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attachment of shares and sale of the same by directing the judgment debtor to produce shares certificates is not wrong=It is a matter of record that the shares held by the respondent in M/s.NFC were attached. The next step is to cause sale of shares. The garnishee i.e., company, in which the respondent had shares, expressed its inability to sell the shares, unless the share certificates are deposited. As a matter of fact, the executing Court ought to have taken those steps in E.A.No.1407 of 2007 itself. Atleast when the petitioner filed E.A.No.738 of 2008, it ought to have directed the respondent to produce the share certificates. The record discloses that on 08.06.2009, the executing Court allowed E.A.No.738 of 2008, but adjourned the matter to 29.06.2009 for production of shares. Instead of ensuring compliance, the executing Court had searched for a shortcut and on 16.06.2010, it has dismissed E.A. No.1407 of 2007; and on that basis, it dismissed E.A.No.738 of 2008. The approach of the executing Court is totally objectionable and this Court takes serious exception to the casual and callous manner, in which the matter was dealt with. It is on account of such attitude that the efficacy of the system is suffering a dent.

THE HON‘BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY Civil Revision Petition No.5591 of 2011 29.11.2011 Veeragandam Venkateswarlu Nerella Veeraswamy Counsel for the petitioner:Sri M.Sudhir Kumar Counsel for the respondent:Sri M.V.S.Suresh Kumar ORDER: It was not without reason that an adage got currency to the effect that the troubles of a plaintiff in a suit start after the … Continue reading

no counter claim of injunction is maintainable in a suit for partition =As long as the suit retains the character of one for partition, the grant of injunction would almost be an extraordinary phenomenon.=Assuming that there is no prohibition in law for filing of a counter claim for the relief of injunction in a suit for partition simplicitor, the person claiming must state the relevant facts that constitute the cause of action. It does not need any emphasis that the cause of action for claiming relief of injunction would be the acts of interference by the plaintiffs in the suit with the possession of the defendants making the counter claim. The affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.610 of 2010 or for that matter, the text, which is sought to be introduced, in the form of a counter claim, is blissfully silent as to the existence of cause of action. For all practical purposes, a counter claim is as good as a suit, and if no cause of action is stated in a suit, it deserves to be rejected. So is the case with the counter claim. It is not as if the filing of a suit by the appellant by itself would constitute the cause of action for filing of the counter claim. The order passed by the trial Court cannot be sustained in law.

THE HON‘BLE MR JUSTICEL.NARASIMHA REDDY Civil Revision Petition No.382 of 2011 05.12.2011 Between: Kommireddy Linga Reddy and another Palgiri Anji Reddy andothers COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS: Sri Narasimhulu COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS: Sri Nimmagadda Satyanarayana ORDER: The petitioners herein filed O.S.No.232 of 2009 in the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Darsi, against respondents 2 to 4, their … Continue reading

whether such a restricted bequest is permissible in view of section 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. =whether a bhumidhar having a right to transfer his land under U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 (the U.P. Act for short), while bequeathing his bhumidhari right in favour of a beneficiary can impose a restriction on the right of the legatee to make it a life estate, and if he does so whether the interest of the holder of a life estate shall continue to remain so restricted, or whether such a legatee can claim his interest to be unrestricted to affect the bequest in favour of other beneficiaries.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2467 OF 2005 Jagan Singh (Dead) Through LRS. … Appellant Versus Dhanwanti & Anr. … Respondents J U D G E M E N T H.L. Gokhale J. This appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India raises the question … Continue reading

judicial service= the petitioner was wrongly denied promotion in July 2003 although his juniors were accorded promotion,the petitioner has been made to retire on December 31, 2006 on attaining the age of 58 years although the superannuation age stood enhanced to 60 years. – promotion, superannuation age of 60 years is to be considered is rejected=A bare perusal of the Clause (B) of amended Rule 20 leaves no manner of doubt that the High Court is empowered to assess and evaluate the record of a judicial officer for continued utility in service upto 60 years. Clause (B) has overriding effect over Clause (A) of Rule 20. This is clear from the expression “Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (A)” with which Clause (B) begins. The mode and manner of assessment and evaluation of the potential of continued utility is prescribed in Rule 20(B)(I) of the 2003 Rules. No legal flaw has been pointed out to the exercise undertaken by the High Court in respect of the assessment and evaluation of the petitioner’s 7 service for continued utility in service upto 60 years.

