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Registration Act, 1908: s.49, proviso – Unregistered sale deed is admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance of the contract – Evidence Act, 1872 – Specific performance – Transfer of property Act, 1882. The question which arose for consideration in the present appeal was whether the courts below erred in holding that an unregistered sale deed was not admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance of the contract. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: The Trial Court erred in not admitting the unregistered sale deed in evidence in view of the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and the High Court ought to have corrected the said error by setting aside the order of the trial court. The main provision in Section 49 provides that any document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein nor such document shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. Proviso, however, would show that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by 1908 Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received as an evidence to the contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. By virtue of proviso, therefore, an unregistered sale deed of an immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- and more could be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale deed can also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered document. When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49 of 1908 Act. By admission of an unregistered sale deed in evidence in a suit for specific performance as evidence of contract, none of the provisions of 1908 Act is affected; rather court acts in consonance with proviso appended to Section 49 of 1908 Act. [Paras 8, 11, 16] [519-C-D; 521-A-E; 525-B] K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited v. Development Consultant Limited (2008) 8 SCC 564, relied on. Kalavakurti Venkata Subbaiah v. Bala Gurappagari Guruvi Reddy (1999) 7 SCC 114, referred to. Case Law Reference: (2008) 8 SCC 564 relied on Para 12 (1999) 7 SCC 114 referred to Para 13 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3192 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 13.11.2008 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in C.R.P.(PD) No. 261 of 2008. K.V. Vishwanathan, B. Rajunath, Vijay Kumar for the Appellant. T.S.R. Venkatramana, G.S. Mani, R. Satish for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3192 OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1451 of 2009] S. Kaladevi …. Appellant Vs. V.R. Somasundaram & Ors. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA,J. Leave granted. 2. The short question is one of admissibility of an unregistered sale deed in a … Continue reading

Whether Vasanth Sreedhar Kulkarni, Eshwar Gouda Burma Gouda Patil and Ms. Mehrunnisa Mahazuz Husen Maniyar (appellants in C.A. Nos. 6662-6670/2002) had the locus to question the allotment of sites to the private respondents from land bearing survey Nos. 533/1, 534A and 534B of village Kanabargi, Belgaum despite the fact that the writ petitions filed by Vasanth Sreedhar Kulkarni and Eshwar Gouda Burma Gouda Patil had been dismissed by the High Court in 1996 and also the fact that they claim to have sold the acquired land and whether the purchasers were entitled to contest writ petitions filed by the allottees of the acquired land are the questions which arise for consideration in these appeals filed against judgments dated 14.12.1999 and 04.04.2000 of the Division Benches of the Karnataka High Court. =In the result, the appeals are dismissed. Appellants – Vasanth Sreedhar Kulkarni and Eshwar Gouda Burma Gouda Patil shall pay cost of Rs.1,00,000/- each to the BDA for thrusting unwarranted litigation upon it. The BDA shall ensure delivery of possession of the sites to the allottees within 8 weeks from today. However, it is made clear that this judgment shall not preclude the State Government from allotting alternative sites to Mumtaz Begum and others, who are said to have purchased small parcels of land from the landowners through Allahuddin Khan.

Non-reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6662-6670 OF 2002 Vasanth Sreedhar Kulkarni and others ……Appellants Versus State of Karnataka and others ……Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6671-6676 OF 2002 Mumtaz Begum Imam Husen Maribalkar and others ……Appellants Versus State of Karnataka and others ……Respondents J U D G … Continue reading

