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Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,1946 – the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – No approval from the central government is necessary when the case was monitored by the constitutional court itself = Manohar Lal Sharma …….Petitioner Versus The Principal Secretary and Ors. ……Respondents = published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41094

Section 6A of the Delhi Special  Police  Establishment  Act,1946 – the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – No approval from the central government is necessary when the case was monitored by the constitutional court itself = whether  the  approval  of  the  Central  Government  is necessary under Section 6A of the Delhi Special  Police  Establishment  Act,1946 (“DSPE … Continue reading

Sec.197 Cr. P.C. – Sanction to prosecution – Since he was removed from service following the procedure laid down in Jharkhand police manual – No sanction to prosecute warranted – Apex court confirmed the orders of the high court = Fakhruzamma … Appellant Versus State of Jharkhand & Anr. … Respondent = published in /Cited in / Reported in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41073

Sec.197 Cr. P.C. – Sanction to prosecution – Since he was removed from service following the procedure laid down in Jharkhand police manual – No sanction to prosecute warranted – Apex court confirmed the orders of the high court =  whether sanction under Section 197  Cr.P.C.  is  necessary  from  the  State Government before prosecuting the … Continue reading

changing his date of birth = whereby the Division Bench has overturned the judgment and order dated 14.6.2004 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 5700(W) of 2001 whereunder he had given the stamp of approval to decision dated 26.2.2004 by the General Manager of the appellant-company, who had rejected the objection of the respondent for changing his date of birth as recorded in his service excerpts and Form ‘B’ Register, the appellants have preferred their appeal by special leave.- “Implementation Instruction No. 76” has tried to support the order passed by the Division Bench. Para (A)(i) deals with Matriculation certificate. It reads as follows: – “(i) Matriculates. In the case of appointees who have passed Matriculation or equivalent examinations, the date of birth recorded in the said certificate shall be treated as correct date of birth and the same will not be altered under any circumstances.” Para (A)(v) deals with revision of determination of date of birth in respect of existing employees. Paras (A)(v)(i)(a) and (b) are as follows: – “v) Review determination of date of birth in respect of existing employees. i) (a) In the case of the existing employees Matriculation Certificate or Higher Secondary Certificate issued by the recognized Universities or Board or Middle pass Certificate issued by the Board of Education and/or Department of Public Instruction and admit cards issued by the aforesaid Bodies should be treated as correct provided they were issued by the said Universities/Boards/Institutions prior to the date of employment. (b) Similarly, Mining Sirdarhip, Winding Engine or similar other statutory certificates where the Manager had to certify the date of birth will be treated as authentic. Provided that where both documents mentioned in (i)(a) and (i)(b) above are available, the date of birth recorded in (i)(a) will be treated as authentic.”- It is a well-known principle that one of the ends of equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If a person has taken an undue advantage the court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would be within its domain to deny the discretionary relief. In fact, Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellants, has basically rested his submission on this axis. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench has erred in extending the benefit to the respondent who had taken undue advantage by not producing the Matriculation Certificate solely on the motive to get an entry into service. In view of our aforesaid premised reasons we are unable to concur with the view taken by the High Court in F.M.A. No. 169 of 2006 and, accordingly, the Judgment dated 17.8.2007 passed by the Division Bench is set aside. 19. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40832 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8634 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 22813 of 2007) Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and others … Appellants Versus Bajrangi Rabidas …Respondent         J U D G M E N T   Dipak Misra, J. … Continue reading

“Enhancement of Annual Intake Capacity in Undergraduate Courses in Medical College for the Academic Session 2013-14 only Regulations 2013”= Writ of Certiorari to quash the Corrigendum Notification No. 37(1)2013/One Time Permission/Med./19355, in so far as it confines the benefits of – the “Enhancement of Annual Intake Capacity in Undergraduate Courses in Medical College for the Academic Session 2013-14 only Regulations 2013” (in short “Regulations 2013”), issued vide notification dated 8.7.2013, to the Government Medical Colleges only, as unconstitutional, being ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.= Central Government is also empowered under Section 3(c) of Indian Medical Council Act, as amended in 2010, to issue various directions to the Board of Governor of the the MCI, which reads as follows :- “3C. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of this Act, the Board of Governors or the Council after its reconstitution shall, in exercise of its powers and in the performance of its functions under this Act, be bound by such directions on questions of policy, other – than those relating to technical and administrative matters, as the Central Government may give in writing to it from time to time; Provided that the Board of Governors or the Council after its reconstitution shall, as far as practicable, be given an opportunity to express its views before any direction is given under this subsection. (2) The decision of the Central Government whether a question is a matter of policy or not shall be final.” Board of Governors of the MCI is, therefore, bound by the Corrigendum issued by the Central Government. We notice that the above corrigendum extending the last date was made applicable only to the Government medical colleges recording the reason that the time would be very short so as to process the applications by the MCI received from the non-government medical colleges. We cannot say that the decision taken by the Central Government is perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable, so as to strike down the corrigendum issued under the extra- ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. – 22. The petitions, therefore, lack in merits and are accordingly dismissed.

