andhra pradesh high court

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Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy – whether the appellant-herein has made out a case for bail. = Though it is pointed out by learned senior counsel for the appellant that since the appellant is in no way connected with the persons in power, we are of the view that the apprehension raised by the CBI cannot be lightly ignored considering the claim that the appellant is the ultimate beneficiary and the prime conspirator in huge monetary transactions. = Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offence having deep rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds needs to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.= Taking note of all these facts and the huge magnitude of the case and also the request of the CBI asking for further time for completion of the investigation in filing the charge sheet(s), without expressing any opinion on the merits, we are of the opinion that the release of the appellant at this stage may hamper the investigation. However, we direct the CBI to complete the investigation and file the charge sheet(s) within a period of 4 months from today. Thereafter, as observed in the earlier order dated 05.10.2012, the appellant is free to renew his prayer for bail before the trial Court and if any such petition is filed, the trial Court is free to consider the prayer for bail independently on its own merits without being influenced by dismissal of the present appeal. 18) With the above observation, the appeal is dismissed.

Page 1     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 730 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 3404 of 2013) Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy …. Appellant(s) Versus Central Bureau of Investigation …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) … Continue reading

Order VI Rule 16 ,17CPC= whether the defendants can withdraw the admission made in the written statement and finally came to the conclusion that the defendant-appellants cannot be allowed to resile from the admission made in the written statement by taking recourse to Order VIII Rule 9 or Order VI Rule 16 CPC by seeking to file a fresh written statement. In the aforesaid premises, filing of a fresh petition by the defendants under Order VI Rule 17 CPC after about 13 years when the hearing of the suit had already commenced and some of the witnesses were examined, is wholly misconceived. The High Court in the impugned order has rightly held that filing of subsequent application for the same relief is an abuse of the process of the court. As noticed above, the relief sought for by the defendants in a subsequent petition under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was elaborately dealt with on the two earlier petitions filed by the defendant-appellants under Order VI Rule 16 and Order VIII Rule 9 CPC and, therefore, the subsequent petition filed by the defendants labelling the petition under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is wholly misconceived and was not entertainable. 25. After giving our full consideration on the matter, we do not find any error in the impugned order passed by the High Court. Hence, these appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

Page 1     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3914 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.12497 of 2008] S. Malla Reddy … Appellant(s) vs. M/s. Future Builders Co-operative Housing Society & Ors. … Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3916 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) … Continue reading

service matter = High Court has allowed all the Writ Petitions and set aside the Circular No. 17 of 2009 dated 30th November, 2009 and Circular dated 12th July, 2010 in so far as they make a provision to exclude the employees from consideration for promotion, who are otherwise eligible to be considered for promotion and are within the zone of consideration, on the basis that they have either obtained the ‘D’ rating in the annual performance report or have been penalized for any misconduct in the preceding 5 years. = Different rules/regulations of the banks provide specific punishments such as “withholding of promotion, reduction in rank, lowering in ranks/pay scales”. However, there is another range of penalty such as censure, reprimand, withholding of increments etc. which are also prescribed under various staff regulations. To debar such an employee from being considered for promotion would tantamount to also inflicting on such employee, the punishment of withholding of promotion. In such circumstances, a punishment of censure/ reprimand would, in fact, read as censure/reprimand + 5 years debarment from promotion. Thus the circulars issued by the bank debarring such employees from being considered would be clearly contrary to the statutory rules. The circulars clearly do not fall within the ratio in Sant Ram’s case (supra). 41. In our opinion, the observations made by this Court in the case of Ram Ashish Dixit (supra) are a complete answer to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Dhruv Mehta. Therefore the High Court, in our opinion, has rightly quashed the aforesaid two Circulars and directed that the respondent be considered for promotion in accordance with the applicable rules. 42. We, therefore find no merit in the civil appeals filed by the appellant-bank, and are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2970-2975 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) NOS.9181-9186 OF 2011] Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Ors. …Appellants VERSUS Manoj Kumar Chak …Respondent WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2989-2992 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) NOS.9306-9309 OF 2011] Vidur Gramin … Continue reading

