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Mortgage & Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882= whether the mortgagor can induct a person as tenant in a mortgaged property, to the prejudice of the mortgagee, pendente lite, in violation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. – No = Section 52 of the TPA prevents a mortgagor from creating any lease during the pendency of mortgaged suit so as to effect the right of a mortgagee or the purchaser. This Court in Mangru Mahto and others (supra) had -an occasion to consider the scope of Section 52 of the TPA in that very context and held as follows: “……………..But in view of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, if the mortgagor grants such a lease during the pendency of a suit for sale by the mortgagee, the lessee is bound by the result of the litigation. If the property is sold in execution of the decree passed in the suit, the lessee cannot resist a claim for possession by the auction-purchaser. The lessee could apply for being joined as a party to the suit and ask for an opportunity to redeem the property. But if he allows the property to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree and they have now lost the present case, the lessees allowed the suit lands to be sold in execution of the mortgage decree and they have now lost the right of redemption. They cannot resist the claim of the auction purchaser of recovery of possession of the lands.”- Section 65-A of the TPA deals with the mortgagee’s powers to lease. However, in view of Section 52, if the mortgagor grants such a lease during the pendency of a suit for sale by the mortgagee, the lessee is bound by the result of litigation and if the property is sold in execution of the decree, the lessee cannot resist a claim for possession by auction purchaser.- A tenant who is inducted during the subsistence of the mortgage is not entitled to get the protection of the Maharashtra Rent Act. This legal position has been settled by this Court in Om Prakash Garg v. Ganga Sahai and others AIR 1988 -SC 108. – In the above-mentioned circumstances, we are of the view that the courts below have not appreciated the various legal issues and committed an error in non-suiting the appellant. We answer those questions in favour of the appellant and hold that the appellant is entitled to get a decree, as prayed for, since the original first respondent was inducted illegally and to the prejudice of the original mortgagee. Consequently, the judgments of the courts below are set aside and the suit is decreed, however, without any mesne profits. The appeal is allowed, but without any order as to costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40663 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 6966 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12731 of 2007) Sunita Jugalkishore Gilda .. Appellant Versus Ramanlal Udhoji Tanna (Dead) Thr. Lrs. and others .. Respondents J U D G M E N T K. S. … Continue reading
Land Acquisition Act = When the land is in developed area , deduction of 10 % is appropriate but the deduction of 1/3rd in market value is harsh =deduction of 1/3rd value of the land would be very harsh on the appellants because the appellants would be getting substantially less compensation on account of the said deduction. It was also submitted that the High Court had taken note of the fact that the land in question was very much within the developed area. If the land was within the developed area, the High Court should not have deducted 1/3rd of the value of the land in question.= Deduction to the extent of 1/3rd of the value of the land is definitely harsh even as per the observations made by the High Court as the land in question is very much in the developed area. The area has been developed by the HUDA and therefore, the deduction of 1/3rd of the value of the land is not justified. Upon considering all relevant facts, in our opinion, it would be absolutely just if 10% value of the land is deducted instead of 1/3rd because the land is forming part of a well developed area.= The market value of the land in question, as determined by the High Court, is Rs. 11.15 lacs per acre and instead of taking 1/3rd, we direct that 10% of the said value shall be deducted. The claimants shall be entitled to other statutory benefits like solatium, interest etc. on the enhanced compensation.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40661 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6958 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 24357 of 2010) Indraj Singh (Dead) …..Appellants through LRs. & Ors. Versus State of Haryana & Anr. …..Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6959 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) … Continue reading
Land Acquisition Actappellant- sec.4 notification, sec.6 and award can be challenged before taking possession with in reasonable time – Notice at locality is mandatory – no company and it’s site can be acquired for industrial purpose = Company itself is running an industry on the date of the notification, we are of the view that there is no justification in acquiring a running industrial unit for industrialization of the area.- In view of the above, it is clear that in spite of knowing the specific ground raised by the appellant about the non- publication of the substance of the notification as prescribed under the Act in the locality concerned, neither the State nor the Land Acquisition Collector availed the opportunity of filing reply refuting the same. In such circumstances, we have no other option except to hold that there was no publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the locality which is held to be mandatory. It is also relevant to point out that by effecting such publication in the locality, it would be possible for the person in possession, namely, either the owner or lessee to make their representation/objection in the enquiry under Section 5A. In addition to the same, such person “owner or occupier” is entitled to file their objections within 30 days from the date of publication in the locality and by non-publication of the same in the locality as provided under the Act, the owner or occupier loses his valuable right. For these reasons also, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed.= Under these circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 08.07.2008 and quash the land acquisition proceedings insofar as the appellant-Company is concerned.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40657 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6792 OF 2013 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19869 of 2008) M/s V.K.M. Kattha Industries Pvt. Ltd. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Haryana & Ors. …. Respondent(s) J U … Continue reading
The Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CETA’) under Chapter 30 of the Schedule (2) deals with pharmaceutical products for the purposes of tariff. At the relevant time, if a product is held to be medicament, then, the rate of duty was 15% and, if not, 70%. Heading 30.03 deals with the medicaments including veterinary medicaments. – ‘Care or cure’, is the clue for the resolution of the lis arising in these cases. If the product by name ‘Moisturex’ is held to be a medicament for cure, the decision goes in favour of the assessee and if the product is held to be one for care of the skin, the decision benefits the Central Excise. The Tribunal has held in favour of the assessee and, thus, the Central Excise is in appeals.= In the case of ‘Moisturex’, there is no dispute that the said cream is prescribed by the dermatologist for treating the dry skin conditions and that the same is also available in chemist or pharmaceutical shops in the market. The cream is not primarily intended for protection of skin. The ingredients in the cream, the pharmaceutical substances do show that it is used for prophylactic and therapeutic purposes. The Central Excise Tariff Act has unambiguously clarified as to what is a medicament for curing an ailment relating to skin. Heading 33.04 dealing with beauty or make-up preparations and preparations for the care of the skin has specifically excluded medicaments. There is also an indication under the same entry that medicinal preparations used to treat certain complaints are to be provided under the Heading 30.03 (medicaments) or 30.04 (products containing pharmaceutical substances used for medical, surgical, dental or veterinary purpose). 21. Tribunals, the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal,West Zonal Bench at Mumbai in the first case and Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, West Zonal Bench at Mumbai in the other, having regard to the pharmaceutical constituents present in the cream ‘Moisturex’ and its use for the cure of certain skin diseases, have rightly held that the same is a medicament liable to be classified under the Heading 30.03 (medicament). Thus, there is no merit in these appeals. They are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40649 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6988 OF 2003 Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai IV … Appellant (s) Versus M/s. Ciens Laboratories, Mumbai … Respondent (s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4434 OF 2004 Commissioner of Central Excise, Thane-II … Appellant (s) Versus M/s. Time Pharma, Mumbai … … Continue reading
service matter – In the absence of public Advertisement, no posts should be filled from the selected list =there was no advertisement for direct recruitment the select list was quashed.the apex court held that There can be no scintilla of doubt that there was requirement of advertisement for inviting the names. However, as we perceive, the present case projects a totally different picture. = sec. “4. Vacancies to be filled up by persons sponsored by employment exchange. – After the commencement of this Act, all vacancies in the posts in any Government establishment or establishment of any public undertaking, statutory body, Government company or local authority shall be filled up by such persons as may be sponsored by an employment exchange.” – sec.6 Employment exchange to submit list of registrants to appointing authority – The employment exchange shall, on receipt of the requisition under section 5, submit to the appointing authority a list of registrants, other than the registrants who belong to the exempted category, in order of seniority determined on the basis of the length of the period of registration in that employment exchange and in accordance with such principle of rotation as the Director of Employment may prescribe from time to time, and also in conformity with the qualification, age, experience or other requirement, if any, as stated in the requisition.”- The Act provides that the persons are to be selected from the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the State that on the basis of the statutory command names were called for from the employment exchange. As stated earlier, he would clarify that though the names were called for from the employment exchange, the process of selection was not restricted to only the sponsored candidates. In essence, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the State that when thousands of candidates had appeared, though not sponsored by the employment exchange, the panel prepared after following due procedure should not have been quashed. – There can be no scintilla of doubt that there was requirement of advertisement for inviting the names. However, as we perceive, the present case projects a totally different picture. The number of posts available was 1446 in the group ‘D’ category. For the said posts more than 57000 candidates competed. On a querry being made, the learned counsel for the State would admit that the vacancies have not been filled up because of pendency of litigation. Regard being had to the special features of the case, we are inclined to set aside the order of the High Court and that of the tribunal and we so do. We further direct the State Government to fill up the posts available from among the select list. We may hasten to clarify that if any one whose name features in the select list has been appointed in any other department or statutory organization or Government company, he cannot claim an appointment in the Department of Irrigation and Waterways. We further direct the respondent-State and its functionaries to adjust respondents 1 and 2 and extend them the benefit of appointment. The appointees cannot claim any seniority with retrospective effect as that might create cavil amongst the appointees in other departments at earlier point of time. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from today. 13. The appeals are disposed of in above terms. However, there is no order as to costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40651 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6748-6749 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 6177-6178 of 2012) Buddhadeb Ruidas & ors. etc. etc. … Appellants Versus State of West Bengal and ors. …Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6750-6751 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) … Continue reading
Order VI Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.= merely because an amendment may take the suit out of jurisdiction of that court is no ground for refusing an application preferred under Order VI Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40624 Non-reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 6273 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) NO.11428 of 2012) Tara V. Ganju & Anr. .. Appellants Versus Basant and Co. & Ors. .. Respondents J U D G M E N T K. S. Radhakrishnan, J … Continue reading
right to receive pension as per the revised formula.= under the Statute 16 (which has been in force from 1982), it is specifically provided that any change in the rate of pension or relief therein into the service conditions of the State Government employees would be extended to the University. = Therefore, in our view, the Division Bench cannot be faulted for taking the view that the reading of Statute read with the resolution passed by the State Government, University employees will be entitled to include 50% of the D.A. into their basic pay for the purposes of calculating their pension.= It is interesting to note that the University was a party to the Writ Petition but the University did not challenge the decision rendered either by the Single Judge or by the Division Bench. 12. In view of this position, in our view, there is no reason to entertain this appeal. The Civil Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40601 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 200 OF 2011 STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. APPELLANTS VERSUS SUDHIR CHANDRA KUMAR & ORS. RESPONDENTS WITH C.A.NO.205/2011, 206/2011, 207/2011, 208/2011, 209/2011, 210/2011, 202/2011, 203/2011, 201/2011 AND 204/2011. O R D E R 1. We have heard Mr.Manish Kumar, learned counsel … Continue reading
A Daily worker on termination of his service not entitled for re-employment as of right as the termination is not amounts to retrenchment of an employee = whether termination of services of the respondent on the expiry of the contract period would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1948 (for short “the ID Act”). = Section 2(bb) says that if the termination of the service of workman is as a result of non-renewal of the contract between the employer and the workman on its expiry of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, the same would not constitute retrenchment.= Facts would clearly indicate that the respondent’s service was terminated on the expiry of the fixed periods mentioned in the office orders and that he had worked only for 54 days. The mere fact that the appointment orders used the expression “daily wages” does not make the appointment “Casual” because it is the substance that matters, not the form. The contract of appointment consciously entered into by the employer and the employee would, over and above the specific terms of the written agreement, indicates that the employment is short-lived and the same is liable to termination, on the fixed period mentioned in the contract of appointment.= “25G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman. 25H. Re- employment of retrenched workmen.- Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity 2[ to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re- employment and such retrenched workman] who offer themselves for re- employment shall have preference over other persons.”= Section 25H will apply only if the respondent establishes that there had been retrenchment. Facts will clearly indicate that there was no retrenchment under Section 2(oo) read with Section 2(bb) of the ID Act. Consequently, Section 25H would not apply to the facts of the case. Similar is the factual and legal situation in the civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.5387 of 2012 as well. We are sorry to note that the Labour Court, learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not properly appreciated the factual and legal position in this case. When rights of parties are being adjudicated, needless to say, serious thoughts have to be bestowed by the Labour Court as well as the High Court. For the above-mentioned reasons we allow both the appeals, set aside the award passed by the Labour Court and confirmed by the High Court. However, there will be no order as to costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40563 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5498 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5387 of 2012) Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation Appellant Versus Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri Respondent with CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5510 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5390 of 2012) J U D G M E N … Continue reading