published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40790         REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 580 OF 2013   Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Medical College & Ors. .. Petitioners   Versus   Union of India & Another .. Respondents   WITH SLP (CIVIL) NO. 24693 OF 2013   J U … Continue reading

Medical college permission – Writ to quash the letter dated 13.07.2013 issued by the Medical Council of India by which the permission granted for renewal of admission for additional intake of students for the academic session 2013-2014 was revoked.= The Medical Council Act, 1956, especially Section 10A, mandates that when a new medical college is to be established or the number of seats to be increased, the permission of the Central Government is a pre-requisite. Section 19A obliges the MCI to prescribe minimum required standards for medical education and the recommendation made by MCI to the Central Government carry considerable weight, it being an Expert Body. MCI had prescribed the regulation – “Minimum Standard Requirements for the Medical College for 100 Admissions Annually Regulations, 1999” which is germane for our case, was published in the Gazette of India dated 29.1.2000. In order to verify the minimum requirements, MCI gets the inspection conducted by Inspectors, who are experts, submit their reports on the availability of the staff – teaching and residents – and other infrastructural facilities, clinical availability, etc. as per the regulations.= “The Prohibition of Unfair Practices in Technical Educational Institutions, Medical Educational Institutions and University Bill, 2010” has already been presented to both the Houses of Parliament. It is reported that the States have welcomed such a legislation, but no further follow up action has been taken. We are confident, earnest efforts would be made to bring in proper legislation, so that unethical and unfair practices prevalent in higher technical and medical institutions can be effectively curbed in the larger public interest. 43. We, therefore, find no good reason to invoke Article 32 of the Constitution of India and none of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners stand violated. The Petition, therefore, lacks merits and is dismissed.