Tamil Nadu Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1975: s.4 – Execution of money decree against agriculturist – Attachment of property – Execution application closed in view of s.4 of the Act staying the execution against agriculturist – After moratorium period ended, initiation of execution proceedings by decree-holder – Auction sale of attached property – Validity of – Held: Auction sale was valid – There was no withdrawal of attachment, nor any question of `eclipse of attachment’ during the period of the statutory stay under the Act – Attachment in execution already effected, continued and was in effect, during the entire period of stay and on expiry of moratorium period, the decree-holder became entitled to continue the execution by proceeding with the sale – Sale of attached property during subsistence of attachment by the judgment-debtor was void – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.51(b), O.21, rr.54, 55, 57, 58. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: s.51(b), O.21, rr.54, 55, 57, 58 – Attachment of immovable property effected in execution of a decree – Determination/removal of – Legal position discussed. O.21, r.57 – Closure of execution application – Held: Is not dismissal of execution application. The appellant obtained a money decree against the judgment-debtor (M). In the execution of the money decree, the properties belonging to `M’ were attached on 29.12.1974. On 10.1.1975, the Tamil Nadu Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1975 came into force, by virtue of which all the proceedings in applications for execution of decrees in which relief was claimed against the agriculturists were stayed until the expiry of one year from the date of commencement of the said Act. As `M’ was an agriculturist, the execution proceedings in regard to the decree obtained by the appellant against her were closed on 15.2.1975. The moratorium period of one year under the Debt Relief Act was extended from time to time till 14.7.1979. After the moratorium period ended, the appellant initiated execution proceedings afresh. In the said execution proceedings, the attached suit property was brought to auction sale on 6.6.1984 and in that auction, the appellant purchased the sale property. `M’ filed an application under Section 47, CPC to set aside the sale. The trial court set aside the sale. The first appellate court reversed the order of trial court and upheld the validity of sale. The High Court upheld the same. In the meanwhile, on 17.2.1978, `M’ had sold the attached property and the purchaser further sold the property and ultimately the attached (suit) property came to the respondent. In 1985, the respondent filed a suit for declaration of title over the suit property against the appellant. A decade later, the respondent filed an additional document. As per the document, the order dated 15.2.1975 was corrected twenty years later on 19.7.1995 converting the attachment which was to continue without any specific time limit, as one to end on the expiry of six months. The said correction was by way of an office note and without notice to the appellant. The appellant challenged the amendment before the High Court. The High Court held that a clerical mistake cannot be converted behind the back of parties and remitted the matter to lower court with direction to give notice to both the parties in respect of the clarification required and the amendment to be made. On 18.9.1996, the District Munsif addressed a communication to the counsel of the appellant for making correction in the suit register as well as in the certified copies. The trial court dismissed the suit. The first appellate court upheld the order of trial court. It was concurrently found by both the courts that the attachment effected on 29.12.1974 was not raised/withdrawn/determined and it continued till the sale of the property in the court auction on 6.6.1984 and, therefore, the sale in favour of appellant was valid and the sales effected by `M’ during the subsistence of the attachment were invalid. The High Court allowed the appeal holding that that when the Debt Relief Act came into force, the executing court had closed the execution proceedings on 15.2.1975 with an observation that the attachment to continue for a period of six months, and at the end of six months the attachment came to an end and was not revived or renewed and auction sale in favour of the appellant was not valid and consequently when `M’ sold the suit property, it was not subject to any attachment and consequently, the respondent who purchased the suit property was the owner of the suit property. In the instant appeal, it was contended for the appellant that on 15.2.1975, the executing court, while closing the execution in view of the stay of execution proceedings by the Debt Relief Act, had made it clear that the attachment would continue. =the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. An attachment of an immovable property in execution of a decree is made by an order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way, and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge (Order 21 Rule 54, CPC), and it continues until the said property is sold and the sale is confirmed, unless it is determined or removed on account of any of the following reasons: (i) By deemed withdrawal under Rule 55 Order 21, CPC, that is, where the attachment is deemed to be withdrawn on account of (a) the amount decreed with all costs, charges and expenses resulting from the attachment being paid into court; or (b) satisfaction of the decree being otherwise made through the court or is certified to the court; or (c) the decree being set aside or reversed. (ii) By determination under Rule 57 Order 21, CPC, that is, after any property has been attached in execution of a decree, the court passes an order dismissing the application for execution of the decree, but omits to give a direction that the attachment shall continue. (iii) By release of the property from attachment under Rule 58 Order 21, CPC, that is, when any claim is preferred to the property attached in execution, or any objection is made to the attachment, on the ground that the property is not liable to such attachment and the court, on adjudication of the claim or the objections, releases the property from attachment. (iv) By operation of law, that is, on account of any statute declaring the attachment in execution shall cease to operate, or by the decree (in respect of which the property is attached) being nullified, or by the execution being barred by the law of limitation. (v) By consent