This tag is associated with 19 posts

Curable mental disorder -No ground for divorce = whether the marriage between the parties can be dissolved by granting a decree of divorce on the basis of one spouse’s mental illness which includes schizophrenia under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Act. In the English case of Whysall v. Whysall[4], it was held that a spouse is ‘incurably of unsound mind’ if he or she is of such mental incapacity as to make normal married life impossible and there is no prospect of any improvement in mental health, which would make this possible in future. The High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, in Pramatha Kumar Maity v Ashima Maity[5] has held that mental disorder of the wife, even if proved, cannot, by itself, warrant a decree of divorce and it must be further proved that it is of such a nature as the husband could not be expected to live with the wife. The Allahabad High Court, in Mt. Tilti Vs. Alfred Rebert Jones[6] has held that where it has come on record that the wife has improved her educational qualifications and has been looking after her children, the apprehension of the husband that there is danger to his life or to his children is not borne out is the finding recorded in the said case. Inability to manage his or her affairs is an essential attribute of an “incurably unsound mind”. The facts pleaded and the evidence placed on record produced by the appellant in this case does not establish such inability as a ground on which dissolution of marriage was sought for by him before the trial court.= It is thus clear that the respondent, even if she did suffer from schizophrenia, is in a much better health condition at present. Therefore, this Court cannot grant the dissolution of marriage on the basis of one spouse’s illness. The appellant has not proved the fact of mental disorder of the respondent with reference to the allegation made against her that she has been suffering from schizophrenia by producing positive and substantive evidence on record and on the other hand, it has been proved that the respondent is in much better health condition and does not show signs of schizophrenia as per the most recent medical report from NIMHANS, as deposed by PW-4 in his evidence before the trial court.- Under Hindu law, marriage is an institution, a meeting of two hearts and minds and is something that cannot be taken lightly. In the Vedic period, the sacredness of the marriage tie was repeatedly declared; the family ideal was decidedly high and it was often realised[7]. In Vedic Index I it is stated that “The high value placed on the marriage is shown by the long and striking hymn”. In Rig Veda, X, 85; “Be, thou, mother of heroic children, devoted to the Gods, Be, thou, Queen in thy father-in- law’s household. May all the Gods unite the hearts of us “two into one” as stated in Justice Ranganath Misra’s ‘Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage’[8]. Marriage is highly revered in India and we are a Nation that prides itself on the strong foundation of our marriages, come hell or high water, rain or sunshine. Life is made up of good times and bad, and the bad times can bring with it terrible illnesses and extreme hardships. The partners in a marriage must weather these storms and embrace the sunshine with equanimity. Any person may have bad health, this is not their fault and most times, it is not within their control, as in the present case, the respondent was unwell and was taking treatment for the same. The illness had its fair share of problems. Can this be a reason for the appellant to abandon her and seek dissolution of marriage after the child is born out of their union? Since the child is now a grown up girl, her welfare must be the prime consideration for both the parties. In view of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the two parties in this case must reconcile and if the appellant so feels that the respondent is still suffering, then she must be given the right treatment. The respondent must stick to her treatment plan and make the best attempts to get better. It is not in the best interest of either the respondent or her daughter who is said to be of adolescent age for grant of a decree of dissolution of marriage as prayed for by the appellant. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of the High Court in not granting a decree of divorce and allowing the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Therefore, we grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Act in favour of the respondent.

 published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40785   REPORTABLE         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO.8264 OF 2013   (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3544 of 2007)       KOLLAM CHANDRA SEKHAR … APPELLANT   Vs.   KOLLAM PADMA LATHA … RESPONDENT       J U … Continue reading

Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short ‘the N.I. Act) by the IXth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bandra, Mumbai in Complaint Case Nos. 292/S/1998, 293/S/1998, 297/S/1998, 298/S/1998, 299/S/1998 and 300/S/1998.= Power of Attorney holder = the attorney holder cannot file a complaint in his own name as if he was the complainant, but he can initiate criminal proceedings on behalf of his principal. We also reiterate that where the payee is a proprietary concern, the complaint can be filed (i) by the proprietor of the proprietary concern, describing himself as the sole proprietor of the “payee”; (ii) the proprietary concern, describing itself as a sole proprietary concern, represented by its sole proprietor; and (iii) the proprietor or the proprietary concern represented by the attorney holder under a power of attorney executed by the sole proprietor.= While holding that there is no serious conflict between the decisions in MMTC (supra) and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra), we clarify the position and answer the questions in the following manner: (i) Filing of complaint petition under Section 138 of N.I Act through power of attorney is perfectly legal and competent. (ii) The Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the Court in order to prove the contents of the complaint. However, the power of attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding the said transactions. (iii) It is required by the complainant to make specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power of attorney holder in the said transaction explicitly in the complaint and the power of attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transactions cannot be examined as a witness in the case. (iv) In the light of section 145 of N.I Act, it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit filed by the complainant in support of the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I Act and the Magistrate is neither mandatorily obliged to call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court, nor to examine the complainant of his witness upon oath for taking the decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. (v) The functions under the general power of attorney cannot be delegated to another person without specific clause permitting the same in the power of attorney. Nevertheless, the general power of attorney itself can be cancelled and be given to another person.