Section 498-A of the IPC could be made compoundable, – a complaint under Section 498-A of the IPC presents difficulty because the said offence is not compoundable except in the State of Andhra Pradesh where by a State amendment, it has been made compoundable. – We, therefore, feel that though offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC is not compoundable, in appropriate cases if the parties are willing and if it appears to the criminal court that there exist elements of settlement, it should direct the parties to explore the possibility of settlement through mediation. – No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive: (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the 10Page 11 wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) xxx xxx xxx (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) xxx xxx xxx (viii) xxx xxx xxx (ix) xxx xxx xxx (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. 11Page 12 (xi) xxx xxx xxx (xii) xxx xxx xxx (xiii) xxx xxx xxx (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.” It is pertinent to note that in this case the husband and wife had lived separately for more than sixteen and a half years. This fact was taken into consideration along with other facts as leading to the conclusion that matrimonial bond had been ruptured beyond repair because of the mental cruelty caused by the wife. – directions, which the courts dealing with the matrimonial matters shall follow: (a) In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Courts shall make all efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes through mediation. Even if the 36Page 37 Counsellors submit a failure report, the Family Courts shall, with the consent of the parties, refer the matter to the mediation centre. In such a case, however, the Family Courts shall set a reasonable time limit for mediation centres to complete the process of mediation because otherwise the resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may get delayed. In a given case, if there is good chance of settlement, the Family Court in its discretion, can always extend the time limit. (b) The criminal courts dealing with the complaint under Section 498-A of the IPC should, at any stage and particularly, before they take up the complaint for hearing, refer the parties to mediation centre if they feel that there exist elements of settlement and both the parties are willing. However, they should take care to see that in this exercise, rigour, purport and efficacy of Section 498-A of the IPC is not diluted. Needless to say that the discretion to grant or not to 37Page 38 grant bail is not in any way curtailed by this direction. It will be for the concerned court to work out the modalities taking into consideration the facts of each case. (c) All mediation centres shall set up pre-litigation desks/clinics; give them wide publicity and make efforts to settle matrimonial disputes at pre-litigation stage. 37. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1794 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4782 of 2007) K. SRINIVAS RAO … APPELLANT Versus D.A. DEEPA … RESPONDENT JUDGMENT (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal, by special leave, has been … Continue reading

Registration Act (16 of 1908), s. 17(1) (c)-Partnership assets consisting of immovable property-Relinquishment by one partner of his share-Deed of relinquishment if should be registered. =The members of two Joint Hindu families (Appellants and Respondents) entered into partnership for carrying on business. The members of one family filed a suit in 1949 for dissolution of the partnership and the taking of accounts. The members of the second family raised the defence that the partnership was dissolved even in 1936 and that accounts were then settled between the two families. In support of that plea they relied upon an unregistered document, which showed that the partnership had come to an end. It was contended by the appellants-plaintiffs, that since the partnership assets included immovable property and the document recorded the relinquishment by the members 6f the plaintifffamily of their interest in those assets, the document was compulsorily registerable under s. 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908; and that as it was not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence to prove the dissolution as well as the settlement of accounts. HELD : The document only records the fact that the partnership had come to an end. It cannot be said to convey any immovable property by a partner to another, expressly or by necessary implication, nor is there any express reference to any immovable property, except a recital of a fact which had taken place earlier. Therefore, the unregistered deed of release by one family of its share in the partnership was admissible in evidence, even though the partnership owned immovable property. [410 D. E] The interest of a partner in partnership assets comprising of movable as well as immovable property should be treated only as movable property. His right during the insistence of the partnership is to get his share of the profits from time to time, as may be agreed upon among the partners, and his right after the dissolution of the partnership, or with his retirement from, the partnership, is only to receive e the money value of his share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or retirement, after a deduction of Liabilities and prior charges. [406 E; 407 F-G) Case law reviewed. =1966 AIR 1300, 1966( 3 )SCR 400, , ,


no adultery against the women =So far as the appellant is concerned, she is charged under Sections 341 and 497 of the Penal Code. Section 497 deals with the offence of adultery and provides as follows: “Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. In such case the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.”


