Bombay High Court

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JURISDICTION OF SMALL CAUSE COURTS IN EVICTING GRATUITOUS LICENSEE = i) Whether the expression “Licensee” used in section 41(1) in Chapter VII of PSCC Act, not having been defined therein, would derive its meaning from the expression “licensee” as used in sub- section (4A) of section 5 of the Rent Act and/or whether the expression “licensee” used in section 41(1) of PSCC Act is a term of wider import so as to mean and include a “gratuitous licensee” also? ii) Whether a suit by a “licensor” against a “gratuitous licensee” is tenable before the Presidency Small Cause Court under section 41 of PSCC Act? = whether a suit filed by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee under Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 (for short “the PSCC Act”), as amended by the Maharashtra Act No.XIX of 1976 (for short “1976 Amendment Act”) is maintainable before a Small Causes Court, Mumbai. 3. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramesh Dwarikadas Mehra v. Indirawati Dwarika Das Mehra (AIR 2001 Bombay 470) held that a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee is not tenable before the Presidency Small Causes Court under Section 41 (1) of the PSCC Act, and it should be filed before the City Civil Court or the High Court depending upon the valuation. The Division Bench held that the expression “licensee” used in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act has the same meaning as in Section 5 (4A) of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (in short “the Rent Act”). Further it was held that the expression “licensee” as used in Section 5(4A) does not cover a gratuitous licensee. The Division Bench in that case rejected the ejectment application holding that the Small Causes Court at Bombay lacked jurisdiction. We are of the view that in such a situation the court also should give a liberal construction and attempt should be to achieve the purpose and object of the legislature and not to frustrate it. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the expression licensee employed in Section 41 is used in general sense of term as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act. 52. We have elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expression ‘licensee’ in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. Looking from all angles in our view the expression ‘licensee’ used in the PSCC Act does not derive its meaning from the expression ‘licensee’ as used in Sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act and that the expression “licensee” used in Section 41(1) is a term of wider import intended to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well. 53. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench of the High Court. In such circumstances, the appeals lack merits and are, therefore, dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

PUBLISHED IN         http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40640   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6726-6727 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) NO.20763-764 OF 2007)   Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & Ors. …. Appellants v. Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr. …Respondents   J U D G M E N T K. … Continue reading

