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Companies Act
Liability of directors under sec.141 – there must be specific pleadings against the accused to fasten liability under sec.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act – A.K. SINGHANIA … APPELLANT VERSUS GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER CO. LTD. & ANR. …RESPONDENTS judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40882
Liability of directors under sec.141 – there must be specific pleadings against the accused to fasten liability under sec.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act High court quashed the complaint– Apex court confirm the same = Section 141 of the Act makes the Directors in charge and responsible to Company “for the … Continue reading
Sec.391 of company Act – seeking approval for compromise scheme – rejected = The Company Petition No. 160 of 2005 was filed by the appellant company herein under Section 391 of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Companies Act”), seeking approval for the scheme of arrangement/compromise dated 10th August, 2005. The said agreement was entered into between the appellant company herein and its class of creditors, namely its deposit holders and bond holders.= i) “Whether the non-obstante clause in Section 45Q of the RBI Act, 1934 prohibits the High Court from sanctioning any scheme for the deposit holders of an NBFC? ii) Whether the petitioner had failed to disclose the RBI letter dated 18th January, 2005 before the learned Company Judge as per the provisions of Section 391(1) of the Companies Act, 1956?” whether the company should have disclosed the aspects arising out of the order dated 18th January, 2005 to enable the depositors and the bond holders to take an informed decision. The High Court has concluded that the company is guilty of such non-disclosure.= Division Bench has concluded that by virtue of non-obstante clause in Section 45Q of the RBI Act, Chapter IIIB of the RBI Act will prevail over Sections 391-393 of the Companies Act. It is held that the provision contained in Section 45QA which is intended to protect the depositors must have primacy over any other law inconsistent with such provision. It is further held that the scheme of arrangement of compromise even if presented by a NBFC would have to conform to the provisions contained in the Chapter IIIB of the RBI Act. The Division Bench also concluded that not only the scheme is contrary to the specific provisions contained in Chapter IIIB of the RBI Act; it is also against public policy. With these observations the Division Bench had declined to approve the scheme and set aside the order passed by the Company Court.- In our opinion, the High Court has correctly concluded that even if no investigation was pending under Section 235-251 of the Companies Act, it was incumbent on the company to disclose the violations pointed out by the RBI on inspection of its books under Section 47N, which led to the issuance of the notice dated 18th January, 2005. This, in our opinion, would clearly reflect on the lack of bonafide of the company in proposing scheme of arrangement. In our considered opinion, non- disclosure of the action taken and initiated by the RBI as apparent from the letter dated 18th January, 2005, amounted to non-disclosure of material facts which are required to be disclosed under Section 391(1) read with Section 393(1) of the Companies Act. The Company Court whilst examining the fairness and the bonafide of a scheme of arrangement does not act as a rubber stamp. It cannot shut its eyes to blatant non-disclosure of material information, which could have a major influence/impact on the decision as to whether the scheme has to be approved or not. In our opinion, the High Court has not committed any error of jurisdiction in rejecting the submission of the appellant that the non-disclosure of the letter dated 18th January, 2005 was not material. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no justification to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40566 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5505-5508 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) NO.12737-12740 OF 2008] M/s. Integrated Finance Co. Ltd. …Appellant VERSUS Reserve Bank of India Etc. Etc. …Respondents J U D G M E N T SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,J. 1. Leave granted. … Continue reading
compounding of offence under Section 211(7) of the Companies Act.= Now the question is whether in the aforesaid circumstances the Company Law Board can compound offence punishable with fine or imprisonment or both without permission of the court. It is pointed out that when the prosecution has been laid, it is the criminal court which is in seisin of the matter and it is only the magistrate or the court in seisin of the matter who can accord permission to compound the offence.= “621A. Composition of certain offences.