of parties, that is, where the decree holder and the judgment debtor agree that the attachment be withdrawn or raised. [Paras 8, 9] 1.2. It is not the case of the respondent that there was determination of the attachment on account of any of the grounds specified in Rule 55 or Rule 58 of Order 21, CPC. There was also no agreement to raise the attachment nor any application for withdrawing the attachment. It is clear from Rule 57 of Order 21, CPC that where the court `dismisses’ the application for execution of the decree, the attachment effected in execution, shall cease unless the court indicates that the attachment shall continue. But where the execution petition is adjourned `sine die’ or closed on account of any moratorium or stay of the execution under a statute, or by an order of stay by any court, there is no “dismissal” of the execution application. Similarly, where the execution application is closed without any specific cause, apparently for purposes of statistical disposal, there is no `dismissal’ of the execution application. An execution application is `dismissed’ when (i) the execution is dismissed as a consequence of the decree being found to be null and void or inexecutable (as contrasted from any temporary eclipse of the decree); or (ii) the execution is dismissed on the ground of any default on the part of the decree-holder. [Paras 10, 11] 1.3. The execution application of the appellant was closed on 15.2.1975 in view of Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1975 staying the executions against agriculturists. What was stayed or kept in abeyance during the period when the statutory stay of execution operated under the Act, was not the attachment, but the further proceedings in pursuance of the attachment, that is, sale of the attached property. The stay was only for a specified limited period. On the expiry of the moratorium period under the Debt Relief Act on 17.10.1979, the decree holder became entitled to continue the execution by proceeding with the sale. Thus, there was no question of determination or withdrawal of attachment, nor any question of `eclipse of attachment’ during the period of the statutory stay under the Debt Relief Act, nor any `revival’ of attachment thereafter. Attachments in execution, already effected, continued and were in effect, during the entire period of stay of execution by the Debt Relief Act. The alienations by `M’ were, therefore, void as against the claim enforceable under the attachment obtained by appellant, having regard to Sec. 64 of the Code. As the attachment obtained by the appellant continued, the sales by `M’ were invalid and the sale in favour of the appellant was valid. [Paras 11, 12] 2.1. If the order of the executing court while closing the execution, was `attachment to continue’, the attachment would have continued in spite of the closing of the execution proceedings. Even if the executing court had closed the execution, in view of the statutory stay, without any specific order continuing the attachment, the attachment would not have ceased as there was no `dismissal’ of execution under Order 21 Rule 57, CPC. But if the order dated 15.2.1975 had stated `attachment to continue for six months’, whether right or wrong, the attachment would have come to an end on the expiry of six months from 15.2.1975, unless it was continued by any subsequent order, or had been modified or set aside by a higher court. [Para 14] 2.2. The High Court erred in proceeding on the basis that by order dated 15.2.1975, the executing court had closed the execution proceedings in view of the enactment of the Debt Relief Act and continued the attachment only for six months and thereafter there was no attachment and, therefore, the sales by `M’ on 17.2.1978 and 8.12.1980 were valid and the court auction sale in favour of the appellant was invalid. When the Debt Relief Act clearly indicated that the attachment would continue during the period when the execution proceedings were stayed, it is ununderstandable how the executing court could make an order that the attachment would continue only for six months. Moreover, when the order dated 15.2.1975 stated “attachment to continue”, it is ununderstandable how the said order could have been amended after 20 years without notice to the plaintiff-decree holder on the basis of some private clarification letter dated 29.10.1985 allegedly written by the District Munsif stating that the order made on 15.2.1975 was not “attachment to continue” but “attachment to continue for six months”. Also, when the order dated 19.7.1995 amending the order dated 15.2.1975 was set aside by the High Court by order dated 22.12.1995 with a direction for fresh disposal in accordance with law after notice to the parties, it is ununderstandable how the District Munsiff, instead of complying with the order of the High Court, could have issued a notice dated 18.9.1996 to both counsel stating that the said correction adding the words “for six months” was required to be made in the certified copies, if any obtained by the Advocates, and that both side Advocates should produce the certified copies for making the correction. The notice dated 18.9.1996, by no stretch of imagination, could be construed as an order. The notice dated 18.9.1996 was apparently issued under an erroneous impression that the High Court had accepted the correction, but had directed making of the correction in the certified copies after notice to the parties. The amendment made pursuant to the office note dated 19.7.1995 having been set aside by order dated 22.12.1995, and no further order having been made thereafter by the executing court, the unauthorized addition of the words “for six months” in the order dated 15.2.1975 have to be ignored and excluded. Therefore, the attachment dated 29.12.1974 continued till the property was sold by public auction on 6.6.1984 and confirmed on 30.7.1985. Consequently any sale by `M’, during the subsistence of the attachment was void insofar as the decree obtained by the appellant. Therefore, neither the purchasers from `M’ nor the respondent who is the subsequent transferee, obtained any title in pursuance of the sales, as the sales were void as against the claims enforceable under the attachment. The order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the first appellate court confirming the dismissal of the respondent’s suit stands restored. [Paras 18, 19, 20] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5798 of 2002. P. Vishwanath Shetty, V. Ramasubramanian, V. Balachandran for the Appellant. K.S. Ramamurthy, A.T.M. Sampath for the Respondent.

