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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 309 – Prayer for stay of criminal proceedings pending probate case – Criminal case alleging the Will to be forged – HELD: Primacy has to be given to criminal case over civil case – Orders of courts below declining to stay criminal proceedings need no interference, in view of the fact that criminal case was instituted much prior to initiation of probate proceedings and because of the conduct of the appellant and the stage in which the probate proceedings are pending – Practice and Procedure – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.41 – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136. Evidence Act, 1872: s. 41 – Pendency of probate case – Its effect on criminal case alleging the will to be forged – Held: Pendency of two proceedings, whether civil or criminal, by itself would not attract the provisions of s. 41 – A judgment has to be pronounced – The genuineness of the will must be gone into – s. 41 would become applicable only when a final judgment is rendered – On facts, courts below rightly declined to stay criminal proceedings – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.309. The appellant filed an application before the Sub-Registrar, Hazaribagh, Jharkhand for registration of a will dated 3.5.1998 stated to have been executed by one Mst. `SA’, and applied before the Delhi Development Authority for grant of mutation in respect of a property in Delhi on the basis of the alleged will. Mst. `SM’, the daughter of Mst. `SA’ also made an application to the DDA for grant of mutation in respect of the Delhi property in her favour. Mst. `SM’ filed a civil suit in Patna questioning the genuineness of the will dated 3.5.1998,and also filed a criminal complaint u/ss 420/468/444/34 IPC in Delhi against the appellant alleging the will dated 3.5.1998 as a forged one. The appellant filed an application for grant of probate in respect of the will dated 3.5.1998 before the Jharkhand High Court u/s 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The appellant first filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court seeking to quash the criminal proceedings and on its dismissal filed an application u/s 309 Cr.P.C. before the Metropolitan Magistrate seeking stay of the proceedings in the criminal case. The said application was dismissed. Appellant’s revision petition also having been dismissed by the High Court, he filed the instant appeal. Meanwhile Mst. `SM’ died after having executed a will in favour of respondent no.2, and the Delhi property was mutated in his name. He was impleaded as respondent no.2 in the appeal. It was contended for the appellant that a judgment in probate proceedings being a judgment in rem as envisaged u/s 41 of the Evidence Act, the criminal proceedings should have been directed to be stayed. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. Section 41 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would become applicable only when a final judgment is rendered. Rendition of a final judgment which would be binding on the whole world being conclusive in nature would take a long time. As and when a judgment is rendered in one proceeding subject to the admissibility thereof keeping in view s.43 of the Evidence Act may be produced in another proceeding. It is beyond any cavil that a judgment rendered by a probate court is a judgment in rem. It is binding on all courts and authorities. Being a judgment in rem it will have effect over other judgments. A judgment in rem indisputably is conclusive in a criminal as well as in a civil proceeding. [Para 12] [1034-D-G] Surinder Kumar & Ors. vs. Gian Chand & Ors. AIR 1957 SC 875; Sardool Singh & Anr. vs. Smt. Nasib Kaur 1987 (Supp.) SCC 146; Mt. Daropti vs. Mt. Santi 1929 Lahore 483 and Darbara Singh vs. Karminder Singh & Ors. AIR 1979 Punjab & Haryana 215 – referred to. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Bhupen Champak Lal Dalal & Anr. (2001) 3 SCC 459, cited. 1.2. Pendency of two proceedings whether civil or criminal, however, by itself would not attract the provisions of s.41 of the Evidence Act. A judgment has to be pronounced. The genuineness of the Will must be gone into. Law envisages not only genuineness of the Will but also explanation to all the suspicious circumstances surrounding thereto besides proof thereof in terms of s.63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, and s.68 of the Evidence Act. [Para 13] [1038-C-D] Lalitaben Jayantilal Popat vs. Pragnaben Jamnadas Kataria & ors. 2009 (1) SCALE 328, relied on. 1.3. As noticed in several decisions of this Court, including two Constitution Bench decisions*, primacy has to be given to a criminal case over a civil case. If primacy is to be given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own merit, keeping in view the evidences brought in it and not in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceedings. In the instant case, the FIR was lodged not only in regard to forgery by the Will but also on the cause of action of a trespass. Not only another civil suit is pending, but a lis in relation to mutation is also pending. [Para 10, 14 and 15] [1029-G; 1038-E; 1039-A] *M.S. Sheriff & anr. vs. State of Madras & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 397 and Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370, relied on. K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr. (2002) 8 SCC 87 M/s Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & anr. etc. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1970) 3 SCC 694 and P. Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu AIR 2008 SC 1884, referred to. 1.4. Whereas the criminal case is pending before the Delhi court, the testamentary suit has been filed before the Jharkhand High Court. Since 2003 not much progress has been made therein. The Will has not been sent to the handwriting expert for his opinion, which is essential for determination of the question in regard to its genuineness. It is alleged that the Will was registered at Hazaribagh after the death of the testatrix. For the last seven years in view of the pendency of the matters before the High Courts in different proceedings initiated by the appellant, the criminal case has not proceeded, although charge-sheet has been filed and cognizance of the offence has been taken. Exercise of such a jurisdiction furthermore is discretionary. [Para 15] [1039-A-C] 1.5. In the facts and circumstance of the case, orders of the Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court need not be interfered with. Firstly, because the criminal case was instituted much prior to the initiation of the probate proceeding and, secondly, because of the conduct of the appellant and the stage in which the probate proceedings are pending. Therefore, it is not a fit case where the Court should exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [Para 15] [1039-D] Case Law Reference: AIR 1954 SC 397 relied on para 10 (2002) 8 SCC 87 referred to para 10 (1970) 3 SCC 694 referred to para 10 (2005) 4 SCC 370 relied on para 11 AIR 2008 SC 1884 referred to para 11 1987 (Supp.) SCC 146 referred to para 12 (2001) 3 SCC 459 cited para 12 AIR 1957 SC 875 referred to para 12 1929 Lahore 483 referred to para 13 AIR 1979 Punjab & Haryana 215 referred to para 13 2009 (1) SCALE 328 relied on para 13 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 416 of 2009. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2008 of the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 184 of 2005. Dinesh Dwivedi, S.K. Sinha, Manish Shanker and Prateek Dwivedi for the Appellant. A. Sharan, ASG, A.M. Singhvi, S.C. Maheshwari, Neera Gupta, Sadhna Sandhu, Anil Katiyar, Sandhya Goswami, H.C. Kharbanda and M.P.S. Tomar for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 416 OF 2009 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 5791 of 2005] SYED ASKARI HADI ALI AUGUSTINE IMAM & ANR. … APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE (DELHI ADMN.) & ANR. … RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Effect of … Continue reading