  published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40735   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.585 OF 2013     Rohilkhand Medical College & Hospital, Bareilly …. Petitioner Versus Medical Council of India & Another … Respondents       J U D G M E N T     K.S. Radhakrishnan, … Continue reading

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (in short ‘the RTE Act’) The Writ Petition was filed in the year 2004 and since then, several interim orders have been passed giving directions to the States and the Union Territories to provide the basic infrastructure facilities like toilet facility, drinking water, class rooms, appointment of teachers and all other facilities so that children can study in a clean and healthy environment. We are, inclined to dispose of this Writ Petition with a direction to all the States to give effect to the various directions already given by this Court like providing toilet facilities for boys and girls, drinking water facilities, sufficient class rooms, appointment of teaching and non- teaching staff etc., if not already provided, within six months from today. We make it clear that these directions are applicable to all the schools, whether State owned or privately owned, aided or unaided, minority or non- minority. As the writ petition is disposed of, no orders are required to be passed on applications for intervention and impleadment and the same are disposed of. 10. We make it clear that if the directions are not fully implemented, it is open to the aggrieved parties to move this Court for appropriate orders.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 631 OF 2004   Environment & Consumer Protection Foundation             .. Petitioner Versus Delhi Administration & Ors.                              .. Respondents   J U … Continue reading

Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001-Constitutional validity of-Held : Act not violative of Articles 14, 19(l)(c) and (a)-Parliament had legislative competence to pass the Act in exercise of powers under Article 245 read with entries 62 and 63 of List I of Seventh Schedule- There is no violation of doctrine of separation of powers-Also legislation not vitiated by the malafides-Hence, Act constitutionally valid-Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 14, 19(1 (c), I9(l)(a), 245, 246 and List I Seventh Schedule, Entries 62 and 63. Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 19-Fundamental rights under-Conferred only on citizens of India- Rights do not stand on common pedestal but have varying dimensions and underlying philosophies-Nature of reasonable restrictions imposed- Discussed. Article 19-Constitutional validity of Legislative enactment-Held : Test of reasonableness is to be satisfied-Also substance of the legislation is to be kept in view-Further, in a challenge laid to the constitutional validity the onus of proof is on going shifting process. Article 19(l)(c)-Right to form associations or unions-Does not carry with it fulfillment of every object of an association for which it was formed-It would be contrary to the scheme of rights guaranteed by part III and those conferred by Article 19(l)(a) to (g)-However, rights flowing from the fundamental rights are sought to be included and qualifications are not merely those in Article 19(4)-Further right to form an association is tested by reference to Article 19(l)(c), validity of restriction by Article 19(4), and once individual citizens form an association and carry on activity, validity of restriction is tested by reference to Article 19(l) (g) read with Article 19(6). Articles 245 and 246-Seventh Schedule, List I- Entries 62 and 63- Indian Council of World Affairs-Institution of national importance- Hence, enactment protected by Entries 62 and 63 of List I of Seventh Schedule-Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001. Articles 245 and 246-Doctrine of Colourable Legislation-Scope of-Held : Deals with the question of legislative competence to enact a law-If legislature is competent the motives, bonafides or malafldes are not relevant. Articles 245, 246, 13, 50 and 226–Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001-Act incorporating same provisions as contained in Ordinance declared invalid by High Court-Effect of the judgment of High Court on the legislation-Held: Judgment of High Court being rendered erroneous, overrulling of which is specifically recorded, the constitutional validity of subsequent legislation is not to be decided on basis of the judgment of High Court-Further before error could be corrected in appeal, Ordinance lapsed rendering appeal infructuous-Also by the impugned Act Parliament not overruling the judgment of High Court nor declaring the same law to be valid which was pronounced to be void by the Court-Hence, Act not violative of doctrine of separation of powers. In 1943, an organisation named India Council of World Affairs was formed. The Association was registered as a society. The principal object of the Society was to promote the study of Indian and international questions so as to develop a body of informed opinion on world affairs and Indian relation thereto through study, research, discussion, lectures, exchange of ideas and information etc., with other bodies in India and abroad engaged in similar activities. The Government of India gave land on lease to the society. The Society was housed in a building constructed