Board of directors

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Land Acquisition act -10% escalation of price- the mode of determining the market value by providing appropriate escalation over the proved market value of nearby lands in previous years (as evidenced by sale transactions or acquisitions), where there is no evidence of any contemporaneous sale transactions or acquisitions of comparable lands in the neighbourhood. The said method is reasonably safe where the relied-on sale transactions/acquisitions precede the subject acquisition by only a few years, that is, up to four to five years. Beyond that it may be unsafe, even if it relates to a neighbouring land. = Apex court enhanced the compensation and in respect of damages remanded the case to trail court for fresh disposal after recording evidence = Himmat Singh and others ….Appellants versus State of M.P. and another ….Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41039

Land Acquisition act    -10% escalation of price–  the mode of determining the  market           value by providing appropriate escalation over the proved market value         of nearby lands in previous years (as evidenced by  sale  transactions         or acquisitions), where there is no evidence  of … Continue reading

Sanction to prosecution when necessary = whether sanction before prosecution is required from each of the competent authorities entitled to remove an accused from the offices held by him, in situations wherein the accused holds a plurality of offices. The second determination was in respect of the requirement of sanction, in situations where the accused no longer holds the office, which he is alleged to have abused/misused, for committing the offence (s) for which he is being blamed. In answer to the first query, it has unambiguously been concluded, that if an accused holds a plurality of offices, each one of which makes him a public servant, sanction is essential only at the hands of the competent authority (entitled to remove him from service) of the office which he had allegedly misused. This leads to the clear inference, that other public offices held by the accused wherein an accused holds a plurality of offices, are irrelevant for purposes of obtaining sanction prior to prosecution. On the second issue it was concluded, that sanction was essential only if, at the time of taking cognizance, the accused was still holding the public office which he had allegedly abused. If the legal position determined in the above judgments is taken into consideration, there is certainly no doubt, that in the facts and circumstances of this case, sanction if required, ought to have been obtained from the Governor of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The instant determination is premised on the fact, that the appellant is stated to have misused his position while discharging his responsibilities as a nominee Director of the MPSIDC. It is clear to us, specially from the deliberation recorded hereinabove, that the appellant’s participation in the Cabinet Review Meeting dated 28.1.1994, and in the relevant meetings of the Board of Directors (of the MPSIDC) had no nexus to the post of Industries Commissioner, Government of Madhya Pradesh, or the subsequent office held by him as Joint Secretary, Department of Heavy Industries, Government of India. Accordingly, in our considered view, sanction of the authorities with reference to the post of Industries Commissioner, Government of Madhya Pradesh and Joint Secretary, Department of Heavy Industries, Government of India held by the appellant, was certainly not required. We therefore, hereby reject the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, that since the appellant continued to hold the above-mentioned public office(s) in his capacity as a member of the IAS cadre, at the time the first charge sheet was filed on 24.9.2007, prosecution could be proceeded with, and cognizance taken, only upon sanction by the competent authority(ies) of the said two offices (Industries Commissioner, Government of Madhya Pradesh and Joint Secretary, Department of Heavy Industries, Government of India), as wholly misconceived.= We are of the view, that the last contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant is a mixed question of fact and law.- whether the accused is guilty of the accusation levelled against him. Therefore, it is neither proper nor possible for us to deal with the last contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, at the present juncture.= we find no merit in the instant appeals. The same are accordingly hereby dismissed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40781 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1454 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.61 of 2012) Ajoy Acharya … Appellant Versus State Bureau of Inv. against Eco. Offence … Respondent With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1455 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 400 of 2012) J … Continue reading

