advocatemmmohan
just another law knowledge bank
anil kumar
When the prosecution failed to prove the basic case of harassment or demand of dowry , it was not open to convict the accused on presumption referring to sec.113 A or 113 B of the Evidence Act = We find that there are contradictory statements which cannot be stated to be a minor contradiction as was suggested by the learned Addl.SSP before the Appellate Court. The improvement in the statements of PW.1 and 12 is clear. The allegation about the demand of dowry of Rs.1,50,000/ and 800 gms. of gold ornaments and harassment and torture made by accused No.1 on deceased was not disclosed and mentioned in the First Information Report or before the Tahsildar(PW.21) who recorded the initial evidence. In Ex.P.2 and complaint Ex.P.3 absolutely there is no evidence to show that Rs.25, 000/ was demanded and Rs.10,000/ was given to accused No.1 either at Benali or at Mysore. Further, payment of Rs.50,000/ and 500 gms. of gold to accused No.1 as dowry was also not established beyond reasonable doubt. Once the prosecution failed to prove the basic ingredients of harassment or demand of dowry and the evidence brought on record were doubted by the trial court, it was not open to the High Court to convict accused No.1 on presumption referring to Section 113A or 113B of the Evidence Act. The presumption of innocence of the accused being primary factor, in absence of exceptional compelling circumstances and perversity of the judgment, it was not open to the High Court to interfere with the judgment of the trial court in a routine manner. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 4th January, 2006 in Criminal Appeal No.1042 of 1999 passed by the High Court, allow the appeal by restoring the judgment dated 2nd August, 1999 of the trial court. The appellant is on bail, his bail bonds stand discharged.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40515 Page 11REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO.937 OF 2006S. ANIL KUMAR @ ANIL KUMAR GANNA … APPELLANTVERUSSTATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENTJ U D G M E N TSUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.This appeal has been preferred by the appellantagainst the judgment dated 4th January, 2006 in CriminalAppeal No.1042 of 1999 passed by the learned Single Judgeof the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, whereby thelearned Single Judge reversed the judgment of acquittaldated 2nd August, 1999 passed by the Xth Additional CitySessions Judge at Bangalore in S.C.No.86 /96 and convictedand sentenced the appellant for the offences under Section304B and Section 498A of the IPC.Page 22The Appellate Court imposed … Continue reading
The Persons with disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 = High court instead of dismissing the writ petition on withdrawal of writ, ought to have consider the same under this act = “47 Non discrimination in Government employments. (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.”= The inquiry was proceeded for about 11 years, when the finding was given that the appellant is insane and the order of compulsory retirement was passed on 15th October, 2007.= The appellant was appointed in the service of respondents as an IAS officer and joined in the year 1977. He served for 30 years till the order of his compulsory retirement was issued on 15th October, 2007. It is not the case of the respondents that the appellant was insane and in spite of that he was appointed as an IAS Officer in 1977. Therefore, even it is presumed that the appellant became insane, as held by the Inquiry Officer, mentally illness being one of the disabilities under Section 2(i) of the Act, 1995, under Section 47 it was not open to the respondents to dispense with, or reduce in rank of the appellant, who acquired a disability during his service. If the appellant, after acquiring disability was not suitable for the post he was holding, should have been shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits. Further, if it was not possible to adjust the appellant against any post, the respondents ought to have kept the appellant on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or, until the appellant attained the age of superannuation whichever was earlier.= The High Court also failed to notice the relevant fact and without going into the merit allowed the counsel to withdraw the writ petition merely on the basis of the finding of Inquiry Officer. In fact the High Court ought to have referred the matter to a Medical Board to find out whether the appellant was insane and if so found, in that case instead of dismissing the case as withdrawn, the matter should have been decided on merit by appointing an Advocate as amicus curiae. ; It is informed at the bar that in normal course the appellant would have superannuated from service on 31st July, 2012. we have no other option but to set aside the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant dated 15th October, 2007 passed by the respondents; the order dated 22nd December, 2008 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A.No.2784/2008 and the impugned order dated 20th April, 2010 passed by the High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C)No.2622/2010 and the case is remitted to the respondents with a direction to treat the appellant continued in the service till the date of his superannuation. The appellant shall be paid full salary minus the subsistence allowance already received for the period from the date of initiation of departmental proceeding on the ground that he was suffering from mental illness till the date of compulsory retirement. The appellant shall also be provided with full salary from the date of compulsory retirement till the date of superannuation in view of the first and second proviso to Section 47 of the Act, 1995. If the appellant has already been superannuated, he will also be entitled to full retiral benefits counting the total period in service. The benefits shall be paid to the appellant within three months, else the respondents will be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date the amount was due, till the actual payment. 21. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observations and directions but there shall be no order as to costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40495 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4944 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.26400 OF 2010) ANIL KUMAR MAHAJAN …APPELLANT VERUS UNION OF INDIA THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES AND PENSIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND TRAINING, NEW DELHI. AND OTHERS … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi dated 20th April, 2010 in W.P.(C)No.2622 of 2010. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: “O R D E R 20.04.2010 After some arguments, learned counsel for the … Continue reading
whether under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 for the welfare of the minor any person other than father can be appointed as guardian. Section 7 of the Act gives power to the court to appoint any person as guardian for the welfare of minor. = It is settled principle of law that the welfare of the minor is paramount for the appointment of the guardian. Section 6 of the Act provides that in case of a minor nothing in this Act shall be construed to take away or derogate from any power to appoint a guardian of his person or property or both, which is valid by the law to which the minor is subject. I am of the view that Section 6 of the Act only says that the Act will not take away the power to appoint a guardian provided under the law to which minor is subject, i.e. Muslim Law but it does not say that this Act does not apply to Muslims governed by the Muslim Law. Therefore, in case, if there is any provision under the Muslim Law providing the power to any authority to appoint the guardian, the same may continue and will not be taken away or derogated by this Act. Therefore, I am of the view that the provisions of Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 is applicable to the Muslim. Section 19 of the Act provides that the Court is not authorised to appoint or declare a guardian of a minor whose father is living and is not in the opinion of the Court, unfit to be guardian. However, Section 17(3) of the Act provides that if minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference the Court may consider that preference. Thus reading of Sections 7, 17 and 19 of the Act together it emerges that in the appointment of the guardian the welfare of the minor is paramount and in case, if minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference his desire and option should be given preference. In the case of Lekha Vs. Anil Kumar, reported in 2007 AWC-5-5494 the minor was aged about 12 years. Before the Court he has expressed his preference to stay with mother. Apex Court held that the minor was intelligent enough to express his desire and desire should be given preference. Apex Court further held that the welfare of the minor is paramount. Learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Navin Singh vs. Jyoti Parashar, reported in AIR (All)-0-441 has held that while deciding the question of custody, the welfare of the child to be looked into and the claim of the mother can not be ignored or denied on the ground that the husband is natural guardian under Section 6 (a) of Guardians and Wards act, 1890. In my view on the facts and circumstances, namely that the father has divorced the mother in the year 2002 and remarried and has three children from the second wife and further minor is living since birth with the mother and now is aged about 15 years and is old enough to form an intelligent preference and has shown his desire before the Court on 16.02.2012 to live with mother. This Court is satisfied that the welfare of the minor is more appropriately be with mother and not with father and under Section 17 (3) of the Act his desire should be given preference. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 30.08.2006 is set aside.