APEX COURT UPHELD THAT THE SUIT FILED BY NATIONAL HOUSING BANK UNDER SPECIAL ACT ENACTED FOR PURPOSE OF HARSHAD S. MEHTA , IS ONLY AN EYE WASH =The entire scandal and the present litigation revolves around the second defendant (since deceased) – one Harshad S. Mehta (a notified person under Section 3(2) of the Act). The scandal exposes the shortcomings and loopholes in the administration of banking sector of this country, more particularly, the State-owned/controlled banks. 6. The National Housing Bank (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Plaintiff’) a statutory Corporation created by an Act of Parliament (Act No. 53 of 1987) filed two suits, one invoking the original jurisdiction of Bombay High Court (Suit No. 211 of 1995) and another before the Special Court established under the Act No. 27 of 1992 being Suit No. 2 of 1995. The said suits came to be filed against (i) the State Bank of Saurashtra which at that point of time was a subsidiary bank of the State Bank of India but later got amalgamated with the State Bank of India, (ii) Harshad S. Mehta, (iii) two of the employees of the plaintiff bank and (iv) the Custodian appointed under Section 3(1) of the Act 27 of 1992.= No oral evidence from plaintiff side except filing some documents – At the time when these documents were being tendered it was clarified to all parties that mere tendering of documents would only establish that there was in existence such a document and that it stated what is stated. It was clarified that the contents of the documents would not be deemed to have been proved. It was clarified that any party who wanted to prove the truth of the contents had to do so by positive evidence. As stated above, except for 2nd Defendant, no other party has led any oral evidence.”; Janakiraman Committee Report – not admissible = The Special Court Act though declares that the Court is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not relieve the Special Court from the obligation to follow the Evidence Act. Further, the learned Judge extensively relied upon the second interim report of the Jankiraman Committee[11] on the ground that the same was tendered[12] by the 1st defendant. 51. Irrespective of the fact whether such a report is admissible in evidence or not, = It is well settled by a long line of judicial authority that the findings of even a statutory Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are not enforceable proprio vigore as held in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Others [AIR 1958 SC 538] and the statements made before such Commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal. In our considered view the report of Janakiraman Committee is not evidence within the meaning of Evidence Act; There is absolutely no evidence on record regarding the payment of the above mentioned amount of Rs.55 crores (approx.) by the plaintiff-Bank to the Standard Chartered Bank except the Janakiraman Committee Report and the correspondence which is neither proved nor the content of the correspondence is explained. On the other hand, the Special Court recorded[17] with respect to the payment of Rs.55 crores (approx.) to the Standard Chartered Bank by the plaintiff – “In the plaintiff’s record there is no clear indication as to for what transaction this cheque had been issued. The plaintiffs were, therefore, not sure for what this cheque had been issued.” 62. In the background of the above discussed pleadings and evidence, we are of the opinion the suit is required to be dismissed on the ground that there is no evidence led by the plaintiff to establish its case. ; suppression of material facts = We must also record our disapproval of the finding recorded by the Special Court that the plaintiff did not suppress the truth. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff approached the Special Court with unclean hands by suppressing the relevant material. We shall first discuss the nature of the suppression and then examine the legal consequences that should follow.= The whole attempt of both the banks is to shield the officers on either side taking refuge under attractive legal pleas – which if examined in the context of the limited facts pleaded give a picture that the suit transaction is an innocuous transaction which unfortunately for the country is not. In our opinion the suit is a sheer abuse of the legal process.= both the plaintiff and respondent Banks simply reiterated their respective stands before the Committee of Secretaries. No attempt appears to have been made by the Government to find out the truth as to (1) how the plaintiff Bank parted with a high denomination cheque and gave custody of the same to Harshad Mehta and (2) as to how the first defendant Bank paid the various amounts to the dictation of Harshad Mehta in the absence of any authorisation by the plaintiff Bank. Be that as it may, if really the Government believed that the judgment of the Special Court does not require any interference, nothing stopped the Government from directing both the Banks to withdraw their appeals before this Court. 74. The whole exercise appears to be an eye wash. A thinly veiled scorn for the orders of this Court.= The professed purpose of the Special Courts Act – the back drop of the scandal that shook the nation – and the manner in which the litigation was conducted coupled with the absolute indifference of the Government to get at the truth only demonstrates the duplicity with which Governments can act. 76. We dismiss the suit and set aside the decree in toto. The consequences follow insofar as the appeals are concerned. But in the circumstances, we do not award any costs.

published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40614  Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2155 OF 1999 State Bank of India Thr. General Manager …Appellant Versus National Housing Bank & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2294 OF 1999 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3647 OF 1999 J U D G M E N … Continue reading

