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Bank

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Service matter – VRS scheme 2000 – Pension Who completed 20 years of service are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29 by the date of VRS – Regulations 28 , 29 and Regulation 18 of the Pension Regulations, 1995 – High court relying on earlier DB bench judgement of Punjab National Bank dismissed the writ petition as the employees who took voluntary service not completed the requisite period for granting pension – basing on that judgment Bank filed this appeal – Apex court held that Regulation 18 of the Pension Regulations, 1995 provides that if broken period is more than six months, it shall be treated as one year. Therefore, all the respondents-writ petitioners having completed more than 19 years and 6 months of service in the Bank, they are to be treated to have completed 20 years of service. The aforesaid question was neither raised nor decided in the case of ‘Bank of Baroda’ or ‘Bank of India’. In view of the aforesaid fact, the appellant-Bank cannot derive the benefit of the decision of this Court in Bank of Baroda as the employees who were parties before the Court in the said case had not completed 20 years of service. As per the decision of this Court in Bank of India, the respondents-writ petitioners having completed 20 years of service are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29.In view of the finding recorded above, the appeals do not have merit in reference with the impugned judgment,they are, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. = STATE OF BANK OF PATIALA … APPELLANT VERSUS PRITAM SINGH BEDI & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41751

 Service matter – VRS scheme 2000 – Pension  Who completed  20  years  of  service  are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29 by the date of VRS – Regulations 28 , 29 and Regulation 18 of  the  Pension  Regulations,  1995 –  High court relying on earlier DB bench judgement of Punjab National Bank dismissed the writ petition  as … Continue reading

Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short “the SICA). – Application for protection of sec.22 (1) of SICA by Guarantors – whether maintainable – Settled law – if the action filed by the Bank comes with in the ambit of term suit, he can obtain protection – if the action of Bank is in the nature of proceedings , he can not avail the protection – in this case , he filed application in proceedings , High court rightly dismissed the application = Inderjeet Arya and another …. Appellants Verses ICICI Bank Limited …. Respondent = Published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41087

Section  22(1)  of  the  Sick  Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short “the SICA). – Application for protection of sec.22 (1) of SICA by Guarantors – whether maintainable – Settled law – if the action filed by the Bank comes with in the ambit of term suit, he can obtain protection – if the action of Bank … Continue reading

Board not liable to pay any amount to the Bank towards subsidy amount as the Borrower committed default =The Borrower had borrowed money from the Bank for its business and as per policy of the State of Karnataka, the Board had assured the Bank that by way of subsidy, the amount of interest would be paid by the Board to the Bank, provided there was no default in repayment of the principal amount by the Borrower.= the Board has been wrongly saddled with the liability of paying Rs.75,213/-.= The question only is with regard to the liability of the Board. The Board is neither a borrower nor a guarantor. = The Commission and the Karnataka State Khadi and Village Industries Board, will have no liability of any kind either in respect of the principal amount of loan or payment of 4% or revised rate of interest to be borne by the borrowers for which interest subsidy eligibility certificate has been issued by the Commission. Its liability shall be restricted only to the extent of payment of interest subsidy as per scheme. The Commission would be liable to pay interest subsidy as per the scheme only for the period of which the loan is sanctioned by the Bank and is not liable to pay such interest subsidy for the defaulted period 87-88.”= In other words, upon default committed by the Borrower, the Board was absolved of its liability of paying interest on behalf of the Borrower to the Bank and its liability was only to the effect that it would surrender its first charge over the moveable and immoveable assets of the borrower in favour of the Bank. 10. In spite of the aforestated facts, the trial court came to the conclusion that the Board was liable to pay interest which was due and payable by the Borrower. In our opinion, the said finding of the trial court is not correct. Even the High Court’s view of confirming the said finding is not correct and therefore, we quash and set aside the judgment of the appellate court as well as the decree passed by the trial court so far as it makes the Board liable to pay the interest on behalf of the Borrower. In view of the contents of the aforestated letter dated 23rd March, 1988, the Board shall surrender its first charge over all the moveable and immoveable assets of the Borrower in favour of the Bank as soon as possible. 11. The appeal stands partially allowed to the above extent with no order as to costs. Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS

published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40772 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8182 OF 2003 (Arising out of SLP ( C) No. 12161 of 2006)   Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT   VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS   1 J U D G M E N T   … Continue reading

