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Competent Authority

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Habeas corpus type writ -as her husband in imprisonment more than 20 years as her mercy petitions were rejected twice made – meaning of life imprisonment reiterated that unless properly remitted by competent authority, life imprisonment means imprisonment for entire lifetime of convict – No court set him free beyond the law with out remission by appropriate authority= ARJUN JADAV … PETITIONER VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41723

Habeas corpus type writ -as her husband – in imprisonment – more than 20 years as her mercy petitions were rejected twice made  – meaning  of  life  imprisonment  reiterated  that unless properly remitted by competent  authority,  life  imprisonment  means imprisonment for entire lifetime of convict – No court set him free beyond the law with out … Continue reading

Haryana Apartment Ownership Act,1983 (for short “the Apartment Act”) – Development Act – Declarations in respect of “common areas and facilities” – the owners cannot claim any undivided interest over those facilities except the right of user – they cannot claim an undivided interest or right of management over them.- agreements executed between the colonizer and the DTCP vis-à-vis the various provisions of the Apartment Act, the statutory declaration made by the colonizer and the Sale Deeds executed between the parties – Apex court set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed before the High Court. The appeal is, therefore allowed. = DLF Limited ….. Appellant Versus Manmohan Lowe and others …..Respondents =published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41058

Haryana Apartment  Ownership  Act,1983 (for short “the Apartment Act”) –  Development Act – Declarations in respect of “common areas and  facilities” – the owners cannot claim any  undivided interest over those facilities except  the  right  of  user – they  cannot claim an undivided interest or right of management over them.- agreements executed between the colonizer and the DTCP  vis-à-vis the  various  provisions … Continue reading

MODVAT- The respondent-company availed deemed MODVAT credit of Rs.77,546/- during the quarter of March, 2000 on the strength of invoices issued by M/s. Sawan Mal Shibhu Mal Steel Re-Rolling Mills, Mandi Govindgarh. During MODVAT verification it was found that the supplier of inputs had not discharged full duty liability for the period covered by the invoices. = Sub-rule (6) of Rule 57A in exercise of which the notification has been issued is as follows: – “(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the inputs on which the duty of excise paid under section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), shall be deemed to have been paid at such rate or equivalent to such amount as may be specified in the said notification, and allow the credit of such duty in respect of the said inputs at such rates or such amount and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the said notification: Provided that the manufacturer shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the inputs acquired by him are goods on which the appropriate duty of excise as indicated in the documents accompanying the goods, has been paid under section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944).”= “Whether the manufacturer of final products is entitled to deemed credit, under Notification 58/97-CE dated 30.8.97 when the manufacturer-supplier of inputs has not paid Central Excise Duty and given a wrong certificate on the body of invoices about duty dischargement under Rule 96ZP of Central Excise Rules, 1944?” = there is no dispute that a declaration was given by the manufacturer of the inputs indicating that the excise duty had been paid on the said inputs under the Act. It is also not in dispute that the said inputs were directly received from the manufacturer but not purchased from the market. There is no cavil over the fact that the manufacturer of the inputs had declared the invoice price of the inputs correctly in the documents. It is perceivable from the factual matrix that the only allegation is that at the time of MODVAT verification it was found that the supplier of the inputs had not discharged full duty liable for the period covered under the invoices. This lapse of the seller is different and not a condition or rather a pre-condition postulated in the notification. 25. Mr. Prasad, learned counsel for the revenue has vehemently urged that it was requisite and, in a way imperative, on the part of the assessee to verify from the concerned authority of the department whether the excise duty had actually been paid or not. The aforesaid submission leaves us unimpressed. As we notice Rule 57A (6) requires the manufacturer of final products to take reasonable care that the inputs acquired by him are goods on which the appropriate duty of excise as indicated in the documents accompanying the goods, has been paid. The notification has been issued in exercise of the power under the said Rule. The notification clearly states to which of those inputs it shall apply and to which of the inputs it shall not apply and what is the duty of the manufacturer of final inputs. Thus, when there is a prescribed procedure and that has been duly followed by the manufacturer of final products, we do not perceive any justifiable reason to hold that the assessee-appellant had not taken reasonable care as prescribed in the notification. Due care and caution was taken by the respondent. It is not stated what further care and caution could have been taken. The proviso postulates and requires “reasonable care” and not verification from the department whether the duty stands paid by the manufacturer-seller. When all the conditions precedent have been satisfied, to require the assessee to find out from the departmental authorities about the payment of excise duty on the inputs used in the final product which have been made allowable by the notification would be travelling beyond the notification, and in a way, transgressing the same. This would be practically impossible and would lead to transactions getting delayed. We may hasten to explicate that we have expressed our opinion as required in the present case pertaining to clauses 4 and 5 of the notification. 26. Consequently, we concur with the view expressed by the High Court and accordingly the appeals, being devoid of merit, stand dismissed without any order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40690 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 7031 of 2009 Commissioner of Central Excise, Jalandhar … Appellant Versus M/s. Kay Kay Industries … Respondent WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 7032 of 2009 WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 7034 of 2009 WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 7392 of 2010 WITH CIVIL APPEAL … Continue reading

