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Coimbatore

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Section 498A and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.= where some part of evidence is not believable, it does not mean that entire case is false, court can take aid of sec.106 of Indian Evidence Act to do justice = “The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. This maxim has not received general acceptance nor has it come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. The doctrine is a dangerous one, especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for replacing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. Falsity of a particular material witness or a material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence 2 (2003) 7 SCC 643 does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment.” – while dealing with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, this Court observed as under: “A fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as to the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilized. Section 106 however is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, has offered an explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.” – PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan has stated that if poison had been consumed prior to the head injury, it would have reached the liver and kidney. He has added that if poison is administered to a person when he is in an unconscious state there is a possibility that it would reach the stomach and intestine. = A1-Babu first caused the head injury to the deceased and when she became unconscious in order to create evidence to suggest that the deceased committed suicide, he administered poison to her. It reached her stomach and intestine but before it could reach the kidney and liver she died. When she succumbed to the head injury, the poison did not pass on to the liver and kidney. The High Court has rightly observed that this is the reason why there is no evidence of any resistance being offered by the deceased and no bruises were found on her lips. The trial court has convicted A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC on the ground that the deceased had suffered only one head injury. The High Court has concurred with the trial court. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. In the circumstances, we confirm the conviction of A1- Babu and A2-Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the sentence imposed on A1- Babu for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We find from the letter dated 17/5/2013 sent by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore that A2-Pappathi has already undergone one year and four months sentence. In the peculiar facts of the case we direct that the sentence already undergone by A2-Pappathi be treated as sentence for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the conviction and sentence of A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. However, we quash and set aside the conviction and sentence of A2- Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I read with Section 109 of the IPC. There is, therefore, no question of her surrendering to the Court. As per order passed by this Court on 8/10/2007, she is on bail. Her bail bond shall stand discharged. As per the order of this Court dated 8/10/2007, A1-Babu is also on bail. Since we have confirmed his conviction and sentence, we direct that he should surrender before the Principal Sessions Judge, Coimbatore to serve out the remaining sentence. His bail bond shall stand cancelled. Needless to say that A1-Babu’s sentence for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304 Part I of the IPC shall run concurrently.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40478 Page 1 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1738 OF 2007 BABU @ BALASUBRAMANIAM AND ANR. …Appellants Versus THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU …Respondent J U D G M E N T (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. The appellants (A1-Babu and A2-Pappathi respectively, for convenience) … Continue reading

MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE – JURISDICTION- LIMITAION – LOCUS STANDI OF THIRD PARTY TO CONTINUE AFTER THE DEATH OF COMPLAINANT= initially complaint was filed before Delhi Forum and subsequently, complaint was filed before Mumbai Forum. But, both fora had no territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint. Late Ms.Mohsena in her complaint has stated that she had undergone Ayurvedic treatment in the year 2001, at Calicut, Kerala. Further, as per Ms.Mohsena’s case, she did not get desire relief for treatment, hence, she came to Mumbai and had undergone some treatment. Thereafter, she shifted to Delhi for further treatment. The mere fact that Ms. Mohsena after getting her initial treatment at Calicut, got further treatment at Mumbai and Delhi will not give these two fora any territorial jurisdiction. Hence, on this short point alone, consumer complaint ought to have been rejected. 15. The second question for consideration is as to whether petitioner has any locus standi to file the present revision petition. It is an admitted case that it was late Ms.Mohsena, who initially had under gone medical treatment provided by Taj Residency at Calicut. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner is the legal heir of Ms.Mohsena, as per Hindu Succession Act. Moreover, it has nowhere been stated by the petitioner as to when parents of Ms.Mohsena died, nor their death certificates have been filed. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that petitioner is not the legal heir of Ms.Mohsena and as such she does not fall within the definition of “Consumer” as defined in the Act. 16. Next question to be seen is as to whether complaint was filed within the period of limitation. 17. As observed hereinabove, Ms.Mohsena got her initial treatment in Taj Residency, Calicut, in the year 2001. However, complaint was filed only in the year 2008 before the Mumbai forum. Thus, the complaint was hopelessly barred by limitation. = Petitioner who was having no locus standi to file the complaint has been pursuing this meritless litigation from day one, just to harass eight respondents out of whom seven are doctors. During last ten years, petitioner has taken the respondents to different consumer fora by filing one petition or the other, just to cause harassment to them. 22. Under these circumstances, present revision petition is liable to be dismissed with punitive cost. Accordingly, we dismiss the present revision petition with punitive cost of Rs.40,000 (Rupees Forty thousand only).