kidnapping or abduction was for ransom.= To attract the provisions of Section 364-A what is required to be proved is: (1) that the accused kidnapped or abducted the person; (2) kept him under detention after such kidnapping and abduction; and (3) that the kidnapping or abduction was for ransom…..”

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2248 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1321 of 2011) Akram Khan …. Appellant(s) Versus State of West Bengal …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is directed … Continue reading

caste =whether “Namdeo Shimpi” caste is a sub-caste within the meaning of Entry 153 (Shimpi) in the Government Notification notifying list of Other Backward Classes (OBC) relating to the State of Maharashtra, even though it is not specifically mentioned as such? =the appellant does not belong to caste `Shimpi’ (OBC) and belongs to `Namdeo Shimpi’ caste which is not OBC in the State of Maharashtra.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10465 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 34229 of 2010 Bharati Balkrishna Dhongade …. Appellant (s) Versus State of Maharashtra & Ors …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) The … Continue reading

apex court held yes= court means any court of civil and criminal. award means any compromise decree is called as decree as per legal services authority act= The question posed for consideration is that when a criminal case filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 referred to by the Magistrate Court to Lok Adalat is settled by the parties and an award is passed recording the settlement, can it be considered as a decree of a civil court and thus executable?

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10209 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.2798 of 2010) K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon …. Appellant (s) Versus C.D. Shaji …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal raises an … Continue reading

arbitration = The petitioner has filed the present application under Sections 11(4) and (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with paragraph 2 of the Appointment of the Arbitrators by the Chief Justice of India Scheme, 1996. It is stated that the parties had entered into a legally valid and enforceable Memorandum of Understanding (`MOU’) – 1 –

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ARBITRATION PETITION NO.18 OF 2010 M/s. Reva Electric Car Co. P. Ltd. …Petitioner VERSUS M/s. Green Mobil …Respondent O R D E R SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. The petitioner has filed the present application under Sections 11(4) and (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation … Continue reading

sanction to prosecute a public servant – absence of sanction can be challenged at the begining, but the validity of sanction can be challenged only during trial of the case

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.2170-2171 OF 2011 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRL) NOS. 10278-10279 OF 2010] DINESH KUMAR … APPELLANT(S) Versus CHAIRMAN, AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND ANOTHER . RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T R.M. LODHA,J. Leave granted. 2. The appellant is … Continue reading

a second protest petition after filing final report is maintainable=The Protest Petition can always be treated as a complaint and proceeded with in terms of Chapter XV of Cr.P.C. Therefore, in case there is no bar to entertain a second complaint on the same facts, in exceptional circumstances, the second Protest Petition can also similarly be entertained only under exceptional circumstances. In case the first Protest Petition has been filed without furnishing the full facts/particulars necessary to decide the case, and prior to its entertainment by the court, a fresh Protest Petition is filed giving full details, we fail to understand as to why it should not be maintainable.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2160 of 2011 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 2768 of 2010) Shiv Shankar Singh …Appellant Versus State of Bihar & Anr. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the … Continue reading

SERVICE MATTER = As has been held by this Court in Director, SCTI for Medical Science & Technology and Another v. M. Pushkaran (supra) each case must be considered on its own merits and where the Court does not find any reason for the authorities not to offer any appointment to the candidate placed in the selection panel the Court can direct appointment. In the facts of the present case, the Madras High Court did not see any justification on the part of the Central Government in not giving effect to the select panel when there was a very large pendency of cases in the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal resulting in hardship to the litigant public as well as loss to the exchequer, but after the Appointments Committee approved appointments of 16 selected candidates found suitable for appointment as members of the Income Tax

1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6567-6569 OF 2010 Union of India & Anr. … Appellants Versus Pradip Kumar Kedia Etc. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. These are the appeals against the common judgment dated 20.03.2009 of the … Continue reading