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: s. 45 – Reference to arbitration under – Scope of – International commercial arbitration – Multi-party agreements – Joint venture agreements with different parties – Some of the agreements contained arbitration clause while the others did not – Dispute between parties leading to filing of suit – High Court referred the entire suit (including the non-signatory parties to the arbitration agreement) for arbitration u/s. 45 – Joinder of non-signatory parties to arbitration – Permissibility – Held: Joinder of non-signatory parties to arbitration is permissible – They can be referred to arbitration, provided they satisfy the pre-requisites u/ss. 44 and 45 r/w Schedule I of the Act – The cases of group companies or where various agreements constitute a composite transaction with intrinsically interlinked cause of action, can be referred to arbitration, even if the disputes exist between signatory or even non-signatory parties – However, the discretion of the court has to be exercised in exceptional, limiting, befitting and cases of necessity and very cautiously – Expression `any person claiming through or under him’ used in s. 45, takes within its ambit persons who are in legal relationships via multiple and multi-party agreements, though they may not all be signatories to the arbitration clause – In the present case, the corporate structure of the companies demonstrates a definite legal relationship between the parties to the lis or persons claiming under them – Their contractual relationship spells out the terms, obligations and roles of the respective parties which they were expected to perform for attaining the object of successful completion of the joint venture agreement – All the other agreements were intrinsically inter-connected with the mother agreement – All the agreements were part of a composite transaction to facilitate implementation of principal agreement – Hence, all the parties to the lis were covered under expression “any person claiming through or under” the principal (mother) agreement – Arbitration clause in the principal agreement was comprehensive enough to include all disputes arising “under and in connection with” principal agreement – Conduct of parties and even subsequent events show that the parties had executed, intended and actually implemented composite transaction contained in principal/mother agreement – Hence, direction to refer the disputes to arbitration -Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) – Article II (3) – ICC Rules – UNCITRAL Model Rules. s. 45 – Issues under – Determination of – Issue of jurisdiction should be decided at the beginning of the proceedings itself and they should have finality – Determination of fundamental issues as contemplated u/s. 45 at the very first instance is not only appropriate but is also the legislative intent – Jurisdiction. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s. 9 – Jurisdiction of civil courts – Jurisdiction of the court and the right to a party emerging from s. 9 is not an absolute right, but contains inbuilt restrictions – Civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits except those which is either expressly or impliedly barred – The provisions of s. 45 of the 1996 Act would prevail over the provisions of CPC – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s. 45. Doctrines/Principles: `Group of Companies’ Doctrine; Principle of `incorporation by reference’; Principle of `composite performance’; Principle of `agreements within an agreement’ and Principle of `Kompetenz kompetenz’ – Discussed. Precedent – Observations – Precedential value – Held: The observations to be construed and read to support the ratio decidendi – They would not constitute valid precedent as it would be hit by the doctrine of stare decisis – Doctrine – Constitution of India, 1950 – Art. 141. Words and Phrases: Expression `connection’ – Meaning of. The questions which inter alia arose for consideration in the present appeals were: (1) What is the ambit and scope of Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (2) Whether in a case where multiple agreements were signed between different parties some containing an arbitration clause and others not and where the parties were not identically common in proceedings before the Court (in a suit) and the arbitration agreement, a reference of disputes as a whole or in part could be made to the arbitral tribunal, more particularly, where the parties to an action were claiming under or through a party to the arbitration agreement; and (3) Whether the principles enunciated in the case of *Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya was the correct exposition of law.= Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 45 is a provision falling under Chapter I of Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which is a self-contained Code. The expression `person claiming through or under’ would mean and take within its ambit multiple and multi-party agreements, though in exceptional case. Even non-signatory parties to some of the agreements can pray and be referred to arbitration provided they satisfy the pre-requisites under Sections 44 and 45 r/w Schedule I. Reference of non-signatory parties is neither unknown to arbitration jurisprudence nor is it impermissible. [Para 167] 1.2 An arbitration agreement, under Section 45 of the 1996 Act, should be evidenced in writing and in terms of Article II of Schedule 1, an agreement in writing shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. Thus, the requirement that an arbitration agreement be in writing is an expression incapable of strict construction and requires to be construed liberally, as the words of this Article provide. Even in a given circumstance, it may be possible and permissible to construe the arbitration agreement with the aid and principle of `incorporation by reference’. Though the New York Convention is silent on this matter, in common practice, the main contractual document may refer to standard terms and conditions or other standard forms and documents which may contain an arbitration clause and, therefore, these terms would become part of the contract between the parties by reference. The solution to such issue should be case-specific. The relevant considerations to determine incorporation would be the status of parties, usages within the specific industry, etc. Cases where the main documents explicitly refer to arbitration clause included in standard terms and conditions would be more easily found in compliance with the formal requirements set out in the Article II of the New York Convention than those cases in which the main contract simply refers to the application of standard forms without any express reference to the arbitration clause. [Para 72] M.V. “Baltic Confidence” and Anr. v. State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. and Anr. (2001) 7 SCC 473: 2001 (1) Suppl. SCR 699; Olympus Superstructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Meena Vijay Khetan and Ors. (1999) 5 SCC 651: 1999 (3) SCR 490 – relied on 1.3 Under the Indian Law, greater obligation is cast upon the Courts to determine whether the agreement is valid, operative and capable of being performed at the threshold itself. Such challenge has to be a serious challenge to the substantive contract or to the agreement, as in the absence of such challenge, it has to be found that the agreement was valid, operative and capable of being performed; the dispute would be referred to arbitration. [Para 78] State of Orissa v. Klockner and Company and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2140: 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 368 – relied on. Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bechtel Corp.(1982) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 425, CA – referred to. Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration by Alan Redfern and Martin Hunder (Fourth Edition) 1.4 The legislative intent and essence of the 1996 Act was to bring domestic as well as international commercial arbitration in consonance with the UNCITRAL Model Rules, the New York Convention and the Geneva Convention. The New York Convention was physically before the Legislature and available for its consideration when it enacted the 1996 Act. Article II of the Convention provides that each contracting State shall recognize an agreement and submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. Once the agreement is there and the Court is seized of an action in relation to such subject matter, then on the request of one of the parties, it would refer the parties to arbitration unless the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of performance. Still, the legislature opted to word Section 45 somewhat dissimilarly. Section 8 of the 1996 Act also uses the expression `parties’ simpliciter without any extension. In significant contra-distinction, Section 45 uses the expression `one of the parties or any person claiming through or under him’ and `refer the parties to arbitration’, whereas the rest of the language of Section 45 is similar to that of Article II(3) of the New York Contention. The Court cannot ignore this aspect and has to give due weightage to the legislative intent. It is a settled rule of interpretation that every word used by the Legislature in a provision should be given its due meaning. The Legislature intended to give a liberal meaning to this expression. [Paras 88 and 89] 1.5 The language and expressions used in Section 45, `any person claiming through or under him’ including in legal proceedings may seek reference of all parties to arbitration. Once the words used by the Legislature are of wider connotation or the very language of Section is structured with liberal protection then such provision should normally be construed liberally. [Para 90] 1.6 In view of the legislative object and the intent of the framers of the statute, i.e., the necessity to encourage arbitration, the Court is required to exercise its jurisdiction in a pending action, to hold the parties to the arbitration clause and not to permit them to avoid their bargain of arbitration by bringing civil action involving multifarious cause of action, parties and prayers. [Para 91] 1.7 The scope of concept of `legal relationship’ as incorporated in Article II(1) of the New York Convention vis-