set off of the period of pre-trial detention against the period of sentence is concerned, Section 428 of the Code is not attracted to the cases of persons convicted by the court-martial to undergo imprisonments.- sentence Set off not applicable to court martial laws= As he is in illegal detention because he had already spent one and half months in custody before the conviction was recorded by the court-martial. the petitioner, an employee of Indian Air Force, who has been found guilty of the offence under Section 39(a) of The Air Force Act, 1950 (for brevity “the Act”) and has been awarded sentence to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months along with other punishments by order dated 15.3.2013 which has been affirmed by the Competent Authority under Section 161(1) of the said enactment, has prayed for issue of a writ of habeas corpus directing the respondents to release him= In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, there can be no scintilla of doubt that the pre-trial detention cannot be set off against the sentence of imprisonment passed by the court-martial for the offence under Section 39(a) which has been affirmed under Section 161(1) of the Act and the period of sentence shall commence from the date when the original proceeding was signed by the Presiding Officer. Thus, there is no illegal detention warranting issue of writ of habeas corpus.= Section 169-A to avoid hardship to the persons convicted by the court-martial. The said provision is as follows: – “169-A. Period of custody undergone by the officer or person to be set off against the imprisonment.— When a person or officer subject to this Act is sentenced by a court martial to a term of imprisonment, not being an imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the period spent by him in civil or military custody during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of order of such sentence, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed upon him, and the liability of such person or officer to undergo imprisonment on such order of sentence shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed upon him.”- Section 151(1) and (3): – “151. Commencement of sentence. – (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) every term of imprisonment or detention awarded in pursuance of this Act shall be reckoned as commencing on the day on which the sentence was awarded. (2) ……………… (3) Whenever any offender is sentenced by a court-martial to a term of imprisonment, in pursuance of this Act, not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the period spent by him in civil or naval custody during investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case, and before the date of order of such sentence, shall be set off against the terms of imprisonment imposed upon him, and the liability of such offender to undergo imprisonment on such order of sentence shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed upon him.”=Though such amendments have been made by the Parliament under the 1950 Act and the 1957 Act, yet no such amendment has been incorporated in the Air Force Act, 1950. The aforesaid provisions, as we perceive, have been incorporated in both the statutes to avoid hardship to persons convicted by the court-martial. Similar hardship is suffered by the persons who are sentenced to imprisonment under various provisions of the Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid amendment in the other two enactments and regard being had to the purpose of the amendment and the totality of the circumstances, we think it apt to recommend the Union of India to seriously consider to bring an amendment in the Act so that the hardships faced by the persons convicted by the court-martial are avoided.

Page 1     Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRL.) No. 78 of 2013 Samrendra Beura … Petitioner Versus U.O.I. & others …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. In this writ petition, preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, … Continue reading

UNAUTHORISED CONSTRUCTION OF APARTMENTS WITH OUT PERMISSION UNDER Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short, ‘the 1966 Act’) = fresh writ petition on third round litigation = the action taken by the Corporation is ultra vires the provision contained in Section 53(3) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short, ‘the 1966 Act’) and held that in view of the observations made by this Court, the High Court cannot interfere with the notices issued under Section 488 of the 1888 Act. We have also gone through Section 53 of the 1966 Act relied upon by Shri Nariman in support of his argument that the Corporation is not entitled to carry out the demolition without giving notice to the occupiers under proviso to Section 53(3). In our opinion, the petitioners are not entitled to invoke Section 53(3) of the 1966 Act in this round of litigation and seek protection of the construction which has been found to be illegal. While deciding Civil Appeal No.7934/2012 and connected matters this Court considered all the contentions urged on behalf of the housing societies and their members and rejected the same by assigning detailed reasons. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a new plea and frustrate the action being taken by the Corporation in furtherance of the notices issued earlier and the observations made by this Court.= giving only 48 hours= keeping in view the fact that the occupants of the illegally constructed flats may not have got sufficient time to vacate the same, we allow five months time to the petitioners and other occupiers of illegal portions of the buildings to vacate the same. This would be subject to the following conditions: i) Within four weeks from today they shall file affidavits in this Court and give unequivocal undertaking that at the end of five months period all of them will voluntarily vacate the disputed portions of the buildings and will not cause any hindrance in the action which may be taken by the Corporation in the light of the observations made by this Court in judgment dated 27.2.2013 in Civil Appeal No.7934/2012 and connected matters. ii) During the period of five months, the petitioners and other occupiers shall not induct any other person in the disputed premises. They shall also not file litigation of any kind in the Bombay High Court or the Courts subordinate to the High Court for frustrating the action already taken by the Corporation or which may be taken hereinafter. Shri Nariman says that the Corporation has disconnected the amenities including the lift service to the buildings in question. Shri Vahanvati, learned Attorney General says that all the amenities which were available to the buildings till last week of April shall be continued for a further period of five months and if any service has been discontinued in the meantime, the same shall be restored immediately. It is made clear that at the end of five months period the Corporation shall have to take action in the light of the observations made in judgment dated 27.2.2013.