published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40769  REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 73 OF 2007   A.C. Narayanan …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Maharashtra & Anr. …. Respondent(s) WITH 2 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2724 of 2008)   Shri G. Kamalakar …. Appellant(s) … Continue reading

service matter – weightage= There is a clear distinction between weightage given for years of service rendered by an employee for purposes of promotion and weightage given for years of service rendered by an employee for purposes of seniority in a grade. While the first concerns eligibility for promotion to a higher post, the other concerns seniority for being considered for promotion to a higher post. = we see no occasion for interfering with the view taken by the High Court to the effect that the grant of retrospective seniority to Supervisors on their appointment as Junior Engineers violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The weightage of service given to the Supervisors can be taken advantage of only for the purpose of eligibility for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer. The weightage cannot be utilized for obtaining retrospective seniority over and above the existing Junior Engineers.- It has been noted therein that the grant of retrospective promotions and seniority was accepted by this Court in four decisions while grant of retrospective seniority was held to be ultra vires in five decisions.- Be that as it may, the pendency of a similar matter before a larger Bench has not prevented this Court from dealing with the issue on merits. Even on earlier occasions, the pendency of the matter before the larger Bench did not prevent this Court from dealing with the issue on merits. Indeed, a few cases including Pawan Pratap Singh were decided even after the issue raised in Asis Kumar Samanta was referred to a larger Bench. We, therefore, do not feel constrained or precluded from taking a view in the matter.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40513 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1712-1713 OF 2002 P. Sudhakar Rao & Ors. …..Appellants Versus U. Govinda Rao & Ors. …..Respondents J U D G M E N T Madan B. Lokur, J. 1. There is a clear distinction between weightage given for years … Continue reading

Nimmagadda Prasad …. bail whether the appellant-herein has made out a case for bail. – Unfortunately, in the last few years, the country has been seeing an alarming rise in white-collar crimes, which has affected the fiber of the country’s economic structure. Incontrovertibly, economic offences have serious repercussions on the development of the country as a whole= It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the Court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offence having deep rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds needs to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country. Taking note of all these aspects, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and also with regard to the claim of the CBI and the defence, we are of the opinion that the appellant cannot be released at this stage, however, we direct the CBI to complete the investigation and file charge sheet(s) as early as possible preferably within a period of four months from today. Thereafter, the appellant is free to renew his prayer for bail before the trial Court and if any such petition is filed, the trial Court is free to consider the prayer for bail independently on its own merits without being influenced by dismissal of the present appeal. 30) With the above direction, the appeal is dismissed.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 728 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9706 of 2012) Nimmagadda Prasad …. Appellant(s) Versus Central Bureau of Investigation …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is directed … Continue reading

Order VI Rule 16 ,17CPC= whether the defendants can withdraw the admission made in the written statement and finally came to the conclusion that the defendant-appellants cannot be allowed to resile from the admission made in the written statement by taking recourse to Order VIII Rule 9 or Order VI Rule 16 CPC by seeking to file a fresh written statement. In the aforesaid premises, filing of a fresh petition by the defendants under Order VI Rule 17 CPC after about 13 years when the hearing of the suit had already commenced and some of the witnesses were examined, is wholly misconceived. The High Court in the impugned order has rightly held that filing of subsequent application for the same relief is an abuse of the process of the court. As noticed above, the relief sought for by the defendants in a subsequent petition under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was elaborately dealt with on the two earlier petitions filed by the defendant-appellants under Order VI Rule 16 and Order VIII Rule 9 CPC and, therefore, the subsequent petition filed by the defendants labelling the petition under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is wholly misconceived and was not entertainable. 25. After giving our full consideration on the matter, we do not find any error in the impugned order passed by the High Court. Hence, these appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

Page 1     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3914 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.12497 of 2008] S. Malla Reddy … Appellant(s) vs. M/s. Future Builders Co-operative Housing Society & Ors. … Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3916 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) … Continue reading