on the land. It had a library, an auditorium, conference room and other office accommodation. The Society was receiving grants from the Government from 1974 until 1987, whereafter it was discontinued. There was serious mal- administration and mismanagement committed by the society. On 30.6.1990, the President of India promulgated an Ordinance whereby a statutory body known as the Indian Council of World Affairs was constituted, having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold and dispose of both movable and immovable properties. The constitutional validity of the Ordinance was challenged. Single Judge of High Court held the Ordinance as ultra vires the Constitution, violating Articles 14, 19(l)(a) and 19(l)(c) thereof and also beyond the legislative competence of Parliament. Union of India filed a letters patent appeal against the judgment. As the Bill seeking to replace the Ordinance by an Act of Parliament could not be passed, the Ordinance lapsed. Division Bench held that the appeal had become infructuous and dismissed the same. The President promulgated Ordinance No. 3 of 2000, on similar and identical terms of the 1990 Ordinance. However, the Ordinance lapsed. Ordinance No. 1 of 2001 was then promulgated seeking to revive Ordinance No. 3 of 2000, however, this Ordinance also lapsed. Thereafter, Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance No. 3 of 2001 was promulgated. Writ petition (C) No. 276 of 2001 was filed challenging the constitutional validity of the Ordinance, 2001. During pendency of this petition, Ordinance came to be replaced by an Act of Parliament-Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001. Writ petition (C) No. 543 of 2001 was filed challenging the constitutional validity of the Act. Writ petitioners contended that by promulgating the impugned Ordinance and by enacting the impugned Act, the Central Government has taken over the Society as also its movable and immovable properties resulting in violation of petitioners’ right to freedom of speech and expression and to form associations or unions as conferred on citizens by Article 19(l)(a) and (c); that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 were effective enough which, if invoked, could have taken care of the alleged grievances; that by passing the legislation, 1CWA institution was singled out though there were several other institutions run by societies or other organizations which committed more serious mismanagement and mal- administration; that the impugned Act is violative of Article 300A as it deprives the petitioners of the property vesting in the society; that the impugned Ordinance and the Act are malicious being motivated by political considerations; that the identically worded Ordinance having held to be unconstitutional and the judgment of High Court holding so having achieved a finality, the Parliament could not have re-enacted the contents of the vitiated Ordinance into an Act; and that the impugned Ordinance and the Act are violative of the doctrine of Separation of Powers. Respondent-Union of India contended that the earlier Ordinances have mere academic relevance in view of the Parliament having ultimately enacted the Act; that as the India Council of World Affairs is an institution of national importance, the impugned enactment is protected by Entries 62 and 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule; that the Society has not been touched, it continues to survive as before and, therefore, there is no violation of fundamental right within the meaning of Article 19(l)(a) and (c); that the building and the library having built out of Government funds, subventions and some donations, the Society does not have any right in any of the properties; that the impugned Ordinance and Legislation were not politically motivated; that the decision of the Single Judge of High Court with respect to the identically worded Ordinance was incorrect; and that appeal filed was disposed of without any adjudication on merits since the High Court held that the appeal was rendered academic in view of the Ordinance having lapsed. =Disposing of W.P. (C) No. 276 of 2001 and dismissing W.P. (C) No. 543 of 2001, the Court HELD : 1. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001 fails. [199-G] 2.1. At one time, the institution-ICWA was receiving financial aid from the Government of India. 1CWA has been declared to be an `institution of national importance’ by the Act of Parliament, thus the Parliament is competent to make any law governing the management, administration and affairs of such an institution. It is not the case of the petitioners that in enacting other provisions of the impugned Act, the Parliament has encroached upon any field of legislation not available to it. The legislation is clearly covered by Entries 62 and 63 of List I Schedule 7 of the Constiution. [199-H, 200-A, B, C] 2.2. The various Entries in the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule are legislative heads defining the fields of legislation. A large and liberal interpretation should be given to the scope of the Entries. Not only the main matter but also any in incidental and ancillary matters are to be included within the field of the entry. The settled rules of interpretation governing the Entries do not countenance any narrow and pedantic interpretation.