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), any offence punishable under this Act whether committed by a company or any officer thereof, not being an offence punishable with imprisonment only, or with imprisonment and also with fine, may, either before or after the institution of any prosecution, be compounded by- (a) the Company Law Board; or (b) where the maximum amount of fine which may be imposed for such offence does not exceed five thousand rupees, by the Regional Director, on payment or credit, by the company or the officer, as the case may be, to the Central Government of such sum as that Board or the Regional Director, as the case may be, may specify: Provided that the sum so specified shall not, in any case, exceed the maximum amount of the fine which may be imposed for the offence so compounded: Provided further that in specifying the sum required to be paid or credited for the compounding of an offence under this sub-section, the sum, if any, paid by way of additional fee under Sub-section (2) of Section 611 shall be taken into account. xx xx xx (4)(a) Every application for the compounding of an offence shall be made to the Registrar who shall forward the same, together with his comments thereon, to the Company Law Board or the Regional Director, as the case may be. (b) Where any offence is compounded under this section, whether before or after the institution of any prosecution, an intimation thereof shall be given by the company to the Registrar within seven days from the date on which the offence is so compounded. (c) Where any offence is compounded before the institution of any prosecution, no prosecution shall be instituted in relation to such offence, either by the Registrar or by any shareholder of the company or by any person authorised by the Central Government against the offender in relation to whom the offence is so compounded. (d) Where the composition of any offence is made after the institution of any prosecution, such composition shall be brought by the Registrar in writing, to the notice of the Court in which the prosecution is pending and on such notice of the composition of the offence being given, the company or its officer in relation to whom the offence is so compounded shall be discharged. xx xx xx (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,- (a) any offence which is punishable under this Act with imprisonment or with fine, or with both, shall be compoundable with the permission of the Court, in accordance with the procedure laid down in that Act for compounding of offences; (b) any offence which is punishable under this Act with imprisonment only or with imprisonment and also with fine shall not be compoundable. (8) No offence specified in this section shall be compounded except under and in accordance with the provisions of this section.”= The legislature in its wisdom has not put the rider of prior permission of the court before compounding the offence by the Company Law Board and in case the contention of the appellant is accepted, same would amount to addition of the words “with the prior permission of the court” in the Act, which is not permissible. As is well settled, while interpreting the provisions of a statute, the court avoids rejection or addition of words and resort to that only in exceptional circumstances to achieve the purpose of Act or give purposeful meaning. It is also a cardinal rule of interpretation that words, phrases and sentences are to be given their natural, plain and clear meaning. When the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted in an ordinary sense and no addition or alteration of the words or expressions used is permissible. As observed earlier, the aforesaid enactment was brought in view of the need of leniency in the administration of the Act because a large number of defaults are of technical nature and many defaults occurred because of the complex nature of the provision. From what we have observed above, we are of the opinion that the power under sub-section (1) and sub-section (7) of Section 621A are parallel powers to be exercised by the Company Law Board or the authorities mentioned therein and prior permission of Court is not necessary for compounding the offence, when power of compounding is exercised by the Company Law Board. In view of what we have observed above, the order impugned does not require any interference by this Court. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.
Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2102 OF 2004 V.L.S. FINANCE LTD. …APPELLANT VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J. This appeal by special leave arises out of an order dated 5th of November, 2003 passed by the Company Judge, Delhi High Court … Continue reading
primarily concerned with the powers of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (for short ‘SEBI’) under Section 55A(b) of the Companies Act, 1956 to administer various provisions relating to issue and transfer of securities to the public by listed companies or companies which intend to get their securities listed on any recognized stock exchange in India and also the question whether Optionally Fully Convertible Debentures (for short ‘OFCDs’) offered by the appellants should have been listed on any recognized stock exchange in India, being Public Issue under Section 73 read with Section 60B and allied provisions of the Companies Act and whether they had violated the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines, 2000 [for short ‘DIP Guidelines’] and various regulations of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009 [for short ‘ICDR 2009’], and also whether OFCDs issued are securities under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 [for short ‘SCR Act’].