A contract for sale of shares is not valid as per sec.13, and 16 of Securities Contracts ( Regulation) Act and as such transfer and registration of shares in the name of purchaser is prohibited and can not be enforced = Armed with the decree, Bhagwati on 12th December, 1994 lodged the transfer deeds in respect of 14120 shares with Peerless for their transfer. Peerless, however, did not accede to the prayer of Bhagwati and by its letter dated 8th February, 1995 refused to register the said shares, inter alia, on the ground that the said transfer of shares by Tuhin in favour of Bhagwati was in violation of the provisions of Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956; hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Regulation Act’. According to Peerless, the contract for sale of shares was not a spot delivery contract, signatures of Tuhin differed from the signatures on the record of Peerless and further the stamps affixed on the instruments of transfer had not been cancelled. Bhagwati re-lodged the shares for transfer on 14th February, 1995 with Peerless but again Peerless did not register those shares in the name of Bhagwati.- Bhagwati, aggrieved by that, approached the Company Law Board, Eastern Region by filing an application under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 hereinafter to be referred to as ’the Act’ and the Company Law Board by its judgment and order dated 25th November, 1998 dismissed the said application inter alia holding that transfer of shares in favour of Bhagwati was against the provisions of Sections 13 and 16 of the Regulation Act and as such, illegal. In the opinion of the Company Law Board Peerless rightly refused registration of transfer. While doing so, the Company Law Board further observed that the shares of a public limited company which are not registered in the Stock Exchange also come under the purview of Regulation Act.= the appellant pleaded that the contract in question is a spot delivery contract and, therefore, does not come within the mischief of Section 16 of the Regulation Act.= “16. Power to prohibit contracts in certain cases.- (1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary to prevent undesirable speculation in specified securities in any State or area, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that no person in the State or area specified in the notification shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of any security specified in the notification except to the extent and in the manner, if any, specified therein. (2) All contracts in contravention of the provisions of sub- section (1) entered into after the date of the notification issued thereunder shall be illegal.” – According to the definition, a contract providing for actual delivery of securities and the payment of price thereof either on the same day as the date of contract or on the next day means a spot delivery contract. When we consider the facts of the present case bearing in mind the definition aforesaid, we find that the contract in question is not a spot delivery contract. True it is that by letter dated 30th of October, 1987 written by Tuhin to Bhagwati, he had stated that the formal agreement had been executed between them on 10th November, 1986 and as per the agreement he is transferring the entire 3530 shares of Peerless purchased from the loan amount and the transfer is in its repayment. However, the agreement dated 21st November, 1994 between Bhagwati and Tuhin which formed part of the compromise decree provides that the sale of shares took place on 30th October, 1987 and in consideration thereof Bhagwati paid a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs on 21st November, 1994 and further the dividend on the entire shares up to the accounting year 1989-90 amounting to Rs.8,64,850 to be retained by Tuhin. In the face of it, the plea of Bhagwati that the payment of Rs. 10 lakh was made to buy peace, is not fit to be accepted and, in fact, that forms part of the consideration for the sale of shares. Once we take this view, the plea of the appellant that it is a spot delivery contract is fit to be rejected. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Company Law Board and the High Court on this issue. Both the contentions of the appellant having no substance, we do not find any merit in this appeal and it is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40558 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7445 OF 2004 BHAGWATI DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. APPELLANT VERSUS PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE & INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD AND ANR. RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J. Appellant aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 30th July, 2003 passed in ACO No.76 … Continue reading
Right to Vote & Right to Contest When arise = “A right to vote is a statutory right, the Law gives it, the Law takes it away. Persons convicted of crime are kept away from elections to the Legislature, whether to State Legislature or Parliament, and all other public elections. The Court has no hesitation in interpreting the Constitution and the Laws framed under it, read together, that persons in the lawful custody of the Police also will not be voters, in which case, they will neither be electors. The Law temporarily takes away the power of such persons to go anywhere near the election scene. To vote is a statutory right. It is privilege to vote, which privilege may be taken away. In that case, the elector would not be qualified, even if his name is on the electoral rolls. The name is not struck off, but the qualification to be an elector and the privilege to vote when in the lawful custody of the police is taken away.” – a person who has no right to vote by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the 1951 Act is not an elector and is therefore not qualified to contest the election to the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of a State.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40561 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3040-3041 OF 2004 The Chief Election Commissioner Etc. … Petitioners Versus Jan Chaukidar (Peoples Watch) & Ors. … Respondents ORDER These are appeals by way of Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against the common order dated … Continue reading
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