[J200-C-E] Navinchandra Mafatlal v. CIT Bombay City, [1955] 1 SCR 829 and Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 989, relied on. British Coal Corporation v. The King, AIR (1935) PC 158 and United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, AIR (1941) FC 16, referred to. 3.1. The Court, confronted with a challenge to the constitutional validity of any legislative enactment by reference to Article 19 would first ask what is the sweep of the fundamental right guaranteed to the citizens by the relevant sub-clause out of sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause (1); if the right canvassed falls within the sweep and expanse of any of the sub- clauses of clause (1), then whether the impugned law imposes a reasonable restriction falling with the scope of clauses (2) to (6) respectively. However, if the right sought to be canvassed does not fall within the sweep of the fundamental rights but is a mere concomitant or adjunct or expansion or incidence of that right, then the validity thereof is not to be tested by reference to clauses (2) to (6). The test which it would be required to satisfy for its constitutional validity is one of reasonableness, or if it comes into conflict with any other provision of the Constitution. This has to be decided by keeping in view the substance of the legislation and not being beguiled by the mere appearance of the legislation. [181-B-D; 187-F] The State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952] SCR 597, followed. H.C. Narayanappa & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors., [1960] 3 SCR 742, relied on. State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose & Ors., [1954] SCR 587, referred to. 3.2. In spite of there being a general presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the legislation, in a challenge laid to the validity of any legislation allegedly violating any right or freedom guaranteed by clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution, on a prima facie case of such violation having been made out, the onus would shift upon the respondent- State to show that the legislation conies within the permissible limits of the most relevant out of clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution, and that the restriction is reasonable. The Court would expect the State to place before it sufficient material justifying the restriction and its reasonability. On the State succeeding in bringing the restriction within the scope of any of the permissible restrictions, such as, the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, decency or morality etc., the onus of showing that restriction is unreasonable would shift back to the petitioner. Where the restriction on its face appears to be unreasonable, nothing more would be required to substantiate the plea of unreasonability. Thus the onus of proof in such cases is an on-going shifting process to be consciously observed by the court. [187-B-E] Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India & Ors., [1950] SCR 869; Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. State of Delhi (Now Delhi Administration) & Anr., [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 156, relied on. 3.3. A right to form associations or unions guaranteed under Article 19(l) (c) does not include within its ken as a fundamental right a right to form associations or unions for achieving a particular object or running a particular institution, the same being a concomitant or concomitant to a concomitant of a fundamental right, but not the fundamental right itself. The associations or unions of citizens cannot further claim as a fundamental right that it must also be able to achieve the purpose for which it has come into existence so that any interference with such achievement by law shall be unconstitutional, unless the same could be justified under Article 19(4) as being a restriction imposed in the interest of public order or morality. It would be contradictory to the scheme underlying the text and the frame of the several fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III and the scheme of the guarantees conferred by sub- clauses (a) to (g) of clause (1) of Article 19. [173-E-H] 3.4. Even a very liberal interpretation cannot lead to the conclusion that the trade unions have a guaranteed right to an effective collective bargaining or to strike, either as part of collective bargaining or otherwise. The right to strike or the right to declare a lock-out may be controlled or restricted by appropriate industrial legislation, and the validity of such legislation would have to be tested not with reference to the criteria laid down in clause (4) of Article 19 but by totally different considerations. A right guaranteed by Article 19(l)(c) on a literal reading thereof can be subjected to those restrictions which satisfy the test of clause (4) of Article 19. The rights not included in the literal meaning of Article 19(l)(c) but which are sought to be included therein as flowing therefrom i.e. every right which is necessary in order that the association, brought into existence, fulfills every object for which it is formed, the qualifications therefor would not merely be those in clause (4) of Article 19 but would be more numerous and very different. Restrictions which bore upon and took into account the several fields in which associations or unions of citizens might legitimately engage themselves, would also become relevant. [175-D-H] 3.5. A perusal of Article 19 with certain other