1   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 31 OF 2004   N.C. DAS Petitioner(s) VERSUS GAUHATI HIGH COURT THR. REGISTRAR Respondent(s) & ORS. J U D G M E N T R.M. LODHA, J. The petitioner on the date of filing the Writ Petition under Article … Continue reading

Limitation Act, 1963-Articles 64 & 65 of the Schedule-Indian Limitation Act, 1908-Articles 142 & 143 of the Schedule-Purchase of suit property by plaintiffs by registered sale deeds without knowledge of earlier purchase of the same by defendants-Suit for possession claiming title by adverse possession was decreed by trial court-High Court reversing the judgment of the trial court holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title by adverse possession-Correctness of-Held, on facts and evidence, positive intention to dispossess the suit property essential to claim adverse possession was not proved by plaintiffs and hence, suit for possession dismissed. Appellant-plaintiffs purchased suit property by two registered sale deeds subsequent to the purchase of the same by respondents-defendants. A suit for possession filed by the appellants claiming title on the basis of adverse possession was decreed by the trial court. The High Court, in appeal, reversed the judgment of the trial court holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title by adverse possession. In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the acknowledgment of the owner’s title was not sine qua non for claiming title by adverse possession. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. Adverse possession is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession . It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostiles. [Para 5] [496-D, E] Downing v. Bird, [100] So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958); Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock, 227 Ark. 1085, 303 S.W.2d 569 (1957); Monnot v. Murphy, [207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742 (1913) and City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 97 A.L.R. 1 (1929), referred to. 1.2. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depend on strong limitation statutes by operation of which, the right to access the court expires through effluxion of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one’s right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or color of title. Simple application of Limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim. [Para 6] [496-F, G; 497-A, B] American Jurisprudence Vol. 3, referred to. Fairweather v. St. Marylebone Property Co., (1962) 2 WLR 1020; [1962] 2 All ER 299; Taylor v. Twinberries, [1930] 2 KB 17 and Chung Ping Kwan & Ors. v. Lam Island Development Company Ltd. (Hong Kong), (1997) AC 38, referred to. 1.3. To assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required. Firstly, application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially “Willful neglect” element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner. Secondly, specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property. [Para 9] [498-D, E, F] 1.4 The aspect of positive intention is weakened by the two sale deeds. Intention is a mental element which is proved and disproved through positive acts. Existence of some events can go a long way to weaken the presumption of intention to dispossess which might have painstakingly grown out of long possession which otherwise would have sufficed in a standard adverse possession case. The fact of possession is important in more than one way. Firstly, due compliance on this count attracts limitation act and secondly, it also assists the court to unearth as the intention to dispossess. [Para 13] [499-D, E] JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, [2005] 