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Section 138 of the NI Act – territorial jurisdiction- where cheques were drawn – cheques were drawn on Axis Bank, Bangalore and presented at Standard Chartered Bank, Bangalore – Statutory notice issued at New Delhi – High court held infavour of complainant – Apex court held that It is in these circumstances that we allow the Appeal, as Courts at Gurgaon do not possess territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act solely because, on the instructions of the Respondent, a legal notice of demand has emanated from that city. The Complaint be returned to the Complainant/Respondent for refilling in the appropriate Court at Bangalore, Karnataka. As mentioned in Dashrath Rupsingh, if the Complaint is re-filed in the appropriate Court in Bangalore within 30 days, it shall be deemed to have been filed within limitation.= CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1771 OF 2014 [Arising out of SLP(Crl.)No. 7653 of 2013] SHIVGIRI ASSOCIATES & ORS. …..Appellants Vs. METSO MINERAL (INDIA) PVT.LTD. …..Respondent = 2014- Aug. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41832
Section 138 of the NI Act – territorial jurisdiction- where cheques were drawn – cheques were drawn on Axis Bank, Bangalore and presented at Standard Chartered Bank, Bangalore – Statutory notice issued at New Delhi – High court held infavour of complainant – Apex court held that It is in these circumstances that we allow the Appeal, as Courts … Continue reading
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. Doctrine of lis pendens is based on legal maxim ‘ut lite pendente nihil innovetur’ (During a litigation nothing new should be introduced). A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. A litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. = KN Aswathnarayana Setty (D) Tr. LRs. & Ors. …Petitioners Versus State of Karnataka & Ors. …Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41041
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. Doctrine of lis pendens is based on legal maxim ‘ut lite pendente nihil innovetur’ (During a litigation nothing new should be introduced). A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a … Continue reading
LAND REFORMS ACT – The appellants claim to be the owners of lands in Sy. Nos. 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 53 situated in village Halligeri, Dharward Taluk, Karnataka, having purchased the same in the year 1956. According to the appellants, the lands were in their personal cultivation since then. 3. The 2nd respondent, Gangappa (since deceased) filed an application before the Special Tahasildar, Land Reforms, Dharwad, contending therein that he had sent an application on 23rd June, 1975 in Form No.7 for registering him as an occupant of the lands belonging to the appellants.- whether in fact the 2nd respondent had filed an application in Form No.7, and if it was found that he had made such an application, then to consider it on merits in accordance with law. = the Tribunal admitted Form No.7 produced by the 2nd respondent and on an enquiry gave definite finding that the applicant-2nd respondent was not in occupation or cultivation of the suit land as a tenant as on 1st March, 1974 or prior thereto. In view of such finding of the Tribunal it was not open for the learned Single Judge to remand the matter again to the Tribunal to enquire whether Form No.7 is on record or Form No.7 was produced by the 2nd respondent which in fact rendered the order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Tribunal ineffective for no reason. The Division Bench of the High Court also failed to notice the above-said fact and thereby erred in affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order dated 2nd June, 2006 passed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.3836/2005(LR) and order dated 3rd June, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.15722/1997, order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Land Tribunal, Dharwad is restored. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40793 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8289 OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.14496 of 2006) CHANNABASAPPA(DEAD) BY LR & ANR. … APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. 1. This … Continue reading
Entrusting the investigation to the CBI = the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 7623 of 2012 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court constituted a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate into the broadcasting of certain news items by certain television channels on 02.03.2012 regarding scuffle between advocates, police and media persons in the premises of the City Civil Court Complex, Bangalore.= a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of West Bengal and Others vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Others, (2010) 3 SCC 571 has laid down certain principles. Though the CBI has issued various principles/suggestions for endorsing the matter to CBI in para 68, it is worthwhile to refer the conclusion in paras 69 & 70. “69. In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly. 70. Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said articles requires great caution in its exercise. Insofar as the question of issuing a direction to CBI to conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but time and again it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. This extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. Otherwise CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and with limited resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the process lose its credibility and purpose with unsatisfactory investigations.” Keeping the above principles in mind, considering the series of unfortunate incidents which occurred within the City Civil Court Complex, Bangalore on 02.03.2012 involving members of the bar, police personnel, journalists and media persons and in spite of the specific direction by the High Court as early as on 16.05.2012, subsequent order of this Court dated 19.10.2012, and also of the fact that the composition of SIT itself has not been finalized, we feel that the present case falls within the principles enunciated by the Constitution Bench and we are satisfied that CBI inquiry is necessitated in the matter in issue. 