LAND ACQUISITION – FIXATION OF COMPENSATION FOR DIFFERENT LANDS UNDER ONE NOTIFICATION = the High Court almost on a uniform basis awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.235/- per sq. yard notwithstanding the type of land involved. Although a distinction had been made between “chahi” lands, “pahar gair mumkin” lands and “gair mumkin” lands while assessing compensation, ultimately, a uniform rate was awarded in respect of the different types of lands which had been acquired. Different reasons have been given by the High Court in arriving at the uniform figure of Rs.235/- per sq. yard, but what is important is that ultimately by applying different methods, the compensation worked out to be same. In the said cases, the High Court had assessed the compensation payable for the acquired lands at the rate of Rs.805/- per sq. yard along with the statutory sums available under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act and solatium on the market value under Section 23(2) thereof. It was also indicated that the land owners would also be entitled to interest as provided under Section 28 of the Act. ; The general cut imposed is at a flat rate of 40%, which, in our view, is not warranted on account of the fact that the lands in question have lost their character and potentiality as agricultural lands and have more or less been converted into lands which were ready for use for the purpose of construction. Taking Ms. Agarwal’s submissions regarding the factors which determine deduction towards development cost, such as location and potentiality, into account, we are of the view that a deduction of 331/3 per cent would be reasonable on account of the passage of time and the all round development in the area which has made it impossible for the lands to retain their original character. 47. Accordingly, we direct that except where we have provided otherwise, wherever a deduction of 40% had been made, the same should be altered to 331/3 per cent and the compensation awarded is to be modified accordingly.; the Collector had awarded compensation at a uniform rate of Rs. 1,81,200/- per acre along with statutory benefits. The Reference Court determined the compensation at the uniform rate of Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The High Court modified the said award and awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 260/- per sq. yard for the land acquired up to the depth of 100 meters abutting National Highway No. 10. The value of the rest of the acquired land was maintained at Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The area in question being already developed to some extent, a cut of 50% on the value is, in our view, excessive. We agree with Mr. Swarup that resorting to the belting system by the High Court was improper and that at best a standard cut of 1/3rd would have been sufficient to balance the smallness of the exhibits produced. It has been pointed out by Mr. Swarup that on a comparative basis, the price of lands in the area in 1991 was on an average of about Rs. 420/- per sq. yard. Given the sharp rise in land prices, the value, according to Mr. Swarup, would have doubled to about Rs. 800/- per sq. yard by 1993. Even if we have to apply the formula of 12% increase, the valuation of the lands in question in 1993 would be approximately Rs. 527/- per sq. yard. Imposing a deduction of 1/3rd, valuation comes to about Rs. 350/- per sq. yard, which, in our view, would be the proper compensation for the lands covered in the case of Mukesh (supra) and other connected matters.

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3279-3287 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.24704-24712 of 2007] Ashrafi and Ors. …Appellants Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. …Respondents WITH C.A.Nos.3288-3299/2013@SLP(C)Nos.13415-13426/2008, C.A.Nos.3300-3319/2013@SLP(C)Nos.12263-12282/2008, C.A.No.3320/2013@SLP(C)No.15648/2008, C.A.Nos.3321-3323/2013@SLP(C)Nos.5392-5394/2008, C.A.Nos.3324-3325/2013@SLP(C)Nos.15485-15486/2009, C.A.Nos.3326-3330/2013@SLP(C)Nos.8592-8596/2009, C.A.Nos.3331-3333/2013@SLP(C)Nos.34118-34120/2010, C.A.Nos.3334-3337/2013@SLP(C)Nos.4176-4179/2010, C.A.Nos.3338-3340/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11156-11158/2009, C.A.No.3341/2013@SLP(C)No.28895/2008, C.A.Nos.3342-3344/2013@SLP(C)Nos.14409-14411/2013 (CC 863-865/2011), C.A.No.3345/2013@SLP(C)No.33257/2010, C.A.Nos.3346-3347/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11171-11172/2009, C.A.Nos.3348-3349/2013@SLP(C)Nos.3125-3126/2011, C.A.Nos.3350-3351/2013@SLP(C)Nos.29721-29722/2009, C.A.No.3352/2013@SLP(C)No.31281/2009, C.A. No.8719 … Continue reading