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7134 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.8950 of 2010)   Chloro Controls (I) P. Ltd. … Appellant Versus Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. & Ors. … Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7135-7136 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.26514-26515 … Continue reading

Service matter – appointment of trained teachers in the vacancies in the post of primary teachers in the state of Bihar = several trained teachers for a direction upon the State of Bihar to appoint them in the vacancies in the post of primary teachers in the State of Bihar. = Be that as it may, in the event, some discrepancies had crept in the final select list, the individual grievances contained various anomalies, which it is difficult for us to unravel. Accordingly, we modify our order dated 13th October, 2011, and allow the applicants to approach the High Court for redressal of their grievances. We also direct that the applications, special leave petitions and writ petitions filed before us be treated as withdrawn, with liberty to the parties to approach the High Court individually or otherwise, for relief, if any, but without, in any way, affecting the appointments of those teachers who have already been appointed against the vacant 34,540 posts and are working. We have been informed during the hearing that about 2413 posts out of the 34,540 posts were still left to be filled up. All the applications, Special Leave Petitions and Writ Petitions are, therefore, disposed of in the light of the aforesaid observations. We make it clear that none of the persons appointed out of the 34,540 vacancies should be disturbed in any way, but the question of filling up the balance vacancies may be taken into consideration, while disposing of the applications in question.