Doctrine of Equality in awarding punishment in departmental proceedings , is applicable or not has to be decided by the appellant authority but not by High court as the High court has no power to issue such a directions = Doctrine of Equality = The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows: (a) When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities; (b) The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority; (c) Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court; – (d) Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The Court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. (e) The only exception to the principle stated in para (d) above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct was identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the Doctrine of Equality when it is found that the concerned employee and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge sheet in the two cases. If co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology lesser punishment to him would be justifiable. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we may observe that, no doubt the charges in respect of two sets of employees were identical. Though the other set of employee accepted the charges on the first day of enquiry, a factor which is to be kept in mind, that even those employees had denied the charges in the first instance and accepted these charges only in the departmental enquiry, that too after realizing that similar charges had been proved against the respondents herein in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, it was not a case where those employees had expressed the unconditional apology in the first instance. This may be a mitigating circumstance for the appellants herein. At the same time, we are of the opinion that all these aspects are to be considered by the appellate authority. The High Court did not look into all these aspects and mandated the appellate authority to pass orders imposing a specific penalty only. This direction of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to take a decision imposing – appropriate penalty on the respondents herein. We are confident that the mitigating circumstances pointed out by the respondents herein would be given due consideration by the appellate authority, keeping in view the ratio of Rajendra Yadav’s case as well. It would be open to the respondents herein to make representation in this behalf to the appellate authority on the basis of which the respondents want to contend that they should be given same treatment as meted out to other three employees. Such a representation will be given 15 days from today. Appellate Authority shall pass appropriate orders deciding the appeals afresh within 2 months from today. 19. Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.

 published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40604      (REPORTABLE) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs…6142/2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10025 of 2012) Lucknow K.Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad,U.P.Gramin Bank) & Anr. …..Appellant (s) Vs. Rajendra Singh …..Respondent (s) With C.A.Nos. 6143 & 6144/2013 (@ SLP (C) Nos.11211 of 2012 & … Continue reading

