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sample voice = If the facts in the present case are examined in the light of the above pronouncements of the Apex Court, it is evident that the Sub Divisional Police Officer, Bapatla is already in possession of a CD containing voices or conversation said to be between A-1 and the victim woman; and the investigating officer wanted sample voice of A-1 and the victim to be recorded in court for the purpose of making comparison of voices contained in the CD with the sample voices recorded in open court. This exercise of recording of sample voices of A-1 and the victim in open court is not going to incriminate A-1 on the basis of such sample voice, but only facilitates the investigating officer and the court to identify voice contained in the CD which is already in possession of the investigating officer. By any stretch of imagination, the exercise of recording sample voice of A-1 for the purpose of identifying the male voice already contained in CD which is collected by the investigating officer during investigation, cannot amount to testimonial compulsion which is prohibited under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU CRIMINALREVISION CASE NO.1219 OF 2010 27-07-2010 Y. Ranganadh Goud State rep. By the Public Prosecutor, High Court of AP., Hyderabad. Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri C. Mastan Naidu Counsel for the Respondent: Public Prosecutor :ORDER: 1. The revision petitioner/A-1 is accused of offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, … Continue reading

Muhammadan Law–Dower–Widow in possession of husband’s estate in lieu of dower–Whether entitled to priority OVer creditors-Nature of widow’s lien for dower. = A Muhammadan widow in possession of her husband’s estate in lieu of her claim for dower with the consent of the other heirs or otherwise is not entitled to priority as against his other unsecured creditors. There is nothing inherent in the very nature of dower which entitles it to priority. 748 Ameer Ammal v. Sankaranarayana Chetty (I.L.R. 25 Mad 658), Meet Meher Ally v. Mst. Areanee (11 W.R. 212), Maina Bibi v. Wasi Ahmad (I.L.R 41 All. 558), Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida- Bibi (A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 46), Imtiaz Begum v. Abdul Karim Khan (A.I.R. 1930 All. 881) referred Kulsum Bibi v. Shiam Sunder Lal (A.I.R. 1936 All. 600), Mst. Ghafooran v. Ram Chandra Das (A.I.R. 1934 All. 168), Mohamed Turabuddin v. Yasin Beeum (17 D.L.R. 224)disap- proved. Maina Bibi, v. Chaudhri Vakil Abroad (52 I.A. 145) ex- plained. =1953 AIR 413, 1950SCR 747, , ,

PETITIONER: [IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (HYDERABAD).]KAPORE CHAND Vs. RESPONDENT: KADAR UNNISA BEGUM AND OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/10/1950 BENCH: SIDDIQUI KHALILUZZAMAN J. BENCH: SIDDIQUI KHALILUZZAMAN J. MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND NAIK R.S. CITATION: 1953 AIR 413 1950 SCR 747 ACT: Muhammadan Law–Dower–Widow in possession of husband’s estate in lieu of dower–Whether entitled to priority … Continue reading

the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short ‘SARFAESI Act’).=The fact remains that the petitioner did not repay the outstanding dues of Rs.17.5 lakhs as on date and therefore, the impugned sale notices have been issued. Once the provisions of Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act have been followed, the petitioner cannot find fault with the subsequent events, as it is for the petitioner to deliver possession or the only course open to the bank is to seek assistance from either the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate. In the instant case, as the petitioner failed to deliver possession, the bank took possession of the property with the assistance of the District Collector by break opening the lock on 16.02.2009 under the cover of panchanama with regard to the inventory of immovable property, which also cannot be found fault with. – in view of the default, the respondent bank issued notice dated 08.09.2007, under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, which was acknowledged by the petitioner on 20.09.2007. It is stated that the petitioner did not give any explanation nor did he respond to the said notice and therefore, the possession notice dated 14.11.2008, under Section 13(4) read with Rule 8(1) was sent to the petitioner and he acknowledged the same on 20.11.2008. The possession notice dated 14.11.2008 was also published in Indian Express dated 25.12.2008. 4. The aforesaid averments have neither been contraverted nor the petitioner has filed any reply, therefore, it cannot be said that the procedure under Section 13 of SARFAESI Act has not been followed. Admittedly, the petitioner received Section 13(2) notice on 20.09.2007 and Section 13(4) notice was also received on 28.11.2008 but so far no action has been taken. If the procedure under Section 13 of SARFAESI Act is not followed, the course open to the petitioner is to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. As the procedure under Section 13 of SARFAESI Act has become final and as the petitioner neither paid the debt amount nor handed over the possession, the bank has to take recourse to Section 14 of SARFAESI Act. Under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act it is open to the secured creditor to seek assistance of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate in taking possession of the secured asset. In the instant case, the District Collector being the District Magistrate his assistance was taken. Accordingly, the District Collector had passed orders dated 06.01.2009 and 19.01.2009 directing the SDPO, Amalapuram to provide necessary security while taking possession of the above said property.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH  AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND NINE PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE V.ESWARAIAH AND  THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR WRIT PETITION No: 3786 of 2009 BETWEEN:      Sagi Venkata Rama Gopala Krishnam Raju (Hindu) S/o. Narasimha      Raju, R/o. … Continue reading

