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Board not liable to pay any amount to the Bank towards subsidy amount as the Borrower committed default =The Borrower had borrowed money from the Bank for its business and as per policy of the State of Karnataka, the Board had assured the Bank that by way of subsidy, the amount of interest would be paid by the Board to the Bank, provided there was no default in repayment of the principal amount by the Borrower.= the Board has been wrongly saddled with the liability of paying Rs.75,213/-.= The question only is with regard to the liability of the Board. The Board is neither a borrower nor a guarantor. = The Commission and the Karnataka State Khadi and Village Industries Board, will have no liability of any kind either in respect of the principal amount of loan or payment of 4% or revised rate of interest to be borne by the borrowers for which interest subsidy eligibility certificate has been issued by the Commission. Its liability shall be restricted only to the extent of payment of interest subsidy as per scheme. The Commission would be liable to pay interest subsidy as per the scheme only for the period of which the loan is sanctioned by the Bank and is not liable to pay such interest subsidy for the defaulted period 87-88.”= In other words, upon default committed by the Borrower, the Board was absolved of its liability of paying interest on behalf of the Borrower to the Bank and its liability was only to the effect that it would surrender its first charge over the moveable and immoveable assets of the borrower in favour of the Bank. 10. In spite of the aforestated facts, the trial court came to the conclusion that the Board was liable to pay interest which was due and payable by the Borrower. In our opinion, the said finding of the trial court is not correct. Even the High Court’s view of confirming the said finding is not correct and therefore, we quash and set aside the judgment of the appellate court as well as the decree passed by the trial court so far as it makes the Board liable to pay the interest on behalf of the Borrower. In view of the contents of the aforestated letter dated 23rd March, 1988, the Board shall surrender its first charge over all the moveable and immoveable assets of the Borrower in favour of the Bank as soon as possible. 11. The appeal stands partially allowed to the above extent with no order as to costs. Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS

published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40772 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8182 OF 2003 (Arising out of SLP ( C) No. 12161 of 2006)   Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT   VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS   1 J U D G M E N T   … Continue reading

Or.VII, rule 11 Rejection of plaint – Pending sec. 80(2) C.P.C. = whether there can be any presumption with regard to grant of the application filed under Section 80(2) of the CPC, even if no order was passed on the said application and whether the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the applications of the appellants filed for rejection of the plaint though the application filed by respondent No.1- plaintiff under Section 80(2) of the CPC was not finally decided.=The High Court noted that I.A. No. I was pending before the Trial Court and yet applications praying for rejection of the plaint had been heard by the Trial Court. The High Court, therefore, presumed that I.A. No. I, filed under Section 80(2) of the CPC, was granted and therefore, the objection with regard to non-compliance of Section 80(1) of the CPC was not justifiable. whether such an application should be granted, the court is supposed to give hearing to both the sides and consider the nature of the suit and urgency of the matter before taking a final decision. By mere filing of an application, by no stretch of imagination it can be presumed that the application is granted. If such a presumption is accepted, it would mean that the court has not to take any action in pursuance of such an application and if the court has not to take any action, then we failed to understand as to why such an application should be filed. It is an admitted fact that no order had been passed on the application filed under Section 80(2) of the CPC. Till a final order is passed granting the said application, in our opinion, the irregularity in filing of the suit continues. If ultimately the application is rejected, the plaint is to be returned and in that event the application filed on behalf of the appellants under Order VII Rule 11 is to be granted. If the application filed under Section 80(2) is ultimately granted, the objection with regard to non issuance of notice under Section 80(1) of the CPC cannot be raised and in that event the suit would not fail on account of non- issuance of notice under Section 80(1) of the CPC. We reiterate that till the application filed under Section 80(2) of the CPC is finally heard and decided, it cannot be known whether the suit filed without issuance of notice under Section 80(1) of the CPC was justifiable. According to the provisions of Section 80(2) of the CPC, the court has to be satisfied after hearing the parties that there was some grave urgency which required some urgent relief and therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to file a suit without issuance of notice under Section 80(1) of the CPC. Till arguments are advanced on behalf of the plaintiff with regard to urgency in the matter and till the trial court is satisfied with regard to the urgency or requirement of immediate relief in the suit, the court normally would not grant an application under Section 80(2) of the CPC. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that mere filing of an application under Section 80(2) of the CPC would not mean that the said application was granted by the trial court. In the aforestated circumstances, we hold that the trial court had wrongly rejected the applications filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The trial court ought to have heard and decided the application filed under Section 80(2) of the CPC before hearing the applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. 28. As a result of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment delivered by the High Court confirming the order of the Trial Court dated 30th September, 2001 is quashed and set aside. The order of the Trial Court rejecting applications under Order VII Rule 11 is also quashed and set aside. It is directed that the trial court shall first of all decide the application filed by respondent no. 1 under Section 80(2) of the CPC and only after final disposal of the said application, the applications filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC shall be decided. 29. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

