This tag is associated with 35 posts

Service matter = The Diploma holders after obtaining Degree , on their application , can be re-designated as Assistant engineers and while considering their promotion for Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical) – They can, therefore, be considered only against the 25% quota reserved for the Subordinate Service and not against 75% reserved for the State Service members directly recruited to that service or appointed by transfer in terms of the Rules. = apex court dismissed the appeal. = B. Thirumal …Appellant Versus Ananda Sivakumar and Ors. …Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41001

The Diploma holders after obtaining Degree , on their application , can be re-designated as Assistant engineers  and while considering their promotion for Assistant  Executive  Engineer (Electrical) –    They can, therefore, be considered  only  against  the 25% quota reserved for the Subordinate Service and not against 75%  reserved for the  State  Service  members  directly  recruited  to  that  service  or appointed by transfer … Continue reading

ACT: Hindu Law-Hindu embracing another religion-whether retains original cast. On reconversion to Hinduism-Whether performance of any particular ceremony or expiatory rites necessary. Representation of the people Act.-Parliamentary election-Constituency reserved for scheduled castes-Whether a Hindu Adi Dravida (scheduled cast) on reconversion to Hinduism belongs to scheduled castes. HEADNOTE: The first respondent was elected to the Lok Sabha from a constituency which was reserved for the Scheduled Castes, The appellant challenged the election of the first respondent on the ground that he was not a member of the Scheduled Castes. The election Tribunal found that the first respondent belonged to the Scheduled Caste and upheld the election. Hence this appeal. The appellant urged that the parents and the sisters of the respondent were shown to be Christians and the respondent was born a Christian and there was no way he could acquire a caste and become an Adi Dravida on conversion to Hinduism. Dismissing the appeal. ^ HELD: At all relevant time, the first respondent was a Hindu Adi Dravida and professed no religion other than Hinduism. The precedents particularly those from South India, clearly establish that no particular ceremony is prescribed for reconversion to Hinduism of a person who had earlier embraced another religion. Unless the practice of the Caste makes it necessary no expiatory rites need be performed and, ordinarily, he regains this caste unless the community does not accept him. In fact, it may not be accurate to say that he regains his caste, it may be more accurate to say that he never lost his caste in the first instance when he embraced another religion. The practice of caste however irrational it may appear to our reason and however repugnant it may appear to our moral and social sense, is so deeprooted in the Indian people that its mark does not seem to disappear on conversion to a different religion. If it disappears, it disappears only to re 974 appear on reconversion. The mark of caste does not seem to really disappear even after some generations after conversion. [981A-C] Administrator-General of Madras v. Anandachari & Ors. ILR 9 MADRAS 466, Muthusami Mudalia & Anr. v. Masilamani & Ors. ILR 33 MADRAS 342, Gurusami Nadar v. Irulappa Konar, 67 MADRAS LAW JOURNAL 399, Ramayya v. Mrs. Josephine Elizabeth, AIR 1937 MAD 172, Goona Durgaprasad Rao v. Sudarsanaswami, ILR 1940 MAD 653, Rajgopal v. Armugon & Ors. [1969] I SCR 254, Rajgopal v. Armugam [1969] I SCR 254, Perumal Nadar v; Ponnuswami [1971] I SCR 49, Vermani v. Vermani AIR 1943 LAHORE 51 and Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwer Parashram & Ors.[1954] SCR 817, referred to.= PETITIONER: S. ANBALAGAN Vs. RESPONDENT: B. DEVARAJAN & ORS.= published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=9653

ACT: Hindu  Law-Hindu embracing  another  religion-whether retains original  cast. On  reconversion to Hinduism-Whether performance of any particular ceremony or  expiatory rites necessary. Representation   of   the  people   Act.-Parliamentary election-Constituency reserved for scheduled castes-Whether a Hindu  Adi Dravida  (scheduled cast) on  reconversion  to Hinduism belongs to scheduled castes.       HEADNOTE: The first respondent … Continue reading