Penal Code, 1860: s.498A – Suicide by married woman – Allegation of maltreatment and cruelty against husband on account of demand of dowry – Victim-deceased had left matrimonial home just after one year of marriage and stayed with her parents for 14 months continuously – She rejoined matrimonial home only at the assurance given in the panchayat by accused and his family members that she would not be humiliated and subjected to cruelty – Three years after marriage, she committed suicide – Conviction of husband u/s.498A – Challenged – Held: While considering the case u/s.498-A, cruelty has to be proved during the close proximity of time of death and should be continuous making life of the deceased miserable forcing her to commit suicide – In the instant case, there was demand of scooter by the accused in the close proximity of the death – The demand was consistent and persistent as the father and the brother of the deceased had specifically deposed that the demand was only in respect of scooter and nothing else – Both these witnesses were subjected to long cross-examination, however, nothing could be elicited from them to show that the allegations made by the prosecution could be false – Conviction upheld – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113B. Evidence Act, 1872: s.113A and s.113B – Distinction between. s.113B – Necessary ingredients – Discussed. Evidence: Suicide note – Evidentiary value of – On facts, held: The authorship of the suicide note was not proved by producing witnesses nor the said document was sent to handwriting expert along with the admitted signature of the deceased for comparison – Prosecution could not establish nexus of the deceased with the said note – Onus was on the accused to establish his defence by sufficient evidence to rebut presumption that he had caused the dowry death, which he failed to discharge – Courts below were right in ignoring the said note – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.304B, 498A. The prosecution case was that the victim-deceased was married to the appellant on 4th April, 1988. After one year of marriage, the deceased came and stayed with her parents for about 14 months and after convening a panchayat of close relatives, she returned to her matrimonial home. On 25th June, 1991, the father of the deceased lodged an FIR that the deceased had committed suicide, making allegations that the deceased was consistently harassed by the appellant and was maltreated and harassed for bringing dowry. The trial court convicted the appellant and his mother under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306, IPC. The High Court acquitted appellant’s mother but dismissed the appeal of the appellant. In the instant appeal, the defence raised by the appellant was that there was no demand of scooter or dowry and that the deceased wanted to marry some other person and her marriage with the appellant was against her will, due to which she felt suffocated and committed suicide, leaving a suicide note (Ex P-2) to that effect. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The theory of love affair of the deceased was disbelieved by the courts below. Ex.P-2, the note allegedly recovered by the Investigating Officer was totally rejected from consideration in evidence for the simple reason that no nexus of the deceased could be established with this document. There was no evidence worth the name from the side of the prosecution or from the defence to indicate that the writing Ex.P-2 was, in fact, in the hand of the deceased. The father and the brother of the deceased when stepped into the witness-box did not say even a word that the document Ex.P-2 was written in the hand of the deceased. Even the defence counsel did not put any specific question/suggestion to these witnesses about authorship of this document, knowing very well that the Investigating Officer had taken it into possession from the almirah of their house. The Investigating Officer (PW6) in his cross-examination stated that the diary, letter and ball-pen were lying in the room and he enquired about the author of the said letter Ex.P-2 and it was revealed that the same was written by the deceased. This statement could be termed as a hear say evidence, having no legal sanctity when the main witnesses were not asked about the authorship thereof. A mere suggestion was put to the father and the brother of the deceased to the effect that the deceased had left a suicide note regarding her relations with some other person. The authorship of this letter could be proved either by producing some witness who had seen the deceased writing and signing or the said document could be sent to some handwriting expert alongwith the admitted writing of the deceased for comparison. Both the situations were missing. Even the Investigating Officer did not say a word as to from whom he had verified about authorship of the said letter. In case this document is taken to be a proved one, this would amount to bye-passing the provisions of the Evidence Act. The witnesses of panchnama of recovery of this letter were not examined. The father and the brother of the deceased both had denied the suggestion of recovery of any such letter nor the letters had been shown to them for identifying the handwriting of the deceased. More so, there was nothing