  published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40715 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7364 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10956 of 2005)     Govt. of Kerala & Ors. …..Appellants   Versus Sudhir Kumar Sharma & Ors. …..Respondents     J U D G M E N T 1 … Continue reading

the damages/compensation cannot be claimed against the State. ? =Whether the death of son of plaintiff was due to want of care, negligence and callousness of defendants as pleaded by plaintiffs?- Whether there is any bar in law, prohibiting award of damages, on account of the death of a soldier or seaman, if it is proved that the death occurred under mysterious circumstances? = if the negligence or want of proper care on the part of State is proved, the tortious liability to pay damages/compensation would arise and the same needs to be treated as constitutional tort. No decided case is cited as to how a State can claim immunity from the obligation to compensate the dependants of its employee, if it is proved that the death occurred on account of its negligence and lack of proper care. The point is answered accordingly. REPORTED/ PUBLISHED http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9823

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Appeal Suit No.3504 of 2004 04.04.2013 Union of India and another. Ashok Narayan Paldhe and others. Counsel for appellants: Sri Ponnam Ashok Goud Counsel for Respondents : Sri Sunil Ganu <GIST: >HEAD NOTE: ?Cases referred 2004 (1) ALD 19 JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon’ble … Continue reading

Or.39, rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. – Scope of sec. 53 of T.P. Act and Scope of Or.2 rule 2 can be decided at the time of the trial, admitted possession only is to be considered at interlocutory stage – In our considered opinion, the learned single judge has completely misconstrued the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC and has committed serious error in deciding the scope of Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. As noticed above the Civil Judge while granting ad-interim injunction very categorically observed in the order that respective rights of the parties shall be decided at the time of final disposal of the suit. The very fact that Plaintiff No.2 is in possession of the property as a tenant under Plaintiff No.1 and possession of Plaintiff No.2 was not denied, the interim protection was given to Plaintiff No.2 against the threatened action of the defendants to evict her without following the due process of law. In our considered opinion, the order passed by the learned single judge cannot be sustained in law. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court in the aforesaid appeal arising out of the order of injunction.

[REPORTABLE] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1004 of 201 3 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.1185 of 2006) Lakshmi alias Bhagyalakshmi and Anr. … Appellant(s) Vs. E.Jayaram (D) by Lr. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T M.Y. EQBAL, J. Leave granted. 2. This appeal … Continue reading

a conditional Hiba is valid – while gifting two other house properties to each of his two sons, the suit schedule property was gifted by Sharfuddin to his wife Mahboob Bee for her life time maintenance and for her protection as well as to his two sons together.The Privy Council in Nawazish Ali Khan Vs. Raza Khan (1st supra) succinctly stated that gifts of the usufruct (ariyat) is recognized under Muslim law and such gift is not a gift of corpus. Further there was no necessity for the donor to write the names of his two sons also while making the gift to his wife Mahboob Bee if really corpus was gifted to late Mahboob Bee. The trial Court has completely missed the aforesaid aspect and proceeded on the footing as if it is a gift of corpus to Mahboob Bee. It is no doubt true that if any condition is attached to a gift of corpus, which runs inconsistent with or in derogation of gift, such condition is held to be void as per Section 164 of the Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law. To my mind, a fair reading of the document Ex.B1 with the help of translations on record, shows that the gift deed-Ex.B1 in respect of suit schedule property was in two parts, while usufruct was gifted to Mahboob Bee, the corpus was gifted to both of his sons. When once we reached to the conclusion that the gift to Mahboob Bee was only of usufruct and not corpus, Section 164 of the Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law by itself will have no application to the facts of the present case. Consequently after the death of Mahboob Bee on 20.6.1988, the suit schedule house stands gifted to both the sons, each having an equal share. The conclusion of the trial Court that there was no Matruka property left by Mahboob Bee is, therefore, unsustainable. Equally inconsequential the further contention of the defendants that Mahboob Bee exercised her right and sold the property to D.W.2 under Ex.B3. Once it is found that Mahboob Bee had only life interest and was entitled to the usufruct only for her life sustenance, it cannot be said that she had a right to alienate the property. As noticed above, Mahboob Bee died on 20.6.1988 and the present suit for partition was filed on 11.2.1993 within about five years of her death. Once the plaintiff is held to be entitled to seek a decree for partition, any unauthorized alienation made by Mahboob Bee has to yield to the said partition. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to separately question the alienation made by Mahboob Bee under Ex.B3 in favour of D.W.2. In my view, therefore, the points 1 and 2 deserve to be answered in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants and consequently the judgment of the trial Court is liable to be reversed. 16. Accordingly the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiffs/appellants shall stand decreed as prayed for. No costs.