 Reported in      http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40581    REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.26824 OF 2012       YASHWANT SINGH & ORS. … PETITIONERS   VS.   STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. … RESPONDENTS   WITH I.A.Nos. 668, 669, 671, 674, 675, 676, 677, 679, 680, … Continue reading

Prohibition imposed under Bombay police Act on the dances at Bars, Hotels by way of amendment was quashed by the Bombay High court and confirmed by the Apex Court =the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, whereby Section 33A of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 as inserted by the Bombay Police (Amendment) Act, 2005 has been declared to be ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.= “the cure is worse than the disease”= Of course, the right to practise a trade or profession and the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 are, by their very nature, intermingled with each other, but in a situation like the present one, such right cannot be equated with unrestricted freedom like a run-away horse. As has been indicated by my learned Brother, at the very end of his judgment, it would be better to treat the cause than to blame the effect and to completely discontinue the livelihood of a large section of women, eking out an existence by dancing in bars, who will be left to the mercy of other forms of exploitation. The compulsion of physical needs has to be taken care of while making any laws on the subject. Even a bar dancer has to satisfy her hunger, provide expenses for her family and meet day to day expenses in travelling from her residence to her place of work, which is sometimes even as far as 20 to 25 kms. away. Although, it has been argued on behalf of the State and its authorities that the bar dancers have taken to the profession not as an extreme measure, but as a profession of choice, more often than not, it is a Hobson’s choice between starving and in resorting to bar dancing. From the materials placed before us and the statistics shown, it is apparent that many of the bar dancers have no other option as they have no other skills, with which they could earn a living. Though some of the women engaged in bar dancing may be doing so as a matter of choice, not very many women would willingly resort to bar dancing as a profession. Women worldwide are becoming more and more assertive of their rights and want to be free to make their own choices, which is not an entirely uncommon or unreasonable approach. But it is necessary to work towards a change in mindset of people in general not only by way of laws and other forms of regulations, but also by way of providing suitable amenities for those who want to get out of this trap and to either improve their existing conditions or to begin a new life altogether. Whichever way one looks at it, the matter requires the serious attention of the State and its authorities, if the dignity of women, as a whole, and respect for them, is to be restored. In that context, the directions given by my learned Brother, Justice Nijjar, assume importance. 6. I fully endorse the suggestions made in paragraph 123 of the judgment prepared by my learned Brother that, instead of generating unemployment, it may be wiser for the State to look into ways and means in which reasonable restrictions may be imposed on bar dancing, but without completely prohibiting or stopping the same. It is all very well to enact laws without making them effective. The State has to provide alternative means of support and shelter to persons engaged in such trades or professions, some of whom are trafficked from different parts of the country and have nowhere to go or earn a living after coming out of their unfortunate circumstances. A strong and effective support system may provide a solution to the problem. 8. These words are in addition to and not in derogation of the judgment delivered by my learned Brother.

published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40565  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2705 OF 2006 State of Maharashtra & Anr. …Appellants VERSUS Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn. & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.2704 OF 2006 State of Maharashtra & Ors. Etc. Etc. ..Appellants VERSUS Ramnath Vishnu Waringe Etc. Etc. …Respondents … Continue reading