specific relief Act = It is a settled legal proposition that the power of attorney holder cannot depose in place of the principal. Provisions of Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of the power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. The word “acts” employed therein is confined only to “acts” done by the power-of-attorney holder, in exercise of the power granted to him by virtue of the instrument. The term “acts”, would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power-of-attorney holder has preferred any “acts” in pursuance of the power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for acts done by the principal, and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of a matter, as regards which, only the principal can have personal knowledge and in respect of which, the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.; In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the appellant has not yet acquired any title over the land, he has no right to receive compensation to the tune of Rs. 29,47,112/-. However, he withdrew the said amount by giving an undertaking to return the said amount to Res. No. 1 in case any such order was passed by the court in this regard. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside, and the same passed by the trial court is restored. As a consequence, the appellant is entitled to get the sale deed executed and registered, with respect to all the suit land available now (minus the land acquired and the land purchased by the respondent no.6). 17. The appellant is directed to refund the amount of compensation received by him to Res. No. 1 within a period of three months, alongwith 9% interest from the date of receipt till the date of payment. Civil Appeal Nos. 2888 and 4459 of 2005 In view of the judgment and order in Civil Appeal Nos. 2885- 2887 of 2005, these appeals are dismissed.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2885-2887 of 2005 S. Kesari Hanuman Goud … Appellant Versus Anjum Jehan & Ors. … Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2888 & 4459 of 2005 J U D G M E N T Dr.B.S.Chauhan, J. Civil Appeal Nos. 2885-2887 of 2005 … Continue reading

Two riparian states – Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra – of the inter-state Godavari river are principal parties in the suit filed under Article 131 of the Constitution of India read with Order XXIII Rules 1,2 and 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. The suit has been filed by Andhra Pradesh (Plaintiff) complaining violations by Maharashtra (1st Defendant) of the 1Page 2 agreements dated 06.10.1975 and 19.12.1975 which were endorsed in the report dated 27.11.1979 containing decision and final order (hereafter to be referred as “award”) and further report dated 07.07.1980 (hereafter to be referred as “further award) given by the Godavari Water Disputes Tribunal (for short, ‘Tribunal’). = The discharge data actually has been observed by the CWC at Yelli gauging site for the period 1968 to 2004, October 29 to May 31 which does indicate that on 75 per cent dependable flow, the total yield for this period is 2.733 TMC (77.39 MM3 ). We find no justifiable reason to discard the discharge data observed by CWC for 36 years. – “storage of Babhali barrage is well within the banks. The sill level and FRL of Babhali barrage are 327 m and 338 m respectively and 13 gates of 15 m x 11 m size are proposed to be installed. The Gross storage of Sri Ram Sagar Project and that of Babhali barrage are 112 TMC and 2.74 TMC respectively and there is a common storage of 0.60 TMC which is just 0.54% of the storage of SRSP. Command area of Babhali barrage is 7995 ha.” – The only difficulty is in respect of nonmonsoon season which contributes about 10 per cent of the flows that too is not well defined and well spread. If this difficulty is taken care of, virtually there is no injury to Andhra Pradesh much less substantial injury in as much as the inhabitants of seven districts (Adilabad, Nizamabad, Karimnagar, Warrangal, Nalgonda, Khammam and Medak) shall not be deprived of water for drinking purpose and irrigation which is the main concern of Andhra Pradesh. – (i) Under the agreement dated 06.10.1975 and the 1979 award of the Tribunal the utilization of 60 TMC water by Maharashtra for the new projects below Paithan dam site on the Godavari and below Siddheswar dam site on the Purna and below Nizamsagar dam site on the Manjra and up to Pochampad dam site on the Godavari is not confined to flowing waters alone in the territory of Maharashtra. (ii) The thrust of the parties in Clause II(i) of the agreement dated 06.10.1975 and the essence of this Clause is to put a cap on the right of Maharashtra to utilize water of Godavari river below the three dams mentioned therein up to Pochampad dam site to the extent of 60 TMC for new projects and in no case exceeding that limit. There is no demarcation made in the agreement that the utilization of waters not exceeding 60 TMC for new projects by Maharashtra shall be from the flowing water through the river from the catchment area only. 58Page 59 (iii) The commitment of Maharashtra that the Babhali barrage project requires 2.74 TMC of water out of the allocation of 60 TMC for new projects under the agreement of which only 0.6 TMC is from the common submergence of Pochampad reservoir and Babhali barrage if accepted and its compliance is ensured, it may be conveniently held that Babhali barrage would not enable Maharashtra to draw and utilize 65 TMC of water from the storage of Pochampad project as alleged by Andhra Pradesh. (iv) Alternatively, even if the interpretation placed upon the agreement dated 06.10.1975 by Andhra Pradesh is accepted that utilization of waters to the extent of 60 TMC for new projects by Maharashtra from below the three dam sites mentioned in Clause II(i) up to Pochampad dam site can be only from water flowing through the river from the catchment area and not from the pondage/water spread area of Pochampad dam, on the basis of facts which have come on record, a case of substantial injury of a serious magnitude and high equity that moves the conscience of the Court has not been made out by Andhra Pradesh justifying grant of injunction .- In light of the above, we hold that Andhra Pradesh is not entitled to the reliefs, as prayed for, in the suit. – The powers and functions of the supervisory committee shall be as follows: (i) The committee shall surprise the operation of the Babhali barrage. (ii) The committee shall ensure that; (a) Maharashtra maintains Babhali barrage storage capacity of 2.74 TMC of water out of the allocation of 60 TMC given to Maharashtra for new projects under the agreement dated 06.10.1975. (b) The gates of Babhali barrage remain lifted during the monsoon season, i.e, July 1 to October 28 and there is no obstruction to the natural flow of Godavari river during monsoon season below the three dams mentioned in Clause II(i) of the agreement dated 06.10.1975 towards Pochampad dam. (c) During the non-monsoon season i.e., from October 29 till the end of June next year, the quantity of water which Maharashtra utilizes for Babhali barrage does not exceed 2.74 TMC of which only 0.6 TMC forms the common submergence of Pochampad reservoir and Babhali barrage. (d) Maharashtra does not periodically utilize 2.74 TMC from time to time. (e) Maharashtra releases 0.6 TMC of water to Andhra Pradesh on 1st March every year. (f) Maharashtra maintains the capacity of Balegaon barrage to 1.5 TMC. Out of this 0.9 TMC is adjusted from sanctioned utilization of Vishnupuri project upstream and 0.6 TMC remains the intercepted storage of Babhali barrage. 84. Suit and IA Nos. 13 and 15 are disposed of as above with no orders as to costs.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ORIGINAL SUIT NO. 1 OF 2006 State of Andhra Pradesh …… Plaintiff Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. …… Defendants WITH WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 134 OF 2006 WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 210 OF 2007 WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 207 OF 2007 AND CONTEMPT PETITION … Continue reading

