advocatemmmohan
just another law knowledge bank
Allahabad High Court
occurrence and the manner in which the three persons on the prosecution side were killed are not in dispute. Hence, the only question that requires consideration by the Court is in regard to the identification of the respondents as the accused.= Awadhesh (PW.4) was not named as a witness in the FIR. He also appears to support the prosecution case but on a closer scrutiny of his deposition, the High Court has pointed out a number of discrepancies. Bhurey (PW.5) is one of the injured witnesses. He has named the respondents as the accused but at the same time he said that some of the miscreants were covering their faces. He was unable to disclose how and at whose hands he himself received the injuries.The High Court has examined the prosecution witnesses in considerable detail and has observed that in the background of the long and very hostile enmity between the two sides and the witnesses being highly interested, it would not be safe to rest the respondents’ conviction on their evidences. 19. On going through the judgments of the trial court and the High Court and the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, we are unable to hold that the view taken by the High Court is unreasonable or implausible. We are satisfied that in the overall facts and circumstances of the case, no interference is warranted with
Page 1 N0N-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.677 OF 2006 STATE OF U.P. … APPELLANT VERSUS RAJESHWAR & ORS. … RESPONDENTS J U D GM E N T Aftab Alam,J. 1. This appeal by special leave, at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh is directed against the … Continue reading
forfeited its right to appoint the arbitrator = whether respondent No. 1 has forfeited its right to appoint the arbitrator having not done so after the demand was made and till the appellant had moved the court under Section 11(6) and, if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the appointment of the arbitrator by respondent No. 1 in the course of the proceedings under Section 11(6) is of any legal consequence and the Chief Justice of the High Court ought to have exercised the jurisdiction and appointed an arbitrator? – In the present case, the Corporation has failed to act as required under the procedure agreed upon by the parties in Clause 29 and despite the demand by the dealer to appoint the arbitrator, the Corporation did not make appointment until the application was made under Section 11(6). Thus, the Corporation has forfeited its right of appointment of an arbitrator. In this view of the matter, the Chief Justice ought to have exercised his jurisdiction under Section 11(6) in the matter for appointment of an arbitrator appropriately. The appointment of the arbitrator by the Corporation during the pendency of proceedings under Section 11(6) was of no consequence. In the course of arguments before us, on behalf of the appellant certain names of retired High Court Judges were indicated to the senior counsel for the Corporation for appointment as sole arbitrator but the Corporation did not agree to any of the names proposed by the appellant. In the circumstances, we are left with no choice but to send the matter back to the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court for an appropriate order on the application made by the dealer under Section 11(6). 25. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Arbitration Case No. 107 of 2004, M/s. Deep Trading Company v. M/s. Indian Oil Corporation and others, is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for fresh consideration by the Chief Justice or the designate Judge, as the case may be, in accordance with law and in light of the observations made above. No costs.
Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2673 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24686 of 2007) M/s. Deep Trading Company …… Appellant Vs. M/s. Indian Oil Corporation and Ors. ……Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA, J. Leave granted. 2. The questions that arise for consideration in this appeal, … Continue reading
whether the respondent, who had sought voluntary retirement from service and was paid gratuity by the appellant under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short, ‘the 1972 Act’) along with Contributory Provident Fund is entitled to pension.
Page 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9024 OF 2012 Allahabad Bank …Appellant versus A.C. Aggarwal …Respondent J U D G M E N T G. S. Singhvi, J. 1. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal filed against the order of the Allahabad High Court … Continue reading
Apex court converted the death penalty to the full life imprisonment= rape followed by murder by a young man, instead of death sentence a life imprisonment should be awarded with a direction that life sentence imposed will extend to the full life of the appellant but subject to any remission or commutation at the instance of the Government for good and sufficient reasons. – we convert the death sentence awarded to the appellant to imprisonment for life and direct that the life sentence of the appellant will extend to his full life subject
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1905 of 2011 Amit …… Appellant Versus State of Uttar Pradesh …… Respondent J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal by way of special leave under … Continue reading
Apex court uphold the judgement of high court as correct. Wakf Board entitled for the property as the orginal owner gifted the property to her husband and the Husband created Wakf. Hence the question of the property acquired out of prostitution by the orginal owner who gifted does not arise, as the wakf was created by Donor not by Donee=No property acquired out of the income of prostitution can be created valid Wakf=once the property changed hands, even the stigma, if any, did not attach thereafter to the property and therefore the erroneous assumption of law to the contrary by the Courts below vitiated their findings as to the character of the property and the capacity to make it the subject matter of a Wakf.