Death certificate -Where funeral was conducted – that local authority can also issue a death certificate = refusing to register the death of his wife, Mrs.Pankajam in Chennai, as per the provisions of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and consequently, sought for a direction to the respondents to issue the death certificate of late Mrs.Pankajam.= Rule 7 of the said Rules deals with notification and form of Certificate under section 10 and it reads as follows: ” (1) The certificate as to the cause of death required under sub-section (3) of section 10 shall be issued in Form No.5 or 5-A and the Registrar shall, after making necessary entries in the Register of Births and deaths, forward all such certificates to the Chief Registrar or the Officer specified by him in this behalf by the 10th of the month immediately following the month to which the certificate relates. (2) Any person who performs the funeral ceremonies of a person dying in a local area within the jurisdiction of a municipality, panchayat or other local authority or any other area, shall whenever required furnish to the Registrar such information as he possesses regarding the particulars required for registration”= The words “and shall also” take steps to inform himself employed in Section 7(2) of the Act, has to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. Whenever, an intimation is given by the persons authorised under Sections 8 and 9 or Rule 6 of the Rules made thereunder, the Registrar has to enter the particulars in the register maintained for the purpose and if any information is received by the Registrar, either through the abovesaid persons or others, he may either orally or in writing, require any person to furnish any particulars, within his knowledge in connection with the Birth or Death in the locality, within which, such person resides and after ascertaining the correctness of the particulars furnished, register the same under the Act.- In view of the above, the contention that the respondents have no statutory duty to register the death of the petitioner’s wife, within the State of Tamil Nadu, as the death had occurred in a moving train between New Delhi and Kanpur, is untenable. 39. In the light of the above discussion and following the judgments stated supra and of the factual admission on the part of the respondents in the counter affidavit the dead body of the petitioner’s wife had been brought to Chennai and cremated within the jurisdiction of the first respondent, the impugned communications are set aside and there shall be a direction to the respondents to register the death of the petitioner’s wife to issue the death certificate of late Mrs.Pankajam, wife of the petitioner, after obtaining a declaration from him for registration, to the effect that the particulars sought to be registered are true and correct and that the particulars have not been registered anywhere else in India and also that the same does not run in conflict with particulars registered by any other authority outside India. 40. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/qrydisp.aspx?filename=38256 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 10.12.2010 CORAM THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR W.P.No.18187 of 2010 M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2010 N.Vedantam … Petitioner vs 1. The Executive Officer, Town Panchayat, Perungalathur, Chennai 600 063. 2. The Director, Directorate of Public Health and Preventive Medicine, 359, Anna Salai, Chennai-6. … … Continue reading

Custom, Excise & Gold (Control) = In order to avail of MODVAT/CENVAT credit, an assessee has to satisfy the assessing authorities that the capital goods in the form of components, spares and accessories had been utilized during the process of manufacture of the finished product. Admittedly, in this case the appellant was not able to identify the machinery for which the goods in question had been used. In the absence of such identification, it was not possible for the assessing authorities to come to a decision as to whether MODVAT credit would be given in respect of the goods in question.”- It is also not in dispute that the appellant had purchased some machinery from others and such machinery had not even been unpacked by it and in the exact condition it had been transported along with the machinery manufactured by it to Vietnam. Thus, the appellant did not use the purchased machinery in its premises or in its factory and therefore, necessary condition incorporated in the Rules for availing credit of the MODVAT had not been complied with. To avail the MODVAT credit, the input on which excise duty is paid must be used in the manufacture of the final product in the factory of the assessee. The machinery purchased by the appellant had not even been tested or was not even unwrapped in the factory of the appellant. In case of such an admitted fact, it cannot be said that the machinery so purchased from others was used by the appellant in the manufacture of the sugar plant. 25. In the instant case, the appellant had only acted as a trader or as an exporter in relation to the machinery purchased by it, which had been exported and used for setting up a sugar plant in a foreign country. In any case, it cannot be said to have manufactured that plant in its factory. Moreover, it is also clear that the appellant-assessee did not pay any excise duty on the sugar plant set up by it in Vietnam and therefore, there cannot be any question of availing any MODVAT credit. 27. For the aforestated reasons as well as for the reasons stated by the Tribunal in the impugned order, we are of the view that the Tribunal had come to a correct conclusion and the conclusion so arrived at by the Tribunal does not require any interference. 28. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40718      NON-REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5509-5510 OF 2003   M/S. KCP Ltd. …..APPELLANT   VERSUS Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai ….RESPONDENT   1 J U D G M E N T   1 ANIL R. DAVE, J.   1. … Continue reading

