of court has been committed, it may punish the contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/-, or with both. Section 12(2) further provides that “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.” Thus, the power to punish for contempt of the court is subject to limitations prescribed in sub-section (2) of the Act.= Bal Kishan Giri …Appellant Versus State of U.P. …Respondent= 2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41546
Contempt of court – High court imposed fine of Rs.20,000/- Apex court held that Section 12(1) of the Act provides that if the court is satisfied that contempt of court has been committed, it may punish the contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/-, or … Continue reading
Whether suit filed by appellant was barred in terms of Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC – Held: A compromise forming the basis of the decree can only be questioned before the same court that recorded the compromise and a fresh suit for setting aside a compromise decree is expressly barred under Order XXIII Rule 3-A – However, in the instant case, the compromise decree alleged to be fraudulent was passed not by a civil court but by a revenue court in a suit u/s.176 of the Land Reforms Act – Revenue courts are neither equipped nor competent to effectively adjudicate on allegations of fraud that has overtones of criminality and the courts really skilled and experienced to try such issues are the courts constituted under the CPC – Further, under s.9 of CPC, the civil court has inherent jurisdiction to try all types of civil disputes unless its jurisdiction is barred expressly or by necessary implication, by any statutory provision and conferred on any other tribunal or authority – Nothing in Order XXIII Rule 3-A bars the institution of a suit before the civil court even in regard to decrees or orders passed in suits and/or proceedings under different statutes before a court, tribunal or authority of limited and restricted jurisdiction – In the facts of the case, provision of Order XXIII not a bar against the suit filed by the appellant – Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 – ss. 176, 178, 182, 331 and 341 and Schedule II. = HORIL … APPELLANT VERSUS KESHAV & ANR. … RESPONDENTS = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXIII, r.3-A – Suit – Maintainability – Appellant filed suit seeking declaration that decree passed by the Assistant Collector, Class-I, in a suit u/ss.176, 178 and 182 of the Land Reforms Act was fraudulent, inoperative and not binding upon him – Allegation that decree passed by Assistant Collector was … Continue reading
Legal Remembrancer’s Manual (for short, ‘LR Manual’) framed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh and Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) whether the respondent who had been appointed as District Government Counsel (Criminal) at Meerut in January, 1993 was entitled to have the term of his appointment renewed. – No = State of U.P. and others ….Appellants versus Ajay Kumar Sharma and another ….Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40968
Legal Remembrancer’s Manual (for short, ‘LR Manual’) framed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh and Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) whether the respondent who had been appointed as District Government Counsel (Criminal) at Meerut in January, 1993 was entitled to have the term of his … Continue reading
Under sec. 311. 233 of Cr. p.c. r/w evidence Act at fag end of trial = RAJESH TALWAR & ANR Vs. CBI & ANR published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40869
Under sec. 311. 233 of Cr. p.c. r/w evidence Act – No application for summoning witnesses and for summoning documents etc., at the fag end of the trial, filed for dilatory tactics is to be allowed = Apex court held that the application is vexatious and intended to … Continue reading
Contempt of court arose when – To hold the respondents or anyone of them liable for contempt this Court has to arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the order of the Court. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction is summary in nature and an adjudication of the liability of the alleged contemnor for wilful disobedience of the Court is normally made on admitted and undisputed facts.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40722 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CONTEMPT PETITION NO.3 OF 2012 IN CONTEMPT PETITION NO.6 & 7 OF 2009 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 503 of 2007 Noor Saba … Petitioner (s) Versus Anoop Mishra & Anr. … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T … Continue reading