1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5798 OF 2002 C.S.Mani (deceasad) by LR C.S.Dhanapalan … Appellant Vs. B.Chinnasamy Naidu (deceased) by LRs … Respondent JUDGMENT R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Appellant obtained a money decree for Rs.4200/- against one Mokshammal on 28.2.1972. He levied execution (EP No.466/1974) in respect of … Continue reading

caste certificate of chief minister of chattisgarh=(Ajit P.K. Jogi) claimed that he belonged to a tribal community known as `Kanwar’, a notified Scheduled Tribe. He obtained social status/caste certificates from time to time, showing him as belonging to Kanwar-Scheduled Tribe, that is, certificate dated 6.6.1967 from the Naib Tehsildar, Pendra Road, Bilaspur, certificate dated 27.2.1984 by the Naib Tehsildar, Pendra Road, Bilaspur, certificate dated 6.3.1986 by the Tehsildar, Pendra Road, certificate dated 12.1.1993 by the Naib Tehsildar, Pendra Road, Bilaspur, certificate dated 11.8.1999 by Naib Tehsildar, Indore, certificate dated 8.1.2001 from the Addl. Collector, Bilaspur and certificate dated 30.9.2003 by Addl. Collector, Bilaspur. The first respondent was elected twice to Rajya Sabha and contested two parliamentary elections from Raigarh and Shahdol constituencies. He successfully contested from Marwahi Vidhan Sabha constituency reserved for Scheduled Tribes in 1991. On 1.11.2000, when the State of Chhattisgarh came into existence, the first respondent became its first Chief Minister and served in that capacity till December, 2002. =The certificates have never undergone a scrutiny by a properly constituted authority. The fact that two writ petitions were filed at some point of time, challenging the claim of first respondent that he belongs to a scheduled tribe may not be conclusive as the first writ petition was