12) In the light of what is stated above, while setting aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 16.05.2012 and in modification of earlier order of this Court dated 19.10.2012, we entrust the entire investigation of the incident to the CBI. Accordingly, we direct the CBI to carry out the investigation and submit a report before the appropriate Court having jurisdiction at Bangalore within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. We further direct the State/SIT to immediately hand over all the records pertaining to the said investigation to the CBI. 13) The appeal is allowed on the above terms. In view of the above direction, no separate order is required in I.A. No. 8 of 2013, accordingly, the same is also disposed of.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40700 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO.7159 OF 2013 2 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22604 of 2012) WITH 3 I.A. NO. 8 IN … Continue reading
Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC) and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter called the ‘DP Act’). = What is material contradiction and the material omissions =It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions were of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements in relation to trivial matters, which do not effect the core of the case of the prosecution, must not be made a ground for rejection of evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the entire evidence available, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses, and the appellate court in the normal course of action, would not be justified in reviewing the same, without providing justifiable reasons for doing so. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, and the other witnesses also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon such evidence. The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found not to be minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, the witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence available or with a statement that has already been recorded, then in such a case, it cannot be held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.; Recording a finding against the medical evidence is perverse = The defence version has been that Shanthi, deceased, had developed illicit relations with one Raju, a close friend of her brother Manimaran (PW.2) and was pregnant at the time of marriage. The Trial Court accepted this version in spite of the fact that the medical evidence was otherwise. Dr. B.R.S. Kashyap (PW.17) mentioned in the post-mortem report (Ex.P-12) that the uterus was intact. Subsequently, an explanation was specifically sought on 2.2.1995 as to whether Shanthi was pregnant at the time of death. Dr. Kashyap (PW.17) opined that she was not pregnant at the time of post-mortem examination. Dr. Kashyap (PW.17) denied the suggestion that he had issued report (Ex.P-14) in collusion with the complainant to the effect that she was not pregnant. 20. The Trial Court placed reliance on the medical history (Ex.P-10) mentioned in the Accident Register of the hospital that Shanthi had 3 months pregnancy. We have examined the original documents also, there is nothing on record to show as at whose behest remarks had been recorded therein. Thus, the finding of the Trial Court about pregnancy of Shanthi recorded by the Trial Court is not worth acceptance.; Duty of accused under sec. 313 Cr.P.C. to give explanation =He did not give any version about the incident, rather pleaded a false defence that Shanthi, deceased, had developed illicit relationship with Raju, a friend of her brother Manimaran, (PW.2) and was pregnant before marriage. To question no. 32, as to whether he wanted to say anything, his reply was only `No’. 23. It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the Court must take note of such explanation even in a case of circumstantial evidence in order to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete. When the attention of the accused is drawn to circumstances that inculpate him in relation to the commission of the crime, and he fails to offer an appropriate explanation, or gives a false answer with respect to the same, the said act may be counted as providing a missing link for completing the chain of circumstances. (Vide: Munish Mabar v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 912). When sec. 113 and 116 Evidence Act comes in to play =The prosecution successfully proved its case and, therefore, provisions of Section 113 of the Evidence Act 1872 come into play. The appellant/accused did not make any attempt, whatsoever, to rebut the said presumption contained therein. More so, Shanthi, deceased, died in the house of the appellant. He did not disclose as where he had been at the time of incident. In such a fact-situation, the provisions of Section 106 of Evidence Act may also be made applicable as the appellant/accused had special knowledge regarding such facts, though he failed to furnish any explanation thus, the court could draw an adverse inference against him. 26. In view of the above, the findings recorded by the Trial Court on each issue had been perverse and the High Court has rightly reversed the said findings. The conduct of the appellant/accused during the trial also disentitled him of any indulgence whatsoever. The appeal lacks merit, and is, accordingly dismissed.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40665 Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2280 of 2009 S. Govidaraju …Appellant Versus State of Karnataka …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the … Continue reading