49 ERG 90; [2005] ECHR 921, referred to. 1.5. Intention to possess can not be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. If the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialize. [Para 15] [499-G; 500-A] Thakur Kishan Singh (dead) v. Arvind Kumar, [1994] 6 SCC 591, referred to. Lambeth London Borough Council v. Blackburn, [2001] 82 P & CR 494 and The Powell v. Macfarlane, [1977] 39 P & CR 452, referred to. 1.6. There must be intention to dispossess. It needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge and plaintiff has an opportunity to object. After all adverse possession right is not a substantive right but a result of the waiving (willful) or omission (negligent or otherwise) of right to defend or care for the integrity of property on the part of the paper owner of the land. Adverse possession statutes, like other statutes of limitation, rest on a public policy that does not promote litigation and aims at the repose of conditions that the parties have suffered to remain unquestioned long enough to indicate their acquiescence. Intention implies knowledge on the part of the adverse possessor. A peaceful, open and continuous possession is engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario i.e. not by force, nor stealth, nor the licence of the owner. [Paras 20, 22 and 23] [501-F, G; 502-A, B-E; 504-C] Saroop Singh v. Banto & Ors., [2005] 8 SCC 330; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India & Ors., [2004] 10 SCC 779; Narne Rama Murthy v. Ravula Somasundaram & Ors., [2005] 6 SCC 614; S. M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakini, AIR (1964) SC 1254; P. Periasami v. Periathambi, [1995] 6 SCC 253; Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, [1996] 1 SCC 639; M. Durai v. Madhu & Ors., (2007) 2 SCALE 309; Saroop Singh v. Banto & Ors., [2005] 8 SCC 330; Mohammadbhai Kasambhai Sheikh & Ors. v. Abdulla Kasambhai Sheikh, [2004] 13 SCC 385; T. Anjanappa & Ors. v. Somalingappa & Anr., [2006] 7 SCC 570; Des Raj & Ors. v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors., (2007) 3 SCALE 371 and Govindammal v. R. Perumal Chettiar & Ors., JT [2006] 10 SC 121 : [2006] 11 SCC 600, referred to. Secy. of State v. Debendra Lal Khan, AIR (1934) PC 23 and State of West Bengal v. The Dalhousie Institute Society, AIR (1970) SC 1978, distinguished. R. v. Oxfordshire County Council & Ors., Ex Parte Sunningwell Parish Council, [1999] 3 ALL ER 385; [1999] 3 WLR 160; Beresford, R (on the application of) v. City of Sunderland, (2003) 3 WLR 1306; [2004] 1 All ER 160; Beaulane Properties Ltd. v. Palmer, (2005) 3 WLR 554 : (2005) EWHC 817 (Ch); JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, (2005) EHCR 921 (2005) 49 ERG 90 [2005] ECHR 921; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96 [108-14 ECHR 2000-I], referred to. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, (1789) and Universal of Human Rights, (1948) referred to. 1.7. Adverse Possession is a right which comes into play not just because someone loses high right to reclaim the property out of continuous and willful neglect but also on account of possessor’s positive intent to dispossess. Therefore, it is important to take into account before stripping somebody of his lawful title, whether there is an adverse possessor worthy and exhibiting more urgent and genuine desire to dispossess and step into the shoes of the paper owner of the property. [Para 58] [513-A, B] P. Krishnamoorthy, Romy Chacko, Girjesh Pandey and Rajiv Mehta for the Appellants. K.R. Sasiprabhu, Arvind Varma, Swati Sinha and Jaysree Singh (for M/S Fox Mandal & Co.) for the Respondents. =2007 AIR 1753, 2007(5 )SCR491 , 2007(6 )SCC59 , 2007(6 )SCALE95 , 2007(6 )JT86

