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Delhi High Court

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jurisdiction of a Single Judge and of Benches of the Court.= JURISDICTION OF A SINGLE JUDGE AND OF BENCHES OF THE COURT 1. Cases ordinarily to be heard by a single Judge—Subject to the provisos hereinafter set forth the following classes of cases shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a Judge setting alone: (i) to (xvii) xxx xxx xxx (xviii) (a) Application or petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of any directions, orders or writs in the nature of Mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto or certiorari for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India or for any other purpose, except: (i) Petitions where vires of Acts or statutory rules, regulations, or bye-laws are challenged. (ii) Petitions where personal liberty is involved. (iii) Petitions pertaining to all Revenue/tax matters including entertainment taxes, except Municipal Tax. (iv) Petitions arising from the orders of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction/Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or seeking directions to them; and (v) Petitions pertaining to Public Interest litigation. (vi) Petitions pertaining to the award to Tenders. (vii) Petitions relating to Co-operative Societies. (viii) Petitions being service matters of Armed Forces of the Union. (ix) Petitions arising out of Land Acquisition. (x) Petitions concerning orders passed by the High Court on the administrative side. Provided that as regards pending cases, the learned single Judge may hear the part-heard matters. Explanation: The preliminary hearing for admission and final disposal of applications and petitions pertaining to matters mentioned in clause (i) to (x) of sub-rule (xviii)(a) above shall however be before a Bench of two Judges and before a Single Bench when there is no sitting of Division Bench.” Rule 4, which relates to jurisdiction of a Bench of two Judges, also reads as under: “4. All cases to be disposed of by a Bench of two Judges save as provided by law or by these rules—Save as provided by law or by these rules or by special order of the Chief Justice, all cases shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges.” A bare reading of the above reproduced provisions makes it clear that the petition filed by respondent No.1 for quashing order dated 31.12.2008 could be heard only by Single Bench of the Delhi High Court. However, by disguising the petition as a Public Interest Litigation, respondent No.1 succeeded in getting the same listed before the Division Bench of the High Court. Unfortunately, the Division Bench did not deal with the objection raised by the appellant to the maintainability of the petition filed by respondent No.1 and proceeded to decide the matter on merits which, in our considered view, was legally impermissible. 15. We are not suggesting that respondent No.1 had indulged in Bench hunting but it needs to be emphasised that every Bench of the High Court should scrupulously follow the relevant rules and should not violate statutory provisions specifying its jurisdiction, else the sanctity of the rules relating to distribution of causes between the Single, the Division Bench and larger Benches will be lost. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The writ petition filed by respondent No.1 shall now be listed before a Single Judge of the High Court, who shall decide the same without being influenced by the observations contained in the impugned order or this order.

 published in       http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40797                     NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 8288 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27387 of 2012) M/s. Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited ….Appellant versus Jan Chetna and others ….Respondents     … Continue reading

Novation of Contract = IMS Learning Resources Private Limited, the respondent herein, filed CS (OS) No.2316 of 2011 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi for a permanent injunction restraining infringement of a registered trademark, infringement of copyright, passing off of damages, rendition of accounts of profits and also for other consequential reliefs against the appellant herein. Appellant preferred IA No.18 of 2012 under Section 8, read with Section 5 -of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for rejecting the plaint and referring the dispute to arbitration and also for other consequential reliefs. The High Court rejected the application vide its order dated 16.04.2012 holding that that earlier agreements dated 01.04.2007 and 01.04.2010, which contained arbitration clause stood superseded by a new contract dated 01.02.2011 arrived at between the parties by mutual consent. = Exit paper would clearly indicate that it is a mutually agreed document containing comprehensive terms and conditions which -admittedly does not contain an arbitration clause. = We may indicate that so far as the present case is concerned, parties have entered into a fresh contract contained in the Exit paper which does not even indicate any disputes arising under the original contract or about the settlement thereof, it is nothing but a pure and simple novation of the original contract by mutual consent. Above being the factual and legal position, we find no error in the view taken by the High Court. The appeal, therefore, lacks merit and stands dismissed, with no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40682 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6997 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.33459 of 2012) M/s Young Achievers ….. Appellant Versus IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd. ….Respondent   J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. Leave granted. 2. IMS Learning Resources … Continue reading

