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Sec.498 A , 306 of I.P.C. – DISCHARGE OF REST OF ACCUSED – NO CASE AGAINST RELATIVES OF HUSBAND – ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE DISCHARGED THEM – HIGH COURT CONFIRMED – APEX COURT ALSO CONFIRMED AND DISMISSED THE APPEAL = Sherish Hardenia & Ors. …..Appellants Versus State of M.P. & Anr. …..Respondents = published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41091

  Sec.498 A , 306 of I.P.C. – DISCHARGE OF REST OF ACCUSED – NO CASE AGAINST RELATIVES OF HUSBAND – ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE DISCHARGED THEM – HIGH COURT CONFIRMED – APEX COURT ALSO CONFIRMED AND DISMISSED THE APPEAL = Whether it is quashing of an  FIR  or  a  Charge-Sheet,  or    summoning a party under Section 319,  CrPC,  this … Continue reading

Sec.138 ,139 and sec. 118 of N.I.Act – Burden of proof – when the complainant not able to say the date when the amount was given – when failed to produce source of income – when gave contradictory statement about filling of cheque whether by accused or by himself – when there is no pleading that cheque was filled with the consent of accused – mere lack of issuing a reply notice and mere non putting a suggestion that the cheque was a blank cheque are not countable points to over throw the positive admissions made by the complainant – Lower court rightly dismissed the complaint – High court wrongly with out assigning valid reasons convict the accused – Apex court set aside the high court orders = John K. Abraham …. Appellant VERSUS Simon C. Abraham & Another …. Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41045

 Sec.138 ,139 and sec. 118 of N.I.Act – Burden of proof  – when the complainant not able to     say the date when the amount was given – when failed to produce source of income – when gave contradictory statement about filling of cheque whether by accused or by himself – when there is … Continue reading

In the absence of any specific overt acts no person should be convicted under sec.147, 148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC – except for his role = PUTCHALAPALLI NARESH REDDY …. APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF A.P. & ETC. …. RESPONDENTS judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40884

 In the absence of any specific overt acts no person should be convicted under sec.147,     148 and 302 read with Section 149  of  the  IPC – except for his role =   Apex court confirmed the high court orders except modified the sentence from life to simple injury for one of the accused who had … Continue reading

Wakf Act, 1995: s.83(5) – Wakf Tribunal – Power of – HELD: Wakf Tribunal is deemed to be a civil court and has the same powers as are exercised by civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure while trying a suit or executing a decree or order – Civil courts are competent to issue injunctions in terms of Or. 39, rr. 1 and 2 and s.151 CPC – Similar orders can, therefore, be passed by the Wakf Tribunal also in suits that are legally triable by it – If the Wakf Tribunal, upon consideration of relevant facts and circumstances, comes to the conclusion that a case for grant of interim injunction has been made out, it shall be free to issue any such injunction – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. 39, rr. 1 and 2 and s.151 – Injunctions. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 492 of 2003. From the Judgment & Order dated 24.01.2002 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CRP No. 1430 of 2001. K.V. Viswanathan, B. Ragunath (for Vijay Kumar) for the Appellants. K. Ramamoorthy, Hari Shankar K., Vikas Singh Jangra for the Respondents.

SYED MOHIDEEN & ANR. v. RAMANATHAPURA PERIA MOGALLAM JAMATH & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 492 of 2003) JULY 21, 2010 [MARKANDEY KATJU AND T.S. THAKUR, JJ.] 2010 (8) SCR 777 The following order of the Court was delivered ORDER The application for substitution is allowed. Heard learned counsel for the parties. This appeal has been … Continue reading