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000= whether the appellant was a juvenile or a child as defined by Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 on the date of occurrence of the offence he was charged with. On a consideration of the Report called for by this Court on this question, the issue must be answered in the affirmative.;whether the conviction of the appellant can be sustained on merits and, if so, the sentence to be awarded to the appellant. In our opinion the conviction of the appellant must be upheld and on the quantum of sentence, he ought to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 read with Section 15 thereof.; whether any appropriate measures can be taken to prevent the recurrence of a situation, such as the present, where an accused is subjected to a trial by a regular Court having criminal jurisdiction but he or she is later found to be a juvenile. In this regard, we propose to give appropriate directions to all Magistrates which, we hope, will prevent such a situation from arising again. =The appellant was a juvenile on the date of the occurrence of the incident. His case has been examined on merits and his conviction is upheld. The only possible and realistic sentence that can be awarded to him is the imposition of a fine. The existing fine of Rs.100/- is grossly inadequate. To this extent, the punishment awarded to the appellant is set aside. The issue of the quantum of fine to be imposed on the appellant is remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board. The jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board is also enjoined to examine the compensation to be awarded, if any, to the family of Asha Devi in terms of the decision of this Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad. whenever an accused, who physically appears to be a juvenile, is produced before a Magistrate, he or she should form a prima facie opinion on the juvenility of the accused and record it. If any doubt persists, the Magistrate should conduct an age inquiry as required by Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to determine the juvenility or otherwise of the accused person. In this regard, it is better to err on the side of caution in the first instance rather than have the entire proceedings reopened or vitiated at a subsequent stage or a guilty person go unpunished only because he or she is found to be a juvenile on the date of occurrence of the incident. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board constituted under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 for determining the appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied on the appellant and the compensation that should be awarded to the family of Asha Devi. Of course, in arriving at its conclusions, the said Board will take into consideration the facts of the case as also the fact that the appellant has undergone some period of incarceration. 72. The appeal is partly allowed with the directions given above.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40541 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 763 OF 2003 Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh & Anr. … Appellants Versus State of U.P. … Respondent J U D G M E N T Madan B. Lokur, J. 1. Three principal issues arise for consideration … Continue reading
The Persons with disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995= Mental disorders – benefits under disability act = whether at the time of discharge from service he was suffering from a disease which made him unfit to continue in service and whether he would be entitled to disability pension.=Although, the Courts are extremely loath to interfere with the opinion of the experts, there is nothing like exclusion of judicial review of the decision taken on the basis of such opinion. What needs to be emphasized is that the opinion of the experts deserves respect and not worship and the Courts and other judicial / quasi-judicial forums entrusted with the task of deciding the disputes relating to premature release / discharge from the Army cannot, in each and every case, refuse to examine the record of the Medical Board for determining whether or not the conclusion reached by it is legally sustainable.= “You have been diagnosed as a case of SCHIZOPHRENIC REACTION and not LUNATIC. As such your request to produce you before a medical board to examine you whether you are Lunatic or free from LUNACY does not arise. Therefore no resurvey medical board can be held in your case.”= His case was considered on 14.11.1977 by the Invaliding Medical Board held at Military Hospital, Meerut and on its recommendations, he was discharged from service. His claim for disability pension was rejected by Principal Controller of Defence Accounts (Pension), Allahabad on the ground that the disease, i.e., Schizophrenic Reaction, which was the cause of his discharge was not attributable to the military service.= Unfortunately, the Tribunal did not even bother to look into the contents of the certificate issued by the Invalidating Medical Board and mechanically observed that it cannot sit in appeal over the opinion of the Medical Board. If the learned members of the Tribunal had taken pains to study the standard medical dictionaries and medical literature like “The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry” by F.C. Redlich and Daniel X. Freedman, and Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, then they would have definitely found that the observation made by Dr. Lalitha Rao was substantially incompatible with the existing literature on the subject and the conclusion recorded by the Invaliding Medical Board that it was a case of Schizophrenic Reaction was not well founded and required a review in the context of the observation made by Dr. Lalitha Rao herself that with the treatment the appellant had improved. In our considered view, having regard to the peculiar facts of this case, the Tribunal should have ordered constitution of Review Medical Board for re-examination of the appellant. 