Inquiry by CBI – rejected due to delay – with liberty to file fresh application on fresh grounds if any = the High Court has rejected the prayer of the appellant to transfer the investigation of his case/complaint to Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the `CBI’). – His request to the Judicial Magistrate in regard to medical examination of the injuries which had been caused to him was rejected. = In sum and substance, firstly, the facts and circumstances of the instant case do not present special features warranting transfer of investigation to CBI, and that too, at such a belated stage where the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. has already been submitted before the competent criminal court. The allegations are only against the then RDO who might have been transferred to various districts during these past 15 years. Similarly various other police officials might have investigated the case and it is difficult to assume that every police official was under his influence and all of them acted with malafide intention. In view of the earlier order of this Court dated 2.9.2008, no subsequent development has been brought to the notice of the court which could warrant interference by superior courts and transfer the investigation to CBI. 15. In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

   published in         http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40664 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1167 of 2013 Prof. K.V. Rajendran …Appellant   Versus   Superintendent of Police, CBCID South …Respondents Zone, Chennai & Ors. J U D G M E N T   Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.   1. This … Continue reading

Fire accident= When there is no clause not to make any constructions to the building with out permission – No claim should be rejected when fire accident was occurred due to short – circute – not concerned with building works = the petitioner issued an insurance policy number 201002/11/03/00372 called ‘Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy’ in favour of the complainant / respondent for a sum of Rs.20.50 lacs for the period 17.3.2004 to 16.03.2005. Out of this amount of Rs.20.50 lacs, Rs.20 lacs was meant for stocks of all kinds of sofa material, curtains cloth, mattresses, pillows, cushions, towels, bed sheets, etc., and Rs.50,000/- was the coverage for furniture, fixtures, fittings and electrical items. During the currency of the policy, fire occurred on 19.09.2004 at about 3:30 a.m. and the respondent estimated the loss to be Rs.20,68,090/-. An intimation was given by the respondent to the local police on the date of the fire and the insurance company was also intimated. The petitioner insurance company appointed a surveyor to assess the loss. Vide his report dated 29.01.2005, the surveyor assessed the loss at Rs.10,80,770/-. The surveyor also pointed out that at the time of loss, there was construction going on in the shop on the first and second floors of the building. In order to supply electric current to first and second floor, electric wires had been put on the main electric meter for the shop, which resulted in probable short-circuiting, leading to fire. The petitioner repudiated the claim, saying that there was violation of conditions of the policy, because construction was going on in the premises. = construction activity was being carried out at the premises in question and as per the surveyor’s report, the probable cause of fire could be due to short-circuiting, but we agree with the findings of the District Forum and State Commission that in this case also, the insurance company cannot escape responsibility to pay the claim under the Policy. We do not agree with the contention of the petitioner that the construction activity had resulted in increased risk for the insured stocks in question. It has also been made clear that there are separate electric connections for the ground floor and first floor and there are separate electricity meters for the same. It is not clear anywhere that the insured was required to obtain permission of the insurance company before starting the construction. The District Forum in their order have rightly assessed the value of the total stocks, in question and the value of the stocks lying safe in the godown, and allowed the claim after taking into consideration both these values. We, therefore, find no illegality or irregularity in the orders passed by the District Forum and State Commission which reflect true appreciation of the facts and circumstances on record. These orders are, therefore, upheld and the present revision petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

published in NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION NO. 2381 OF 2012 (From the order dated 30.03.2012 in First Appeal No. 970/2008 of Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission)   United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Regd. & Head Office 24, Whites Road Chennai – 600014 Through its Regional office No. 1 Kanchenjunga Building … Continue reading