At the cost of repetition, it has to be observed that a plaint cannot be rejected only on the basis of a defence available to a defendant, and the question as to whether any averment in a plaint constitutes res judicata or is the basis of any misinterpretation of a judgment has to be considered at the hearing of the suit. Not at the threshold. Though the learned counsel for the parties have addressed arguments touching partly on the merits of the matters, this Court has chosen not to refer to them, lest, any view expressed thereon would have its shadow or impact upon the adjudication of the matter by the trial Court.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY C.R.P. Nos.525 of 2011 and bt 07-07-2011 V. Narasimha Reddy and others Sara Abdul Gafoor and others Counsel for the petitioners : Sri K. Rama Krishna Reddy,learned Senior Counsel Counsel for respondents : Sri Sunil B. Ganu :COMMON ORDER: Respondents 1 to 17 herein (for short ‘the respondents’) filed … Continue reading

Constitution of India, 1950-Tenth Schedule Paras 2 (1) (a) and (2) 3 and 8-Members of Legislative Assembly-Four were elected as independent members and two were sole members of their respective political parties-Complaint of defection to another political party-Speaker of the assembly relying on the statements of the members in electronic media, disqualified them from membership of the Assembly-Members declined to watch the recording in order to point out doctoring therein-Members sought permission to cross-examine and lead evidence-Denial thereof-Orders of disqualification challenged on the ground of violation of principles of Natural Justice and malafide-Held: In the facts and circumstances of the case mere denial to cross examine and adduce evidence may not automatically lead to violation of principles of Natural Justice-On the facts plea of malafide not acceptable-A member cannot be permitted to get away with defection on the ground of mere technicalities-Order of the speaker not illegal and unreasonable-The independent members have incurred disqualification under Para 2 (2)-To determine whether an independent member has joined a political party the test is not whether he has fulfilled the formalities for joining a political party but that he has given up his independent status-Protection of Para 3 is not applicable to a single member party-Burden to prove the requirement of Para 3 is on the member who seeks protection thereunder-Members of political parties having failed to prove the split in their respective parties, not entitled to protection under Para 3-Evidence-Burden to prove-Haryana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Member on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986. Election Law-Defection Law-Object of-Discussed. Evidence-Admission-Evidentiary value of-Held: Admission is best evidence-Though conclusive it is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. Judicial Review-Scope of-In cases of disqualification of members of Legislative Assembly-Held: Speaker, while exercising power to disqualify members acts as a Tribunal-Validity of such orders can be challenged on the ground of ultra vires or malafide or having been made in colourable exercise of power based on extraneous and irrelevant consideration-But the scope of judicial review in respect of such proceedings is limited-Order would be a nullity if rules of natural justice are violated-Principles of Natural Justice. Principle of Natural Justice-Right to hearing-Opportunity to cross examine and adduce evidence denied-Denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing alleged-Held: Principles of Natural Justice are flexible and have to be examined in each case-They cannot be fixed in rigid mould-In the present case in view of the conduct of the alleging parties, mere denial of opportunity to cross examine or adduce evidence may not automatically lead to violation o principles of Natural Justice. Interpretation of Statutes-It is ordinarily not the function of the court to read word, in a statute-Court must proceed on the assumption that legislature did not make a mistake and it intended to say what it said-Constitution of India, 1950-Tenth Schedule para 3 and 2 (1) (a). Doctrines-Doctrine of necessity-Applicability of. Petitioners were elected to the State Assembly. Four petitioners were independent members and two were lone members representing their respective political parties in the Assembly. Speaker of the Assembly disqualified them from the membership of the Assembly in exercise of its power under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. All the petitioners challenged the orders of disqualification on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice; that impugned orders were result of malafide of the Speaker as the disqualifications were made in utter haste with a view to deprive them of their right to vote in elections to Rajya Sabha in view of the fact that the Speaker, on telephone had told that if they abstained from voting, their disqualification could be avoided; that the speaker had no basis for coming to the conclusion regarding their defection; and that the petitioners belonging to the political parties were entitled to protection of Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule since there were splits in their original political parties and they being single member parties in the Assembly, having joined another party, the stipulation that when more than one-third members join another party, there is a split, stood fulfilled, it being a case of hundred per cent members joining another political party. – Dismissing the Writ Petitions, the Court HELD: 1. The Speaker, while exercising power to disqualify members, acts as a Tribunal and though validity of the orders, thus, passed can be questioned in the writ jurisdiction of this Court or High Courts, the scope of judicial review is limited. The orders can be challenged on the ground of ultra vires or malafides or having been made in colourable exercise of power based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations. The order would be a nullity if rules of natural justice are violated. [535-B-D] Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Ors., [1992] supp 2. SCC 651, relied on. 2.1. The Speaker, in law, was the only authority to decide whether the petitioners incurred or not, disqualification under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution in his capacity as Speaker. He had obviously opportunity to see the petitioners and hear them and that is what has been stated by the Speaker in his order. Speaker has not committed any illegality by stating that he had on various occasions seen and heard these MLAs. It is not a case where the Speaker could transfer the case to some other tribunal. The doctrine of necessity under these circumstances would also be applicable. No illegality can be inferred merely on the Speaker relying upon his personal knowledge of having seen and heard the petitioners for coming to the conclusion that persons in the electronic evidence are the same as he has seen and so also their voices. [548-A-C] Dewan Singh v. Champat Singh and Ors., [1969] 3 SCC 447, distinguished. 