Articles like 26, 29 and 30 shows that while Article 19 grants rights to the citizens as such, the associations can lay claim to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19 solely on the basis of there being an aggregation of citizens, i.e., the rights of the citizens composing the body. As the stream can rise no higher than the source, associations of citizens cannot lay claim to rights not open to citizen or claim freedom from restrictions to which the citizens composing it are subject. While right to form an association is to be tested by reference to Article 19(l)(c) and the validity of restriction thereon by reference to Article 19(4), once the individual citizens have formed an association and carry on some activity, the validity of legislation restricting the activities of the association shall have to be judged by reference to Article 19(l)(g) read with 19(6). A restriction on the activities of the association is not a restriction on the activities of the individual citizens forming membership of the association. [174-B-C, 174-A-B] Smt. Damyanti Naranga & Anr: v. The Union of India and Ors., 11971] 3 SCR 840 and Asom Rashtrabhasha Prachar Samiti, Hedayatpur- Gauhati-3 and Anr. v. State of Assam and Ors., [1989] Supp. SCR 160, distinguished. Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Am:, [1978] 1 SCC 248; All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National Industrial Tribunal, [1962] 3 SCR 269; M/s. Raghubar Dayal Jai Parkash & Anr: v. Union of India & Anr., [1962] 3 SCR 547; Azeez Basha v. Union of India, [1968] 1 SCR 833; D.A. V. College Jullundur etc., v. The State of Punjab and Ors., [1971] 2 SCC 269; Sethapathi Nageswara Rao & Ors. v. The Government of A. P. & Ors., AIR (1978) A.P. 121 (F.B.); Harakh Bhagat and Anr. v. Assistant Registrar, Co- operative Societies, Barh, and Ors., AIR (1968) Patna 211; S.P. Motta v. Union of India & Ors., [1983] 1 SCC 51 and L.N. Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1988] 2 SCC 433, referred to. 3.6. As soon as citizens form a company, the rights are guaranteed to them by Article 19(l)(c). Once a company or a corporation is formed, the business carried on by the said company or corporation is the business of the company or corporation, and is not the business of the citizens who get the company or corporation formed or incorporated, and the rights of the incorporated body must be judged on that footing alone and cannot be judged on the assumption that they are the rights attributable to the business of individual citizens. The same principle would apply to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. [177-D-F] Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd & Anr. v. The State and Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 885, relied on. 3.7. The pith and substance of the impugned legislation is to take over an institution of national importance. As the formation of the society, which is a voluntary association, is not adversely affected and the members of the society are free to continue with such association, the validity of the impugned legislation cannot be tested by reference to sub-clauses (a) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 19. The activity of the society which was being conducted through the institution ICWA has been adversely affected and to that extent the validity of the legislation shall have to be tested by reference to sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19. The activity was of the society and the society cannot claim a fundamental right. Even otherwise the impugned legislation is a reasonable legislation enacted in the interest of the general public and to govern an institution of national importance. It is valid. It does not offend the right guaranteed by Article 19(l)(c). It also does not in any manner deprive the members of the Society of their freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(l)(a). [184-G-H, A-B; 187-G] 4.1. No other institution in the grip of more serious mismanagement and mal-administration is named or particularized so as to be comparable with ICWA and there can be a legislation in respect of a single institution as is clear from the language itself of Entries 62 and 63 of List I. A single institution is capable of being treated as a class by itself for the purpose of legislation if there are special circumstances or reasons which are applicable to that institution and such legislation would not incur the wrath of Article 14. [192-G-H; 193-A] 4.2. Merely because an alternative action under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 could have served the purpose, a case cannot be and is not made out for finding fault with another legislation if the same be within the legislative competence of the Parliament. The Parliament had legislative competence to pass the legislation in exercise of its legislative power under Article 245 of the Constitution read with Entries 62 and 63 of List I. The legislation cannot be said to be arbitrary or violative of Article 14. [192-B-C] S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & On., [1983] 1 SCC 51; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, [1959] SCR 279; Raja Birakishore v. State of Orissa, [1964] 7 SCR 32 and Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, [1950] SCR 869, referred to. 5. The exercise of testing the vires of the impugned legislation by reference to Article 300A of the Constitution