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 7062 of 2000 PETITIONER: P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy & Ors RESPONDENT: Revamma and Ors DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/04/2007 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T S.B. SINHA, J : BACKGROUND FACTS One Thippaiah was the owner of 5 acre 23 guntas of land having … Continue reading

Or.1 rule 10 impleading of a party ?=Basically, it is for the plaintiff in a suit, to identify the parties against whom he has any grievance and to implead them as defendants in the suit filed for necessary relief. He cannot be compelled to face litigation with the persons against whom he has no grievance. Where, however, any third party is likely to suffer any grievance, on account of the outcome of the suit, he shall be entitled to get himself impleaded. The question as to whether an individual is a proper or necessary party to a suit, would depend upon the nature of relief claimed in the suit and the right or interest projected by the persons, who propose to get themselves impleaded. No hard and fast rule can be weighed, that would cover a possible situation in this regard.

THE HON’BLESRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY C.R.P.No.716 of 2011 08-07-2011 Pallapu Mohanarao (died) per LRs ..petitioners And Thammisetty Subba Rao & others ..Respondents Counsel for the petitioners: Sri M.R.S. Srinivas Counsel for respondents : ORDER: The 1st respondent filed O.S.No.229 of 2005 in the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, against the respondents 2 and … Continue reading

service matter – promotion= It needs no emphasis that a judicial officer has to be disciplined and must behave as a responsible officer. Indiscipline in the judiciary cannot be tolerated. However, as noted above, the remarks of the District Judge that the appellant was, `irresponsible and indisciplined officer who has no regard for superiors or truth’ have been expunged/substituted by the Inspecting Judge. The effect of such expunction/substitution is that the appellant cannot be considered an irresponsible or indisciplined officer on the basis of remarks recorded by the District Judge. The gravity of what has been recorded in column (3) is, thus, lost. Moreover, the root of the problem between the two senior judicial officers appears to be clash of ego. In the words of Samuel Johnson, every man is of importance to himself. The observation noted in column (3), `He never came to me in the chamber or at the residence to discuss any problem relating to Nazarat’ indicates that the District Judge was not happy with the appellant for having not given due importance to him. 18. Be that as it may, due to consideration of the remarks recorded by the District Judge and not taking into consideration that 15

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2307 OF 2011 Pratap Singh …. Appellant Versus State of U.P. & Anr. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. The appellant – a judicial officer – having not been promoted in the substantive vacancy to Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (for short, `UPHJS’) … Continue reading

Limitation Act, 1963-Articles 64 & 65 of the Schedule-Indian Limitation Act, 1908-Articles 142 & 143 of the Schedule-Purchase of suit property by plaintiffs by registered sale deeds without knowledge of earlier purchase of the same by defendants-Suit for possession claiming title by adverse possession was decreed by trial court-High Court reversing the judgment of the trial court holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title by adverse possession-Correctness of-Held, on facts and evidence, positive intention to dispossess the suit property essential to claim adverse possession was not proved by plaintiffs and hence, suit for possession dismissed. Appellant-plaintiffs purchased suit property by two registered sale deeds subsequent to the purchase of the same by respondents-defendants. A suit for possession filed by the appellants claiming title on the basis of adverse possession was decreed by the trial court. The High Court, in appeal, reversed the judgment of the trial court holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title by adverse possession. In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the acknowledgment of the owner’s title was not sine qua non for claiming title by adverse possession. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. Adverse possession is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession . It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostiles. [Para 5] [496-D, E] Downing v. Bird, [100] So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958); Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock, 227 Ark. 1085, 303 S.W.2d 569 (1957); Monnot v. Murphy, [207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742 (1913) and City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 97 A.L.R. 1 (1929), referred to. 1.2. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depend on strong limitation statutes by operation of which, the right to access the court expires through effluxion of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one’s right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or color of title. Simple application of Limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim. [Para 6] [496-F, G; 497-A, B] American Jurisprudence Vol. 3, referred to. Fairweather v. St. Marylebone Property Co., (1962) 2 WLR 1020; [1962] 2 All ER 299; Taylor v. Twinberries, [1930] 2 KB 17 and Chung Ping Kwan & Ors. v. Lam Island Development Company Ltd. (Hong Kong), (1997) AC 38, referred to. 1.3. To assess a claim of adverse possession, two-pronged enquiry is required. Firstly, application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially “Willful neglect” element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the paper-owner. Secondly, specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the property. [Para 9] [498-D, E, F] 1.4 The aspect of positive intention is weakened by the two sale deeds. Intention is a mental element which is proved and disproved through positive acts. Existence of some events can go a long way to weaken the presumption of intention to dispossess which might have painstakingly grown out of long possession which otherwise would have sufficed in a standard adverse possession case. The fact of possession is important in more than one way. Firstly, due compliance on this count attracts limitation act and secondly, it also assists the court to unearth as the intention to dispossess. [Para 13] [499-D, E] JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, [2005] 49 ERG 90; [2005] ECHR 921, referred to. 1.5. Intention to possess can not be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. If the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialize. [Para 15] [499-G; 500-A] Thakur Kishan Singh (dead) v. Arvind Kumar, [1994] 6 SCC 591, referred to. Lambeth London Borough Council v. Blackburn, [2001] 82 P & CR 494 and The Powell v. Macfarlane, [1977] 39 P & CR 452, referred to. 1.6. There must be intention to dispossess. It needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge and plaintiff has an opportunity to object. After all adverse possession right is not a substantive right but a result of the waiving (willful) or omission (negligent or otherwise) of right to defend or care for the integrity of property on the part of the paper owner of the land. Adverse possession statutes, like other statutes of limitation, rest on a public policy that does not promote litigation and aims at the repose of conditions that the parties have suffered to remain unquestioned long enough to indicate their acquiescence. Intention implies knowledge on the part of the adverse possessor. A peaceful, open and continuous possession is engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario i.e. not by force, nor stealth, nor the licence of the owner. [Paras 20, 22 and 23] [501-F, G; 502-A, B-E; 504-C] Saroop Singh v. Banto & Ors., [2005] 8 SCC 330; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India & Ors., [2004] 10 SCC 779; Narne Rama Murthy v. Ravula Somasundaram & Ors., [2005] 6 SCC 614; S. M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakini, AIR (1964) SC 1254; P. Periasami v. Periathambi, [1995] 6 SCC 253; Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, [1996] 1 SCC 639; M. Durai v. Madhu & Ors., (2007) 2 SCALE 309; Saroop Singh v. Banto & Ors., [2005] 8 SCC 330; Mohammadbhai Kasambhai Sheikh & Ors. v. Abdulla Kasambhai Sheikh, [2004] 13 SCC 385; T. Anjanappa & Ors. v. Somalingappa & Anr., [2006] 7 SCC 570; Des Raj & Ors. v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors., (2007) 3 SCALE 371 and Govindammal v. R. Perumal Chettiar & Ors., JT [2006] 10 SC 121 : [2006] 11 SCC 600, referred to. Secy. of State v. Debendra Lal Khan, AIR (1934) PC 23 and State of West Bengal v. The Dalhousie Institute Society, AIR (1970) SC 1978, distinguished. R. v. Oxfordshire County Council & Ors., Ex Parte Sunningwell Parish Council, [1999] 3 ALL ER 385; [1999] 3 WLR 160; Beresford, R (on the application of) v. City of Sunderland, (2003) 3 WLR 1306; [2004] 1 All ER 160; Beaulane Properties Ltd. v. Palmer, (2005) 3 WLR 554 : (2005) EWHC 817 (Ch); JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, (2005) EHCR 921 (2005) 49 ERG 90 [2005] ECHR 921; Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96 [108-14 ECHR 2000-I], referred to. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, (1789) and Universal of Human Rights, (1948) referred to. 1.7. Adverse Possession is a right which comes into play not just because someone loses high right to reclaim the property out of continuous and willful neglect but also on account of possessor’s positive intent to dispossess. Therefore, it is important to take into account before stripping somebody of his lawful title, whether there is an adverse possessor worthy and exhibiting more urgent and genuine desire to dispossess and step into the shoes of the paper owner of the property. [Para 58] [513-A, B] P. Krishnamoorthy, Romy Chacko, Girjesh Pandey and Rajiv Mehta for the Appellants. K.R. Sasiprabhu, Arvind Varma, Swati Sinha and Jaysree Singh (for M/S Fox Mandal & Co.) for the Respondents.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 7062 of 2000 PETITIONER: P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy & Ors RESPONDENT: Revamma and Ors DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/04/2007 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T S.B. SINHA, J : BACKGROUND FACTS One Thippaiah was the owner of 5 acre 23 guntas of land having … Continue reading