pari passu= whether the claims of the workmen who claimed to be entitled to payment pari passu have to be considered by the official liquidator or whether their claims have to be adjudicated upon by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (for short, ‘DRT’) is likely to arise in a large number of cases where recoveries are sought to be made pursuant to the certificates issued by the DRT and, therefore, these appeals required consideration preferably by a Bench of three-Judges. This is how these appeals have come up before us.= (i) If the debtor company is not in liquidation nor any provisional liquidator has been appointed and merely winding up proceedings are pending, there is no question of distribution of sale proceeds among secured creditors in the manner prescribed in Section 19(19) of the 1993 Act. (ii) Where a company is in liquidation, a statutory charge is created in favour of workmen in respect of their dues over the security of every secured creditor and this charge is pari passu with that of the secured creditor. Such statutory charge is to the extent of workmen’s portion in relation to the security held by the secured creditor of the debtor company. (iii) The above position is equally applicable where the assets of the debtor company have been sold in execution of the recovery certificate obtained by the bank or financial institution against the debtor company when it was not in liquidation but before the proceeds realized from such sale could be fully and finally disbursed, the company had gone into liquidation. In other words, pending final disbursement of the proceeds realized from the sale of security in execution of the recovery certificate issued by the debt recovery tribunal, if debtor company becomes company in winding up, Section 529A read with Section 529(1)(c) proviso come into operation and statutory charge is created in favour of workmen in respect of their dues over such proceeds. (iv) The relevant date for arriving at the ratio at which the sale proceeds are to be distributed amongst workmen and secured creditors of the debtor company is the date of the winding up order and not the date of sale. (v) The conclusions (ii) to (iv) shall be mutatis mutandis applicable where provisional liquidator has been appointed in respect of the debtor company. (vi) Where the winding up petition against the debtor company is pending but no order of winding up has been passed nor any provisional liquidator has been appointed in respect of such company at the time of order of sale by DRT and the properties of the debtor company have been sold in execution of the recovery certificate and proceeds of sale realized and full disbursement of the sale proceeds has been made to the concerned bank or financial institution, the subsequent event of the debtor company going into liquidation is no ground for reopening disbursement by the DRT. (vii) However, before full and final disbursement of sale proceeds, if the debtor company has gone into liquidation and a liquidator is appointed, disbursement of undisbursed proceeds by DRT can only be done after notice to the liquidator and after hearing him. In that situation if there is claim of workmen’s dues, the DRT has two options available with it. One, the bank or financial institution which made an application before DRT for recovery of debt from the debtor company may be paid the undisbursed amount against due debt as per the recovery certificate after securing an indemnity bond of restitution of the amount to the extent of workmen’s dues as may be finally determined by the liquidator of the debtor company and payable to workmen in the proportion set out in the illustration appended to Section 529(3)(c) of the Companies Act. The other, DRT may set apart tentatively portion of the undisbursed amount towards workmen’s dues in the ratio as per the illustration following Section 529(3)(c) and disburse the balance amount to the applicant bank or financial institution subject to an undertaking by such bank or financial institution to restitute the amount to the extent workmen’s dues as may be finally determined by the liquidator, falls short of the amount which may be distributable to the workmen as per the above illustration. The amount so set apart may be disbursed to the liquidator towards workmen’s dues on ad hoc basis subject to adjustment on final determination of the workmen’s dues by the liquidator. (viii) The first option must be exercised by DRT only in a situation where no application for distribution towards workmen’s dues against the debtor company has been made by the liquidator or the workmen before the DRT. (ix) Where the sale of security has been effected in execution of recovery certificate issued by the DRT under the 1993 Act, the distribution of sale proceeds has to be made by the DRT alone in accordance with Section 529A of the Companies Act and by no other forum or authority. (x) The workmen of the company in winding up acquire the standing of the secured creditors on and from the date of winding up order (or where provisional liquidator has been appointed, from the date of such appointment) and they become entitled to the distribution of sale proceeds in the ratio as explained in the illustration appended to Section 529(3)(c) of the Companies Act. (xi) Section 19(19) of the 1993 Act does not clothe DRT with jurisdiction to determine the workmen’s claim against the debtor company. The adjudication of workmen’s dues against the debtor company in liquidation has to be made by the liquidator. In other words, once the company is in winding up the only competent authority to determine the workmen’s dues is the liquidator who obviously has to act under the supervision of the company court and by no other authority. (xii) Section 19 (19) is attracted only where a debtor company is in winding up or a provisional liquidator has been appointed in respect of such company. If the debtor company is not in liquidation or if in respect of such company no order of appointment of provisional liquidator has been made and merely winding up proceedings are pending, the question of distribution of sale proceeds among secured creditors in the manner prescribed in Section19(19) of the 1993 Act does not arise.= the claims of the workmen who claim to be entitled to payment pari passu have to be considered and adjudicated by the liquidator of the debtor company and not by the DRT. We answer the question accordingly. 74. The impugned judgment is set aside. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai III and the official liquidator of the Company shall proceed further now concerning workmen’s dues as indicated in this judgment. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs. All pending applications stand disposed of.

‘      REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7045 OF 2005 Bank of Maharashtra … Appellant Vs. Pandurang Keshav Gorwardkar & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7046 OF 2005 JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA,J. These two appeals from the Bombay High Court came up before atwo-Judge Bench (B.P. … Continue reading

Complainants- Respondent Nos.2 and 3 have filed complaint being C.R. Case No.71C/2012 on 15.03.2012 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dibrugarh under Section 417 and 420 I.P.C., for taking appropriate criminal action against respondent No.4, who was accused in the complaint, and also against the Manager, United Bank of India as well as the Regional Manager of the Bank.- The Complainant, however, stated before the High Court that he had purchased the property somewhere in the year 2005. However, that is not reflected in the legal opinion given by the advocate to the Bank. We are of the view that the Bank has acted bona fide on the report of the advocate after searching the relevant records for the last 12 years. Further, we have also perused the complaint filed by respondent Nos.2 and 3 and found no indication in the complaint as against any of the officers of the Bank that they have acted in their individual capacity or otherwise so as to cheat the complainant. If at all there is any grievance that is against respondent no.4. In such circumstances, we are inclined to allow the appeal and quash the criminal complainant as far as the Bank and the officials are concerned.