PUBLISHED IN http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00130606113118111RP23492011.htm   NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION  PETITION NO.   2349   OF  2011 (Against the order dated   24.06.2010   in Appeal No. A/10/267 of the State Commission,   Maharashtra) Ms. Raika Bandukwalla D/o Abdeali 25, Colaba causeway Mumbai – 400039                                                       ……. Petitioner   Versus   Dr. Anuradha Nayyar Samaj Ayurvedic Centre 14, Kohinoor Road Dadar East Mumbai – 400014   Dr.G.R. Verma The Arya Vaidya Pharmacy (Cbe) Ltd. 8-A/42, W.E.A. Karol Bagh New Delhi-110005   Ayurvedic Trust & Research … Continue reading

goods damaged in transit = compensation = consumer foram=”……Any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.”

1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3546 OF 2006 M/s Nagpur Golden Transport Company (Regd.) … Appellant Versus M/s Nath Traders & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal by way of special leave under … Continue reading

Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 – ss.18 and 28 – Passing off – Cause of action – Appellants manufacturing and selling banana chips under the trademark A-ONE – Filed application for registration of the trade mark- Application still pending – Respondent too filed application seeking registration as user of trademark A-ONE – Suit filed by appellants seeking injunction to restrain respondent from `passing off’ his goods using the trade mark A-ONE – Dismissal of, by High Court – Justification – Held: Justified – Before registration is granted for trade mark, there is no right to assert that the mark has been infringed – A proposed registration, which may or may not be granted, does not confer a cause of action to the plaintiff, whether application for registration is filed by plaintiff, or defendant – Mere filing of trade mark application cannot be regarded as a cause of action for filing a suit for `passing off’ – On facts, filing of application for registration of trade mark did not indicate any deception on part of respondent to injure business or goodwill of the appellants – Necessary requirements of an action for `passing off’ were absent. The appellants were manufacturing and selling banana chips under the trademark “A-ONE” since 1986. In 1999, they filed an application before the Trade Mark Registry for registration of the trade mark “A-ONE”. The application remained pending. In 2000, the respondent too filed an application seeking registration as user of the trademark “A-ONE”. Thereafter, the appellants filed suit before the High Court seeking injunction to restrain the respondent from `passing off’ his goods using the trade mark “A-ONE”. The High Court dismissed the suit. The question which arose for consideration in the instant appeals was as to whether the appellants were entitled to seek injunction to restrain the respondent from passing off his goods using the trademark “A-ONE”.

REPRORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 4480-4481 of 2002 K. Narayanan and Anr. … Appellants VERSUS S.Murali …Respondent JUDGMENT TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. The present appeals are filed at the instance of the appellants against the Judgment and final order dated 18th of April, 2002 passed by the … Continue reading

In feudal society sexual relationship between man and woman outside marriage was totally taboo and regarded with disgust and horror, as depicted in Leo Tolstoy’s novel `Anna Karenina’, Gustave Flaubert’s novel `Madame Bovary’ and the novels of the great Bengali writer Sharat Chandra Chattopadhyaya. When a wife is deserted, in most countries the law provides for maintenance to her by her husband, which is called alimony. However, earlier there was no law providing for maintenance to a woman who was having a live-in relationship with a man without being married to him and was then deserted by him. 24. In USA the expression `palimony’ was coined which means grant of maintenance to a woman who has lived for a substantial period of time with a man without marrying him, and is then deserted by him (see `palimony’ on Google). The first decision on palimony was the well known decision of the California Superior Court in Marvin vs. Marvin (1976) 18 C3d660. This case related to the famous film actor Lee Marvin, with whom a lady Michelle lived for many years without marrying him, and was then deserted

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2028-2029__OF 2010 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos.2273-2274/2010] D. Velusamy .. Appellant -versus- D. Patchaiammal .. Respondent JUDGMENT Markandey Katju, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. None has appeared for the respondent although she has … Continue reading

The sole respondent, who is none other than the husband of the aggrieved person in an application filed under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to for short as ‘the Act’ only) is the revision petitioner. By order dated 19.5.2010 in M.P.No.6596 of 2008, the court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Thrissur allowed the petition in part granting the following reliefs, in favour of the aggrieved person/wife:- “1. The respondent is restrained from uttering obscene words and from making defamatory statements against the petitioner and also from committing any acts of violence in her working place. 2. The respondent is directed to remove himself from the shared house situated in the ‘A’ schedule property. 3. The respondent is restrained from committing any mischief to the ‘B’ schedule items kept in the ‘A’ schedule house. 4. The respondent is restrained from alienating or from encumbering the property having an extent of 6= cents comprised in survey No.598/1 of Thrissur village.”

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 338 of 2011() 1. VINCENT CHIRAYATH, AGED 57 YEARS, … Petitioner Vs 1. DR.P.L.MARY, AGED 55 YEARS, … Respondent 2. THE STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY 3. THE UNION OF INDIA, For Petitioner :SRI.P.CHANDRASEKHAR For Respondent :SRI.T.P.M.IBRAHIM KHAN,ASST.S.G OF INDI The Hon’ble MR. Justice V.K.MOHANAN Dated … Continue reading

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