failures of Appellate court = the Appellate Court was required to deal with each and every question raised on behalf of the appellants. Though the aforesaid questions were raised before the trial court as well as the High Court, we find that the High Court failed to discuss and decide the questions raised by the appellants -Apex court remanded for fresh disposal = the Division Bench held that the accused persons have failed to explain the circumstances under which they had come in possession of the motor cycle belonging to PW-1 which had been used by the deceased and, therefore, the presumption would arise against the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.= High court (i) The prosecution failed to prove the recovery of motor cycle from the possession of the appellant as the witnesses, who were the Panch had not stood to the test of cross-examination. (ii) PW-40 was examined to prove the alleged seizure of motor cycle (MO5). But the said witness deposed that he reached the place after the seizure. PW-40 could not state the date and time when seizure was made and he signed in Mahazar (Ex.P.23). According to PW.40 he had signed the Mahazar at the cross of Nelagadahalli Village but according to Seizure Mahazar (Ex.P.23), the place of seizure was NITF Cross. In the cross-examination he admitted that he did not remember MO5 vehicle was seized by the police. (iii) PW-2 in his deposition stated that the deceased had informed him that the motor cycle was seized for violation of Traffic Rules. This clearly shows that the motor cycle had already been seized by the Police. (iv) The prosecution also failed to prove the recovery of Wrist Watch (MO6) of the deceased. To prove the said aspect prosecution examined PW-8 and PW-9. The case of the prosecution was that Wrist Watch (MO6) was seized from PW-8, the brother of accused No.1. But PW-8 turned hostile and stated that nothing has been seized from him. Another witness was PW-9, who in his evidence stated that he had not seen any seizure and also turned hostile. In Ex.P.1, the complainant, PW-17 (mother of the deceased) has not stated anything regarding Wrist Watch of the deceased. Therefore, it is clear that the story of Wrist Watch was subsequently inserted to create evidence against the accused, but the prosecution failed to establish. (v) The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the allegation that the exhumation of dead body was at the instance of the accused. The Investigation Officer (PW-45) in his cross-examination deposed that he knew the place of burial of dead body prior to the recording of the voluntary statement of the accused. Therefore, it can be said that the dead body has been recovered at the instance of the accused. (vi) The prosecution also failed to prove the last seen theory. The Poojari who performed the Pooja of motor cycle has categorically stated that he cannot identify the persons who visited the temple, as thousands of people used to visit the temple in a day. (vii) Once the prosecution has failed to prove the main offence under Section 302 of the IPC, offence under 201 IPC also does not survive for consideration. The evidence of PWs-2, 10, 11, 14 and 45, not at all stood the test of the cross-examination. the High Court being the Appellate Court was required to deal with each and every question raised on behalf of the appellants. Though the aforesaid questions were raised before the trial court as well as the High Court, we find that the High Court failed to discuss and decide the questions raised by the appellants. 8. In view of the finding recorded above, we are of the view that the case should be remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The impugned judgment dated 19th January, 2010 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.968 of 2006 is, accordingly, set aside. The case is remitted back to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeal in accordance with law. It will be open to the appellants to raise all the questions and objections as raised in this appeal or as taken before the High Court. The respondents may also contest the case in support of the judgment passed by the trial court. The appeal stands disposed of with the aforesaid observation.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40539 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 887 OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.1937 of 2013) P. NAGESH AND ANOTHER … APPELLANTS VERUS STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. This … Continue reading
whether the mother tongue or the regional language can be imposed by the State as the medium of instruction at the primary education stage.= The vital question involved in this petition has a far-reaching significance on the development of the children in our country who are the future adults. The primary school years of a child is an important phase in a child’s education. Besides, it moulds the thinking process and tutors on the communication skills. Thus, primary education lays the groundwork for future learning and success. Succinctly, the skills and values that primary education instills are no less than foundational and serve as bases for all future learning. Likewise, the importance of a language cannot be understated; we must recollect that reorganization of States was primarily based on language. Further, the issue involved in this case concerns about the fundamental rights of not only the present generation but also the generations yet to be born. (i) What does Mother tongue mean? If it referred to as the language in which the child is comfortable with, then who will decide the same? (ii) Whether a student or a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage? (iii) Does the imposition of mother tongue in any way affects the fundamental rights under Article 14, 19, 29 and 30 of the Constitution? (iv) Whether the Government recognized schools are inclusive of both government-aided schools and private & unaided schools? (v) Whether the State can by virtue of Article 350-A of the Constitution compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary schools?= With regard to the above, all the connected matters including petitions/applications shall be placed before the Constitution Bench. Since the matter in issue started in the year 1994, early disposal of the case is desirable. Hence, the Registry is directed to place the same before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for necessary directions.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40528 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 2 CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5166-5190 OF 2013 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 18139-18163 of 2008 The State of Karnataka & Anr. …. Appellant (s) Versus The Associated Management … Continue reading