2.2. Undoubtedly, the Speaker has to comply with the principles of natural justice and cannot pass an order on the basis of pre-determination but in the present case, it cannot be held that the impugned order suffers from any such infirmity. It cannot be said that the petitioners were not given a fair deal by the Speaker and principles of natural justice have been violated. [553-A-B] 2.3. The requirement to comply with the principles of natural justice is also recognized in rules made by the Speaker in exercise of powers conferred by paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The Speaker, Haryana Legislative Assembly, made the Haryana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Members on ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 in exercise of power conferred by paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule. [535-D-F] 2.4. The question whether reasonable opportunity has been provided or not cannot be put in a strait-jacket and would depend on the fact situation of each case. While considering the plea of violation of principles of natural justice, it is necessary to bear in mind that the proceedings, under the Tenth Schedule, are not comparable to either a trial in a court of law or departmental proceedings for disciplinary action against an employee. But the proceedings here are against an elected representative of the people and the judge holds the independent high office of a Speaker. The scope of judicial review in respect of proceedings before such Tribunal is limited. Howsoever limited may be the field of judicial review, the principles of natural justice have to be complied with and in their absence, the orders would stand vitiated. The yardstick to judge the grievance that reasonable opportunity has not been afforded would, however, be different. Further, if the view taken by the Tribunal is a reasonable one, the Court would decline to strike down an order on the ground that another view is more reasonable. The Tribunal can draw an inference from the conduct of a member, of course, depending upon the facts of the case and totality of the circumstances. [535-F-H; 536-A-C] 2.5. In the present case, petitioners filed their replies to the complaint and were asked by the Speaker to watch the video recording and point out doctoring thereof, if any. The petitioners failed to do so. The petitioners cannot be permitted to sit on the fence, take vague pleas, make general denials in the proceedings before the Tribunal of the nature under consideration. Under these circumstances, mere denial of opportunity to cross-examine or adduce evidence may not automatically lead to violation of principles of natural justice. The principles of natural justice cannot be placed in such a rigid mould. The principles of natural justice are flexible and have to be examined in each case. [540-D-H] National Textile Workers’ Union and Ors. v. P.R. Ramakrishnan and Ors., [1983] 1 SCC 228, distinguished. Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, [1981] 1 SCC 664; Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India and Ors., [1994] Supp. 2 SCC 641; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Ors., [1992] Supp. 2 SCC 651; Mrs.Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr., [1978] 1 SCC 248 and Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985] 3 SCC 398, referred to. John v. Rees and Anr., [1969] 2 All E.R. pp. 307-309, referred to. 2.6. It is evident from the facts that the petitioners declined to watch the recording, failed to show how and what part of it, if any, was not genuine but merely made general denials and sought permission to cross-examine and opportunity to lead evidence. [543-E-F] 2.7. The sufficiency of the time granted depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Having regard to the facts of the case it cannot be accepted that in the present case, the petitioners were not granted sufficient time to meet the case against them. [543-G-H] 2.8. Admission is the best evidence that can be relied upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. The petitioners have failed to satisfy the latter part. [552-H; 553-A] Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Ors., [1960] 1 SCR 773, relied on. 3. The object for enacting the defection law is to curb the menace of defection. Despite defection a member cannot be permitted to get away with it without facing the consequences of such defection only because of mere technicalities. The substance and spirit of law is the guiding factor to decide whether an elected independent member has joined or not a political party after his election. [541-D-F] 4.1. Petitioners (independent members) have incurred disqualification as provided in paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India. [554-B-C] 4.2. It is correct that there is a fundamental difference between an independent elected member and the one who contests and wins on ticket given by a political party. This difference is recognized by various provisions of the Tenth Schedule. An independent elected member of a House incurs disqualification when he joins any political party after election as provided in paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule. It is also correct that the proposition that giving of outside support by an independent elected member is not the same thing as joining any political party after election. To find out whether an independent member has extended only outside support or, in fact, has joined a political party, materials available and also the conduct of the member are to be examined by the Speaker. It may be possible in a given situation for a Speaker to draw an inference that an independent member of the Assembly has joined a political party. No hard and fast rule can be laid down when the answer is dependent on the facts of each case. [541-A-D] 4.3. To determine whether an independent member has joined a political party the test is not whether he has fulfilled the formalities for joining a political party. The