THE HON‘BLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR C.C.C.A.NO. 69 of 2001 31-05-2010 Abdul Khader (died) and others Muzaffaruddin (died) and others Counsel for appellants: Mr. K. Prathap Reddy Counsel for Respondents: Mr. Basith Ali Yavar :JUDGMENT: 1. Plaintiffs in OS.No. 147 of 1993 on the file of the VI-Addl. Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, … Continue reading

Land Acquisition: Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 18 (as amended and adopted in State of Karnataka)-Reference to Court-Application under S. 18(3)(b)-Limitation period-Applicability of S. 5 of the Limitation Act-Notice of award under S. 12(2) served on the claimant-Claimant filed application under S. 18(1) seeking reference within 90 days as laid down in S. 18(2)-Deputy Commissioner failed to make a reference within 90 days as laid down in S. 18(3)(a)-Claimant approached civil court under S. 18(3)(b) after 10 years-Application for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act also filed-Civil Judge condoned delay and directed Deputy Commissioner to make a reference-High Court refused to interfere-Correctness of-Held: On expiry of a period of three years and 90 days right of Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of claimant to move the court gets extinguished-Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to an application under S. 18(3)(b)-High Court’s judgment set aside-Limitation Act, 1963, S. 5. The notice of award under S. 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka) was served on the respondent-claimant. The respondent filed an application under Section 18(1) of the Act (as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka) within 90 days as prescribed under Section 18(2) of the Act. But the Deputy Commissioner did not make a reference within 90 days as provided under Section 18(3)(a) of the Act. The respondent approached the civil court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act after more than 10 years after receipt of the notice of the award. The respondent also filed an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The civil judge condoned the delay and directed the Deputy commissioner to make a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act. In revision, the High Court refused to interfere on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had application and there was no reason to interfere with the condoning of the delay by the civil judge. Hence the appeal. The following questions arose before the Court:- (1) Whether on expiry of the period of three years and 90 days the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of the claimant to move the court get extinguished? (2) Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka)? =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The State Legislature by an amendment brought to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 substituted the proviso to Section 18(2) by replacing the period of six weeks by a period of 90 days and making the starting point, the date of service of notice from the Deputy Commissioner under Section 12(2) of the Act. Section 18(3) was added directing that the Deputy Commissioner should make the reference to the court within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of the application under Section 18(1) of the Act. If he failed to do so within the period of 90 days, the party was given a right under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act to apply to the court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference and the court was conferred the power to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such period as may be fixed by the court. [543-d-f] 2. No time for applying to the court in terms of Section 18(3) of the Act is fixed by the statute. But since the application is to the court, though under a special enactment, Article 137, the residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be attracted and the application has to be made within three years of the application for making a reference or the expiry of 90 days after the application. [544-d-e] The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major, AIR (1994) SC 2227, Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, [1976] 4 SCC 634 and Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal, [1969] 9 SCC 414, relied on. Special Land Acquisition Officer v. G.C. Paramraj, ILR 1991(2) Karnataka 1109, approved. 3. On a plain understanding of the Scheme of Section 18 of the Act as amended in Karnataka, it is apparent that a claimant has to make an application for reference within a period of 90 days of the service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. The Section casts a duty on the concerned officer to make a reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application for reference. The mere inaction on the part of the officer does not affect or straightaway extinguish the right of the claimant-applicant. The claimant is conferred the right to approach the court but he has to do so, within three years of his having made an application for reference in view of the general law of limitation. It is in this context that it has been held that the time available to a claimant for approaching the court for getting a reference made, is in all three years and 90 days from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. That accrual is when he makes an application for reference within the time prescribed by Section 18(2) of the Act. The controversy that is generated in these appeals is whether on the expiry of the said period of three years and 90 days, the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of the claimant to move the court get extinguished. It is to be remembered that the claimant had made his application for reference within the 90 days prescribed by the statute. Should a construction be adopted which will lead to a position that a claimant who has done his part, loses his right on the failure of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application for reference? That will depend on the statutory scheme. [545-g-h; 546-a-d] 4. Under the Karnataka scheme, the period for making an application for reference has been enhanced from six weeks to 90 days and the terminus a quo is the receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) of