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Ambala

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offences punishable under Sections 365 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the `IPC’) = “We are of opinion that the expression “under a misconception of fact” is broad enough to include all cases where the consent is obtained by misrepresentation; the misrepresentation should be regarded as leading to a misconception of the facts with reference to which the consent is given. In Section 3 of the Evidence Act Illustration (d) states that a person has a certain intention is treated as a fact. So, here the fact about which the second and third prosecution witnesses were made to entertain a misconception was the fact that the second accused intended to get the girl married…….. “thus … if the consent of the person from whose possession the girl is taken is obtained by fraud, the taking is deemed to be against the will of such a person”. … Although in cases of contracts a consent obtained by coercion or fraud is only voidable by the party affected by it, the effect of Section 90 IPC is that such consent cannot, under the criminal law, be availed of to justify what would otherwise be an offence.”; there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance.” Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.= If the prosecutrix was in fact going to Ambala to marry the appellant, as stands fully established from the evidence on record, we fail to understand on what basis the allegation of “false promise of marriage” has been raised by the prosecutrix. We also fail to comprehend the circumstances in which a charge of deceit/rape can be leveled against the appellant, in light of the afore-mentioned fact situation. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant, who has already served more than 3 years sentence, is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2322 of 2010 Deepak Gulati …Appellant Versus State of Haryana …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 28.1.2010, passed by the Punjab … Continue reading

Tube well repairs = mere filing of an affidavit of the petitioner/complainant in the absence of any written agreement/contract which normally incorporates the kind of service to be rendered and under what terms and conditions, mere filing of affidavit ipso facto without corroborative/other supportive material would not constitute sufficient evidence. It is not the case of the petitioner/complainant that the job work entrusted to the respondent/opposite party was pursuant to any written agreement/contract which incorporated the conditions of payment/supply of material. In the absence of any such written agreement/contract, mere submissions and contentions would not be sufficient to hold the respondent/opposite party liable and that is precisely what the State Commission has done. We further notice that the respondent/opposite party in his written version to the complaint had very emphatically denied the allegation and on the contrary had stated that the complaint has been filed to avoid payment of more than Rs.20,000/- outstanding against the complainant against the electric motor purchased on loan from one of his relatives. The possibility of a false claim as a counter-blast therefore cannot be ruled out especially when the complainant has filed no rejoinder. 7. In view of the above, we do not find any illegality, material irregularity much less any jurisdictional error calling for our interference in the impugned order and dismiss the revision petition in limine.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION NO. 4228 OF 2011 [Against the order dated 07.09.2011 in First Appeal No. 159/2006 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula]   Lachhman Dass alias Lachhman Ram S/o Ajmer Singh R/o Village Devi Nagar Tehsil and District Ambala                                …      Petitioner Versus Joginder Singh Mistry S/o Chanan Ram R/o Village Mehdoodan Tehsil Rajpura District Patiala                                                    …      Respondent BEFORE :             HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE … Continue reading

CONDONATION OF DELAY= In the facts of this case it is clear that of all the three ladies, who were the appellants, one of them was pursuing the case and she fell sick. Therefore, she was not in a position to pursue the legal remedy with due diligence as a result of which the appeal was filed with a delay of 63 days. The delay of 63 days is not a delay for a long period and there has been some explanation for the delay. The High Court should have, before passing the impugned judgment, considered the explanation for the delay along with the facts of the case, the position of the parties, the nature of the litigation and the period of delay. The High Court should also have considered that it has been settled by a catena of cases that, unless the delay is gross, an explanation for the same should be liberally construed. It appears that the High Court has not been able to consider all these relevant facts in their correct perspective before passing the impugned order. 8

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.9059 OF 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.18191/2009) Poonam & others …Appellant(s) – Versus – Harish Kumar and another …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This civil appeal is directed against … Continue reading

Dying declaration = when her statement was shrouded by suspicious circumstances and contrary to the claim of the prosecution. Particularly, when she was alleged to have 97% burns and being under constant sedatives first at Civil Hospital, Naraingarh and then at PGI, Chandigarh, in such a situation she could not be expected to make a statement at a stretch without asking any questions. Admittedly, the Executive Magistrate, PW-2 did not put any question and recorded her answers. 14) Another important aspect relating to failure on the part of prosecution is that on the date of the incident, the deceased had two children aged about six and four years respectively and both of them were present there, admittedly, the I.O. has not enquired them about the genuineness of the incident. Though, there are number of immediate neighbours/co- 19

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 328 OF 2004 Surinder Kumar …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Haryana …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 19.12.2003 passed by the High Court … Continue reading