test is whether he has given up his independent character on which he was elected by the electorate. A mere expression of outside support would not lead to an implication of a member joining a political party. At the same time, non-fulfillment of formalities with a view to defeat the intent of paragraph 2(2) is also of no consequence. The question of fact that a member has given up his independent character and joined, for all intent and purposes, a political party though not formally so as to incur disqualification provided in paragraph 2(2) is to be determined on appreciation of the material on record. Applying this test here, it cannot be held that the Speaker committed any illegality in coming to the conclusion that the petitioners had joined the Indian National Congress. The conclusions reached by the Speaker cannot be held to be unreasonable, assuming that two views were possible. [553-F-H; 554-A-B] 5.1. On the facts of the present case, the Speaker was justified in coming to the conclusion that there was no split in the original political party of the petitioner ‘J’. Likewise, in Writ Petition of another petitioner belonging to political party, the Speaker on consideration of relevant material placed before him came to the conclusion that there was no split as contemplated by paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule. The finding of the Speaker cannot be faulted. In fact, letter of the petitioner dated 17th June sent to the Speaker itself shows that what was claimed was that the Haryana unit of the Republican Party of India effected a split in the original party on 21st December, 2003. The finding that the claim of split was made as an afterthought to escape disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule cannot be held to be unreasonable or perverse. The Speaker was justified in coming to the conclusion that despite various opportunities, no valid proof or evidence was placed on record by the petitioner to show that indeed a split had taken place in the original political party. [563-d-g] 5.2. The disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) is incurred when a member of the House voluntarily gives up membership of his original political party. Paragraph 2 is, however, subject to paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule. If conditions of paragraph 3 are satisfied, despite giving up membership voluntarily, a member would not incur disqualification under paragraph 2. Paragraph 3 proceeds on the assumption that but for the applicability of the said provision the disqualification under paragraph 2 would be attracted. The burden to prove the requirements of paragraph 2 is on the person who claims that a member has incurred the disqualification. The burden to prove the requirements of paragraph 3 is on the member who claims that there has been a split in his original political party and for that reason disqualification under paragraph 2 is not attracted. [558-C-E] Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India and Ors., [1994] Supp. 2 SCC 641, relied on. 5.3. The acceptance of the contention that only claim is to be made to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 3 can lead to absurd consequences besides the elementary principle that whoever makes a claim has to establish it. It will also mean that when a claim as to split is made by a member before the Speaker so as to take benefit of paragraph 3, the Speaker, without being satisfied even prima facie about the genuineness and bonafides of the claim, has to accept it. It will also mean that even by raising a frivolous claim of split of original political party, a member can be said to have satisfied this stipulation of paragraph 3. The acceptance of such broad proposition would defeat the object of defection law, namely, to deal with the evil of political defection sternly. For the purposes of paragraph 3, mere making of claim is not sufficient. The prima facie proof of such a split is necessary to be produced before the Speaker so as to satisfy him that such a split has taken place. [559-C-F] 5.4. In the present case, the Speaker has held that the petitioner has failed to satisfy that split in the original party, had taken place. The petitioner voluntarily gave up membership of National Congress Party (NCP) and joined this newly formed party. On these facts, the disqualification of voluntarily giving up membership of NCP stands attracted subject to the claim of the petitioner under paragraph 3. The petitioner had to prove that the stipulations of paragraph 3 are satisfied. The Speaker has held that no valid proof or evidence was placed on record to show that split had indeed taken place in NCP. The Speaker, on the basis of material on record, has come to the conclusion that the petitioner was wanting to treat his own defection allegedly supported, according to the petitioner, by some party workers at local level as a split in his original political party. Such a plea was not accepted by the Speaker. The Speaker is right. Such a split, if held to be valid for the purposes of paragraph 3, would defeat the very purpose of the law. The requirement is not the split of the local or State wing of original political party but is of original political party as defined in paragraph 1(c) of the Tenth Schedule read with the explanation in paragraph 2(1) to the effect that ‘an elected member of a House shall be deemed to belong to the political party, if any, by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member’. [559-F-H; 560-C-E[ Madan Mohan Mittal, MLA v. The Speaker, Punjab Vidhan Sabha The Punjab Law Reporter Vol.CXVII 1997-3, 374 – disapproved. 