Since only legal points raised , the petitioner is allowed to submit his case on those points only like that of PIL and as he was authorised by other petitioners also = Should the adjudication sought for by the petitioner be refused at the threshold on the basis of the fairly well established legal proposition that a third party/stranger does not have any right to participate in a criminal prosecution which is primarily the function of the State. = All that the petitioners seek is an authoritative pronouncement of the true purport and effect of the different provisions of the JJ Act so as to take a juvenile out of the purview of the said Act in case he had committed an offence, which, according to the petitioners, on a true interpretation of Section 2(p) of the Act, is required to be identified and distinguished to justifya separate course of action, namely, trial in a regular Court of Law as a specific offence under the Penal Code and in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The adjudication that the petitioners seek clearly has implications beyond the case of the first respondent and the proceedings in which he is or may be involved. = We are, therefore, of the view that it would be appropriate for us hold that the special leave petition does not suffer from the vice of absence of locus on the part of the petitioners so as to render the same not maintainable in law. We, therefore, will proceed to hear the special leave petition on merits and attempt to provide an answer to the several questions raised by the petitioners before us. 13. We, therefore, issue notice in this special leave petition and permit the respondents to bring their respective additional pleadings on record, if any. 14. By our order dated 31.7.2013 we had permitted the first petitioner to bring to the notice of the Board that the present special leave petition was to be heard by us on 14.8.2013. We are told at the Bar that in anticipation of our orders in the matter, the Board has deferred further consideration of the proceedings against the first respondent. In the light of the view taken by us that the questions raised by the petitioners require an answer which need not be specific qua the first respondent we make it clear that it is now open for the Board to proceed further in the matter and render such orders, in accordance with law, as may be considered just, adequate and proper.

 published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40679    REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1953 OF 2013 Dr. Subramanian Swamy and Ors. … Petitioner (s) Versus Raju, Through Member, Juvenile Justice Board And Anr. … Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T RANJAN GOGOI, J. 1. Should the … Continue reading

Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C. = The fact that the defendants remained ex parte or no written statements are filed, by itself, does not relieve a Court, of its obligation to verify the legality and genuinity of the claim in any suit.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=16690 PETITIONER: BALRAJ TANEJA & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: SUNIL MADAN & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/09/1999 BENCH: D.P.Mohapatro, S.Saghir Ahmad JUDGMENT: S.SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Leave granted. Respondent No.1, Sunil Madan, filed a suit in the Delhi High Court against the appellants and respondent No.2 for specific performance of an agreement for sale in respect … Continue reading

Service matter = whether fixation of benchmark would amount to change in the criteria of selection in the midstream when there was no such stipulation in that regard in the advertisement.- whether there was any change in the mode of selection after the process of selection had started. – Rule 8 is a step in the preparation of a list of eligible candidates with minimum qualifications who may be considered for appointment. The list is prepared in order of merit. The one higher in rank is deemed to be more meritorious than the one who is lower in rank. It could never be said that one who tops the list is equal in merit to the one who is at the bottom of the list. Except that they are all mentioned in one list, each one of them stands on a separate level of competence as compared with another. That is why Rule 10(ii), Part C speaks of “selection for appointment”. Even as there is no constraint on the State Government in respect of the number of appointment to be made, there is no constraint on the State Government in respect of the number of appointments to be made, there is no constraint on the Government fixing a higher score of marks for the purpose of selection. In a case where appointments are made by selection from a number of eligible candidates it is open to the Government with a view to maintain high-standards of competence to fix a score which is much higher than the one required for mere eligibility.” “In the case at hand, as we perceive, the intention of the Commission was to get more meritorious candidates. There has been no change of norm or procedure. No mandate was fixed that a candidate should secure minimum marks in the interview. Obtaining of 65% marks was thought as a guidelines for selecting the candidate from the OBC category. The objective is to have the best hands in the field of law. According to us, fixation of such marks is legitimate and gives a demarcating choice to the employer. It has to be borne in mind that the requirement of the job in a Competition Commission demands a well structured selection process. Such a selection would advance the cause of efficiency. Thus scrutinized, we do not perceive any error in the fixation of marks at 65% by the Commission which has been uniformly applied. The said action of the Commission cannot be treated to be illegal, irrational or illegitimate.” It is stated at the cost of repetition that there is no change in the criteria of selection which remained of 80 marks for written test and 20 marks for interview without any subsequent introduction of minimum cut off marks in the interview. It is the short listing which is done by fixing the benchmark, to recruit best candidates on rational and reasonable basis. That is clearly permissible under the law.(M.P.Public Service Commission vs. Navnit Kumar Potdar & Anr. (1994) 6 SCC 293). – 18. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be to dismiss the appeals as bereft of any merit. No costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40656 [REPORTABLE] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6799/2013 (arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No. 34427/2011) Yogesh Yadav …..Appellant Versus Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents WITH C.A.No.6800/2013 (@ SLP(civil) Nos.6988/2012 C.A.No.6801/2013 (@ SLP(civil) Nos.9556/2012   J U D G M E N T A.K.SIKRI,J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Counsel … Continue reading