service matter – The maximum punishment that could have been imposed on an employee after conducting due departmental enquiry was dismissal from service. The rule making authority, by way of amendment, has bifurcated the rule 9(vii) into two parts, namely, 9(vii)(a) and 9(vii)(b). As is evincible, the chargesheet only referred to the imposition of major penalty or to be dealt with under the said rules relating to major penalty. In this backdrop, it would be difficult to say that the employee had the vested right to be imposed a particular punishment as envisaged under the unamended rules. Once the charges have been proven, he could have been imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement or removal from service or dismissal from service. The rule making authority thought it apposite to amend the rules to introduce a different kind of punishment which is lesser than the maximum punishment or, for that matter, lesser 47Page 48 punishment than that of compulsory retirement from service. The order of compulsory retirement is a lesser punishment than dismissal or removal as the pension of a compulsorily retired employee, if eligible to get pension under the Pension Rules, is not affected. Rule 9(vii) was only dealing with reduction or reversion but issuance of any other direction was not a part of it. It has come by way of amendment. The same being a lesser punishment than the maximum, in our considered opinion, is imposable and the disciplinary authority has not committed any error by imposing the said punishment, regard being had to the nature of charges. It can be looked from another angle. The rule making authority has splitted Rule 9(vii) into two parts – one is harsher than the other, but, both are less severe than the other punishments, namely, compulsory retirement, removal from service or dismissal. The reason behind it, as we perceive, is not to let off one with simple reduction but to give a direction about the condition of pay on restoration and also not to 48 Page 49 impose a harsher punishment which may not be proportionate. In our view, the same really does not affect any vested or accrued right. It also does not violate any Constitutional protection. 51. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the order passed by the High Court that a double punishment has been imposed does not withstand scrutiny. 52. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The orders passed by the High Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1428-1428 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 24224-24225 of 2008) The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others … Appellants Versus Ch. Gandhi …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. 2. The present appeals … Continue reading

“Under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act children of void marriage are legitimate. Under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolve firstly on heirs in Clause (1) which include widow and son. Among the widow and son, they all get shares. The second wife taken by deceased Government employee during subsistence cannot be described a widow of deceased employee, their marriage void. Sons of the second wife being the legitimate sons of deceased would be entitled to the property of deceased employee in equal shares along with that of first wife and the sons born from the first marriage. That being the legal position when Hindu male dies intestate, the children of the deceased employee born out of the second wedlock would be entitled to share in the family pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity. The second wife was not entitled to anything and family pension would be admissible to minor children only till they attained majority”.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN PRESENT THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU   CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 1215 OF 2008 Between : Sugunamma and others.                                     …APPELLANTS A N D Contral Power Distribution Company of A.P. Ltd. and others.                     …RESPONDENTS            THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE … Continue reading

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