the Act. The Section proceeds further and imposes a duty on the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference to the Court within 90 days from the date of receipt of the application under Section 18( 1) of the Act. Though it may not be conclusive what one has to notice is that expression used is “shall” and not “may”. The scheme does contemplate a situation where the Deputy Commissioner, in spite of the peremptory nature of the duty cast on him, still fails to make the reference within the time stipulated by Section 18(3)(a). The claimant is, therefore, given the right to approach the Court, namely, the Court that is to deal with the claim on the reference being made, to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within a time to be fixed by the Court. This right to apply to the Court which is to deal with the reference, is not available under the Central Act. [547-d-f] 5. Extinguishment of a right can be expressly provided for or it can arise by the implication from the statute. Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka sets out a scheme. Having made an application for reference within time before the Deputy Commissioner, the claimant may lose his right by not enforcing the right available to him within the time prescribed by law. Section 18(3)(a) and Section 18(3)(b) read in harmony, casts an obligation on the claimant to enforce his claim within the period available for it. The scheme brings about a repose. It is based on a public policy that a right should not be allowed to remain a right indefinitely to be used against another at the will and pleasure of the holder of the right by approaching the court whenever he chooses to do so. When the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference on the application of the claimant under Section 18( 1) of the Act stands extinguished on the expiry of 3 years and 90 days from the date of application for reference, and the right of the claimant to move the Court for compelling a reference also stands extinguished, the right itself loses its enforceability and thus comes to an end as a result. This is the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as adopted in the State of Karnataka. The High Court is, therefore, not correct in searching for a specific provision bringing about an extinguishment of the right to have a reference and on not finding it, postulating that the right would survive for ever. [551-e-h; 552-a-b] State of M.P. v. Bhai Lal AIR (1964) SC 1006, referred to. 6. Under the scheme .of Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka the claimant loses his right to move the Court for reference on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of his making an application to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 18 (1) of the Act within the period fixed by Section 18(2) of the Act. This loss of right to move the court precludes him from seeking a remedy from the court in terms of Section 18 of the Act. This loss of right in the claimant puts an end to the right of the claimant to seek an enhancement of compensation. To say that the Deputy Commissioner can make a reference even after the right in that behalf is lost to the claimant would be incongruous. Once the right of the claimant to enforce his claim itself is lost on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act, there is no question of the Deputy Commissioner who had violated the mandate of Section 18(3)(a) of the Act, reviving the right of the claimant by making a reference at his sweet will and pleasure, whatever be the inducement or occasion for doing so. On a harmonious understanding of the scheme of the Act in the light of the general principle that even though a right may not be extinguished, the remedy may become barred, it would be appropriate to hold that on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of application for reference made within time under Section 18(1) of the Act the remedy of the claimant to have a reference gets extinguished and the right to have an enhancement becomes unenforceable. The Deputy Commissioner would not be entitled to revive a claim which has thus become unenforceable due to lapse of time or non-diligence on the part of the claimant. [552-b-f] The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major AIR (1994) SC 2227, relied on. Assistant Commissioner v. Laxmi Bai ILR 1987 Karnataka 2132, approved. Hanamappa v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer ILR (1998) Karnataka 4071 (FB), overruled. 7. On the failure of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference within 90 days from the date of an application under Section 18(1) of the Act, the claimant is given the right to approach the Land Acquisition Court seeking the compelling of a reference by the Deputy Commissioner. Once the right to move for a compelled reference is lost to the claimant on the scheme of Section 18, the very right to have a claim for enhancement, would come to an end in view of the fact that the remedy in that behalf becomes barred. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner cannot revive that right to a reference. [553-f-g] 8. The right to have a reference enforced through Court or through the Deputy Commissioner becomes extinguished on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference made in time. Consistent with this position it has necessarily to be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not be available since the consequence of not enforcing the right to have a reference made on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as obtaining in Karnataka, is to put an end to the right to have a reference at all. Since in that sense it is an extinguishment of the right, the right cannot be revived by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. [554-g-h; 555-a] The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major AIR (1994) SC 2227, relied on. The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major AIR (1994) SC 2227 and Assistant Commissioner v. Laxmi Bai, ILR (1987) Karnataka 2132, approved. Sanjay R. Hegde, Anil K. Mishra, A. Rohen Singh and N. Ganpathy, (NP) for the Appellant. K. Radhakrishnan and Mrs. K. Sarada Devi for the Respondent No. 1566/2001.=2006 AIR 24 , 2005(4 )Suppl.SCR535 , 2005(8 )SCC709 , 2005(8 )SCALE768 , 2005(9 )JT89