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4069 OF 2008 Collector, Bilaspur ………Appellant Vs. Ajit P. K. Jogi & Ors. …….Respondents WITH Civil Appeal No.4074 of 2008 Civil Appeal No.4079 of 2008 Civil Appeal No.4082 of 2008 J U D G M E N T R. V. Raveendran J. These … Continue reading

women are entitled to equal shares and also equally liable for joint family debts=in pending cases, the recent amendment of 2005 of Hindu succession act is applicable even after the preliminary decree is passed=whether the preliminary decree can be modified ?= In Phoolchand1, this Court has stated the legal position that C.P.C. creates no impediment for even more than one preliminary decree if after passing of the preliminary decree events have taken place necessitating the readjustment of shares as declared in the preliminary decree. The court has always power to revise the 14 It is true that final decree is always required to be in conformity with the preliminary decree but that does not mean that a preliminary decree, before the final decree is passed, cannot be altered or amended or modified by the trial court in the event of 15

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8538 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9586 of 2010) Ganduri Koteshwaramma & Anr. …. Appellants Versus Chakiri Yanadi & Anr. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. Leave granted. 2. The question that arises in this appeal, by special leave, is: … Continue reading

service matter =The Rajasthan Public Service Commission, first respondent holds examinations for direct recruitment to State and subordinate service posts under the Rajasthan State and Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment by Combined Competitive Examinations) Rules 1962 (`Rules’ for short). Appellant appeared as an `open market candidate’ in the 1983 examination and was selected to Rajasthan Tehsildar Services (Subordinate service) and = Sub-rule 1 of Rule 11 of Rules provided that the number of chances which a candidate appearing at the examinations can avail of, shall be restricted to three, for direct recruitment to posts specified in Schedules I and II of the Rules. The said rule was amended by notification dated 30.3.1990 whereby the ceiling in regard to the number of chances to appear in the examination was relaxed by increasing it from 3 to 4 examinations.= Having regard to the bar contained in Rule 4(2)(v), the appellant could not have appeared for the examination for the year 1990, as an NGE candidate, as by then he had appeared only thrice as an open market candidate and had not exhausted all the four chances as an open market candidate.

Not Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8399 OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP [C] No.27941/2008] Ashok Kumar Jain … Appellant Vs. Rajasthan Public Service Commission Through its Chairman & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave granted. 2. The Rajasthan … Continue reading

Mysore (Religious and Charitable Inams) Abolition Act, 1955: Inam lands – Granted to eldest son with the consent of brother and other family members – Partition – Held: Inam lands cannot be regarded as individual property of grantee – In terms of provisions under the 1955 Act, inam lands liable to be granted to tiller of such lands who may be an archak/tenant/office bearer – Such grant is meant for benefit of family of tiller and not for his individual benefit – Thus, grant of land in favour of the eldest son, with the consent of other members of the family could not disentitle other members to exercise their right to claim share in the property/lands – Moreover, lands Tribunal granted occupancy right to grantee because his father was Archak of the temple and not because the conditions as laid down in s. 6(A) of the Act are fulfilled – Occupancy right, as granted to him, was not his individual right – Hence, the lands in question available for partition. Father of respondent Nos. 1 & 2 was serving as an Archak in a temple and had been cultivating the inam lands attached to the temple. After his death, the lands were granted by the authority to respondent No.1, the eldest son, with the consent of other members of the family. Respondent No.1 was also acting as the Manager of the ancestral and self-acquired property of his father. Appellant, son of respondent No.2, issued a legal notice to respondent No.1 demanding partition of the joint family properties including inam lands. Respondent No.1 refused to partition the immovable properties. The appellant filed a suit for partition claiming his share in the properties along with mesne profits. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that prior partition was established in view of the admission by respondent No.2 and as such the appellant could not demand partition. Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the High Court. Review petition was also dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal. Appellant contended that in respect of inam lands granted to respondent No. 1, the High Court had committed an error by holding that since the appellant and the respondent No.2 had not performed the duties as archak of the Inamdar Temple and they had not personally cultivated the lands, they were not entitled to grant of the inam lands. Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 3 submitted that respondent no.1 had got the properties, imam land in question, vacated from the tenants who had been cultivating it and thereafter he was personally cultivating the same and after coming into force of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable Inams) Abolition Act, an application for grant of occupancy rights was moved on his behalf and the right was conferred on him by the competent authority after proper inquiry and therefore, the appellant could not claim partition of the same; that respondent no.1 was admittedly the archak of the temple and he was also cultivating the properties personally for a continuous period of 3 years prior to the date of its vesting with him and therefore, he was entitled to apply for registration of his right in terms of provisions of the Act; and that the grant of such right is a personal right which cannot be characterized as an ancestral right because in this case, even if his father was alive, he could not have become entitled to grant of occupancy rights because he was not cultivating the lands. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Under the scheme of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable Inams Abolition) Act, inam lands are liable to be granted to the tiller of such lands, be, as it may, as tenants, archaks or office bearers of the inamdar temple. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that such grants are meant for the benefit of the family of the tiller and not for him individually and for this reason, there can be no justification to disregard the rights of the junior members of the family if their eldest member was performing the duties of archak with the consent of others. For this reason and in view of the decision of this court in the case of Nagesh Bishto, this Court is of the view that grant of land to archak cannot disentitle the other members of the family of the right to the land and such granted land, therefore, is also available for partition. Furthermore, it also emerges from the judgment of the Trial Court that the tenants cultivating the land had stated that respondent no.2 had requested his father to allow him to cultivate the lands who accordingly gave his consent before the land tribunal also. Such being the position, if other members of the family had not objected to his becoming the archak of the temple because he was the eldest and also allowed him to cultivate the lands then, if subsequently he was, by virtue of the fact that he was the archak and also personally cultivating the lands, granted the lands, he cannot take away the rights of such other members of the family in the granted lands. (Para -13) [474-G-H; 475-A-D] Nagesh Bishto Desai Vs. Khando Tirmal Desai etc. (1982) 2 SCC 79 – relied on. 1.2 It is pellucid that respondent No.1 is relying only on Section 6A of the Act to submit that he was granted the occupancy rights. It is clear from Section 6A of the Act that respondent No.1 satisfied the conditions enumerated therein and for that reason, he was granted the occupancy rights. If seen in isolation, conclusion would be that since respondent No.1 had fulfilled the conditions of Section 6A of the Act, he was granted the occupancy rights and the question of bringing the other family members did not arise. However, this Court is not inclined to look at Section 6A in isolation. If seen in totality, it is discernible that the father of respondent No.1 gave his consent and allowed respondent no.1 to cultivate the land after taking the same from the tenants. Even the land tribunal, while passing the order granting occupancy rights, had not confined itself to the fact that the conditions in Section 6A were fulfilled. Rather, the land tribunal had observed that the father of respondent No. 1 was the archak and anubhavdar of the temple and this was a prime consideration in granting occupancy rights to the respondent No.1. Therefore, it would be wrong to hold that simply because the conditions in Section 6A were fulfilled, the respondent no. 1 was granted occupancy rights and it was his individual rights. The truth is that the respondent No.1 became the Archak after the death of his father because he was the eldest in the family and only then came the question of satisfying the conditions of Section 6A of the Act. (Para – 14) [475-E-H; 476-A-B] 1.3 It is wrong on the part of respondent No.1 to say that his father, even if he had been alive, would not have been granted occupancy rights because the lands at that time were cultivated by the tenants. For grant of occupancy rights, personal cultivation is just one condition. The other conditions include that if a person is managing the properties, which his father was doing, would also be entitled to the grant of occupancy rights. (Para – 15) [476-C-D] 1.4 Respondent No. 1 was made archak after the death of his father because he was the eldest member of the family. Being the archak, he cultivated the lands and obtained occupancy rights. In such circumstances, it would be highly unjust to deprive the other members of the family from getting their share in the properties by relying only on Section 6A of the Act. Therefore, this Court is also of the opinion that the granted lands are also available for partition and grant of occupancy to one member will not disentitle the other members. (Para – 15) [476-D-F] Appi Belchadthi & Ors. vs. Sheshi Belchadthi & Ors. (1982) 2 Karnataka Law Journal 565 – approved. Case Law Reference (1982) 2 SCC 79 Relied on Para – 12 (1982) 2 Karnataka Law Journal 565 Approved Para – 15 S.B. Sanyal, Rajesh Mahale for the Appellant. A.K. Ganguli, S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar and D.P. Chaturvedi for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5646 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21197 of 2006) K.V. Sudharshan …Appellants VERSUS A. Ramakrishnappa & Ors. …Respondents JUDGMENT TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and final order … Continue reading