Land Acquisition Act = Advance possession payment of compensation like rents as fixed by LAO – enhanced by District court under sec.18 reference = pending appeal interim orders to deposit half of the compensation is legal = whether the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench was justified in directing the State to deposit the rental compensation with the Appellate Court at the rate of 8% per annum on the award value passed by the Reference Court for the period of occupation before formal acquisition, allowing the appellant to withdraw only 50% of such rental compensation during the pendency of the appeal. = It is not in dispute that in most of the cases the rental compensation has not been paid. If that factual position continues, it clearly is a case where the amount to which a person is entitled is withheld without any legitimate excuse. The learned counsel for the appellants strenuously urged that in most of the cases the proceedings have not yet attained finality and are pending either before the Reference Court or in appeal. That does not provide a legitimate excuse to the appellants to withhold payment of the rental compensation. The amount calculated on the basis of award by the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be below than the amount to be ultimately fixed. If in appeal or the reference proceeding, there is any variation, the same can be duly taken note of as provided in law. There is no difficulty and we find none as to why the compensation on the basis of value determined by the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be paid. If there is upward revision of the amount, the consequences will follow and if necessary, redetermination of the rental compensation can be made and after adjustment of the amount paid, if any, balance can be paid. If, however, the Land Acquisition Officer’s award is maintained then nothing further may be required to be done. In either event, payment of the rental compensation expeditiously would be an appropriate step. Looking at the problem from another perspective, one thing is clear that authorities have clearly ignored the sense of urgency highlighted in the various resolutions.”- For the reason aforesaid, if the High Court recalled the order dated 5th October, 2010 and directed the State Government to deposit rental compensation at the rate of 8% of the amount awarded by the Reference Court with the appellate Court, allowing the appellant to withdraw the half of the amount, no interference is called for. However, this order will not stand in the way of appellant to claim proportionate higher rental compensation, if the order of the Reference Court is upheld or further enhancement of compensation is made by the Appellate Court. 20. We find no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed with observations as made above. No costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40514 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.    5084              OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.31318  of 2011) KAZI AKILODDIN SUJAODDIN           … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.          … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted.  The appellant is aggrieved by impugned order   dated   15th  September,   2011   passed   by   the   Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in a   Review   Application,   MCA   No.774/2011.   By   the   impugned order the Division Bench reviewed and recalled the judgment and order dated 5th  October, 2010  passed in Writ Petition No.3883/2010(D)   … Continue reading

Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act,=Chapter VIII-A, which was introduced into the the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as “the 1976 Act”, in 1986, pertains to the acquisition of “cessed properties” for co-operative societies of occupiers. In view of the questions raised in the writ petitions, the matter was initially referred to a Bench of 7-Judges, but, thereafter, by order dated 20.02.2002, the matters have been referred to a Bench of Nine-Judges and are still pending decision. Since no final decision seems to be in the offing, the writ petitioners have filed IA No. 3 of 2012, for interim reliefs.= Whether MHADA has any obligation to provide similar accommodation to others in respect of the 30% surplus land, is a controversy which we need not go into and will surely be decided, whenever the Nine-Judge Bench sits to take up these matters. But for the purposes of this case, we regret that in spite of the inordinate delay in the working of the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the 1976 Act, which was intended for the benefit of a certain section of tenants and occupants of cessed buildings, we are unable to grant the relief prayed for, as the same goes against the very grain of the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the 1976 Act.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40501 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A. NO. 3 OF 2012 IN WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 342 OF 1999 KAMLESH C. SHAH & ORS. …PETITIONERS Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. 1. Chapter VIII-A, which … Continue reading

the damages/compensation cannot be claimed against the State. ? =Whether the death of son of plaintiff was due to want of care, negligence and callousness of defendants as pleaded by plaintiffs?- Whether there is any bar in law, prohibiting award of damages, on account of the death of a soldier or seaman, if it is proved that the death occurred under mysterious circumstances? = if the negligence or want of proper care on the part of State is proved, the tortious liability to pay damages/compensation would arise and the same needs to be treated as constitutional tort. No decided case is cited as to how a State can claim immunity from the obligation to compensate the dependants of its employee, if it is proved that the death occurred on account of its negligence and lack of proper care. The point is answered accordingly. REPORTED/ PUBLISHED http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9823

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Appeal Suit No.3504 of 2004 04.04.2013 Union of India and another. Ashok Narayan Paldhe and others. Counsel for appellants: Sri Ponnam Ashok Goud Counsel for Respondents : Sri Sunil Ganu <GIST: >HEAD NOTE: ?Cases referred 2004 (1) ALD 19 JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon’ble … Continue reading