Arbitration and conciliation act= The arbitrator was, therefore, not right in law in coming to the conclusion that the agreement between the appellant and the respondent No.2 was void and not enforceable as the consideration or object of the agreement was hit by the letter dated 31.08.1990 of the Government of India, Ministry of Defence. This letter may be an instruction to the officers of the Defence Department to reject a tender where the rate quoted by the tenderor is more than 20% below the reasonable rates but the letter was not an Act of the legislature declaring that any supply made at a rate below 20% of the reasonable rates was unlawful. The finding of the arbitrator on Issue No.4 is thus patently illegal and opposed to public policy. In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 at page 727], this Court after examining the grounds on which an award of the arbitrator can be set aside under Section 34 of the Act has said: “31……However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term “public policy” in Renusagar case it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal.” 12. We accordingly set aside the Award of the arbitrator and the judgments of the City Civil Court, Hyderabad and the

1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2755 OF 2007 Union of India … Appellant Versus Col. L.S.N. Murthy & Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 of … Continue reading

Penal Code, 1860/Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: Sections 409, 415, 420, 120-B/Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) – Alleged cheating of Bank – All six accused found guilty for offences under Section 120-B, 420 IPC and three accused found guilty for offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act – Convicted – High Court affirming the order, but acquitting one accused – On appeal, Held: Prosecution failed to prove conspiracy as also wrongful gains – Impugned judgment unsustainable and set aside – Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 138. Constitution of India, 1950: Article 136 – Special Leave jurisdiction – Ordinarily concurrent finding of fact not interfered with – However, the jurisdiction must be exercised whenever it is required to do so for securing the ends of justice and to avoid injustice. A charge sheet was filed under Sections 120-B, 420 IPC r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act alleging inter alia that there was criminal conspiracy between the accused persons to cheat the State Bank of India. Special Judge for CBI cases found A-1 to A-6 guilty for the offence under Section 120-B and 420 IPC, A-4 to A-6 were found guilty for the offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Accordingly, he convicted and sentenced the accused. High Court dismissed the appeals of the accused, but acquitted A-6. Hence the appeals. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been made out. [Para 21] [810- F-G] 1.2 It is reiterated that one of the ingredients of cheating as defined in Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code is existence of an intention of making initial promise or existence thereof from the very beginning of formation of contract. [Para 21] [810-H; 811-A] Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI (2003) 5 SCC 257; Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 736; Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal (2007) 7 SCC 373; All Carogo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain & Anr. 2007 (12) SCALE 391; R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta & Ors. 2008 (14) SCALE 85 and Sharon Michael & ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. 2009 (1) SCALE 627 – relied on. 2. It may be that there had been certain procedural irregularities in the transaction. However, sufficient evidence is available on record to show that the Officers had done so for the purpose of promoting the business of the Bank. In relation whereto or in respect whereof, initiatives had been taken by P.Ws. 19 and 20. It is furthermore not denied or disputed that after the cheque discounting facility was stopped in April, 1989 by Accused No.4, there has been a meeting at the residence of P.W. 20. In his deposition, the said witness categorically admitted that the said meeting was arranged at the instance of Accsued No.1. It is incomprehensible that a meeting has been arranged at his residence on the day he was on leave at the instance of Accused No.1. He must have developed grievance against the Accused No.4 as regards the stoppage of the said facility. If immediately thereafter the said facility had been restored by the Accused No.4, a stand taken by him that it was done under the oral instructions of the higher authorities appears to be plausible. [Para 22] [813-E-H; 814-A] 3. The prosecution apart from the fact that it had utterly failed to bring on record any evidence of conspiracy must also be held to have failed to bring on record any evidence of wrongful gain so as to attract the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or otherwise. [Para 23] [814-A-B] 4. The findings arrived at by the Special Judge as also the High Court proved the ingredients of offence under Section 409 of the IPC. The accused persons, however, have not been charged for commission of the said offence. Conspiracy by and between the Bank officials and the Accused Nos. 1 to 3 has been stated to be for commission of the offence of cheating for the purpose of arriving at a finding that there has been a conspiracy so as to cheat the Bank. It was necessary for the prosecution to establish that there had been a meeting of mind at the time when the facility had been granted. Such meeting of mind on the part of the accused persons has not been proved. Furthermore, the prosecution case even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety does not lead to a finding that even Accused Nos. 1 to 3 had any wrongful intention at the time when the contract was initiated. [Para 24] [814-C-F] 5. It is one thing to say that there has been an abuse of a prevalent banking practice for the purpose of causing wrongful loss to the Bank and causing wrongful gain to others but it is another thing to say that by reason thereof, the ingredients of cheating are attracted.[Para 27] [814-H; 815-A] 6. It would bear repetition to state that accused persons have not been charged under Section 409 of the IPC; even the Accused Nos. 1 to 3 have not been charged for entering into a conspiracy with Accused Nos. 4, 5 and 6 in respect of commission of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is in the aforementioned situation, this Court is of the opinion that the judgment of conviction and sentence cannot be upheld. [Paras 28, 29] [815-B-D] Lala Ram & Ors. vs. State of U.P. (1990) 2 SCC 113 – relied on. 7. It is one thing to say that ordinarily a concurrent finding of fact shall not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Consti-tution of India but it is another thing to say that despite opining that accused are entitled to acquittal, a judgment of conviction passed against them should be upheld. In fact, the jurisdiction of this Court must be exercised wherever it is required to do so for securing the ends of justice and to avoid injustice.[Para 30] [815- H; 816-A-B] Case Law Reference (2003) 5 SCC 257 relied on Para 21 (2006) 6 SCC 736 relied on Para 21 (2007) 7 SCC 373 relied on Para 21 2007 (12) SCALE 391 relied on Para 21 2008 (14) SCALE 85 relied on Para 21 2009 (1) SCALE 627 relied on Para 21 (1990) 2 SCC 113 relied on Para 30 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 942 of 2009 From the Judgement and Order dated 17.07.2007 of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 1998. With Criminal Appeal No. 945 of 2009 Criminal Appeal Nos. 943-944 of 2009 K.T.S. Tulsi, M. N. Krishnamani, Ravindra Shrivastava, Radha Rani, Hari Kumar, Kunal Verma, Krishna Kumar, Supriya Jain, Anup Jain, C. Batra, D. Mahesh Babu, Gaurava Bhagava, Raj Kamal, Rishi Malhotra, K.V. Mohan, with them for the Appellant. R. Datta, ASG, Rajni, P. Narasimha, B. Krishna Prasad, with them for the Respondent.