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. 12 r. 6 – Judgment on admission – Held: There should be a clear and unequivocal admission of the case of the plaintiff by the defendant – It is essentially a question of fact and depends on the facts of the case – On facts, in suit for possession by landlord against tenant, there is no clear admission of the case of landlord about termination of tenancy by tenant in its written statement or in its reply to the petition of landlord u/Or. 12 r. 6 – Thus, order of trial court and High Court, set aside – Matter remanded to trial court for disposal of the suit. The respondent-landlord filed suit against the appellant-tenant for recovery of possession and mesne profits on the ground that the lease deed had expired by efflux of time and notice to that effect was sent to the appellant but the appellant failed to vacate the suit property. The appellant filed written statement. The respondent did not file any rejoinder. They filed an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. The High Court upheld the order of the trial court holding that the case of ejectment was made out against the appellant on the basis of admission of the case of the respondent in the written statement filed by the appellant. Hence, the appeal. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The principles of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, can be followed only if there is a clear and unequivocal admission of the case of the plaintiff by the appellant. Whether or not there is a clear, unambiguous admission by one party of the case of the other party is essentially a question of fact and the decision of this question depends on the facts of the case. This question, namely, whether there is a clear admission or not cannot be decided on the basis of a judicial precedent. [Paras 12 and 13] [552-G-H; 553-A-B] 1.2. In the instant case, the respondent filed an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC for passing a judgment on admission. In the said petition, the respondents-plaintiffs averred that in view of the admission on existence of relationship of landlord and tenant and thereafter, service of the termination notice, the only question left for adjudication for the purpose of possession is “whether the termination of the tenancy has been validly terminated?” To that application the appellant gave a reply, again denying that there was any admission by them about termination or determination of tenancy. It was stated that in the suit issues are still to be framed and the case be tried in accordance with CPC as there is no admission by the appellant and the respondents-plaintiffs had to prove its case with legally admissible evidence. As such prayer was made to dismiss the application of the respondents-plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. [Paras 8, 10 and 11] [551-E; 552-A-E] 1.3. It cannot be said that there is a clear admission of the case of the respondents-plaintiffs about termination of tenancy by the appellant in its written statement or in its reply to the petition of the respondents- plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6. The parties have confined their case of admission to their pleading only. The counsel for the respondents- plaintiffs fairly stated before this Court that he is not invoking the case of admission `otherwise than on pleading’. Thus, in the pleadings of the appellant there is no clear admission of the case of respondents- plaintiffs. [Paras 14 and 15] [553-D-G] 1.4. In view of the facts of the instant case, the judgment of the High Court as well as of the Additional District Judge cannot be upheld and are set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial court for expeditious disposal of the suit as early as possible [Paras 22 and 23] [555-E-F] Karam Kapahi and Ors. vs. M/s. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust and Anr. 2010 (3) SCALE 569, distinguished. Uttam Singh Duggal and Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 120; Koramall Ramballav vs. Mongilal Dalimchand 23 Calcutta Weekly Notes (1918-19) 1017; J.C. Galstaun vs. E.D. Sassoon & Co., Ltd. 27 Calcutta Weekly Notes (1922-23) 783; Abdul Rahman and brothers vs. Parbati Devi AIR 1933 Lahore 403, referred to. Gilbert vs. Smith 1875-76 (2) Chancery Division 686; Hughes vs. London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow Assurance Company (Limited) Times Law Reports 1891-92 Volume 8 pg 81; Landergan vs. Feast Law Times Reports 1886-87 Volume 85 pg 42; Ellis vs. Allen (1914) 1 Ch. D. 904, referred to. Case Law Reference: 2010 (3) SCALE 569 Distinguished. Para 13 (2000) 7 SCC 120 Referred to. Para 14 1875-76 (2) Chancery Division 686 Referred to. Para 16 Times Law Reports 1891-92 Volume 8 pg 81 Referred to. Para 17 Law Times Reports 1886-87 Volume 85 pg 42 Referred to. Para 18 23 Calcutta Weekly Notes (1918-19) 1017 Referred to. Para 19 27 Calcutta Weekly Notes (1922-23) 783 Referred to. Para 20 (1914) 1 Ch. D. 904 Referred to. Para 20 AIR 1933 Lahore 403 Referred to. Para 21 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4344 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 28.11.2008 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RFA No. 465 of 2008. Shiv Kumar Suri for the Appellant. K.V. Viswanathan, Arunima Dwivedi, Anil Kaushik, Gopal Sigh Chauhan, Neha S. Verma and Shiv Prakash Pandey for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4344 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.2689 of 2009) M/s Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. ..Appellant(s) Versus M/s Jasbir Singh Chadha (Huf) & Anr. ..Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal … Continue reading

Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – ss.13(2), 13(4) and 14 – Entitlement of bank to recover outstanding dues from the guarantor without proceeding against the borrower – Appellant-bank issued notices to the-guarantor u/s.13(2) and 13(4) and filed application u/s.14 without first initiating action against the-borrower for recovery of the outstanding dues -Held: The action taken by the appellant cannot be faulted on any legally permissible ground – The High Court completely misdirected itself in assuming that the appellant could not have initiated action against the guarantor without making efforts for recovery of its dues from the borrower – Banks/Banking. Constitution of India, 1950: Article 136 – Interference with interim order passed by High Court – Scope – Appellant-bank initiated action for recovery of outstanding dues in terms of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act – Interim order by High Court restraining the bank from proceeding under the Act – Challenge to – Held: Normally the Supreme Court does not interfere with the discretion exercised by High Court to pass an interim order in a pending matter – However, on facts, an exception is required to be made out as the order under challenge had the effect of defeating the very object of the said legislation to ensure that there were no unwarranted impediments in the recovery of the debts, etc. due to banks, other financial institutions and secured creditors – Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Article 226 – Cases relating to recovery of dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors – Exercise of power under Article 226 – Rules of self-imposed restraint to be kept in mind by the High Courts – The High Courts should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters – The High Courts should not ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. Article 226 – Writ petition bypassing alternative statutory remedy – Maintainability of – Appellant-bank initiated action for recovery of outstanding dues in terms of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act – Writ petition filed challenging the action initiated by bank – Held: The writ petition was liable to be dismissed because effective an alternative remedy was available to the writ petitioner u/s.17 of the SARFAESI Act, which contained a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance – Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – Remedy – Alternative remedy. Words and Phrases – “any person” (used in s.17(1) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002) – Meaning of. Respondent no.2 obtained a term loan from appellant-bank for opening a colour lab. Respondent no.1 gave guarantee for repayment of the loan; she mortgaged her property and executed an agreement of guarantee making herself liable for repayment of the loan amount with interest. Respondent no.1, however, failed to repay the loan amount, whereupon the appellant issued notice against respondent nos.1 and 2 under s.13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) asking them to pay the outstanding dues alongwith future interest and incidental expenses. Upon receipt of the notice, respondent no.1 offered to settle the loan account, but the appellant did not accept the offer and filed an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, which was allowed by the District Magistrate/Collector. Thereafter the appellant issued notice to respondent nos.1 and 2 under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. Respondent no.1 filed writ petition and prayed that the appellant be restrained from taking coercive action in pursuance of the notices issued under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) and the order passed by the District Magistrate/Collector. Respondent no.1 contended that the notices issued by the appellant for recovery of the outstanding due were ex facie illegal and liable to be quashed because no action had been taken against the borrower i.e. respondent no.2 for recovery of the outstanding dues. The appellant, on the other hand, pleaded that the action initiated against respondent no.1 was consistent with the provisions of SARFAESI Act; that respondent no.1 was bound to discharge her obligations to pay the outstanding dues and that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed because an alternative remedy was available to respondent no.1 under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The High Court passed an interim order restraining the appellant from taking action in furtherance of the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. In the instant appeal, the question which arose for consideration was whether the appellant could have issued notices to respondent no.1 under Section 13(2) and (4) of the SARFAESI Act and filed an application under Section 14 without first initiating action against the borrower i.e., respondent no.2, for recovery of the outstanding dues. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:1. Normally, this Court does not interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court to pass an interim order in a pending matter but, having carefully examined the matter, this Court feels persuaded to make an exception in this case because the order under challenge has the effect of defeating the very object of the legislation enacted by Parliament for ensuring that there are no unwarranted impediments in the recovery of the debts, etc. due to banks, other financial institutions and secured creditors. [Para 13] [21-D-E] 2.1. In the present case, the High Court completely misdirected itself in assuming that the appellant could not have initiated action against respondent no.1 without making efforts for recovery of its dues from the borrower-respondent no.2. The High Court was not at all justified in injuncting the appellant from taking action in furtherance of notice issued under Section 13(4) of the Act. [Paras 15, 28] [22-G-H; 32-C] 2.2. Even after receipt of notices under Section 13(2) and (4) and order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, respondent Nos.1 and 2 did not bother to pay the outstanding dues. Therefore, the action taken by the appellant for recovery of its dues by issuing notices under Section 13(2) and 13(4) and by filing an application under Section 14 cannot be faulted on any legally permissible ground and, the High Court committed serious error by entertaining the writ petition of respondent No.1. [Para 16] [23- A-C] Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad (1969) 1 SCR 620; State Bank of India v. M/s. Indexport Registered and others (1992) 3 SCC 159 and Industrial Investment Bank of India Limited v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala (2009) 9 SCC 478 – relied on. 3.1. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No.1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression `any person’ used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal, are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. The High Court overlooked the settled law that ordinarily a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. [Para 17] [23-D-H] 3.2. While dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. [Para 17] [23-H; 24-A-B] 3.3. The powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, one cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. The stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any exception, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order. [Para 18] [24-C-H; 25-A-B] 3.4. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncements of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. It is hoped that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection. [Para 27] [31-H; 32-A-B] Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes (1964) 6 SCR 654; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433; Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and others (1985) 1 SCC 260; Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan and others (2001) 6 SCC 569; CCT, Orissa and others v. Indian Explosives Ltd. (2008) 3 SCC 688; City and Industrial Development Corporation v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and others (2009) 1 SCC 168; Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement and another (2010) 4 SCC 772 and Modern Industries v. Steel Authority of India Limited (2010) 5 SCC 44 – relied on. Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556; Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1; Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 – referred to. Case Law Reference: (1969) 1 SCR 620 relied on Para 14 (1992) 3 SCC 159 relied on Para 14 (2009) 9 SCC 478 relied on Para 14 AIR 1969 SC 556 referred to Para 18 (1998) 8 SCC 1 referred to Para 18 (2003) 2 SCC 107 referred to Para 18 (1964) 6 SCR 654 relied on Para 19 (1983) 2 SCC 433 relied on Para 20 (1985) 1 SCC 260 relied on Para 21 (2001) 6 SCC 569 relied on Para 22 (2008) 3 SCC 688 relied on Para 23 (2009) 1 SCC 168 relied on Para 24 (2010) 4 SCC 772 relied on Para 25 (2010) 5 SCC 44 relied on Para 2 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5990 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 28.10.2009 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 55375 of 2009. Yashraj Singh Deora, Rajesh Gautam, Shiv Mitter (for Mitter & Mitter Co.) for the Appellant.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.10145 of 2010) United Bank of India …Appellant Versus Satyawati Tondon and others …Respondents JUDGMENT 1. Leave granted. 2. With a view to give impetus to the industrial development of the country, the Central and State … Continue reading