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2024 of 1999 PETITIONER:STATE OF KARNATAKA RESPONDENT:LAXUMAN DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/10/2005 BENCH:CJI R.C. LAHOTI,G.P. MATHUR & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN JUDGMENT:J U D G M E N T WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4459/1999, 607-609/2000, 5547/2000, 1566/2000 and 1567/2001   P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J. All these appeals involve questions connected with the scope and effect … Continue reading

Order I Rule 1 C.P.C=The sole defendant in the Original Suit is the appellant in A.S.No.213 of 2003 and Sri Venkateshwara Cooperative Industrial Estate Limited (‘the Society’, for brevity), represented by its authorised signatory, one of the directors and five others are the appellants in A.S.No.2990 of 2004. They were not parties to the main suit, but however, they filed an application in C.M.P.No.15246 of 2003 seeking leave of this Court to prefer an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree on the ground that the Society has purchased the suit land and that they are aggrieved by the impugned judgment. The said petition was ordered.=Since it appears that the plaintiffs’ have established their case in the suit filed by them against the defendant that the plaintiffs are dominant litus and they are not claiming relief from the society, their case cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that the Society is not impleaded as party to the suit. Though it is also argued on behalf of the appellants that the suit filed by three different plaintiffs in respect of land purchased by them separately and, therefore, they cannot file a joint suit, but, the suit filed by the plaintiffs’ appears to be maintainable under Order I Rule 1 C.P.C., which reads that all the persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative and if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise, since all the plaintiff’s’ have been alleging that the defendant tried to interfere with their possession and claiming relief against one and the same defendant arising out of the same act or transaction, I am of the view that the suit filed by the plaintiffs’ is maintainable.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.CHANDRA KUMAR     APPEAL SUIT Nos.213 of 2003 & 2990 of 2004     Dated:-        November, 2010     APPEAL SUIT No.213 of 2003   Between:-   P.Rathan Lal …Appellant   AND   N.Sudarshan Reddy and others …Respondents   APPEAL SUIT No.2990 of 2004   Between:-   Sri Venkateshwara Coop. Industrial … Continue reading

stay of execution is to be perused in the appeal not in the execution petition=The petitioner preferred an appeal with delay condone application against the judgment and decree in the suit, which the decree holder sought to execute. Admittedly, no stay is granted by the appellate Court staying the judgment and decree. Until and unless the appellate Court stays the execution of the decree, the decree holder is entitled to proceed with for execution of the decree. The petitioner having filed the appeal, it is for him to move the appellate Court and get stay of execution of the decree. The petitioner without pursuing his remedy before the appellate Court, filed the present application, seeking stay of the EP Proceedings, which the Court below has rightly dismissed, and I find no error, whatsoever to interfere with the same.