When the prosecution failed to prove the basic case of harassment or demand of dowry , it was not open to convict the accused on presumption referring to sec.113 A or 113 B of the Evidence Act = We find that there are contradictory statements which cannot be stated to be a minor contradiction as was suggested by the learned Addl.SSP before the Appellate Court. The improvement in the statements of PW.1 and 12 is clear. The allegation about the demand of dowry of Rs.1,50,000/ and 800 gms. of gold ornaments and harassment and torture made by accused No.1 on deceased was not disclosed and mentioned in the First Information Report or before the Tahsildar(PW.21) who recorded the initial evidence. In Ex.P.2 and complaint Ex.P.3 absolutely there is no evidence to show that Rs.25, 000/ was demanded and Rs.10,000/ was given to accused No.1 either at Benali or at Mysore. Further, payment of Rs.50,000/ and 500 gms. of gold to accused No.1 as dowry was also not established beyond reasonable doubt. Once the prosecution failed to prove the basic ingredients of harassment or demand of dowry and the evidence brought on record were doubted by the trial court, it was not open to the High Court to convict accused No.1 on presumption referring to Section 113A or 113B of the Evidence Act. The presumption of innocence of the accused being primary factor, in absence of exceptional compelling circumstances and perversity of the judgment, it was not open to the High Court to interfere with the judgment of the trial court in a routine manner. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 4th January, 2006 in Criminal Appeal No.1042 of 1999 passed by the High Court, allow the appeal by restoring the judgment dated 2nd August, 1999 of the trial court. The appellant is on bail, his bail bonds stand discharged.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40515 Page 11REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO.937 OF 2006S. ANIL KUMAR @ ANIL KUMAR GANNA … APPELLANTVERUSSTATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENTJ U D G M E N TSUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.This appeal has been preferred by the appellantagainst the judgment dated 4th January, 2006 in CriminalAppeal No.1042 of 1999 passed by the learned Single Judgeof the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, whereby thelearned Single Judge reversed the judgment of acquittaldated 2nd August, 1999 passed by the Xth Additional CitySessions Judge at Bangalore in S.C.No.86 /96 and convictedand sentenced the appellant for the offences under Section304B and Section 498A of the IPC.Page 22The Appellate Court imposed … Continue reading
motorcycle accident – personal injury = “The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii)Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v)Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).= In the present case, the claim petition filed by the appellant claimed an amount of Rs.3,50,000/-, the Tribunal awarded Rs.1,94,350/- which was enhanced by the High Court to Rs.2,65,000/-. The evidence of the doctor tendered in the Tribunal on 3.12.2008 stated that the future treatment would cost more than Rs.90,000/-. This corroborating evidence has not been contravented. The High Court however awarded only an amount of Rs.15,000/- towards future medical expenses. In view of the dicta in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar (supra) we accept the corroborative evidence given by the doctor, and add the amount as reflected in the doctor’s evidence. A similar view has been taken by a Bench of this Court recently in Civil Appeal No. 5945 of 2012 Kavita Vs. Deepak, decided on 22.8.2012 to which one of us (G.S. Singhvi J) was party. This would add the remaining amount of Rs.75,000/- to the compensation awarded by the High Court which takes it to a figure of Rs.3,40,000/. Since, the doctor has said that the expenses could be more than Rs.90,000/- but has not specified how much would be that amount, we add the remaining amount of Rs.10,000/- to make it Rs.3,50,000/- and thus fully allow the claim of the appellant. The amount of Rs.85,000/- thus added, with interest at 8% from the date of the petition (as originally awarded) will give her an added amount in the range of Rs. 1,25,000/. That will meet her requirement as placed before the MACT in her claim petition in its entirety. . The appeal is accordingly allowed. The claim petition filed by the appellant will stand decreed at Rs.3,50,000/- with interest @ 8% per annum from the date of the petition as awarded by the MACT. The respondent No.2 insurance company is directed to pay the amount as now added with interest at 8% as above within 8 weeks from today.
Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4340 OF 2013 (Arising out SLP (C) No.8164 of 2012) Smt. V. Sudha … Appellant Versus P. Ganapathi Bhat & Anr. … Respondents J U D G E M E N T H.L. Gokhale J. Delay condoned. Leave granted. 2. This … Continue reading
the delay of 449 days in filing the appeals before the Division Bench = Considering the issues raised and the positive direction given by the learned single Judge, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court ought to have condoned the delay and gone into the merits of the matter in the light of the provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957. Though the High Court concentrated only on narrating the pleadings of the parties, reasoning of the learned single Judge and cause shown for condoning the delay, but has not considered the substantial grounds urged by the State. As rightly pointed out by learned senior counsel for the State that though in the last paragraph there is some reference about the reasoning of the learned single Judge, not much attention was given on the merits of the claim made by the State.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 2 CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 8803-8805 OF 2012 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14177-14179 of 2010) The State of Karnataka & Ors. …. Appellant (s) Versus Vivekananda M. Hallur & Ors. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E … Continue reading
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