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT – Section 23 – Special provision relating to dwelling houses – Omission of by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 – Effect of – Constitution of India, Article 136. Will – Proof of – Concurrent finding that it was validly proved – No reason to differ with the same. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES: Report of the Law Commission may be looked into for the purpose of construction of a statute – But the same would not prevail over a clear and unambiguous provision. In this appeal, the question involved was as to the effect of the amendment made to Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Amending Act, 2005 thereby omitting Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, which was a special provision relating to dwelling houses. -Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD:1. Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act has been omitted so as to remove the disability on female heirs contained in that Section. It sought to achieve a larger public purpose. If even the disability of a female heir to inherit the equal share of the property together with a male heir so far as joint coparacenary property is concerned has been sought to be removed, this Court fails to understand as to how such a disability could be allowed to be retained in the statute book in respect of the property which had devolved upon the female heirs in terms of Section 8 of the Act read with the Schedule appended thereto. Restrictions imposed on a right must be construed strictly. In the context of the restrictive right as contained in Section 23 of the Act, it must be held that such restriction was to be put in operation only at the time of partition of the property by metes and bounds, as grant of a preliminary decree would be dependant on the right of a co-sharer in the joint property. Concededly a preliminary decree could be passed declaring each co-sharer to be entitled to 1/5th share therein in terms of the provisions contained in Section 8 of the Act. 1/5th share in each co-sharer upon death of the predecessor-in-interest of the parties is absolute. They cannot be divested of the said right as the restriction in enjoyment of right by seeking partition by metes and bounds is removed by reason of Section 3 of the 2005 Act. Where a partition has not taken place, Sub-section (5) of Section 3 shall apply. [Para 22] [1019-B-F] `174th Report of the Law Commission’, referred to. 2.1. Neither the 1956 Act nor the 2005 Act seeks to reopen vesting of a right where succession had already been taken place. The operation of the said statute is no doubt prospective in nature. [Paras 22 and 23] [1020-F- G] 2.2. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the question as to whether a statute having prospective operation will affect the pending proceeding would depend upon the nature as also text and context of the statute. Whether a litigant has obtained a vested right as on the date of institution of the suit which is sought to be taken away by operation of a subsequent statute will be a question which must be posed and answered. [Para 24] [1021-A-B] 3. It is trite that although omission of a provision operates as an amendment to the statute but then Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, could have been applied provided it takes away somebody’s vested right. Restrictive right contained in Section 23 of the Act, cannot be held to remain continuing despite the 2005 Act. [Para 25] [1021-C-D] Eramma v. Verrupanna & Ors. (1966) 2 SCR 626; The State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose & ors. AIR 1962 SC 945; S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. (2006) 2 SCC 740; Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. Janardan Ramchandra Kulkarni & ors. AIR 1960 SC 794; Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry AIR 1961 SC 29; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Bhajan Kaur & Ors. 2008 (8) SCALE 475; Vishwant Kumar v. Madan Lal Sharma & Anr. (2004) 4 SCC 1; Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah & Anr. 2008 (11) SCALE 42; Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector & Etio & Ors. (2007) 5 SCC 447; Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia (1988) 4 SCC 284 and M/s Kesho Ram & Co. & ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 151, held inapplicable. Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 536, referred to. 4.1. Institution of a suit is not barred. What is barred is actual partition by metes and bounds. [Para 26] [1031-A] 4.2. A right in terms of Section 23 of the Act to obtain a decree for partition of the dwelling house is one whereby the right to claim partition by the family is kept in abeyance. Once, the said right becomes enforceable, the restriction must be held to have been removed. Indisputably, when there are two male heirs, at the option of one, partition of a dwelling house is also permissible. [Para 28] [1033-C-D] 4.3. In terms of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, the female heirs, subject to the statutory rule operating in that field, are required to be treated equally to that of the male heirs. Gender equality is recognized by the world community in general in the human rights regime. [Para 29] [1033-F] Sheela Devi & Ors. v. Lal Chand & Anr. (2006) 8 SCC 581, held inapplicable. Shyam Sunder & Ors. v. Ram Kumar & Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 24; Narashimaha Murthy v. Susheelabai (Smt) and Others (1996) 3 SCC 644 and Anuj Garg & Ors. v. Hotel Association of India & ors. AIR 2008 SC 663, referred to. Bhe & Ors. v. The Magistrate, Khayelisha & Ors. (2004) 18 BHRC 52 (South African Constitutional Court), referred to. 5. It is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as the fact remains that Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act as it stood was to be applicable on the date of the institution of the suit. Respondents may file a new suit and obtain a decree for partition. [Para 29] [1034-E-F] 6. Both the courts below have considered all the essential ingredients of proof of Will, viz., preparation of the Will, attestation thereof as also suspicious circumstances surrounding the same. They have arrived at a concurrent finding that the Will was not validly proved. There is no reason to differ therewith. [Para 31] [1037-C-D] Case Law Reference: (1966) 2 SCR 626 held inapplicable Para 22 AIR 1962 SC 945 held inapplicable Para 25 (2006) 2 SCC 740 held inapplicable Para 25 AIR 1960 SC 794 held inapplicable Para 25 AIR 1961 SC 29 held inapplicable Para 25 2008 (8) SCALE 475 held inapplicable Para 25 (2000) 2 SCC 536 referred to Para 25 (2004) 4 SCC 1 held inapplicable Para 26 2008 (11) SCALE 42 held inapplicable Para 26 (2007) 5 SCC 447 held inapplicable Para 26 (1988) 4 SCC 284 held inapplicable Para 26 (1989) 3 SCC 151 held inapplicable Para 26 (2006) 8 SCC 581 held inapplicable Para 26 (2001) 8 SCC 24 referred to Para 26 (1996) 3 SCC 644 referred to Para 27 (2004) 18 BHRC 52 referred to Para 29 AIR 2008 SC 663 referred to Para 29 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2535 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 29.01.2007 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in O.S.A. Nos.196 and 197 of 2001. K.V. Viswanathan, P.B. Suresh and Vipin Nair (for Temple Law Firm) for the Appellant. K. Kamamoorthy, B.P. Balaji, N. Shoba, Sriram J. Thalapathy and Adhi Venkataraman for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2535 OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9221 of 2007] G. Sekar …Appellant Versus Geetha & Ors. …Respondents JUDGMENT S.B. SINHA, J : 1. Leave granted. 2. Effect of the amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short “the … Continue reading

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