CASENO.: Appeal (civil) 1505 of 1988 PETITIONER: SHRI HAFAZAT HUSSAIN S/O MUBARAK HUSSAIN Vs. RESPONDENT: ABDUL MAJEED S/O SRI WALI MOHD. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/08/2001 BENCH: S. Rajendra Babu & Doraiswamy Raju JUDGMENT: Raju, J. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 29.1.1985 of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court … Continue reading
Scope of or. 23, rule 3 A of C.P.C.= whether the suit filed by the appellant was not maintainable being barred in terms of Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure= It is also well settled that under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, the civil court has inherent jurisdiction to try all types of civil disputes unless its jurisdiction is barred expressly or by necessary implication, by any statutory provision and conferred on any other tribunal or authority. We find nothing in Order XXIII Rule 3-A to bar the institution of a suit before the civil court even in regard to decrees or orders passed in suits and/or proceedings under different statutes before a court, tribunal or authority of limited and restricted jurisdiction.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 776 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P(Civil )No.6632 of 2006) HORIL … APPELLANT VERSUS KESHAV & ANR. … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T Aftab Alam, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and … Continue reading
contempt of court =Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the applicant, submitted that an apology has been given by the contemnors pursuant to the orders passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.968 of 2009 (arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5593 of 2006) and this apology is in force. He further submitted that the facts stated in the Contempt Petition would show that the contemnors are repeatedly intimidating the 9 applicant and his family members and for this reason the applicant has made a prayer to the Court to pass an order commanding the contemnors not to enter within 100 metres of the premises of Santosh Medical College and its administrative block, hospital, hostel and the residence of the applicant.=We cannot possibly direct the contemnors not to go to any public place such as the public road, bank, shopping complex but considering all aspects of the matter, we direct that the two contemnors will not enter into the premises of Santosh Medical College, its 10 administrative block, its hospital, its hostel and the residence of the applicant. The Contempt Petition is disposed of accordingly.
1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CONTEMPT PETITION (CRL.) No.7 of 2010 (In Criminal Appeal No.2323 of 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 666 of 2010) P. Mahalingam …… Applicant Versus Monica Kumar & Anr. …… Respondents WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2323 OF 2011 (Arising out of Special … Continue reading
service matter – promotion= It needs no emphasis that a judicial officer has to be disciplined and must behave as a responsible officer. Indiscipline in the judiciary cannot be tolerated. However, as noted above, the remarks of the District Judge that the appellant was, `irresponsible and indisciplined officer who has no regard for superiors or truth’ have been expunged/substituted by the Inspecting Judge. The effect of such expunction/substitution is that the appellant cannot be considered an irresponsible or indisciplined officer on the basis of remarks recorded by the District Judge. The gravity of what has been recorded in column (3) is, thus, lost. Moreover, the root of the problem between the two senior judicial officers appears to be clash of ego. In the words of Samuel Johnson, every man is of importance to himself. The observation noted in column (3), `He never came to me in the chamber or at the residence to discuss any problem relating to Nazarat’ indicates that the District Judge was not happy with the appellant for having not given due importance to him. 18. Be that as it may, due to consideration of the remarks recorded by the District Judge and not taking into consideration that 15
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2307 OF 2011 Pratap Singh …. Appellant Versus State of U.P. & Anr. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. The appellant – a judicial officer – having not been promoted in the substantive vacancy to Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (for short, `UPHJS’) … Continue reading
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – s. 173 – Motor accident – Resulting in death – Claim for compensation – Award by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal – Appeal by insurer contending that application for claim being u/s 173, not maintainable in view of s.53 of Employees States Insurance Act, 1948 – Appeal dismissed by High Court =On appeal, Held: Entitlement to the claim to be worked out by the Tribunal by taking note of s. 53 – Employees States Insurance Act, 1948 – s. 53. Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr. v. Francis De Costa and Anr. 1993 Suppl.(4) SCC 100; A. Trehan v. Associated Electrical Agencies 1996(4) SCC 255 and Bharagath Engg. v. R. Rangamayaki 2003(2)SCC 138, relied on. Case Law Reference: 1993 Suppl.(4) SCC 100 Relied on Para 6 1996(4) SCC 255 Relied on Para 7 2003(2) SCC 138 Relied on Para 8 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3324 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 28.10.2002 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in FAFO No. 2019 of 2002. Atul Nanda, R. Hakeem, Sanjay Bhardwaj and P.N. Puri for the Appellants. K. Radhakrishnan, B. Sunita Rao, Sunita Sharma, S.N. Terdol and Sushma Suri for the Respondents.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3324 of 2009 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 5989 of 2003) National Insurance Co. Ltd. ….Appellant Versus Hamida Khatoon and Ors. ….Respondents JUDGMENT Dr. ARIJTI PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division … Continue reading