compensation for wrongful detention by abusing the police powers – apex court granted 2 lakhs – Crime No.11/98 was registered against the appellant under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 and Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code = the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in W.A. No.1426 of 2010 is under challenge. By the impugned judgment the Division Bench u­pheld the judgment dated 27th April, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.1243 of 2003 and dismissed the appeal, affirming the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge by his judgment dismissed the writ petition preferred by the appellant claiming the damages and praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay him jointly and severally a sum of Rs.10,00,000/­ for his alleged illegal detention and confinement. = Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power.= It has already been noticed that the respondents before the Advisory Board or before the trial court failed to bring on record any evidence to frame the charges against the appellant under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1992 and under Section 505(1)(b) of the IPC or under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. In spite of the same, Ist respondent, 2nd respondent, V.Jegannathan, the then Inspector General and Commissioner of Police, Salem City and the 3rd respondent, M. Ramasamy, the then Inspector of Police, Fairlands Police Station, Salem City before this Court have taken similar plea that the appellant was inciting the police personnel in Tamil Nadu to form an association to fight for their rights and toured the districts of Coimbatore, Tiruchirapalli, Pudukottai and Chennai City and incited the serving police personnel over forming of an association, and acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. By way of additional affidavit certain so called statements of persons have been enclosed which have been filed without any affidavit and were neither the part of the trial court record or material placed before the Advisory Board. The aforesaid action on the part of the Ist, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondent in support of their act of detaining the appellant illegally by placing some material which has beyond the record justifies the appellant’s allegation that the respondents abused their power and position to support their unfair order. In view of the observation made above, though we do not give specific finding on mala fide action on the part of the Ist, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondent but we hold that the respondent­State and its officers have grossly abused legal power to punish the appellant to destroy his reputation in a manner non­oriented by law by detaining him under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 in lodging a Criminal Case No.11/98 under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1992 and under Section 505(1)(b) of the IPC based on the wrong statements which were fully unwarranted.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40488 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4815    OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.32704 OF 2010) N. SENGODAN        … APPELLANT VERUS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HOME (PROHIBITION & EXCISE) DEPARTMENT, CHENNAI AND OTHERS            … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. 2. In   this   appeal   the   judgment   dated   16th  August,   2010 passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in W.A.   No.1426   of  2010   is  under   challenge.   By  the  impugned judgment the Division Bench u­pheld the judgment dated 27th April,   … Continue reading

Section 245: Set off of refunds against tax remaining payable: Where under any of the provisions of this Act, a refund is found to be due to any person, the Assessing Officer, Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Commissioner (Appeals) or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, as the case may be, may, in lieu of payment of the refund, set off the amount to be refunded or any part of that amount, against the sum, if any, remaining payable under this Act by the person to whom the refund is due, after giving an intimation in writing to such person of the action proposed to be taken under this section.” 20. From a reading of the above Section, it is crystal clear that the Assessing Officer, Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Commissioner (Appeals) or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, as the case may be, may, in lieu of payment of the refund, set-off the amount to be refunded or any part of that amount, against the sum, if any, remaining payable under the Act by the person to whom the refund is due, after giving an intimation in writing to such person of the action proposed to be taken under that Section. (emphasis supplied).On a perusal of the entire material documents including the impugned order, it is clearly evident that there is no intimation in writing to the petitioner-assessee before making such an adjustment of refund. No doubt, the respondent is empowered to make the adjustment of refund, but the same can be done only in the manner as contemplated under the provisions of the Act. It is conspicuous from the records that there is no intimation in writing to the petitioner before making such adjustment of refund. As the respondent has not followed the procedures prescribed under the provisions of the Act while adjusting the refund amount with the outstanding amount, the impugned order is vitiated in law and is liable to be set aside. For the foregoing reaasonings, the impugned order is set aside. The Writ Petition is allowed and the matter is remanded back to the respondent for compliance of Section 245 of the Act, and thereafter, the respondent is at liberty to adjust the refund amount payable to the petitioner with the amount payable for the respective assessment year, in accordance with law. Such an exercise shall be completed by the respondent within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. The Miscellaneous Petition is closed. Reported in/ published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/filename=41825