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order IX Rule 13, second proviso – Ex parte decree, when can be set aside – Held: An ex-parte decree can be set aside if the defendant satisfies the court that summons were not duly served or he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called for hearing – However, the court shall not set aside the said decree on mere irregularity in the service of summons or in a case where defendant had notice of the date and sufficient time to appear in the court – In order to determine the application under Order IX, Rule 13, the test that has to be applied is whether the defendant honestly and sincerely intended to remain present when the suit was called for hearing and did his best to do so – Sufficient cause is to be judged by reasonable standard of cautious man – In the instant case, trial court passed ex parte decree for divorce in favour of the husband – High Court set aside the ex parte decree without dealing with the issue of service of summons – High Court held that presumption stood rebutted by a bald statement made by the respondent/wife that she was living at different address with her brother – Order of the High Court not sustainable – However, in order to meet the ends of justice, a sum of Rs.10 lakhs awarded to wife as a lump sum amount for maintenance – Compromise/Settlement. Order XLIII, Rule 2 – Appeal from orders – Power of appellate court to interfere with an ex-parte order – Held: The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on question of law and on facts – The first appellate court should not disturb and interfere with the valuable rights of the parties which stood crystallised by the trial court’s judgment without opening the whole case for re-hearing both on question of facts and law – More so, the appellate court should not modify the decree of the trial court by a cryptic order without taking note of all relevant aspects, otherwise the order of the appellate court would fall short of considerations expected from the first appellate court in view of the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31 and such judgment and order would be liable to be set aside – The manner in which the language of the second proviso to Order IX, Rule 13 has been couched by the legislature makes it obligatory on the appellate Court not to interfere with an ex-parte decree unless it meets the statutory requirement. Evidence Act, 1872: s.114, Illustration (f) – Presumption of service – Registered letter – Held: There is a presumption of service of registered letter – However, the presumption is rebuttable on a consideration of evidence of impeccable character – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.27. ss.101, 103 – Burden of proof of facts – Held: Rests on the party who substantially asserts it and not on the party who denies it – Burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any special law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. Practice and procedure: Technicalities of the law should not prevent the court from doing substantial justice and doing away the illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment impugned before it – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Words and phrases: “Sufficient”, “Sufficient Cause” – Meaning of. The appellant-husband filed a divorce petition against the respondent-wife. A notice of petition was sent to her by court which she allegedly refused to accept. The notice was sent again on 7.8.1989, which the respondent again refused to accept. The notice sent by registered AD was also returned to the court with report of refusal. Under the court’s order, summons were affixed at the house of the respondent, but she did not appear. She was also served through public notice published in a newspaper, which was also sent to her. Thereafter, on 08.11.1989, the respondent was proceeded ex parte and ex parte judgment was passed in favour of the appellant and the marriage between the parties was dissolved. Two years after the passing of the decree of divorce, the appellant got married and became father of two sons from the said marriage. The respondent, after the expiry of 4 years of the passing of the ex-parte decree of divorce filed an application under Order IX Rule 13, CPC for setting aside the same on the grounds that ex-parte decree had been obtained by fraud and collusion with the postman etc., to get the report of refusal and that she had not been served notice even by substituted service and also that even subsequent to obtaining decree of divorce, the appellant did not disclose the fact of grant of divorce to her during the proceedings of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The said application was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation of delay. The trial court dismissed the applications. The High Court set aside the order of the trial court. The instant appeal was filed challenging the order of the High Court. =Allowing the appeal, the Court Held: 1.1. An ex-parte decree against a defendant has to be set aside if the party satisfies the court that summons had not been duly served or he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. However, the court shall not set aside the said decree on mere irregularity in the service of summons or in a case where the defendant had notice of the date and sufficient time to appear in the court. It is not permissible for the court to allow the application in utter disregard of the terms and conditions incorporated in the second proviso to Order IX Rule 13, CPC. “Sufficient Cause” is an expression which has been used in large number of statutes. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, in as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been “not acting diligently” or “remaining inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. [Paras 8 and 9] [662-A-G] Ramlal & Ors. v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361; Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi & Anr. AIR 1968 SC 222; Surinder Singh Sibia v. Vijay Kumar Sood AIR 1992 SC 1540; Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation & Another (2010) 5 SCC 459);Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 993; Brij Indar Singh v. Lala Kanshi Ram & Ors. AIR 1917 P.C. 156; Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1336; Mata Din v. A. Narayanan AIR 1970 SC 1953 – relied on. 1.2. While deciding whether there is a sufficient cause or not, the court must bear in mind the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned and the technicalities of the law should not prevent the court from doing substantial justice and doing away the illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment impugned before it. [Para 11] [663-C-E] State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr. AIR 2000 SC 2306; Madanlal v. Shyamlal AIR 2002 SC 100; Davinder Pal Sehgal & Anr. v. M/s. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 451; Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sao & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 1201; Kaushalya Devi v. Prem Chand & Anr. (2005) 10 SCC 127; Srei International Finance Ltd. v. Fair growth Financial Services Ltd. & Anr. (2005) 13 SCC 95; Reena Sadh v. Anjana Enterprises AIR 2008 SC 2054) – relied on. 1.3. In order to determine the application under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC, the test that has to be applied is whether the defendant honestly and sincerely intended to remain present when the suit was called on for hearing and did his best to do so. Sufficient cause is thus the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. Therefore, the applicant must approach the court with a reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a strait- jacket formula of universal application. [Para 12] [663-F-H] 2.1. In view of the provisions of Section 114 Illustration (f) of the Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 there is a presumption that the addressee has received the letter sent by registered post. However, the presumption is rebuttable on a consideration of evidence of impeccable character. The provisions of Section 101 of the Evidence Act provide that the burden of proof of the facts rests on the party who substantially asserts it and not on the party who denies it. In fact, burden of proof means that a party has to prove an allegation before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour. Section 103 provides that burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any special law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The provision of Section 103 amplifies the general rule of Section 101 that the burden of proof lies on the person who asserts the affirmative of the facts in issue. The High court did not deal with the issue of service of summons or as to whether there was “sufficient cause” for the wife not to appear before the court at all, nor did it set aside the said findings recorded by the trial court. The High Court held that presumption stood rebutted by a bald statement made by the respondent/wife that she was living at different address with her brother and this was duly supported by her brother who appeared as a witness in the court. The High Court erred in not appreciating the facts in the correct perspective as substituted service is meant to be resorted to serve the notice at the address known to the parties where the party had been residing last. More so, it was nobody’s case that respondent/wife made any attempt to establish that there had been a fraud or collusion between the appellant and the postman. Not a single document was summoned from the post office. No attempt was made by the respondent/wife to examine the postman. It is nobody’s case that the “National Herald” daily newspaper published from Delhi did not have a wide circulation in Delhi or in the area where the respondent/wife was residing with her brother. In such a fact-situation, the impugned order of the High Court was liable to be set aside. [Paras 13,15, 17, 18 and 19] [664-B-C; G- H; 665-A-B; 666-G-H; 667-A-C] Greater Mohali Area Development Authority & Ors. v. Manju Jain & Ors. AIR 2010 SC 3817; Dr. Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, JT 2010 (12) SC 287; Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani AIR 1989 SC 1433 and Rabindra Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 663 – relied on. 2.2. The appellate court has to decide the appeal preferred under Section 104 CPC following the procedure prescribed under Order XLIII, Rule 2 CPC, which provides that for that purpose, procedure prescribed under Order XLI shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals from orders. Order XLI, Rule 31 CPC provides for a procedure for deciding the appeal. The law requires substantial compliance of the said provisions. The first appellate court being the final court of facts has to formulate the points for its consideration and independently weigh the evidence on the issues which arise for adjudication and record reasons for its decision on the said points. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on question of law and on facts. [Para 20 and 21] [667-D- G] Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos & Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 526; Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh & Anr. AIR 1963 SC 146; Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari AIR 2001 SC 965; Madhukar v. Sangram AIR 2001 SC 2171; G. Amalorpavam & Ors. v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 224; Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari (2007) 8 SCC 600; Gannmani Anasuya & Ors. v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary & Ors. AIR 2007 SC 2380 – relied on. 2.3. The first appellate court should not disturb and interfere with the valuable rights of the parties which stood crystallised by the trial court’s judgment without opening the whole case for re-hearing both on question of facts and law. More so, the appellate court should not modify the decree of the trial court by a cryptic order without taking note of all relevant aspects, otherwise the order of the appellate court would fall short of considerations expected from the first appellate court in view of the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31 CPC and such judgment and order would be liable to be set aside. In view of the said statutory requirements, the High Court was duty bound to set aside at least the material findings on the issues, in spite of the fact that approach of the court while dealing with such an application under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC would be liberal and elastic rather than narrow and pedantic. However, in case the matter does not fall within the four corners of Order IX, Rule 13 CPC, the court has no jurisdiction to set aside ex-parte decree. The manner in which the language of the second proviso to Order IX, Rule 13 CPC has been couched by the legislature makes it obligatory on the appellate Court not to interfere with an ex-parte decree unless it meets the statutory requirement. The High Court has not set aside the material findings recorded by the trial court in respect of service of summons by process server/registered post and substituted service. The High Court failed to discharge the obligation placed on the first appellate court as none of the relevant aspects have been dealt with in proper perspective. It was not permissible for the High Court to take into consideration the conduct of the appellant subsequent to passing of the ex-parte decree. More so, the High Court did not consider the grounds on which the trial Court had dismissed the application under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC filed by the respondent/wife. The appeal has been decided in a casual manner. [Paras 22, 23 and 24] [668-G-H; 669-A] B.V. Nagesh & Anr. v. H.V. Sreenivassa Murthy, JT (2010) 10 SC 551 – relied on. 3. In view of the fact that the appellant got married in 1991 and has two major sons, it would not be possible for him to keep the respondent as a wife. A lump sum amount of Rs. 5 lakhs had been offered by the counsel for the appellant to settle the issue. However, the demand by the respondent/wife had been of Rs. 50 lakhs. Considering the income of the appellant as he had furnished the pay scales etc. An award of Rs. 10 lakhs to the wife would meet the ends of justice as a lump sum amount of maintenance for the future. The said amount be paid by the appellant to the respondent in two equal instalments within a period of six months from today. [Para 25] [669-B-E] Case Law Reference: AIR 1962 SC 361 Relied on Para 9 AIR 1968 SC 222 Relied on Para 9 AIR 1992 SC 1540 Relied on Para 9 (2010) 5 SCC 459) Relied on Para 9 AIR 1964 SC 993 Relied on Para 10 AIR 1917 P.C. 156 Relied on Para 10 AIR 1964 SC 1336 Relied on Para 10 AIR 1970 SC 1953 Relied on Para 10 AIR 2000 SC 2306 Relied on Para 11 AIR 2002 SC 100 Relied on Para 11 AIR 2002 SC 451 Relied on Para 11 AIR 2002 SC 1201 Relied on Para 11 (2005) 10 SCC 127 Relied on Para 11 (2005) 13 SCC 95 Relied on Para 11 AIR 2008 SC 2054) Relied on Para 11 AIR 2010 SC 3817 Relied on Para 13 JT 2010 (12) SC 287 Relied on Para 13 AIR 1989 SC 1433 Relied on Para 14 (2008) 7 SCC 663) Relied on Para 18 AIR 1954 SC 526 Relied on Para 21 AIR 1963 SC 146 Relied on Para 21 AIR 2001 SC 965 Relied on Para 21 AIR 2001 SC 2171 Relied on Para 21 (2006) 3 SCC 224 Relied on Para 21 (2007) 8 SCC 600 Relied on Para 21 AIR 2007 SC 2380) Relied on Para 21 JT (2010) 10 SC 551) Relied on Para 22 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1467 of 2011. From the Judgment & Order dated 17.7.2007 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO No. 63 of 2002. Vikrant Yadav, Vishal Malik, Piyush Kant Roy, Gaurav Dhingra, M.C. Dhingra for the Appellant. Geeta Dhingra, Chander Shekhar Ashri for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO…1467… OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) NO. 19632 of 2007) Parimal … Appellant Versus Veena @ Bharti …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment … Continue reading