5.5. In the case of split, one-third members of State Legislature belonging to that political party must form a group to make the split effective within the State Legislature but it does not lead to the conclusion that the Parliament intended to treat State Unit of a political party as a separate entity for the purposes of the benefit of paragraph 3. Paragraph 1(c) defining original political party and explanation as given in paragraph 2(1) have already been noticed hereinbefore. It is clear from a bare reading thereof that the elected member belongs to the political party by which he is set up as a candidate for election as such member. From the plain language of these provisions, it cannot be held that for the purposes of the split, it is the State Legislature party in which split is to be seen. If a member is set up by a National Party, it would be no answer to say that events at National level have no concern to decide whether there is a split or not. In case a member is put up by a National Political party, it is split in that party which is relevant consideration and not a split of that political party at the State level. [562-B-E] G. Viswanathan v. Hon’ble Speaker Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Madras and Anr., [1996] 2 SCC 353, relied on. 5.6. The words ‘he and any other person’ and the words ‘the group’ in paragraph 3 on the plain reading shows that the benefit of paragraph 3 is not available to a single member legislature party. It cannot be said that the words ‘he and any other person’, in the context of a recognized single member legislature party should be read and understood as ‘he or he and any other members of his legislature party constitute the group’. The Court cannot read words in the Constitution which do not exist. Undoubtedly, paragraph 2(1)(a) is subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 and if paragraph 3 applies and ingredients thereof are satisfied the member would not attract disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a). In that sense paragraph 3 overrides paragraph 2(1)(a). The factor that a single member legislature party is recognized by the Speaker is of no relevance in interpreting paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule. In the context of the language of paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule, Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which requires that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject of context, ‘words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice-versa’ has no applicability. It is, ordinarily, not the function of the Court to read words into a statute. The Court must proceed on the assumption that the Legislature did not make a mistake and it intended to say what it said. It is well settled that “the Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result’. [566-D-H; 567-A-B] P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries and Ors., [1990] 2 SCC 378, referred to. 5.7. It cannot be said that when paragraph 3 protects when there is defection of a group consisting of not less than one-third of the members of a legislature party, the intention of law can never be to deprive such a benefit where group is 100%. Firstly, there is no contradiction or ambiguity or defect or omission in paragraph 3; secondly, there is no manifest contradictions insofar as the apparent object of the defection law is concerned in paragraph 3 depriving the benefit of single member legislature party; thirdly the legislature is assumed to have known the existence of single member legislature party; and finally from the language of paragraph 3, it is evident that the Parliament did not intend to grant the benefit of paragraph 3 to a single person legislature party, having regard to the object of the Constitutional amendment dealing with evil of defection. Advisedly, the words are ‘he and other members’ instead of the words ‘he or he and other members’. [567-A-E] 5.8. The object of the Tenth Schedule is to discourage defection. Paragraph 3 intended to protect a larger group which, as a result of split in a political party which had set up the candidates, walks off from that party and does not treat it as defection for the purposes of paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule. The intention of the Parliament was to curb defection by a small number of members. That intention is clear from paragraph 3 which does not protect a single member legislature party. By Constitution (Ninty-first Amendment) Act, 2003, paragraph 3 has been omitted from the Tenth Schedule. [567-D-F] 5.9. The question of drawing adverse inference in view of Speaker not rebutting the averments, would depend upon the satisfaction of the Court, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ordinarily, the adverse inference can be drawn in respect of allegations not traversed, but there is no general rule that adverse inference must always be drawn, whatever the facts and circumstances may be. The facts and circumstances of the present case as to how the petitioners have been avoiding to appear before the Speaker; how the proceedings were being delayed and long adjournments sought on ground such as non-availability of senior advocates because of court vacations. In the light of these peculiar facts and circumstances, a telephone call like the one alleged can mean that further adjournment as sought for by the petitioners is possible if they do not vote in the Rajya Sabha election. On facts there is no adverse inference and the plea of malafides cannot be accepted. [568-B-E] 6. Certain questions have been raised about the confidence in the matter of impartiality on some issues having political overtones which are decided by the Speaker in his capacity as a Tribunal. It has been urged that if not checked, it may ultimately affect the high office of the Speaker. Recommendations have been made by the National Commission to review the working of the Constitution recommending that the power to decide on the question as to disqualification on ground of defection should vest in the Election Commission instead of the Speaker of the House concerned. There are views of number of other experts, committees/commissioner to the effect that the power of disqualification as a result of defection need to be exercised in accordance with the opinion of the Election Commission as in the case of decision on question as to disqualification of members provided for in Article 103 and 194(2) of the Constitution. [568-H; 569-A-C] Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Ors., [1992] supp. 2 SCC 651, referred to. Anti-Defection Law and Parliamentary Privileges by Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap; Indian Constitutional Law by M.P. Jain 5th Edn; Constitutional Law of India, 2nd Edn. by T.K. Tope, Reviewing the Constitution edited by Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap and Ors; First V.M. Tarkunde Memorial Lecture on “Indian Democracy Reality or Myth?” delivered by Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, referred to. Ajay Siwach, A.A.G., P.P. Rao, V.A. Bobde, Soli J. Sorabjee, R.N. Trivedi, Mahendra Anand, Shanti Bhushan, Rakesh K. Khanna Jaspal Singh, R.N. Karanjawala, Arunabh Chaudhary, Sarvesh Singh Baghel, Abhishek Kumar, Anshuman Ashok, Dashmeet Chaddha, Kanika Agnihotri, Pragya Baghel, Manik Karanjawala, Gaurav Vatts, Aditya Kumar Choudhary, Manish Mohan, Sweta Garg, Surya Kant, Sandeep Sharma, T.V. George, Sanjai Pathak, Ugra Shankar Prasad and Arun Kumar Beriwal for the appearing parties.

CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 287 of 2004 PETITIONER: Jagjit Singh RESPONDENT: State of Haryana & Ors DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/12/2006 BENCH: CJI,C.K. Thakker & P.K. Balasubramanyan JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [With WP (C) Nos.290, 291, 292, 293 & 294 of 2004] Y.K. Sabharwal, CJI. These petitions challenge the legality … Continue reading

writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, challenging the Notification dated 03.7.2006 issued under Section 4 and the Notification dated 18.12.2007 issued under

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 66 OF 2007 Devender Kumar Tyagi & Ors. ………….. Petitioners versus State of U.P. & Ors. ………..Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 67 OF 2007 Jai Prakash Tyagi & Ors. ………….. Petitioners versus State of U.P. & Ors. ………..Respondents J U … Continue reading

Dr. Svetoslav Roerich, a Russian born, was an internationally acclaimed painter, artist and recipient of many national and international awards including Padma Bhushan from the President of India in the year 1961. Smt. Devika Rani Roerich, grand niece of Rabindranath Tagore had made valuable contributions and outstanding services to the Indian Motion Pictures and Film Industry, was known to be the “First Lady of the Indian Screen”. She was awarded Padmashri by the President of India in the year 1958 and was the recipient of the first Dada Saheb Phalke Award and the Soviet Land Nehru Award in the year 1989.

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6520 OF 2003 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.6521-6537 OF 2003 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO.6538 OF 2003 K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. … Appellants Vs State of Karnataka …Respondent J U D G M E N T K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. The constitutional validity of … Continue reading

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