Reported/published in http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD COURT NO.5 FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER NO.2826 OF 2006 Smt. Rizwana Begum @ Pappoo. ….Appellant Versus Noor Ahmad. ….Respondents ********** Hon’ble Rajes Kumar, J. Heard Sri T.A.Khan, learned counsel for appellant and Mohd. Islam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. This is an appeal by … Continue reading
registration of the car stood in the name of Anil Kumar and petitioner after purchasing vehicle got it insured in his own name without transfer of registration certificate in his name. – not entitled to claim insurance = Section 50 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 provides as under: ”50(1)(b) The transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may be, and shall forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the report received by him from the transferor in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration”. 7. As per this provision, the petitioner was bound to get the registration certificate transferred in his name and intimate to the insurance company but as the petitioner failed to get it transferred in his name within specified period, petitioner was not entitled to get any compensation only on the ground that policy existed in his name. At the time of taking policy, petitioner had no insurable interest in the vehicle and respondent/OP has not committed any error in repudiating claim. Learned State Commission has not committed any error in allowing appeal and dismissing complaint filed by the petitioner. We find no infirmity, material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and revision petition is liable to be dismissed at admission stage. 8. Consequently, revision petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed at admission stage with no order as to cost.
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 64 OF 2013 (From the order dated 10.10.2012 in Appeal No.876/2012 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula) D.P. Srivastava S/o Late Sh. Keshava Prasad Srivastava C1/102, Mayfair Tower Charmwood Village, Suraj Kund Road, Faridabad – 121 009, Haryana … Petitioner/Complainant Versus M/s. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Plot No.60, Okhla Industrial Estate Phase II Opp. SBI Bank, New Delhi … Continue reading
specific performance case, arbitration case , company petition -M/s.Merbanc Financial Services Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the company") is absolute owner of 1853.80 square yards in Plot No.7, Sector 1, HUDA Techno Enclave in Sy. No.64 of Madhapur village, Sherilingampally, Ranga Reddy District. The applicant approached the company for development of the said plot into a multi-storied building complex. They entered into a development agreement-cum-General Power of Attorney on 6.1.1999 (for brevity, "agreement"). Under the said agreement, the applicant was authorized to construct a multi- storied building complex on the said plot. The company has to secure exemption under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. As per Clause 3 of the agreement, the applicant shall invest his capital and construct the building complex as per mutually agreed plan and building specifications ensuring that the design and construction shall be sound and that it should confirm to statistical engineering practices. The applicant has to deposit security amount of Rs.20.00 lakhs. He paid a sum of Rs.5 lakhs towards security deposit at the time of the execution of the agreement. The balance security deposit of Rs.15 lakhs is payable within a fortnight from the intimation of fact of obtaining exemption order from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority by the company. As per Clause (14) of the agreement, the company has to liquidate its liability to Andhra Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation ("APIDC") and obtain original documents of title within five months from the date of the agreement. Some delay occurred in getting clearance from the Urban Land Ceiling Authority by the company. The applicant claims to have spent considerable amount in carrying out the developmental activity pursuant to the said agreement. The company took the stand that the applicant failed to pay balance security deposit amount of Rs.15 lakhs as per Clause 3(d) of the agreement and thereby, it issued letter dated 18.4.2000 terminating the agreement.The Supreme Court after taking into consideration the economic reforms in the country reduced the rate of interest awarded by the arbitrators from 18% to 9%, vide decision of the Supreme Court in=compensation not to be given for any remote or indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of breach of contract. Awarding of damages by Arbitrator on the claim made by contractor that he would have earned more profit if money due to him is paid in time is unsustainable as it is too remote a claim to be allowed.
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.SESHASAYANA REDDY C.A.No.480 of 2007 In C.P.No.113 of 2002 12-07-2010 A.Sridhar Lakshman M/s.Merbanc Financial Services Ltd. Rep. by Official Liquidator and others !Counsel for the Applicants: Sri P.Vinayaka Swamy Counsel for the Respondents: Sri M.Anil Kumar for Official Liquidator Sri S.Sriram Reddy for respondent No.5 :ORDER: This application under Section 34 … Continue reading
advocatemmmohan 