‘ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRL.M.P. NO.10983/2013 IN AND CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.774 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL) NO. 8977 OF 2012) UNITED BANK OF INDIA & ANR. Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF ASSAM & ORS. Respondent(s) O R D E R Heard counsel on either side. Leave granted. This appeal … Continue reading

whether the Company Judge under the Companies Act, 1956 (for short “the 1956 Act”) has jurisdiction at the instance of the Official Liquidator to set aside the auction or sale held by the Recovery Officer under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for brevity “the RDB Act”) or whether the Official Liquidator is required to follow the route as engrafted under the RDB Act by filing an appeal assailing the auction and the resultant confirmation of sale.= It is well settled in law that if there is only one remedy, the doctrine of election does not apply and we are disposed to think that the Official Liquidator has only one remedy, i.e., to challenge the order passed by the Recovery Officer before the DRT. Be it noted, an order passed under Section 30 of the RDB Act by the DRT is appealable. Thus, we are inclined to conclude and hold that the Official Liquidator can only take recourse to the mode of appeal and further appeal under the RDB Act and not approach the Company Court to set aside the auction or confirmation of sale when a sale has been confirmed by the Recovery Officer under the RDB Act. in M.V. Janardhan Reddy (supra) wherein the sale was aside by the Company Judge. It may be stated here that the Company Court had imposed a condition that the permission of the Company Court shall be obtained before the sale of the properties, immoveable or moveable, is confirmed or finalized. On the aforesaid basis, this Court opined that when the bank was permitted to go ahead with the proposed sale of the assets of the company under liquidation by way of auction but such sale was subject to confirmation by the Company Court and all the parties were aware about the condition as to confirmation of sale by the Company Court, it was not open to the Recovery Officer to confirm the sale and, therefore, the sale was set aside by the Company Court, being in violation of the order. Thus, we find that the facts in the said case were absolutely different and further this Court did not deal with the jurisdiction of the Company Court vis-à-vis DRT as the said issue really did not arise. Hence, it is not an authority for the proposition that the Official Liquidator can approach the Company Court to set aside the auction or sale conducted by the Recovery Officer of the DRT.- the Official Liquidator can prefer an appeal before the DRT. As he was prosecuting the lis in all genuineness before the Company Court and defending the order before the Division Bench, we grant him four weeks’ time to file an appeal after following the due procedure. On such an appeal being preferred, the DRT shall deal with the appeal in accordance with law. The DRT is directed to decide the appeal within a period of two months after offering an opportunity of hearing to all concerned. Till the appeal is disposed of, the interim order passed by this Court shall remain in force. We hasten to clarify that we 3Page 34 have not expressed anything on the merits of the case. 30. Consequently, the appeal is disposed of in the above terms leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2511 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 35627 of 2011) The Official Liquidator, U.P. and Uttarakhand … Appellant Versus Allahabad Bank and others …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. 2. The … Continue reading

the Bank had failed to insure the property.=The State Commission was also informed that in all cases of house loan advanced in Tiruchirapalli by the OP/Bank, during 2003-09 period, the bank itself had insured all houses. In none of the cases, premium was directly paid to the insurance company by the borrower. Clause 13 in the loan agreement needs to be viewed in this background. Had the OP/Bank acted with promptitude and insured the house in time, the benefit of insurance would have been available when the floods came and damaged it. This lapse was further compounded by belated effort on the part of the Bank to ensure it, at the cost of the complainant. The State Commission has therefore rightly held it to be a case of deficiency of service.- the decision of the Tamilnadu Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in FA No. 194 of 2011 is bases on correct appreciation of the evidence on record. There is no case for intervention by this Commission in exercise of powers under Section 21 (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The revision petition is therefore dismissed and the impugned order is confirmed. Further, considering the conduct of the revision petitioner an additional cost of Rs 25,000 is awarded to the respondent/complainant. The same shall be paid by the revision petitioner within three months. Failing this, the amount shall carry interest at 9% for the period of delay.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION NO.4645 OF 2012 (Against the order dated 24.07.2012 in First Appeal No.194/2011 of the State Commission, Tamil Nadu)   1. The Chairman Indian Bank Chennai   2. The Manager Indian Bank, Thillai Nagar, 10th Cross, Tiruchirapalli- 18                                                                                                                                       ……….Petitioners     Versus 1. Consumer Protection Council Tamilnadu, No.2, RMS Building, … Continue reading

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