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS     DATED: 30.4.2013   CORAM:   THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.DHANAPALAN   W.P.No.8571 of 2013 & M.P.No.1 of 2013           M/s.Cognizant Technology Solutions India P. Ltd., 6th Floor, New No.165/Old No.110, Menon Eternity Building, St.Mary’s Road, Chennai-600 018 represented by its Director .. … Continue reading

SALE OF PLEDGED SECURITES WITH OUT NOTICE UNDER SEC.176 OF CONTRACT ACT NOT VALID AND LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION = M/s.Green Gardens Private Limited entered into Facility Agreement dated 26.06.2008 with M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited to avail loan of Rs.240 Crores. The loan was secured by pledge of shares equivalent to 200% of the loan amount. M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited disbursed the loan of Rs.227.5 Crores against sanctioned loan of Rs.240 Crores. 3. Mrs.A.Indira Anand and Mrs.K.Bharathi executed Pledge Agreement in favour of M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited to pledge their shares as security for the loan advanced to M/s.Green Gardens Pvt. Ltd. Mr.A.Ravishankar Prasad and Mr.A.Manohar Prasad gave personal guarantee to secure the loan. Along with the Pledge Agreement, Mrs.A.Indira Anand and Mrs.K.Bharathi also executed irrevocable power of attorney in favour of M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited. Taking note of pledge creation forms executed by Mrs.A.Indira Anand and Mrs.K.Bharathi, M/s.Indiabulls Securities Limited recorded pledge of share in their record. 4. 11.07.2008, Mrs.Gemini Arts Pvt. Ltd., and M/s.Gemini Foundation Pvt. Ltd., also became co-borrowers along with M/s.Green Gardens Pvt. Ltd. On 30.09.2008, M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited issued a recall notice to the borrowers as well as to Mrs.A.Indira Anand and Mrs.K.Bharathi. 5. In response to the notice, M/s.Green Gardens Pvt. Ltd., repaid a sum of Rs.5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores only). However, on 12.11.2008, notice was issued to the borrowers informing that the cheques issued for Rs.2 Crores and Rs.3 Crores were returned unpaid. M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited invoked the pledge on 12.11.2008 and accordingly, pledged shares were transferred to the account of M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited in terms of Regulation 58(8) of SEBI Regulations, 1996. 6. On 18.11.2008, margin call notice was issued and on 02.12.2008, M/s.Indiabulls Securities Ltd., sold a part of the shares pledged on instruction of M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited. Being aggrieved by the action of M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited in invoking the pledge and sale of shares by M/s.Indisbulls Securities Ltd., Mrs.A.Indira Anand filed C.S.No.1172 of 2008 in this Court.= On a plain reading of Section 176 of the Contract Act, it is clear that before exercising the power of sale the pawner should give to the pledger reasonable notice of the sale (of the pledged thing) Section 176 is mandatory and even if there is a term in the contract of pledge to waive notice, still, the pledge is not relieved of his obligation to give notice before the sale of pledged articles.”= Section 176 of the Contract Act provides that if the pawner makes a default in payment of the debt in respect of which the goods were pledged, the pawner may bring a suit against the pawner upon the debt, or he may sell the thing pledged on giving the pawner reasonable notice or the same. The contention that notice of the contemplated sale to the pawner should be inferred from his letter dated 13-8-1948, cannot hold water inasmuch as the said letter does not disclose that a reasonable notice had been given by the pawnee to the pawner to sell the securities. A notice of the character contemplated by Section 176 cannot be implied. Such notice has to be clear and specific in language indicating the intention of the pawnee to dispose of the security. No such intention was disclosed by the Bank in any letter to the respondent.- I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the sale of the securities by the appellant Bank without reasonable notice to the respondent was bad and was not binding on hint. What is contemplated by Section 176 is not merely a notice but a ‘reasonable’ notice, meaning thereby a notice of intended sale of the security by the creditor within a certain date so as to afford an opportunity to the debtor to pay up the amount within the time mentioned in the notice. No such notice was ever given by the appellant to the respondent. There can thus he no escape from the conclusion that the sale of the securities by the appellant was against law and not binding on the respondent. The conclusion reached by the lower appellate court was, therefore, legally sound.”=the arbitral award can be set aside if it is contrary to (a) fundamental policy of Indian Law, (b) the interests of India; or (c) justice or morality. A narrower meaning to the expression ‘public policy’ was given therein by confining judicial review of the arbitral award only on the aforementioned three grounds REPORTED IN / PUBLISHED IN judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/filename=41781