on record to show that she was educated. The Investigating Officer had not stated anywhere that he knew the handwriting of the deceased nor he has disclosed on whose information he had inferred that the letter had been written by the deceased. In such a fact situation, the recovery of such letter is to be disbelieved and the letter is required to be ignored totally. More so, it has no probative value because it is no body’s case that the alleged suicide note is in the handwriting of the deceased. Evidently, the suicide note, Ext.P-2 purported to have been written by the deceased had been taken by appellant as his defence while making his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the onus was on him to establish his defence by leading sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he has caused the dowry death. The appellant miserably failed to discharge that onus. The defence of the appellant, thus, was very weak and fragile. In view of that, there is no cogent reason to take a view contrary to the view taken by the courts below that Ex.P2, the suicide note was not worth consideration. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 19] ] [734-H; 735-G-H; 736- A-H; 737-A-F; 738-A-B] 2.1. The demand of scooter had been consistent and persistent as the father and the brother of the deceased had specifically deposed that the demand was only in respect of scooter and nothing else. Had this allegation been false, the said witnesses could have also mentioned other articles purported to have been demanded by the appellant or his other family members. Therefore, the veracity of the evidence of these two witnesses on this issue cannot be doubted. Both the witnesses were subjected to long cross- examination at the behest of the appellant, however, nothing could be elicited from them to the extent that the allegations made by the prosecution could be false. [Para 14] [737-G-H; 738-A-B] 2.2. While considering the case under Section 498-A, IPC, cruelty has to be proved during the close proximity of time of death and it should be continuous and such continuous harassment, physical or mental, by the accused should make life of the deceased miserable which may force her to commit suicide. In the instant case, the conduct of the accused forced the deceased to leave her matrimonial home just after one year of marriage and stay with her parents for 14 months continuously. It was only at the assurance given by the panchayat that the accused or his family members would not humiliate or subject the deceased with cruelty, that she rejoined her matrimonial home. It was specific evidence of the brother of the deceased that just few days before her death, when he went to see his sister, there was a demand of scooter by the appellant. In such a fact situation, it cannot said that there was no demand of scooter in the close proximity of the death. [Paras 15] [738-B-E] 2.3. In the provision of Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872, the legislature in its wisdom has used the word “shall” thus, making a mandatory application on the part of the court to presume that death had been committed by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with or demand of dowry. It is unlike the provisions of Section 113A of the Evidence Act where a discretion has been conferred upon the court wherein it had been provided that court may presume to abatement of suicide by a married woman. Therefore, onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section 113B relatable to Section 304B IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. The only requirement is that death of a woman has been caused by means other than any natural circumstances; that death has been caused or occurred within 7 years of her marriage; and such woman had been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand of dowry. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death. The expression shown before her death has not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case, the court has to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is any proximate connection between the demand of dowry and act of cruelty or harassment and the death. [Paras 16 to 18] [738-F-H; 739-A-G] T. Aruntperunjothi v. State through S.H.O., Pondicherry AIR 2006 SC 2475; Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2008 SC 332; State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu Ram AIR 2008 SC 982; Anand Kumar v. State of M.P., AIR 2009 SC 2155; Undavalli Narayana Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2010 SC 3708 – referred to. Case Law Reference: AIR 2006 SC 2475 referred to Para 18 AIR 2008 SC 332 referred to Para 18 AIR 2008 SC 982 referred to Para 18 AIR 2009 SC 2155 referred to Para 18 AIR 2010 SC 3708 referred to Para 18 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1322 of 2004. From the Judgment & Order dated 05.04.2004 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No. 708-SB of 1998. Mahabir Singh, Rishi Malhotra, Prem Malhotra for the Appellant. Manjit Singh, AAG, Rao Ranjit, Harikesh Singh, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1322 OF 2004 Bansi Lal …Appellant Versus State of Haryana …Respondent JUDGMENT Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh dated 5th May, 2004 in … Continue reading