Section 72 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1881= “Whether the work of quality audit of roads or work of similar nature involves “the execution of any work or supply of any materials or goods” within the meaning of Section 72 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1881 and can be awarded by the Commissioner only by inviting tenders, as contemplated by that provision?”= In the result, our answers to the question referred by the Division Bench is as under: “The work of quality audit of roads or work of similar nature to be done by a person who must enjoy trust and confidence of the public authority is not covered by the expression “the execution of any work or supply of any materials or goods” within the meaning of Subsection (1) of Section 72 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, Hence, it is not necessary for Municipal Commissioner to assign such work only by inviting tenders as contemplated by the proviso, i.e. sub-section (3) of Section 72 of the said Act.”

reported / published in http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/judgements/2012/&fname=OSWP1312.pdf&smflag=N     Bombay High Court kambli 1 PIL-9.12 dt.12-12-12 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY. ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO.9 OF 2012 … Niyaz Ahmed Vanu …Petitioner v/s. 1.Municipal Corporation of Gr.Mumbai (M.C.G.M.) 2.The Municipal Commissioner, (M.C.G.M.) 3.The Chief Engineer (Roads Transport & Bridges) (M.C.G.M.) 4.M/s.SGS … Continue reading

Revision powers in rent control cases = (1) What is the scope and ambit of the power of revision under section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 ? (2) Whether a revision application under section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 would be maintainable in respect of a procedural order passed under the Code of Civil Procedure in a suit arising out of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act ?= For an order to be revisable under section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, the order must affect the very existence of the suit or the foundation of the party’s case in their pleadings and not merely a procedural order, not affecting the substantive rights of parties, though such procedural order may ultimately affect the strength or weakness of the case of the aggrieved litigant which is to be finally determined at the trial while passing the decree in the suit or final order in the proceeding.= Following are instances of revisable orders. (i) an order refusing leave to amend the plaint or written statement, where the proposed amendment is for assertion of rights or liabilities under the Rent Act or any other substantive law (ii) an order rejecting an application for restoration of the suit under Order 9 Rule 4 of the CPC (iii) an order allowing or rejecting an application for a declaration that the suit has abated (iv) an order refusing to extend the time for filing a written statement (v) an order for deleting an issue pertaining to rights or liabilities under the Rent Act, or any other substantive law This list is illustrative and not exhaustive.- Following are instances of orders which would not be revisable orders:- (i) an order granting leave to amend plaint or written statement (ii) an order granting extension of time to file written statement (iii) an order raising additional issue (iv) an order made for production of documents or discovery or inspection. (v) an order directing a plaintiff/defendant to furnish better and further particulars (vi) an order issuing or refusing to issue a commission for examination of witnesses (vii) an order issuing or refusing to issue summons for additional witness or document (viii) an order condoning delay in filing documents, after the first date of hearing. (ix) an order of costs to one of the parties for its default (x) an order granting or refusing an adjournment (xi) an order allowing an application for restoration of the suit under Order 9 Rule 4 of CPC This list is also illustrative and not exhaustive. 88. As regards question No.1 about scope and ambit of power of revision under Section 34(4) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, our answer is that after the revisional Court is satisfied about maintainability of the revision application, the revisional Court will consider whether the impugned order is according to law. However, “according to law” refers to the order as a whole, and is not to be equated to errors of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall order, which must be according to law, which it would not be , if there is a miscarriage of justice due to mistake of law. = As a general rule where substantial justice has been done by order of the lower Court, the revisional Court will not interfere with it notwithstanding the fact that the reasons for the order are not correct or the order is improper or irregular. reported/published in http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/judgements/2013/&fname=CWP2932810.=N

Bombay High Court     WP-9562-2010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.9562 OF 2010 Bhartiben Shah, R/o.Rasik Niwas, `F’ Road, Marine Lines, Mumbai-400002. .. Petitioner versus Smt.Gracy Thomas and others .. Respondents Mr. Vikram Goel a/w Ashok K. Goel for petitioner. Mr. Y.E. Mooman a/w Manisha B. … Continue reading

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