Granting of protective relief even after withdrawal of suit can be granted so as make the party to avail suitable remedy in correct forum =in the interest of justice the court has inherent power to continue interim relief even after disposal of a case.= it is very clear that if a petition is not maintainable and is ultimately withdrawn, the court should not continue interim relief for a period beyond withdrawal of the writ petition. However, the afore stated observation would not apply to a case where the matter is heard on merits and after considering the facts of the case the court permits withdrawal of the case. In such a case, the court is at liberty to extend the interim relief or can grant interim relief for a limited period after recording reasons for the same. 18. In view of the facts of the case, in our opinion, the High Court was not in error while extending the interim relief for some time while permitting withdrawal of the appeal as the High Court has also recorded the reasons for which the interim relief was extended till 10.5.2010. 19. In view of the aforestated legal position, in our opinion, the High Court did not commit any error while extending the interim relief especially when the matter was heard on merits by the court and only to facilitate the appellants therein, the High Court had permitted withdrawal of appeal. 20. In the circumstances, we dismiss the appeal with no order as to costs. Interim relief which had been granted earlier by this Court stands vacated.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40571     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5499 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12909 of 2010)   M/s. Hotel Queen Road Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. …APPELLANTS VERSUS Mr. Ram Parshotam Mittal & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS WITH S.L.P.(C) NO. CC No.20730 OF 2009 … Continue reading

claimants are entitled to same compensation fixed already on relied judgement in the absence of negative grounds= in Balbir Singh’s case the value of the land was fixed to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha. We are, therefore, of the view that while every other reasoning of the Division Bench in adopting the value, which was fixed in Balbir Singh’s case was justified, there is no need to deduct any amount from the said value, in as much as the exemplar relied upon by the Division Bench in Balbir Singh’s case, were all sale deeds pertaining to the period 18.01.1982 to 22.07.1983 i.e., prior to the very first notification issued in respect of the present acquisition of all the four villages viz., 01.08.1983, which notification pertains to the lands belonging to the appellants which were situated in Sahibabad Daulatpur village. = The appeals stand partly allowed by enhancing the compensation from Rs.42,000/- per bigha as determined by the Division Bench of the High Court to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in respect of both categories of land. With the above modification in the rate of land value, the appeals stand partly allowed. Needless to add that appellants would be entitled for consequential benefits as per the law, if any.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40474 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.949 OF 2005 Premwati …. Appellant VERSUS Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO.2443 OF 2005 Rajinder Singh (D) by Lrs. …. Appellants VERSUS Delhi College of Engineering ….Respondent J U D G M E N T … Continue reading

the Swadeshi Act “27. Penalties Any person who.:- (a) having in his possession, custody or control any property forming part of any of the textile undertaking wrongfully withholds such property from the National Textile Corporation; or (b) wrongfully obtains possession of, or retains any property forming part of, any of the textile undertaking; or shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees. shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.”- “……that a complaint under Section 27 of Act 30 of 1986 could only have been filed by the petitioner if the title of the property in dispute was clearly in their favour. Both the Courts below have correctly assessed the facts and circumstances of the case and have rightly come to the conclusion that in the absence of having any clear title in their favour the complaint under Section 27 was misconceived and, therefore, rightly dismissed.”