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order VIII, Rule 1 (As amended by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002-Written statement filed beyond maximum period-Acceptance of-Held: It was in discretion of court-Amended Order VIII, Rule 1 though worded in negative form, was not mandatory keeping in view the context in which it was enacted-Neither the power of Court to take on record written statement filed beyond time is specifically taken away nor consequences of non-extension of time specifically provided for. Respondent was served with summons issued by the trial court. They filed their written statement beyond 90 days, which was the magimum period allowed, apart from the normal period of 30 days from the date of service of summons. Appellant objected to same. However, Trial Court accepted the written statement, and High Court dismissed appeal of appellant against same. Hence the present appeal. Appellant contended that after substitution of Order VIII, Rule 1 by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment), 2002, the court had no discretion to extend the period for filing the written statement beyond the maximum period. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1. Order VII, Rule 1 after the amendment casts an obligation on the defendant to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him and within the extended time falling within 90 days. The provision does not deal with the power of the court and also does not specifically take away the power of the Court to take the written statement on record though filed beyond the time as provided for. Further, the nature of the provision contained in Order VIII Rule 1 is procedural. It is not a part of the substantive law. Substituted Order VIII, Rule l intends to curb the mischief of unscrupulous defendants adopting dilatory tactics, delaying the disposal of cases causing inconvenience to the plaintiffs and petitioners approaching the court for quick relief and also to the serious inconvenience of the court faced with frequent prayers for adjournments. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. While justice delayed may amount to justice denied, justice hurried may in some cases amount to justice buried. [756-C, D, E] Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, [1975] 1 SCC 774; Shreenath and Anr. v. Rajesh and Ors., AIR (1998) SC 1827, referred to. Blyth v. Blyth, 1966 1 All. E.R. 524 (HL), referred to. 2. It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII is circumscribed by the words `shall not be later than ninety days’ but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided though they may be read by necessary implication. Merely because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in negative form. [757-E, F] Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, JT (2005) 6 SC 486, followed. Kailash v. Nankhu and Ors., [2005] 4 SCC 480, relied on. Nishakant Pandey and Alok Kumar for the Appellant. Aman Lekhi, Rajiv Ranjan Dwivedi, Nagendra Kumar, Harish Pandey, Syamel Kumar, Rakesh Kumar and Jaspreet Singh Rai for the Respondents.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5066 of 2005 PETITIONER: Smt. Rani Kusum RESPONDENT: Smt. Kanchan Devi and Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/08/2005 BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & H.K. SEMA JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 377 OF 2005) ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Order passed by a learned … Continue reading