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS     Dated: 30.04.2013 THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD K.SHARMA O.P.Nos.228, 229, 258 and 272 of 2012   1. M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited *(previously known as Indiabulls Financial Services Limited) having its Registered Office at F-60, II Floor, Connaught Place, New Delhi-110 001. Rep. By its Authorized … Continue reading

SARFAESI Act, verses Official liquidator under companies Act = any sale conducted defraud other secured creditor within one year after the commencement of company petition is void = There cannot be any doubt of the fact from the dates given earlier that the transfer was within a period of six months from the date of presentation of the liquidation proceedings and consequently it is statutorily invalid and the law does not recognize it. In fact, an attempt was sought to be made that there is no reference to sale in either of the Sections and it only refers to transfer and consequently these provisions can have no application. It has to be held that the transfer of interest in immovable property is in consequence of a sale and therefore the word transfer takes in its fold the very act of sale. Therefore, by applying Section 531 it is quite clear that the transfer shall be deemed to be invalid. 12. Even under Section 531-A it is quite clear if the sale was within a period of one year from the date of presentation of the liquidation proceedings as against the Official Receiver who represents the body of the creditors on his appointment after the winding up proceedings, the sale is void. Therefore, by applying Section 531 or 531-A it is quite clear from any angle the sale in this case is hit by the above provisions and when the sale is statutorily invalid or void there is no need for a relief to be asked by the Official Receiver to set aside the sale or approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal, since these two provisions are to be exclusively dealt by the Company Court alone, which is rightly contended by the Official Liquidator. I hold that this Court alone can decide the binding nature of the transactions under Section 531 or 531(A) of the Companies Act. It is to be noted that the powers conferred under the SARFAESI Act for the Bank or the Authorized Officer is only in order to avoid the delay of legal proceedings and it does not give any right or advantage to misuse the power of quasi judicial nature in order to convert a Non Performing Asset and realize the money by adopting improper mode. Therefore, for all the above reasons, I hold that the sale as held by the Authorized Officer on behalf of the Creditor Bank is void and the right of the Official Receiver in the liquidation proceedings cannot be defeated and as the sale is void, it goes to the root of the obligations between the auction purchaser and the Authorized Officer and when once the sale is set aside as void, it is needless to say that the Creditor Bank cannot take advantage of the void sale and the auction purchaser shall be restored to the same position prior to the sale and any amount realized by the Creditor Bank cannot be retained by it. Accordingly, W.P.No.19297 of 2012 is allowed granting the reliefs claimed thereunder. W.P.No.33655 of 2011 and Company Application No.1972 of 2011 are dismissed. Consequent on the orders holding that the sale as void as it comes within the purview of this Court, Company Application No.421 of 2013 is also allowed as a consequence of the sale being held as void under Section 531 and 531 (A) of the Companies Act. No costs.

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L. NAGESWARA RAO WRIT PETITION Nos.19297 of 2012 & 33655 of 2011 & COMP.A.Nos.1972 of 2011 & 421 of 2013 in C.P.No.215 of 2010 22.04.2013. M/s. United Steel Allied Industries Private Limited ….Petitioner M/s. Indian Bank, Corporate Office, and others …Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Counsel for the Respondents: <Gist : >Head … Continue reading

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