common questions of fact and law relating to the eligibility of the Special Leave Petitioners, who are members of the Haryana Civil Medical Services, to be admitted to the Post-Graduate Courses conducted by the Pt. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences, Rohtak, Respondent No.2 herein, against the reserved quota for such candidates. = once the results had been declared and a select list had been prepared, it was not open to the State Government to alter the terms and conditions just a day before counselling was to begin, so as to deny the candidates, who had already been selected, an opportunity of admission in the aforesaid courses. It is no doubt true that the benefits of admission in the reserved category are many, but the same is the result of the policy adopted by the State Government to provide for candidates from the reserved category and since the Appellants had been selected on the basis of merit, in keeping with the results of the written examination, the submission made by Mr. Patwalia that such admissions in the reserved category will have to be made keeping in mind the necessity of upholding the standard of education in the institution, as was observed in Mamata Mohanty’s case (supra), is not applicable in the facts of this case. The Appellants have shown their competence by being selected on the basis of their

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.9717 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.15974 of 2011) PARMENDER KUMAR & ORS. … Appellants Vs. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. … Respondents WITH C.A.NO.9718/2011 @ SLP(C)NO.16075/2011, C.A.NO.9719/2011 @ SLP(C)NO.16346/2011, C.A.NO.9720/2011 @ SLP(C)NO.16228/2011, C.A.NO.9721/2011 @ SLP(C)NO.16229/2011 & C.A.NO.9722/2011 @ SLP(C)NO.16230/2011. J U … Continue reading

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