quit notice sec.106 of transfer of property act =The contents of quit notice used to be examined meticulously by the civil Courts before Section 106 of the Act came to be amended in the recent past. According to the amended provision, even if there exists any defects in the notice, they do not constitute the basis for dismissal of the suit. Ultimately, the purport of the notice is only to inform the lessee of the intention on the part of the lessor to resume the premises. Once that purpose is served, any technical defects do not matter. Even otherwise, the appellant is not able to point out any defect in Ex.A1.

THE HON‘BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY   A.S. No.288 of 2010 JUDGMENT:               The appellant is a lessee in respect of the premises bearing No.28-2-4, Prakasaraopeta, Visakhapatnam, owned by the respondents.  The respondents filed O.S.No.480 of 2008 in the Court of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam for eviction of the appellant and for … Continue reading

Suit: Suit for declaration of title and injunction – Plaintiffs claiming to be owners of the suit land – Reliance placed on various documents – Trial court decreeing the suit – High Court setting aside the decree – On appeal, held: The suit land was a Government land – The land was not subjected to any land revenue – Documents relied on, do not establish title of the plaintiffs on the lands – Mysore Revenue Manual – Paras 236 and 376 – Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1961 – s. 67. Suit for declaration of title – Against Government and against private individual – Difference between – discussed. Suit for declaration of title against Government – Grant of decree – Criteria for – Discussed. Suit for declaration of title against Government – Onus to prove title – Held: It is for the claimants to establish their title to suit properties – Weakness of Government’s defence or absence of contest, are not sufficient to decree declaratory suits against the Government. Adverse possession – Right adverse to the Government – Claim of – Held: To claim adverse possession, claimant’s possession should be actual, open and visible, hostile to the owner and continued during entire period necessary to create bar under the law of limitation. Appellant-plaintiffs filed the present suit for declaration of title and consequential relief of permanent injunction in respect of the suit land (Survey Nos. 30 and 31), against the respondent-defendants. Appellants claimed to be owners of a tank in Survey No. 30 and a barren land in Survey No. 31. They claimed that the suit land was part of the land owned by their ancestors, and they were in continuous possession of the suit land as owners. The appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction when City Improvement Trusts Board attempted to interfere with their possession of the tank (Survey No. 30). Subsequently the present suit was filed wherein the appellants-plaintiff claimed title over the suit land Survey Nos. 30 and 31, placing reliance on Exs. P1, P2, P10, P11, P12 and P18. During pendency of the present suit, first suit was dismissed. Appeal against the order was also dismissed by High Court observing that the judgment would not affect the pending (present) suit. Plea of the respondent-defendants was that Survey No.30 was a Government tank shown as Kharab land in the revenue records and Survey No. 31 was also a government barren land shown in revenue records as Government Kharab land. Trial court decreed the suit holding that appellants had made out their possession and title with regard to the suit property. High Court, in appeal, set aside the decree. Hence the present appeals. =Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. The appellants were not registered as the owners or khatedars or occupiers of the suit lands in any revenue records. They did not have any document of title referring to the suit properties. The appellants did not have possession. Even assuming that the tank in Survey No. 30 was repaired/ maintained by the ancestors of plaintiff at some point of time, there is no document to show that the tank was used, maintained or repaired by the appellants or their predecessors during more than half a century before the filing of the suit. The suit has to fail. [Para 21] [926-B-D] 1.2. The High Court, being the first appellate court is the final court of fact. It has, after examining the evidence exhaustively recorded a finding that the appellants have not established their title or possession. There is no error in the findings and conclusions of the High Court. The appellants who came to court claiming title, not having established title, their suit is liable to be dismissed. [Para 19] [925-D-E] 2.1. Suits for declaration of title against the Government, though similar to suits for declaration of title against private individuals differ significantly in some aspects. The first difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour of the Government. All lands which are not the property of any person or which are not vested in a local authority, belong to the Government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the Government, unless any person can establish his right or title to any such land. This presumption available to the Government, is not available to any person or individual. The second difference is in regard to the period for which title and/or possession have to be established by a person suing for declaration of title. Establishing title/possession for a period exceeding twelve years may be adequate to establish title in a declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/possession for a period exceeding thirty years will have to be established to succeed in a declaratory suit for title against Government. This follows from Article 112 of Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a longer period of thirty years as limitation in regard to suits by Government as against the period of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire State and it is not always possible for the Government to protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments. Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protect its properties and maintain proper records, either due to negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession against the Government. Any loss of Government property is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements. [Para 15] [921-G-H; 922-A-E] 2.2. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title and injunction against Government, in a casual manner, ignoring or overlooking the special features relating to Government properties. Instances of such suits against Government being routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries are common. Whether the Government contests the suit or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a Government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his title by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit (except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the Government or a statutory development authority), or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years. In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the presumptions available in favour of the Government, grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the Government by relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted or admitted. [Para 16] [922- G-H; 923-A-B] 2.3. Section 67 of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1961 declares that all tanks and all lands which are not the property of any person are the property of the State Government. Weakness of Government’s defence or absence of contest, are not therefore sufficient to decree declaratory suits against the Government. It is for the appellants to establish their title to the suit properties. [Para 18] [924-E; 925-B-C] 2.4. A court should necessarily seek an answer to the following question, before it grants a decree declaring title against the Government : whether the plaintiff has produced title deeds tracing the title for a period of more than thirty years; or whether the plaintiff has established his adverse possession to the knowledge of the Government for a period of more than thirty years, so as to convert his possession into title. Incidental to that question, the court should also find out whether the plaintiff is recorded to be the owner or holder or occupant of the property in the Revenue Records or Municipal Records, for more than thirty years, and what is the nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if he is in possession – authorized or unauthorized; permissive; casual and occasional; furtive and clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed or implied (following a title). [Para 16] [923-C-E] 2.5. Mere temporary use or occupation without the animus to claim ownership or mere use at sufferance will not be sufficient to create any right adverse to the Government. In order to oust or defeat the title of the Government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title of the Government or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of the Government. To claim adverse possession, the possession of the claimant must be actual, open and visible, hostile to the owner (and therefore necessarily with the knowledge of the owner) and continued during the entire period necessary to create a bar under the law of limitation. In short, it should be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent. Mere vague or doubtful assertions that the claimant has been in adverse possession will not be sufficient. Unexplained stray or sporadic entries for a year or for a few years will not be sufficient and should be ignored. By its very nature, a claim based on adverse possession requires clear and categorical pleadings and evidence, much more so, if it is against the Government. [Para 17] [923-F-H; 924-A-B] On facts: 3.1. Exhibit P18 is an extract of the register maintained by the Public Works Department showing the details of tanks in Bangalore Division. The said extract is in respect of Serial No.279 from the said register relating to a tank described as `Maistry Kere’ or `Maistry Palyada Kere’ in Jakkasandra village, the extent of the water body being 11 acres. The name of the tank is followed by the word `private’ in the register and gives particulars of the Achkat area of the tank (that is area of land irrigated by the said tank) in the year 1906-07. The appellants took the plea that the description of the tank as `private’ in the Tank Register would demonstrate that the tank did not belong to the Government and that it was privately owned. The High Court however held that the mere use of the word `private’ after the description of the tank, will not establish appellant’s title or possession in regard to Survey No.30. [Para 5] [916-E-G] 3.2. A reading of Para 376 of the Mysore Revenue Manual shows that a private tank can be constructed by a private individual, either in his own land or on Government unoccupied land. It also shows that private individuals may restore Government tanks. Therefore it follows that when a tank is described as `private’ in the Tank Register, that by itself will not establish that the land where the tank is situated is private land. When a tank enumerated in the Tank Register maintained by the Government, adds to the description of the tank, by the word `private’, it merely shows that the tank in question had been constructed by a private individual but it does not lead to the inference that the land on which the tank is constructed belonged to a private individual. [Para 7] [917-G-H; 918-A-B] 3.3. Para 236 of the Manual shows that a private land on being converted into a private tank would not get full exemption or remission from payment of land assessment, but was extended only a partial remission. In fact, if a tank was constructed on a private land, the