“Indian Limitation Act, 1908–S. 4, 14, 15(a) read with S. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code–Whether the Notice period to the Railways is to be excluded for the purpose of limitation. =Art. 22, Indian Limitation Act, 1908, provides a period of one year for a suit for compensation for injury to the person from the date when the injury was sustained. In the present case, the injury was sustained by the Appellant on January 1, 1958, while travelling by train from Ambala Cantt.. to Delhi and the suit should have been filed on January 1, 1959; but as the Appellant had to serve a notice under S.80 of the C.P.C. before filing the suit, the notice was served on the General Manager on December 29, 1958. The suit was originally filed in Karnal Court on March 2, 1959 as March 1, 1959 was a holiday. Later, the suit was transferred to the Sub-Judge’s Court at Panipat which by its order returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court, as the Mohri Railway Station where the injury was sustained, was outside the jurisdiction of that Court. The plaint was, ultimately, filed before SubJudge’s Court at Ambala. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation and the High Court also confirmed the decision. Before this Court, Counsel for the appellant raised the following points :-(1) The suit could not have been instituted without giving 2 months’ notice U/S 80 of C.P.C. and if this period of 2 months is excluded for the purpose of limitation, ‘the suit was within time. (2) that if the Karnal Court was not the proper Court in which the suit should have been filed, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of S.4 of the Limitation Act; (3) that the Karnal Court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaint and therefore, that was the proper Court for the purpose of S. 4 of the Act; (4) that under S. 14 of the Act, the Appellant was to get the benefit of excluding the period during which he was prosecuting the suit at Karnal and Panipat. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : (i) S.80 of the C.P.C. provides, among other things, that no suit shall be instituted against the Railways until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been delivered. S.80 only prescriber, a condition precedent for the institution of the suit and has nothing to do with the period of limitation for a suit. The appellant cannot wait till the 29th of December 1958 as the period of limitation was to expire on January 1, 1959. [687B] (ii)Section 4 of the Limitation Act provides that where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit may be instituted on the reopening day. In the present case, if the Karnal Court was not the proper Court, the plaintiff would not be entitled to the benefit of S.4. He can get the benefit of S.4 only if the suit were filed in the proper Court. [687E] Maqbul Ahmed and Others v. Pratap Narain Singh and Others, 62 I.A. 80, referred to. 685 (iii)The appellant cannot get the benefit of s. 14 of the Limitation Act because even if the appellant was entitled to get an exclusion of the time during which he was prosecuting the suit in the Kemal and Panipat Court, the suit would not be in time as the filing of the suit in the Karnal Court was beyond the period of limitation. [688B-C] (iv)Further, the appellant’s contention that the filing of the suit at the proper Court at Ambala was a continuation of the suit filed at Karnal and Panipat, has no force, because when the plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court and was presented in that Court, the suit can be deemed to be instituted in the proper Court only when the plaint was presented in that Court. The suit instituted at the proper Court at Ambala was not a continuation of the suit filed in the Karnal Court. [688E] Hirachand Succaram Gandhy & Co. v. G.I.P. Ry. Co. A.I.R, 1928 Bombay 421; Bimla Prasad Mukerji v., Lakshmi Devi & Ors. A.I.R. 1926 Calcutta 355 and Ram Kishun v. Ashirbad, I.L.R. 29 Patna, 699, referred to. (v)Whether Karnal Court was the proper Court and had jurisdiction entertain the plaint or not in the facts and circumstances of the case the appellant had never raised these contentions before the trial Court or in the High Court. Therefore, be cannot be allowed to raise these points for the first time before this Court. [690A]

PETITIONER: AMAR CHAND INANI Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA DATE OF JUDGMENT13/10/1972 BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN GROVER, A.N. MUKHERJEA, B.K. CITATION: 1973 AIR 313 1973 SCR (2) 684 1973 SCC (1) 370 ACT: “Indian Limitation Act, 1908–S. 4, 14, 15(a) read with S. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code–Whether the Notice … Continue reading

the punishment of dismissal from service is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the offences held to be proved. While we may not interfere with the findings of guilt, in a case of this nature, having regard to the nature of offences, we may consider the proportionality of punishment to find out whether it is perverse and irrational. Even accepting the said findings of guilt regarding charges (1), (4) and 5(c), it is clearly a case of shockingly disproportionate punishment being meted out to the Commandant for offering an alternative interpretation to

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 876 of 2003 Union of India & Ors. … Appellants Vs. Bodupalli Gopalaswami … Respondent With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 877 of 2003 Bodupalli Gopalaswami … Appellant Vs. Union of India & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T R.V.RAVEENDRAN,J. … Continue reading

QUASHING OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT = the learned Single Judge of the High Court did not appreciate the nature of the on and off relationship between the appellant and the respondent No.2, which caused him to dismiss the appellant’s application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground that there were serious allegations in the FIR which have been registered against the appellant regarding his alleged cruelty and maltreatment of the

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1709 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl) No.7924 of 2008) Bhushan Kumar Meen … Appellant Vs. State of Punjab and Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T ALTAMAS KABIR,J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant, who had all … Continue reading

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