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – s.166 – Fatal accident – Deceased aged 53 years of age and working as a Senior Assistant in the State Electricity Board – Claim petition by his three sons and paternal grand-mother – Tribunal applied a multiplier of 11 and awarded total compensation of Rs.14,27,496/- with interest @ 9% p.a. – High Court, however, reduced the compensation by adopting a split multiplier of 6 – On appeal, held: High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from the multiplier used by the Tribunal without disclosing any reason therefor – It also did not consider the clear and corroborative evidence about the prospect of future increment of the deceased – Judgment of High Court deserves to be set aside for it was perverse and clearly contrary to the evidence on record – Respondents directed to pay compensation of Rs.18,00,000/- with the rate of interest as granted by the Tribunal. PW1’s father was crossing the road, when a Maruti Van (owned by the first respondent) came at a high speed and dashed against him, causing severe injuries to him which ultimately led to his death. The deceased was 53 years of age and was survived by his wife and three sons, the appellants. They filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming Rs.20,00,000/- as compensation. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) found that the death of PW1’s father was due to the rash and negligent driving of the van driver (the second respondent). The deceased was working as Senior Assistant in Karnataka Electricity Board (KEB) and his last drawn gross monthly salary was Rs.15,642/- i.e. Rs.1,87,704/- annually. The Tribunal applied a multiplier of 11 and awarded total compensation of Rs.14,27,496/- along with interest of 9% p.a. The High Court reduced the compensation to Rs.11,82,000/- by adopting a split multiplier of 6. In the instant appeals, the appellants contended that while awarding compensation, the High Court erred in not considering the future prospects of the deceased and the revision in his salary and that it further erred in adopting a split multiplier. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. The law regarding addition in income for future prospects has been clearly laid down in Sarla Varma case. In the said case, the Court held that there should be no addition to income for future prospects where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. The Bench called it a rule of thumb and it was developed so as to avoid uncertainties in the outcomes of litigation. However, the Bench held that a departure can be made in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. The rule of thumb evolved in Sarla Verma is to be applied to those cases where there is no concrete evidence on record of definite rise in income due to future prospects. The said rule was based on assumption and to avoid uncertainties and inconsistencies in the interpretation of different courts, and to overcome the same. [Paras 8, 9] [1067-C; 1068-A-C] 1.2. In the present case there is clear and incontrovertible evidence on record that the deceased was entitled and in fact bound to get a rise in income in the future, a fact which was corroborated by evidence on record. Thus, the present case comes within the `exceptional circumstances’ and not within the purview of rule of thumb laid down by the Sarla Verma judgment. Hence, even though the deceased was above 50 years of age, he was entitled to increase in income due to future prospects. [Para 10] [1068-D-E] Sarla Varma (Smt.) & Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Another (2009) 6 SCC 121 – referred to. 2. The evidence of PW.1 is that there are four claimants, three of them are the sons of the deceased and the other claimant is paternal grand-mother. Therein, he stated that the deceased was the only bread earner of the family. It was stated by PW.1 that if his father, the deceased, would have been alive he could have got promotion and could have received a salary of Rs.20,000/- per month. PW.3, a Senior Assistant in KEB, in his evidence also stated that the deceased was 52 years of age at the time of his death and he was having six years of service left; that his annual increment was Rs.350/- and that in the year 2003 (which would have been year of retirement), the basic pay of the deceased would have been around Rs.16,000/- and in all he would have obtained gross salary of Rs.20,000/- per month. PW.3 deposed that as per the Board Agreement for every five years their pay revision is compulsory. Both the witnesses were cross- examined before the Tribunal but the evidence leading to pay revision was not assailed. Therefore, the consistent evidence before the Tribunal was that if the deceased would have been alive he would have reached the gross salary of Rs.20,000/- per month. [Paras 11 to 13] [1068-F-H; 1069-A] 3. In view of this evidence, the Tribunal should have considered the prospect of future income while computing compensation but the Tribunal has not done that. In the appeal, which was filed by the appellants before the High Court, the High Court instead of maintaining the amount of compensation, granted by the Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had not given any reason. The High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from the multiplier used by the Tribunal without disclosing any reason therefor. The High Court also did not consider the clear and corroborative evidence about the prospect of future increment of the deceased. When the age of the deceased is between 51 and 55 years the multiplier is 11, which is specified in the II Column in the II Schedule in the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Tribunal had not committed any error by accepting the said multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate why the High Court chose to apply the multiplier of 6. Thus, the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside for it is perverse and clearly contrary to the evidence on record, for having not considered the future prospects of the deceased and also for adopting a split multiplier method. [Paras 14, 15] [1069-C-G] 4. The income of the deceased will be taken to be Rs.20,000/- p.m. which amounts to Rs.2,40,000/- p.a. After deduction of 1/3rd amount for personal expenses, the loss of notional income will be Rs.1,60,000/-. The multiplier of 11 will be applied, from which the loss of dependency will amount to Rs.17,60,000/-. Besides, award Rs.10,000/- for funeral and transport expenses, Rs.6,000/- for medical expenses prior to death and Rs.25,000/- for loss of love and affection is also awarded. Thus, the total compensation awarded amounts to Rs.18,01,000/- which is round off to Rs.18,00,000/-. The amount of compensation would thus be Rs.18,00,000/- with the rate of interest as granted by the Tribunal. [Paras 16, 17] [1069- H; 1070-A-C] Case Law Reference: (2009) 6 SCC 121 referred to Para 8 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1923-1924 of 2011. From the Judgment & Order dated 12.01.2009 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in MFA No. 6476/2002(MV) C/w M.F.A. No. 5596 of 2002. G.V. Chandrashekar for the Appellants…

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1923-1924 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.16406-16407 of 2010) Sri. K.R. Madhusudhan & Ors. …Appellant(s) Versus The Administrative Officer & Anr. …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J. 1. Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3. On 4.10.1998, … Continue reading

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