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – ss. 166 and 163A; Second Schedule Clause (6) – Fatal motor accident – Of non-earning mother/house-wife – Claim petition u/s. 166 – Compensation to her dependants – Criteria for determination – Held: The claimants are entitled to compensation – The services of non- earning mother/house-wife cannot be compared with that of a house- keeper/servant/employee, but monetary values should be put to the services rendered by them – Though s. 163A does not apply, in terms, to claim u/s. 166, yet in the absence of a definite criteria for determination of compensation payable to the dependants of non-earning house-wife/mother, it would be reasonable to rely upon the criteria specified in clause (6) of the Second Schedule and then to apply appropriate multiplier – Suggestion to Parliament to amend the provisions of the Act and the related laws for giving compensation to the dependents of woman/home-maker – Legislation. Words and Phrases – `Services’ – Meaning of. A woman, aged about 39 years, died in a motor accident. The Appellant No. 1 (husband) and appellant No. 2 (son) filed a petition u/s. 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation of Rs. 19,20,000/- . The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal held that the claimants were entitled to compensation. While determining the quantum of compensation, it held that in view of clause (6) of Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, the income of the deceased could be assessed at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. (Rs. 68,000 p.a.) and after making deduction of Rs. 20,000 towards personal expenses and applying multiplier of 15, the total loss of dependency was assessed as Rs. 6 lakhs. However, the tribunal reduced the amount of compensation to Rs. 2,50,000/-. The appeal, preferred by the claimants was dismissed by the High Court. In the instant appeal, the question for determination was as to what should be the criteria for determination of the compensation payable to the dependants of a woman who dies in a road accident and who does not have regular source of income. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: Per G.S. Singhvi, J. 1. It is not possible to quantify any amount in lieu of the services rendered by the wife/mother to the family i.e. husband and children. However, for the purpose of award of compensation to the dependents, some pecuniary estimate has to be made of the services of housewife/mother. In that context, the term `services’ is required to be given a broad meaning and must be construed by taking into account the loss of personal care and attention given by the deceased to her children as a mother and to her husband as a wife. They are entitled to adequate compensation in lieu of the loss of gratuitous services rendered by the deceased. The amount payable to the dependants cannot be diminished on the ground that some close relation like a grandmother may volunteer to render some of the services to the family which the deceased was giving earlier. [Para 24] [333-H; 334-A-C] 2. It is highly unfair, unjust and inappropriate to compute the compensation payable to the dependents of a deceased wife/mother, who does not have regular income, by comparing her services with that of a house- keeper or a servant or an employee, who works for a fixed period. The gratuitous services rendered by wife/mother to the husband and children cannot be equated with the services of an employee and no evidence or data can possibly be produced for estimating the value of such services. It is virtually impossible to measure in terms of money the loss of personal care and attention suffered by the husband and children on the demise of the house-wife. [Para 32] [338-E-G] 3. Section 163A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 contains a special provision for payment of compensation on the basis of a structured formula as indicated in the Second Schedule of the Act, which contains a table prescribing the compensation to be awarded with reference to the age and income of the deceased. The note appended to column (1) of the Second Schedule makes it clear that from the total amount of compensation, 1/3rd is to be deducted in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself, had he been alive. Clause (6) of the Second Schedule lays down that in the cases of fatal and disability in non-fatal accidents, income of the non-earning person should be taken as Rs.15,000/- per annum and that of spouse shall be taken as 1/3rd of the income of the earning/surviving spouse. [Para 14] [326-G-H; 327-A-B] 4. Though, Section 163A does not, in terms, apply to the cases in which claim for compensation is filed u/s. 166 of the Act, in the absence of any other definite criteria for determination of compensation payable to the dependents of a non-earning housewife/mother, it would be reasonable to rely upon the criteria specified in clause (6) of the Second Schedule and then apply appropriate multiplier. [Para 32] [338-H; 339-A-B] General Manager Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs.) and Ors. 1994 (2) SCC 176; U.P. S.R.T.C. v. Trilok Chandra 1996 (4) SCC 362; Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. 