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40480 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4818 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 4706 of 2006) National Textile Corpn. (UP) Ltd. …. Appellant(s) Versus Dr. Raja Ram Jaipuria & Ors. …. Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4819 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP … Continue reading

Non- official as co – accused can be prosecuted along with other official accused by Special court = Admittedly, 2G Scam case is triable by the Special Judge against the persons accused of offences punishable under the PC Act in view of sub­Section (1) of Section 4. The Special Judge alone can take the cognizance of the offence specified in sub­ Section (1) of Section 3 and conspiracy in relation to them. While trying any case, the Special Judge may also try an offence other than the offence specified in sub­Section (1) of Section 3, in view of sub­Section (3) of Section 4. A magistrate cannot take cognizance of offence as specified in Section 3(1) of the PC Act. In this background, as the petitioners have been shown as co­accused in second­ supplementary chargesheet filed in 2G Scam case, it is open to the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence under Section 120­B and Section 420 IPC.- the Special Judge while trying the co­ accused of an offence punishable under the provisions of the Act as also an offence punishable under Section 120­B read with Section 420 IPC has the jurisdiction to try the appellant also for the offence punishable under Section 120­B read with Section 420 IPC applying the principles incorporated in Section 223 of the Code.; In the present case there is nothing on the record to suggest that the petitioners will not get fair trial and may face miscarriage of justice. In absence of any such threat & miscarriage of justice, no interference is called for against the impugned order taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioners. On 11th April, 2001, when the 2G Scam Case was taken up by this Court, this Court, inter alia, observed as follows: “Acting on such basis, this Court has given directions for establishing a separate Special Court to try this case and pursuant to such direction, a Special Court has been constituted after following the due procedure. We also make it clear that any objection about appointment of Special Public Prosecutor or his assistant advocates or any prayer for staying or impeding the progress of the Trial can be made only before this Court and no other court shall entertain the same. The trial must proceed on a day­to­ day basis. All these directions are given by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution and in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case.” From the aforesaid order it is clear that this Court passed the order under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution, in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case. – In Rupa Asbhok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and another, (2002) 4 SCC 388, this Court held that a final judgment or order passed by this Court cannot be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution by an aggrieved person, whether he was a party to the case or not. For the said reason also, it is not open to the petitioner to indirectly assail the order passed by this Court in 2G Scam case. 30. We find no merit in these writ petitions, they are accordingly dismissed. The Special Court is expected to proceed with the trial on day­to­day basis to ensure early disposal of the trial. There shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40469 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (C) No. 57 OF 2012 ESSAR TELEHOLDINGS LTD. … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.  … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 59 OF 2012 LOOP TELECOM LTD.  … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.      … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 96 OF 2012 VIKASH SARAF … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.  … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Feeling   aggrieved   by   the   order   dated   21st December, 2011 passed by the Special Judge, Central 1Page 2 Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi taking cognizance against   the   petitioners,   they   … Continue reading

Section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003,-THE OCCUPIER OF THE PREMISES IS ENTITLED FOR ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN HIS NAME, IF THE OWNER REFUSED TO TAKE CONNECTION IN HIS NAME = Section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003, is very clear that it is the duty of every licencee to give supply of electricity to the owner or occupier of any premises within its area.= the occupier of the premises is entitled as of her own right under Section 43 to supply of electricity and respondent No. 1 should have ensured that such supply was restored to the petitioner after complying with all necessary formalities as provided under the Act and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder.= In case, the owner of the premises for any reason is not willing for supply of electricity in his name then the supply shall be made in the name of the petitioner who is the occupant of the premises and the meter shall also be installed in the name of the petitioner and the petitioner will be liable for all charges of consumption of electricity.

‘ PUBLISHED IN http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp ITEM NO.18 COURT NO.3 SECTION X S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO(s). 103 OF 2013 DR. MEENA CHAUDHARY @DR. MEENA P.N.SINGH Petitioner(s) VERSUS BSES RAJDHANI POWER LTD. AND ORS. Respondent(s) (With application … Continue reading

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