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9813 OF 2011 Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited & Ors. .. Appellants Versus Securities and Exchange Board of India & Anr. .. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9833 OF 2011 J U D G M E N T K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, … Continue reading
the apex court held that since the constructions works are very slow , the limited orders given the single judge are conferred. When the interim injunction can be granted ? It is settled law that while passing an interim order of injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court is required to consider three basic principles, namely, a) prima facie case, b) balance of convenience and inconvenience and c) irreparable loss and injury. In addition to the above mentioned three basic principles, a court, while granting injunction must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also 6
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9709 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22276 of 2011 Makers Development Services Pvt. Ltd. …. Appellant (s) Versus M. Visvesvaraya Industrial Research and Development Centre …. Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9710 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) … Continue reading
what is the arbitration agreement ? = the pre-requisites of a valid and binding arbitration agreement leading to an appropriate reference under the Act. Section 2(1)(b) defines `arbitration agreement’ to be an agreement referred to in Section 7. Section 7 of the Act states that an `arbitration agreement’ is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. The arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement and shall be an agreement in writing. An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in any of the clauses i.e. clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the Act. Once these ingredients are satisfied, there would be a binding arbitration agreement between the parties and the aggrieved party would be in a capacity to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 11(6) of the Act.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ARBITRATION PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 5 OF 2010 Powertech World Wide Limited … Petitioner Versus Delvin International General Trading LLC … Respondent O R D E R Swatanter Kumar, J. 1. M/s. Powertech World Wide Limited, the petitioner, is a limited company registered under the Companies Act, … Continue reading
whether priority given to the dues payable by an employer under Section 11 of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, `the EPF Act’) is subject to Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 (for short, `the Companies Act’) in terms of which the workmen’s dues and debts due to secured creditors are required to be paid in priority to all other debts.= we would emphasize that in terms of Section 530(1), all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the company to the Central or State Government or to a local authority, all wages or salary or any employee, in respect of the services rendered to the company and due for a period not exceeding 4 months all accrued holiday remuneration etc. and all sums due to any employee from provident fund, a pension fund, a gratuity fund or any other fund for the welfare of the employees maintained by the company are payable in priority to all other debts. This provision existed when Section 11(2) was inserted in the EPF Act by Act No. 40 of 1973 and any amount due from an employer in respect of the employees’ contribution was declared first charge on the assets of the establishment and became payable in priority to all other debts. However, while inserting Section 529A in the Companies Act by Act No.35 of 1985 Parliament, in its wisdom, did not declare the workmen’s dues (this expression includes various dues including provident fund) as first charge. The effect of the amendment made in the Companies Act in 1985 is only to expand the scope of the dues of workmen and place them at par with the debts due to secured
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9630 O F 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 7642 of 2011) Employees Provident Fund Commissioner … Appellant(s) Versus O.L. of Esskay Pharmaceuticals Limited … Respondent(s) With CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9633 O F 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave … Continue reading
Cheque bounce case – quashed by apex court = whether the director is liable for the cheque issued even after resignation -inasmuch as the certified copy of the annual return dated 30.09.1999 is a public document, more particularly, in view of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 read with Section 74(2) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, we hold that the appellant has validly resigned from the Directorship of the Company even in the year 1998 and she cannot be held 14 = whether a complaint can be quashed on the probable defense of the accused-however, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents — which are beyond suspicion or doubt — placed by the accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if the accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for 13 = whether a certified copy of annual return of a company is a public document ?=Sub-section (1) of Section 74 refers to public documents and sub-section (2) provides that public documents include “public records kept in any State of private documents”. A conjoint reading of Sections 159, 163 and 610(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 read with sub-section (2) of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 make it clear that a certified copy of annual return is a public document
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2033 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 85 of 2011 Mrs. Anita Malhotra …. Appellant(s) Versus Apparel Export Promotion Council & Anr. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This … Continue reading
With regard to the damages for use and occupation of the premises in question after 31.3.2009, as the second option has not been given within the time prescribed under the lease deed, the second defendant can be said to be unauthorized tenant. Therefore the landlord is entitled to damages for use and occupation. 13. It is not in dispute that it is agreed between the parties that for every five years, there is an increase of 20% in the rent. If that is taken into consideration, certainly, the landlord is entitled to a sum of Rs.24,000/- per month towards damages for use and occupation of the premises in question by the defendants bank from 1.4.2009. Hence, the damages granted by the trial Court for use and occupation of the premises in question by the second defendant bank are modified, and the defendants are directed to pay damages @ Rs.24,000/- per month from 1.4.2009 till the date of vacating the premises. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants are doing banking operations in the premises in question and that there are many formalities and lengthy procedure for vacating the premises by the defendants bank i.e. they have to obtain permission from the Reserve Bank of India, and they have to secure suitable alternative accommodation for the bank, and hence, he prays to grant considerable time i.e. till the end of the year 2012, to vacate the premises in question. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, reasonable time can be granted to the appellants/defendants to vacate the premises in question. 15. In the result, the Appeal Suit is dismissed, directing the appellants/defendants to vacate the suit schedule premises on or before 31.12.2012 and to pay Rs.24,000/- per month for use and occupation of the premises from 31.3.2009 till vacating the premises. It is also made clear that the appellant shall give an undertaking before the trial Court that they will vacate the premises in question on or before 31.12.2012. No costs.