Doctrine of Equality in awarding punishment in departmental proceedings , is applicable or not has to be decided by the appellant authority but not by High court as the High court has no power to issue such a directions = Doctrine of Equality = The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows: (a) When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities; (b) The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority; (c) Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court; – (d) Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The Court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. (e) The only exception to the principle stated in para (d) above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct was identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the Doctrine of Equality when it is found that the concerned employee and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge sheet in the two cases. If co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology lesser punishment to him would be justifiable. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we may observe that, no doubt the charges in respect of two sets of employees were identical. Though the other set of employee accepted the charges on the first day of enquiry, a factor which is to be kept in mind, that even those employees had denied the charges in the first instance and accepted these charges only in the departmental enquiry, that too after realizing that similar charges had been proved against the respondents herein in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, it was not a case where those employees had expressed the unconditional apology in the first instance. This may be a mitigating circumstance for the appellants herein. At the same time, we are of the opinion that all these aspects are to be considered by the appellate authority. The High Court did not look into all these aspects and mandated the appellate authority to pass orders imposing a specific penalty only. This direction of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to take a decision imposing – appropriate penalty on the respondents herein. We are confident that the mitigating circumstances pointed out by the respondents herein would be given due consideration by the appellate authority, keeping in view the ratio of Rajendra Yadav’s case as well. It would be open to the respondents herein to make representation in this behalf to the appellate authority on the basis of which the respondents want to contend that they should be given same treatment as meted out to other three employees. Such a representation will be given 15 days from today. Appellate Authority shall pass appropriate orders deciding the appeals afresh within 2 months from today. 19. Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.

 published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40604      (REPORTABLE) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs…6142/2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.10025 of 2012) Lucknow K.Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad,U.P.Gramin Bank) & Anr. …..Appellant (s) Vs. Rajendra Singh …..Respondent (s) With C.A.Nos. 6143 & 6144/2013 (@ SLP (C) Nos.11211 of 2012 & … Continue reading

legality of an order passed by the Joint Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, Sagar Division, Sagar, M.P., superseding the Board of Directors of District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., Panna without previous consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, as provided under the second proviso to Section 53(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960= In such circumstances of the case, we are inclined to dismiss both the appeals with costs directing re-instatement of the first respondent Board of Directors back in office forthwith and be allowed to continue for the period they were put out of office by the impugned order which has been quashed. We also direct the State of Madhya Pradesh to pay an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- to the Madhya Pradesh Legal Services Authority within a period of one month by way of costs and also impose a cost of Rs.10,000/- as against the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Sagar, the officer who passed the order, which will be deducted from his salary and be deposited in the Panna DCB within a period of two months from today. Ordered accordingly. Further, we are inclined to give the following general directions in view of the mushrooming of cases in various Courts challenging orders of supersession of elected Committees: (1) Supersession of an elected managing Committee/Board is an exception and be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances and normally elected body be allowed to complete the term for which it is elected. (2) Elected Committee in office be not penalised for the shortcomings or illegalities committed by the previous Committee, unless there is any deliberate inaction in rectifying the illegalities committed by the previous committees. (3) Elected Committee in Office be given sufficient time, say at least six months, to rectify the defects, if any, pointed out in the audit report with regard to incidents which originated when the previous committee was in office. (4) Registrar/Joint Registrar are legally obliged to comply with all the statutory formalities, including consultation with thePage 34 34 financing banks/Controlling Banks etc. Only after getting their view, an opinion be formed as to whether an elected Committee be ousted or not. (5) Registrar/ Joint Registrar should always bear in mind the consequences of an order of supersession which has the effect of not only ousting the Board out of office, but also disqualify them for standing for election in the succeeding elections. Registrar/Joint Registrar therefore is duty bound to exercise his powers bona fide and not on the dictation or direction of those who are in power. (6) Registrar/Joint Registrar shall not act under political pressure or influence and, if they do, be subjected to disciplinary proceedings and be also held personally liable for the cost of the legal proceedings. (7) Public money not to be spent by the State Government or the Registrar for unnecessary litigation involving disputes between various factions in a co-operative society. Tax payers money is not expected to be spent for settling those disputes. If found necessary, the same be spent from the funds available with the concerned Bank

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4691 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6860 of 2012] State of M.P. and Others .. Appellants Versus Sanjay Nagayach and Others .. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4692 OF 2013, (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 13125 … Continue reading

whether the respondent, who had sought voluntary retirement from service and was paid gratuity by the appellant under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short, ‘the 1972 Act’) along with Contributory Provident Fund is entitled to pension.

Page 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9024 OF 2012 Allahabad Bank …Appellant versus A.C. Aggarwal …Respondent J U D G M E N T G. S. Singhvi, J. 1. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal filed against the order of the Allahabad High Court … Continue reading

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