18. In Controller of Defence Accounts (Pension) v. S. Balachandran Nair (2005) 13 SCC 128 on which reliance has been placed by the Tribunal, this Court referred to Regulations 173 and 423 of the Pension Regulations and held that the definite opinion formed by the Medical Board that the disease suffered by the respondent was constitutional and was not attributable to Military Service was binding and the High Court was not justified in directing payment of disability pension to the respondent. The same view was reiterated in Ministry of Defence v. A.V. Damodaran (2009) 9 SCC 140. However, in neither of those cases, this Court was called upon to consider a situation where the Medical Board had entirely relied upon an inchoate opinion expressed by the Psychiatrist and no effort was made to consider the improvement made in the degree of illness after the treatment. 19. As a corollary to the above discussion, we hold that the impugned order as also orders dated 14.7.2011 and 16.9.2011 passed by the Tribunal are legally unsustainable. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The orders passed by the Tribunal are set aside and the respondents are directed to refer the case to Review Medical Board for reassessing the medical condition of the appellant and find out whether at the time of discharge from service he was suffering from a disease which made him unfit to continue in service and whether he would be entitled to disability pension.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40505 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5922 OF 2012 Veer Pal Singh …Appellant versus Secretary, Ministry of Defence …Respondent J U D G M E N T G. S. Singhvi, J. 1. This appeal is directed against order dated 19.12.2011 of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Lucknow … Continue reading
Service matter = (i) Whether two different age of superannuation of 58 and 60 years can be prescribed for the employees similarly situated, including members of the same service, solely on the basis of their source of entry in the service. (ii) Whether ‘the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam (Retirement on attaining age of Superannuation) Regulations, 2005’ fixing two different age of superannuation for similarly situated employees of Jal Nigam are discriminatory and ultra vires under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.= ‘no pay no work’ is not applicable to the employees who were guided by specific rules like Leave Rules etc. relating to absence from duty. Such principle can be applied to only those employees who were not guided by any specific rule relating to absence from duty. If an employee is prevented by the employer from performing his duties, the employee cannot be blamed for having not worked, and the principle of ‘no pay no work’ shall not be applicable to such employee. = Regulation 31 shall be applicable and the age of superannuation of employees of the Nigam shall be 60 years; we are of the view that following consequential and pecuniary benefits should be allowed to different sets of employees who were ordered to retire at the age of 58 years: (a) The employees including respondents who moved before a court of law irrespective of fact whether interim order was passed in their favour or not, shall be entitled for full salary up to the age of 60 years. The arrears of salary shall be paid to them after adjusting the amount if any paid. (b) The employees, who never moved before any court of law and had to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, they shall not be entitled for arrears of salary. However, in view of Regulation 31 they will deem to have continued in service up to the age of 60 years. In their case, the appellants shall treat the age of superannuation at 60 years, fix the pay accordingly and re-fix the retirement benefits like pension, gratuity etc. On such calculation, they shall be entitled for arrears of retirement benefits after adjusting the amount already paid. (c) The arrears of salary and arrears of retirement benefits should be paid to such employees within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench dated 29th July, 2010 and other impugned judgments stand modified to the extent above.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40490 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5527 OF 2012 (arising out of SLP (c) No. 31279 of 2010) STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH … APPELLANT Versus DAYANAND CHAKRAWARTY & ORS. … RESPONDENTS With C.A.No.5528 of 2012 (Arising Out of SLP(C) No.35579 of 2010) C.A.No.56175659 of 2012 (Arising Out of SLP(C) No.5218 5260 of 2011) C.A.No. 5529 of … Continue reading
“1. Whether the use of beacons red-light and sirens by persons other than high constitutional functionaries is lawful and constitutional? 2. Whether the provision of security to persons other than the constitutional functionaries without corresponding increase in sanctioned strength and without a specific assessment of threat is lawful and constitutional? 3. Whether the closure of roads for facilitating movement of VIPs is lawful and constitutional?”
‘ ITEM NO.305 COURT NO.3 SECTION XI S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I ARECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).25237/2010 (From the judgement and order dated 21/08/2009 in CMWP No.15440/1998 of TheHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD) ABHAY SINGH Petitioner(s)VERSUSSTATE … Continue reading
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