Interim Order: Partition suit – Preliminary decree – Appeal before High Court – Interim order maintaining status quo – Modified by High Court permitting respondent to raise construction of second floor =HELD: Merely because there was some purported inconvenience indicated by respondent, that could not have been a ground to permit construction of second floor – Order of High Court set aside – Parties to maintain status quo till disposal of matter by High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1143-1144/09 Form the Judgement & Order dated 20.10.08 of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Sccundcrabad (A.P.), in CCCA MP No.111 of 2007 and CCCA MP. 671 of 2006. Dharam Bir Raj Vohra and S.K. Sabharwal for the Appellants.

2009 (3 ) SCR 336 PEDDI ASHOK KUMAR & ORS. v. PEDDI SUDARSHAN RAO (Civil Appeal Nos. 1143-44 of 2009) FEBRUARY 20, 2009 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.] The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order … Continue reading

the Supreme Court in K. Veeraswami v. Union of India7, it cannot be said that judicial pronouncements made by Judges and Judicial Officers can be subjects for prosecuting those Judges or Judicial Officers in discharge of their judicial functions, particularly in any private complaint filed by the aggrieved party whether such aggrieved party is a party to those proceedings in which judicial pronouncements were rendered. 20. Section 77 IPC reads as follows: "77. Act of Judge when acting judicially.- Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law." Under this provision, no judicial act performed by a Judge can be an offence. For applicability of Section 77, the following ingredients are necessary: a) that the act was done by a Judge b) that the said act was done by the Judge when acting judicially and c) that it was done in exercise of any power which is given to the Judge by law (or) the said act was done by the Judge in good faith believing that the power was given to him by law.

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1472 of 2010 17-09-2010 Tummala Lakshmana Rao Sri Sadhu Narayana and 7 others. Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri Thummala Lakshmana Rao (in person) Counsel for the respondents: Nil :ORDER: 1. The petitioner seeks to file this revision petition questioning order dated 16.04.2010 passed by the Chief … Continue reading

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