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU APPEAL SUIT NO. 558 OF 2011 12.09.2011 Between: Central Bank of India & another …Appellants And Kurnool Chit Funds Private Limited …Respondent THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU APPEAL SUIT NO. 558 OF 2011 JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and decree dated 24.06.2011 in Original Suit … Continue reading
Companies Act, 1956; Sections 529 and 529A-Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920; Section 47-Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 48-Company created first charge and second charge over its immoveable assets in favour of two lending banks respectively for loans obtained-Company Court ordered winding up of the Company and appointed an official Liquidator-First charge holder filed a suit for recovery before Debt Recovery Tribunal which is pending-Second charge holder filed a suit before trial court which was decreed-First charge holder lodged a claim before the Official Liquidator and filed an application before the Company Court for recovery of amount-Company Court dismissed the application holding that the bank is only entitled to pro-rata share since it had relinquished its first charge over the assets by filing a claim with the Official Liquidator-High Court dismissed the Second Appeal-Correctness of-Held, Section 529A of the Companies Act only deals with pari passu treatment of the dues of the workmen and secured creditors and does not deal with inter se priorities amongst the secured creditors-Claim of first charge holder will continue to prevail over the claim of the second charge holder as provided under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act-Provision in the Act must be given effect to the extent the Parilament intended and not beyond it-Parliament never intended to deprive the first charge holder of its right under any Act. Appellant-Bank and two other banks (respondent nos. 3 and 4) advanced loan to respondent no. 1-Company for setting up a manufacturing plant. Respondent no. 2-bank also advanced a loan to the company for providing working capital funds. The company created a first charge in favour of the appellant and the two banks by way of equitable mortgage of little deeds of its immovable property. The company created a second charge with respondent no.2 by way of constructive delivery of title deeds. Court passed an order directing winding up of the company and appointed an Official Liquidator under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant and the two banks filed a suit for recovery of money before Debt Recovery Tribunal. The appellant and the two banks filed an application before the Company Court under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 to continue with the suit for recovery of the security and remain outside the winding up proceedings, which was granted. Respondent no.2 filed a suit before trial court against the company for recovery of money. In the meantime, the Official Liquidator issued a public notice to all the creditors to put forth their claim of their debts. The appellant lodged a claim with the Official Liquidator. The trial court decreed the suit filed by respondent no.2. The appellant and the two banks filed a Company Application before the Company Court claiming first charge over the assets of the company. The Company Court held that on filing a claim with the Official liquidator, the appellant and the two banks had relinquished their first charge over the assets of the company and are hence only entitled to pro-rata share out of the sale proceeds. The Second Appeal filed before Division Bench of the High Court was dismissed. In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 comes into play by reason of the provisions of Chapter V of the Companies Act, 1956; that wrong reliance was placed on section 47(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 ignoring other provisions of the Act; the first charge holders and second charge holders could not be equated; that respondent no. 2 also having filed a claim before the Official Liquidator, it should not have been given any preferential treatment; and that the right of the secured creditor does not get obliterated only because the appellant responded to the public notice issued by the office Liquidator; and that section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act would override the provisions of Section 529 of the Companies Act, 1956. Respondent no. 2, the bank contended under section 529-A of the Companies Act, 1956, no distinction is made amongst the secured creditors and hence the appellant cannot have a priority over its claim; that Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act is subservient to sections 529 and 529-A of the Companies Act as the latter had been enacted subsequent to the Transfer of Property Act; that the claim of the appellant shall rank pari passu only with all other secured creditors and not a preferential right; that having regard to the provisions of section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the appellant would be deemed to have relinquished its rights. Respondent Official Liquidator contended that having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, the appellant would be deemed to have relinquished his rights. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 contains a non-obstante clause. The non-obstante nature of a provision although may be of wide amplitude, the interpretative process thereof must be kept confined to the legislative policy. Only because the dues of the workmen and the debt due to the secured creditors are treated pari passu with each other, the same by itself would not lead to the conclusion that the concept of inter se priorities amongst the secured creditors had thereby been intended to be given a total go-by. A non-obstante clause must be given effect to, to the extent the Parliament intended and not beyond the same. Section 529-A of the Companies Act does not ex facie contain a provision on the aspect of priority amongst the secured creditors and, hence, it would not be proper to read thereinto things, which the Parliament did not comprehend. [545-d, f, h; 546-a] 1.2. While enacting a statute, the Parliament cannot be presumed to have taken away a right in property. Right to property is a constitutional right. Right to recover the money lent by enforcing a mortgage would also be a right to enforce an interest in the property. In terms of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Act, the claim of the first charge holder shall prevail over the claim of the second charge holder. Such a valuable right, having regard to the legal position as obtaining in common law as also under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, must be deemed to have been known to the Parliament. Thus, while enacting the Companies Act, the Parliament cannot be held to have intended to deprive the first charge of the said right. Such a valuable right, therefore, must be held to have been kept preserved. [546-d, e, g] Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. v. Management and Ors., [1973] 1 SCC 813, referred to. 1.3. If the Parliament, while amending the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, intended to take away such a valuable right of the right charge holder, it could have stated so explicity. Deprivation of legal right existing in favour of a person cannot be presumed in construing the statute. In fact, a contrary presumption shall have to be raised. [546-h; 547-a] 1.4. Section 529(1)(c) of the Companies Act speaks about the respective rights of the secured creditors which would mean the respective rights of secured creditors vis-a-vis unsecured creditors. It does not envisage respective rights amongst the secured creditors. Merely because Section 529 of the Act does not specifically provide for the rights of priorities over the mortgaged assets, that, would not mean that the provisions of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act in relation to a company, which has undergone liquidation, shall stand obliterated. [547-b] 1.5. If the inter se priority of secured creditors gets obliterated by merely responding to a public notice, it would lead to deprivation of the secured creditor of his right over the security and would bring him at par with an unsecured creditor. The logical sequitor of such an inference would be that even unsecured creditors would be placed at par with the secured creditors. This could not have been the intendment of the legislation. [547-c, d] 1.6. The provisions of the Companies Act may be a special statute but if the special statute does not contain any specific provision dealing with the contractual and other statutory rights between different kinds of the secured creditors, the specific provisions contained in the general statute shall prevail. [547-e] Maru Ram v. Union of India and Ors., [1981] 1 SCC 107, referred to. 1.7. There does not exist any provision in the Companies Act which provides that the provisions of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act would not be applicable in relation to the affairs of a company. Unless, expressly or by necessary implication, such a provision contrary to or inconsistent therewith carrying a different intent can be found in the Companies Act, Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be held to be inapplicable. [547-g, h] Mulla’s Transfer of Property, Act 9th edition, referred to. 1.8. Section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act is attracted by virtue of Section 529(1) of the Companies Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Insolvency Act would become applicable where a secured creditor voluntarily relinquishes his security for the general benefit of the creditors. The expression “relinquish” envisages a conscious act, i.e., an act where a person was aware of his right and then relinquishes the same. The same must be for the general benefit of the creditors. His action must lead to a conclusion that he, for one reason or the other, intended to stand in the queue for receiving money owed to him. It, however, does not stand obliterated only by the filing of an affidavit or proof of claim with the official liquidator. Such a claim had been filed pursuant to a notice issued by the official liquidator. If the creditor does not respond to the said notice, he would not be in a position to bring to the notice of the official liquidator, the existance of his right. [549-b-e] Ramantha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, referred to. 1.11. Sub-Section (3) of Section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act clearly envisages the position where he does not either relalise or relinquish his security. He, in such a situation, may state in his Affidavit of Proof, the particulars of the security and value at which he assesses the same. The consequences therefor would ensue. If the Official Receiver proceeds to sell the security, the Court first has to pay to amount at which the security was valued to the secured creditor out of the sale proceeds. [549-f] Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr., [1979] 2 SCC 529 and State Bank of Mysore v. Official Liquidator and Ors., (1985) 58 Company Cases Kar 609, referred to. Rajiv Shakdher, U.A. Rana and Srabonee Roy (for Gagrat & Co.) for the Appellant. Shrish Kumar Misra, V.P. Singh, Pankaj Bhatia, M.T. George, Sanjay Bhatt and Amit Kumar for the Respondents.
CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2332 of 2006 PETITIONER: ICICI BANK LTD. RESPONDENT: SIDCO LEATHERS LTD. & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/04/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & P.K. Balasubramanyan JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.23360/2004) S.B. SINHA, J : Leave granted. Interpretation of Sections 529 and 529-A of … Continue reading
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