land would be continued to be assessed to land revenue with appropriate partial remission. On the other hand, if it is a Government unoccupied land on which a private individual is permitted to construct the tank, it will continue to be shown as Government Kharab land and will not be subjected to any land revenue. In this case neither Survey No.30 nor Survey No.31 is assessed to land revenue and are shown as Government Kharab land in all revenue records (vide Ex. D7, D8, D9, D10, D11 and D12). Unarable lands including tanks are described as Phut Kharab. The Tank register extract (Ex.D15) and other documents produced by respondents show that the tank was breached and BDA had formed a layout in a major portion of the tank land and the remaining area was being developed into a park by the Forest Department. Therefore, Ex. P18 proves that Survey No.30 was not a land owned by a private individual and that it belonged to Government. [Para 8] [918-C-F] 3.4. Ex. P1 which is an extract of Phut Pahani (Inspection Statement showing the old survey numbers and corresponding new numbers of lands and full information regarding tenure and occupancy of the land, described in the Mysore Revenue Manual), did not relate to nor provide proof of ownership of any land. Ex.P1 merely disclosed that when it was inspected on 18.6.1871, survey no.25 of Jakkasandra measuring 10 acres 28 guntas was a tank and that it was repaired by predecessor of appellant. This document therefore does not help the appellants to prove title of their predecessor to the tank. Unless the title to the land on which the tank is situated is established, the mere fact that the tank was shown to have been maintained or repaired by any private individual will not make him the owner of the tank. At best it will show that the tank was maintained by him as a private tank for the purpose of irrigation. [Para 10] [919-D-F] 3.5. Ex.P2 (settlement deed) does not refer to the tank. It does not give the total extent of the land. It does not disclose whether Survey. Nos. 30 and 31 formed part of Dalavai Dinne owned by the ancestors of appellants at any point of time. The settlement deed merely shows that the predecessor of the appellants had settled certain land, known as Dalavai Dinne which was assessed to land revenue, to his son and does not help the appellant to establish title to either survey Nos. 30 or 31. While the settlement deed describes the land settled as land assessed to land revenue, significantly, Survey Nos. 30 or 31 which are now claimed by the appellants as part of Dalavai Dinne were never assessed to land revenue, but were always described as Government Kharab land. Ex.P1 and P2 are therefore of no assistance to the appellants. [Para 11] [919-G-H; 920-A-C] 3.6. Ex.P.10 and P11 are contract notes executed by contractors said to have been engaged by the predecessor of the appellants for execution of certain works relating to the tank at Dalavai Palya. They are not signed by the predecessor of the appellants. Even assuming that the documents (Ex.P10 and P11) are genuine and related to a tank situated in Survey No.30, they would not help the appellants to establish title to Survey No. 30, or Survey. No. 31. [Para 12] [920-E-F] 3.7. Ex.P12 is said to be the Tank Majkur Register Extract maintained by the Assistant Superintendent of Land Records, Bangalore Sub-Division, showing that Re-survey No.30 measured 11 acres 21 guntas and the entire extent was karab (tank) and it corresponded to old survey No.25. It also records that the tank was dug by and was later repaired by predecesors of the appellants about 25 years ago and thereafter no one has repaired it and it is in the state of good repair. The date of inspection or entry is not mentioned and it does in no way help the appellants to prove title to the land. [Para 13] [920-H; 921-A-B] 3.8. The land acquisition reference proceedings relied upon by the appellant did not relate to Survey Nos. 30 or 31. It is related to other lands and the issue before the court was a dispute between the appellant and some other claimants. There is no adjudication of the title of the appellants or their ancestors in regard to Survey Nos. 30 or 31. Nor is there any finding by the court which can support the appellants’ claim to Survey No.30 or Survey No. 31. Therefore, the High Court has rightly rejected the said judgment as not relevant for examining the title of the appellants. [Para 14] [921-C-E] 3.9. The first appellant had earlier filed a suit for a permanent injunction, claiming that he was in possession of Survey. No. 30 (tank). That suit and appeal therefrom were dismissed by recording a finding that he failed to establish possession. The observation of the High Court while dismissing the appeal from the decision in the earlier injunction suit, that the dismissal will not come in the way of plaintiff establishing title in the subsequent suit for declaration of title, will not dilute the finding recorded by the trial court and High Court that the first appellant was not in possession, which has attained finality. [Para 20] [925-F-H; 926-A] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1588-1589 of 2008. From the Judgment & Order dated 4.9.2007 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 448 & 529 of 1996. Raju Ramachandran, Sanjay R. Hegde, Joseph Pookkatt, Bhardwaj, S. Iyengar, S.N. Bhat for the Appellants. S.S. Javeli, Basava Prabhu Patil, S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar, A.S. Kulkarni, Vijay Kumar, Anitha Shenoy, Rashmi Nanda Kumar for the Respondents.

R. HANUMAIAH & ANR. v. SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA REVENUE DEPARTMENT & ORS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 1588-1589 of 2008) FEBRUARY 24, 2010* [R.V. Raveendran and Swatanter Kumar, JJ.] 2010 (4) SCR 904 The Order of the Court was delivered by ORDER R.V. RAVEENDRAN J. 1. These appeals by special leave are by the plaintiffs … Continue reading

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