2009 (6) SCC 121 – relied on. Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 385; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal (2007) 5 SCC 428; Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan (1977) 2 SCC 441; Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (1987) 3 SCC 234; Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 121; Raj Rani and Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (2009) 13 SCC 654; Ningamma and Anr. v. United Insurance Company Limited (2009) 13 SCC 710 – referred to. 5. In the instant case, appellant No.1 in his deposition had categorically stated that the deceased was earning Rs.50,000/- per annum by paintings and handicrafts, the respondents did not lead any evidence to controvert the same. Notwithstanding this, the tribunal and the High Court altogether ignored the income of the deceased. The tribunal did advert to the Second Schedule of the Act and observed that the income of the deceased could be assessed at Rs.5,000/- per month (Rs.60,000/- per annum) because the income of her spouse was Rs.15,416/- per month and then held that after making deduction, the total loss of dependency could be Rs.6 lacs. However, without any tangible reason, the tribunal decided to reduce the amount of compensation by observing that the deceased was actually non-earning member and the amount of compensation would be too much. The High Court went a step further and dismissed the appeal by erroneously presuming that neither of the claimants was dependent upon the deceased and the services rendered by her could be estimated as Rs.1250/- per month. The reasons assigned by the tribunal for reducing the amount of compensation are wholly untenable and the approach adopted by the High Court in dealing with the issue of payment of compensation to the appellants was ex facie erroneous and unjustified. [Paras 33 and 34] [339-E-H; 340-A-B] 6. The appellants are entitled to compensation of Rs.6 lacs. Respondent No.1 is directed to pay the said amount of compensation along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing application u/s. 166 of the Act till the date of payment. [Para 35] [340-C-D] Lata Wadha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. 2001 (8) SCC 197; M.S. Grewal and Anr. v. Deep Chand Sood and Ors. (2001) 8 SCC 151; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer and Anr. (2003) 8 SCC 731; A. Rajam v. M. Manikya Reddy 1989 ACJ 542 ; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Shamsher Singh Manu-JK-0180-2002; National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Mahadevan, Minor Buvanadevi, Minor Venkatesh and Parameswaran (2009) ACJ 1373; Chandra Singh and Ors. v. Gurmeet Singh and Ors.(2003) VII AD (Delhi) 222; Krishna Gupta and Ors. v. Madan Lal and Ors. 96 (2002) DLT 829; Captan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.112 (2004) DLT 417; Amar Singh Thukral v. Sandeep Chhatwal 112 (2004) DLT 478 – referred to. Berry v. Humm and Co. (1915) 1 K.B. 627; Regan v. Williamson (1976) 1 W.L.R. 305; Mehmet v. Perry (1977) 2 All ER 52 – referred to. Kemp and Kemp on Quantum of Damages, (Special Edition – 1986) – referred to. Per Asok Kumar Ganguly, J. (Supplementing) 1. Despite the clear constitutional mandate to eschew discrimination on the grounds of sex, in Article 15(1) of the Constitution, in its implementation, there is a distinct gender bias against women in various social welfare legislations and also in judicial pronouncements. [Para 1] [340-E-F] 2. Clause 6 of the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for notional income of those who had no income prior to accident. Clause 6 has been divided into two classes of persons, (a) non-earning persons, and (b) spouse. Insofar as the spouse is concerned, the income of the injured in fatal and non-fatal accident has been categorized as 1/3rd of the income of the earning and surviving spouse. It is, therefore, assumed if the spouse who does not earn, which is normally the woman in the house and the home-maker, such a person cannot have an income more than 1/3rd of the income of the person who is earning. This categorization has been made without properly appreciating the value of the services rendered by the home-maker. To value the income of the home-maker as one-third of the income of the earning spouse is not based on any apparently rational basis. [Para 3] [340-G-H; 341-A-C] 3. In the Census of 2001, it appears that those who are doing household duties like cooking, cleaning of utensils, looking after children, fetching water, collecting firewood have been categorized as non-workers and equated with beggars, prostitutes and prisoners who, according to census, are not engaged in economically productive work. As a result of such categorization about 36 crores (367 million) women in India have been classified in the Census of India, 2001 as non-workers and placed in the category of beggars, prostitutes and prisoners. This entire exercise of Census operation