is uncalled for in the instant petition since the right to property has ceased to be a fundamental right, and it is doubtful if it could be enforced by a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution; that a case of violation of Article 300A the way it is canvassed is not taken up in the writ petition; that the petition raises disputed questions of facts; that the Union of India has taken over the institution by enasting a law which is within the legislative competence of the Parliament; and that there is not one document of title produced by the petitioners in support of their claim to the property. [191-D; 190-H; 191-A-C] 6. The whole doctrine of Colourable legislation resolves itself into the question of the competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular law. It does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature. If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, motives which impelled it to act are irrelevant and if incompetent, the question of motive does not arise at all. In the instant case, the Parliament has the requisite competence to enact the impugned Act, the enquiry into the motive which persuaded the Parliament into passing the Act-are not relevant. [168-E-G]. K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo & Ors. v. State of Orissa, [1954] SCR 1 and Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. State of Delhi (Now Delhi Administration) & Anr:, [1962] Supp. 1 SCC 156, referred to. 7.1. Filing of an appeal destroys the finality of the judgment under appeal. Upon the lapsing of the earlier Ordinance pending an appeal before a Division Bench, appeal being rendered infructuous, the judgment of Single Judge about the illegality of the earlier Ordinance, cannot any longer bar this Court from deciding about the validity of a fresh law on its own merits, even if the fresh law contains similar provisions. [198-F; 199-A-B] 7.2. The judgment of High Court is not correct and the overruling of the same is specifically recorded. If by reason of retrospective alteration of the factual or legal situation, the judgment is rendered erroneous, the constitutional validity of the subsequent legislation is not available to be decided on the basis of the previous judgment. [195-D] 7.3. A legislation which on an independent scrutiny is held to be within the legislative competence of the enacting legislature cannot be struck down merely because the legislature has re-enacted the same legal provisions into an Act which, ten years before, were incorporated in an Ordinance and were found to be unconstitutional in an erroneous judgment of the High Court and before the error could be corrected in appeal the Ordinance itself lapsed. By the impugned Act the Parliament has not overruled the judgment of the High Court nor has it declared the same law to be valid which has been pronounced to be void by the court. It would have been better if before passing the Bill into an Act the attention of the Parliament was specifically invited to the factum of an earlier part materia Ordinance having been annulled by the High Court. The impugned Act is not liable to be annulled on the ground of violation of the doctrine of Separation of Powers. [199-C-G] Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors., [1969] 2 SCC 283; M/A. Misrilal Jain v. State of Orissa & Anr:, [1977) 3 SCC 212; Madan Mohan Pathak & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [1978] 2 SCC 50; Union of India & Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., [1989] 2 SCC 754; Indian Aluminium Co. & Ors. v. State of Kerala& Ors., [1996] 7 SCC 637; Welfare Association A. R.P. Maharashtra & Anr. v. Ranjit P. Gohil & Ors., JT (2003) 2 SC 335; People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., [2003] 4 SCC 399 and Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain & Anr., [1975] Supp. SCC 1, referred to. A Judge on Judging : The Role of a Supreme Court in Democracy- By President Aharon Barak, Supreme Court of Israel, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 116, No. 1, November 2002, p. 135, referred to. 8. All the grounds taken in writ petition challenging the Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001 have been reiterated and reurged in the writ petition challenging the Indian Council of World Affairs Act 2001. As the merits of the pleas raised on behalf of the writ petitioners are available to be considered in the latter writ petition, the writ petition challenging the Ordinance is rendered infructuous and is disposed of without any adjudication on merits. The Ordinance having ceased to operate, the factum of promulgation of such Ordinance remains only a part of the narration of events. Further no such action was taken thereunder the legality whereof may survive for adjudication. [168-A-C] CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 276 of 2001. WITH W.P. (C) No. 543 of 2001. =2004 AIR 1295, 2003(6 )Suppl.SCR151 , 2004(1 )SCC712 , 2003(10 )SCALE141 ,

CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 276 of 2001 Writ Petition (civil) 543 of 2001 PETITIONER: Dharam Dutt & Ors. RESPONDENT: Union of India & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/11/2003 BENCH: R.C. LAHOTI & BRIJESH KUMAR. JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T R.C. LAHOTI, J. W.P. (C) No.276/2001 filed on June 22, 2002, … Continue reading

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