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA                                                                                                   CIVIL REVISION PETITION No:258 OF 2012        ORDER: This revision is filed against the order dated 6.8.2010 passed in EA No.162 of 2010 in EP No.32 of 2009 in O.S.No.52 of 2000 on the file of the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Chittoor. The petitioner-Judgment debtor filed the application viz., … Continue reading

Jurisdiction-Jurisdiction of Civil Court vis-a-vis Revenue Court-Suit for declaration of sale deeds as null and void-In respect of agricultural as well abadi lands-Before Civil Court-Right, title and interest of the co-sharers of the vendor and entries of names in Revenue Record required to be decided-Trial and Appellate Courts holding that Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the case only to the extent of Abadi land-In Writ Petition, High Court held the suit maintainable before Civil Court-On appeal, held: In the facts of the case, in respect of agricultural land Revenue Court alone had jurisdiction to decide the case and not the civil court-U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act, 1950-s. 299B. Respondent No. 1 – Plaintiff filed a suit seeking cancellation of sale deeds executed by him in favour of the contesting respondents and appellant-defendant on the ground that the same were illegal and null and void as they were not executed with his free will and on his own accord but under intoxication; that he being co-sharer of the property with respondent Nos. 10 to 12 (though their names not entered in Revenue Records), he alone had no right, title or interest to sell the property. Defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Trial Court held that suit was cognizable by the Civil Court so far as abadi land was concerned and in respect of agricultural land jurisdiction vested with the Revenue Court under Section 299B of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Appellate Court confirmed the order of the trial court. Respondent No. 1-Plaintiff filed a Writ Petition which was allowed by High Court holding that the suit was maintainable before Civil Court. Hence the present appeal. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. In the light of the facts of the case, the Courts below were wholly right in reaching the conclusion that such a suit could be entertained only by a Revenue Court and Civil Court had no jurisdiction. The High Court by reversing those orders had committed an error of law and of jurisdiction which deserves interference by this Court. [Para 16] 2. So far as abadi land is concerned, the trial Court held that Civil Court had jurisdiction and the said decision has become final. But as far as agricultural land is concerned, the Trial Court as well as Appellate Court were right in coming to the conclusion that only Revenue Court could have entertained the suit on two grounds. Firstly, the case of the plaintiff himself in the plaint was that he was not the sole owner of the property and defendant Nos. 10 to 12 who were proforma defendants, had also right, title and interest therein. He had also stated in the plaint that though in the Revenue Record, only his name had appeared but defendant Nos. 10 to 12 have also right in the property. Both the Courts below were right in holding that such a question can be decided by a Revenue Court in a suit instituted under Section 229-B of Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. [Para 12] 3. Courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that legality or otherwise of insertion of names of purchasers in Record of Rights and deletion of name of the plaintiff from such record can only be decided by Revenue Court since the names of the purchasers had already been entered into. Only Revenue Court can record a finding whether such an action was in accordance with law or not and it cannot be decided by a Civil Court. [Para 13] Shri Ram and Anr. v. Ist Addl. Distt. Judge and Ors., [2001] 3 SCC 24, relied on. Shobha Dixit, Ashok Kumar Sharma and Sanjay Misra for the Appellants. Manoj K. Mishra, Anju, Sheela, Amit Yadav, D.N. Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra and Rachana Srivastava for the Respondents. =2007(2 )SCR395 , 2007(4 )SCC213 , 2007(2 )SCALE607 , 2007(3 )JT282

CASENO.: Appeal (civil) 3659 of 2003 PETITIONER: KAMLA PRASAD & ORS RESPONDENT: SRI KRISHNA KANT PATHAK & ORS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/02/2007 BENCH: C.K. THAKKER & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T C.K. THAKKER, J. This appeal is filed by the appellant-original defendant Nos. 1 to 6 against an … Continue reading

“Whether the transaction entered into between the parties, Ex.P-1 is a mortgage or a sale outright ?”= Consequently, substantial question of law formulated for the decision of this appeal is decided that it was a mortgage and not a sale outright.

HIGH COURT OF CHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Second Appeal No 6 of 1994 1 Mangtin 2 Bhagwati 3 Shyamwati 4 Rambai 5 Mantora 6 Makhan 7 Ishwari 8 Rajni Bai 9 Munni Bai …Petitioners Versus 1 Rahibai 2 Ajit Died and deleted 3 Sigga Bai 4 Gopal 5 Mangali Bai 6 Budhwantin Bai 7 Pancho Bai … Continue reading

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