is done under an Act of Parliament. The approach of equating women, who are home- makers, with beggars, prostitutes and prisoners as economically non- productive workers by statutory authorities betrays a totally insensitive and callous approach towards the dignity of labour so far as women are concerned and is also clearly indicative of a strong gender bias against women. It is thus clear that in independent India also, the process of categorizing is dominated by concepts which were prevalent in colonial India and no attempt was made to restructure those categories with a gender sensitivity which is the hallmark in the Constitution of India. [Paras 4, 7 and 8] [341-D-E; 342-B-D] 4. Women are generally engaged in home-making, bringing up children and also in production of goods and services which are not sold in the market but are consumed at the household level. Thus, the work of women mostly goes unrecognized and they are never valued. Therefore, in the categorization by the Census, what is ignored is the well known fact that women make significant contribution at various levels including agricultural production by sowing, harvesting, transplanting and also tending cattles and by cooking and delivering the food to those persons who are on the field during the agriculture season. [Paras 10 and 11] [342-E-H; 343-A] 5. The gender bias has also been reflected in the judgment of the High Court whereby the High Court has accepted the tribunal’s reasoning of assessing the income of the victim at Rs.1,250/- per month. Even if one goes by the formula under clause (6) of the Second Schedule, income of the victim comes to Rs.5,000/- per month. [Para 13] [343-B] National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Minor Deepika rep. by her guardian and next friend, Ranganathan and Ors. (2009) 6 MLJ 1005 – referred to. 6. It has to be recognized that the services produced in the home by the women for other members of the household are an important and valuable form of production. It is possible to put monetary value to these services. Alternative to imputing money values is to measure the time taken to produce these services and compare these with the time that is taken to produce goods and services which are commercially viable. One has to admit that in the long run, the services rendered by women in the household sustain a supply of labour to the economy and keep human societies going by weaving the social fabric and keeping it in good repair. If these services are taken for granted and no value is attached to this, this may escalate the unforeseen costs in terms of deterioration of both human capabilities and social fabric. [Paras 23 and 25] [346-G-H; 347-E-F] 7. The time spent by women in doing household work as home-makers is the time which they can devote to paid work or to their education. This lack of sensitiveness and recognition of their work mainly contributes to women’s high rate of poverty and their consequential oppression in society, as well as various physical, social and psychological problems. The courts and tribunals should do well to factor these considerations in assessing compensation for housewives who are victims of road accident and quantifying the amount in the name of fixing `just compensation’. [Para 26] [347-G-H; 348-A] 8. Parliament is required to have a rethinking for properly assessing the value of home-makers and householders work and suitably amending the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and other related laws for giving compensation when the victim is a woman and a home-maker. Amendments in matrimonial laws may also be made in order to give effect to the mandate of Article 15(1) in the Constitution. [Para 28] [348-D] Case Law Reference: In the Judgment of G.S. Singhvi, J: (2004) 5 SCC 385 Referred to. Para 15 (2007) 5 SCC 428 Referred to. Para 16 (1977) 2 SCC 441 Referred to. Para 16 (1987) 3 SCC 234 Referred to. Para 16 2009 (6) SCC 121 Referred to. Para 17 (2009) 13 SCC 654 Referred to. Para 18 (2009) 13 SCC 710 Referred to. Para 18 (1915) 1 K.B. 627 Referred to. Para 20 (1976) 1 W.L.R. 305 Referred to. Para 21 (1977) 2 All ER 52 Referred to. Para 22 2001 (8) SCC 197 Referred to. Para 25 (2001) 8 SCC 151 Referred to. Para 26 (2003) 8 SCC 731 Referred to. Para 26 1989 ACJ 542 Referred to. Para 27 Manu-JK-0180-2002 Referred to. Para 28 (2009) ACJ 1373 Referred to. Para 29 (2003) VII AD (Delhi) 222 Referred to. Para 30 96 (2002) DLT 829 Referred to. Para 30 112 (2004) DLT 417 Referred to. Para 30 112 (2004) DLT 478 Referred to. Para 30 1994 (2) SCC 176 Relied on. Para 32 1996 (4) SCC 362 Relied on. Para 32 2009 (6) SCC 121 Relied on. Para 32 In the Judgment of Asok Kumar Ganguly, J: (2009) 6 MLJ 1005 Referred to. Para 13 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 30.4.2004 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in First Appeal from Order number 2408 of 2003. Sanjay Singh, Sharve Singh, Ugra Shankar Prasad for the Appellant. Hetu Arora, Pramod Dayal, Nikunj Dayal Arun Kumar Beriwal, Vishnu Mehra (for B.K. Satija) for the Respondent.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5843 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.19655 of 2004) Arun Kumar Agrawal and another ……Appellants Versus National Insurance Company and others ……Respondents JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. What should be the criteria for determination of the compensation payable to … Continue reading