  ‘ ITEM NO.301 COURT NO.3 SECTION IX S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).17002/2013 (From the judgement and order dated 29/04/2013 in WP No.1076/2013 of The HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY) RAJESH … Continue reading

under Sections 279 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”), Sections 184, 177 and 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short “M.V. Act”), Sections 5, 6, 8 and 10 of the Gujarat Animal Preservation Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “the Principal Act”) and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.- ‘buffalo calf’ has not been mentioned as prohibited animal. Sub- section 1A of Section 5 stipulates the schedule of animals which are as under: (a) a cow; (b) the calf of a cow, whether male or female and if male, whether castrated or not; (c) a bull; (d) a bullock. It is clear from the above description of animals that the buffalo calf does not fall under the list of prohibited animals. It is true that Section 5(1) prohibits slaughtering of any animal without a certificate in writing from the Competent Authority that the animal is fit for slaughter. In other words, without a certificate from competent authority, no animal could be slaughtered. Sub-section (1A) to Section 5 mandates that no certificate under sub-section (1) shall be granted in respect of the above mentioned animals. In the said section, admittedly, ‘buffalo calf’ has not been mentioned as prohibited animal. In such circumstance, the prohibition relating to release of vehicle before a period of six months as mentioned in Section 6B(3) of the Amendment Act is not applicable since the appellant was transporting 28 buffalo calves only. In view of the same, it is not advisable to keep the seized vehicle in the police station in open condition which is prone to natural decay on account of weather conditions. In addition to the above interpretation, whatever be the situation, it is of no use to keep the seized vehicle in the police station for a long period. 13) In the light of the above conclusion, order dated 24.08.2012, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Gandhinagar in Criminal Misc. Application No. 9 of 2012, order dated 01.09.2012, passed by the District and Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar in Criminal Revision Application No. 73 of 2012 and order dated 25.09.2012, passed by the High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 2755 of 2012 are set aside and the respondents are directed to release the vehicle – Eicher Truck bearing Regn. No. GJ-9-Z-3801 forthwith. 14) The appeal is allowed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 219 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 8971 of 2012) Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Gujarat & Anr. …. Respondent(s) 2 J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal … Continue reading

election case = caste certificate=Initially the appellant was shown as a person belonging to the “Khatik” community and later as a person belonging to `”Kalal” community.=after an appropriate enquiry, passed an order dated 25.2.2009 invalidating the caste certificate and recommended to the Regional Commissioner, Aurangabad to set aside the election of the appellant herein to the Zilla Parishad.

Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10740 OF 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 29584 of 2009) Omprakash, s/o Chandranath Arya …….Appellant Versus State of Maharashtra & Ors. ……Respondents J U D G M E N T CHELAMESWAR, J. Leave granted. 2. The State of … Continue reading

whether the appointment of an authority at cost of one of party to the dispute for giving judgement in that dispute is proper?the Government of Gujarat by its letter dated 31.01.2006 requested the Government of India for approval of the nomination of persons to be appointed as Competent Authority for acquisition of right of user under the Petroleum and Minerals, Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (for short `the Act’) and one of the persons was Shri V.I. Gohil, Retired Deputy Collector. In the letter dated 31.01.2006 of the Government of Gujarat making the aforesaid request to the Government of India, it was stated that the = “…. It would be to broad a proposition to extend the theory of bias to exclude persons only because such person draws the salary from the bodies like public corporation, State Government. It would altogether be a different case if it was a case of a private employer and his employee. We cannot equate the case of a person in private employment with that of a person in public employment. …” – For the aforesaid reasons, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court as well as the proceedings for determination of compensation in the case of the appellants only. We, however, make it clear that this judgment will not affect any of the orders

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8629 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 17022 OF 2008) Trilok Sudhirbhai Pandya …… Appellant Versus Union of India & Ors. …… Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8630 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 17021 OF 2008) Nilkanth … Continue reading

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