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Damage to the crop due pesticides – not proved; Claim by other persons whoes names not mentioned in the purchased Bill = (2012) 2 SCC 506 – National Seeds Corporation Ltd. Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. in which it was held that not only the purchaser of goods, but also beneficiaries who use the goods with approval of the person who purchased goods fall within purview of consumer. We agree with the proposition of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, but in the case in hand, complainants have submitted in paragraph 1 of the complaint that they have purchased pesticides for a sum of Rs.9,000/- whereas bill dated 12.12.2006 is in the name of only Complainant no. 2. Further, perusal of complaint reveals that nowhere complainants have alleged that Complainant No. 1 and Complainant nos. 3 to 9 used aforesaid pesticides with approval of complainant no.2. In such circumstances, it cannot be inferred that Complainant No. 1 and Complainant Nos. 3 to 9 sprayed purchased pesticides on their crop with the approval of Complainant No. 2 who purchased pesticides from OP No. 2 and 3, and in such circumstances, Complainant No. 1 and Complainant 3 to 9 do not fall within purview of consumer and learned State Commission has not committed any error in holding that except Complainant No. 2, rest of the complainants do not fall within purview of consumer.- Complainants have not placed on record any laboratory report to substantiate that crops were damaged 100% due to application of pesticide. Report of Agriculture Development Officer only reveals that there was 100% damage to the wheat crop. These officers have not carried out any test to ascertain whether 100% damage to the wheat crop was due to application of purchased pesticides or not. They have mentioned damage as told by the complainants meaning thereby without carrying out any test regarding application of pesticides on the wheat crop. They have given report regarding damage to the crop due to application of purchased pesticides. 8. In the light of above discussion, we do not find any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and revision petition is liable to be dismissed.

published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/0013092511533404RP444612.htm NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION                                                 NEW DELHI          REVISION PETITION NO. 4446 OF 2012 (From the order dated 13.07.2012 in Appeal No. 859/2011 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula) 1. Devender Kumar S/o Sh. Khicchu 2. Radha Charan S/o Sh. Puran Lal 3. Mahendar S/o Sh. Heti 4. Devraj S/o Sh. Puran Lal 5. Parkash S/o Sh. Khema 6. Chander S/o Sh. Khajan Singh 7. Nand Kishore S/o Sh. Shiv Charan 8. Shyam S/o Sh. Uttam Singh 9. Rajender S/o Sh. Bhagmal All R/o of Village Mohna, … Continue reading

Curable mental disorder -No ground for divorce = whether the marriage between the parties can be dissolved by granting a decree of divorce on the basis of one spouse’s mental illness which includes schizophrenia under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Act. In the English case of Whysall v. Whysall[4], it was held that a spouse is ‘incurably of unsound mind’ if he or she is of such mental incapacity as to make normal married life impossible and there is no prospect of any improvement in mental health, which would make this possible in future. The High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, in Pramatha Kumar Maity v Ashima Maity[5] has held that mental disorder of the wife, even if proved, cannot, by itself, warrant a decree of divorce and it must be further proved that it is of such a nature as the husband could not be expected to live with the wife. The Allahabad High Court, in Mt. Tilti Vs. Alfred Rebert Jones[6] has held that where it has come on record that the wife has improved her educational qualifications and has been looking after her children, the apprehension of the husband that there is danger to his life or to his children is not borne out is the finding recorded in the said case. Inability to manage his or her affairs is an essential attribute of an “incurably unsound mind”. The facts pleaded and the evidence placed on record produced by the appellant in this case does not establish such inability as a ground on which dissolution of marriage was sought for by him before the trial court.= It is thus clear that the respondent, even if she did suffer from schizophrenia, is in a much better health condition at present. Therefore, this Court cannot grant the dissolution of marriage on the basis of one spouse’s illness. The appellant has not proved the fact of mental disorder of the respondent with reference to the allegation made against her that she has been suffering from schizophrenia by producing positive and substantive evidence on record and on the other hand, it has been proved that the respondent is in much better health condition and does not show signs of schizophrenia as per the most recent medical report from NIMHANS, as deposed by PW-4 in his evidence before the trial court.- Under Hindu law, marriage is an institution, a meeting of two hearts and minds and is something that cannot be taken lightly. In the Vedic period, the sacredness of the marriage tie was repeatedly declared; the family ideal was decidedly high and it was often realised[7]. In Vedic Index I it is stated that “The high value placed on the marriage is shown by the long and striking hymn”. In Rig Veda, X, 85; “Be, thou, mother of heroic children, devoted to the Gods, Be, thou, Queen in thy father-in- law’s household. May all the Gods unite the hearts of us “two into one” as stated in Justice Ranganath Misra’s ‘Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage’[8]. Marriage is highly revered in India and we are a Nation that prides itself on the strong foundation of our marriages, come hell or high water, rain or sunshine. Life is made up of good times and bad, and the bad times can bring with it terrible illnesses and extreme hardships. The partners in a marriage must weather these storms and embrace the sunshine with equanimity. Any person may have bad health, this is not their fault and most times, it is not within their control, as in the present case, the respondent was unwell and was taking treatment for the same. The illness had its fair share of problems. Can this be a reason for the appellant to abandon her and seek dissolution of marriage after the child is born out of their union? Since the child is now a grown up girl, her welfare must be the prime consideration for both the parties. In view of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the two parties in this case must reconcile and if the appellant so feels that the respondent is still suffering, then she must be given the right treatment. The respondent must stick to her treatment plan and make the best attempts to get better. It is not in the best interest of either the respondent or her daughter who is said to be of adolescent age for grant of a decree of dissolution of marriage as prayed for by the appellant. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of the High Court in not granting a decree of divorce and allowing the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Therefore, we grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Act in favour of the respondent.

 published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40785   REPORTABLE         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO.8264 OF 2013   (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3544 of 2007)       KOLLAM CHANDRA SEKHAR … APPELLANT   Vs.   KOLLAM PADMA LATHA … RESPONDENT       J U … Continue reading

Since only legal points raised , the petitioner is allowed to submit his case on those points only like that of PIL and as he was authorised by other petitioners also = Should the adjudication sought for by the petitioner be refused at the threshold on the basis of the fairly well established legal proposition that a third party/stranger does not have any right to participate in a criminal prosecution which is primarily the function of the State. = All that the petitioners seek is an authoritative pronouncement of the true purport and effect of the different provisions of the JJ Act so as to take a juvenile out of the purview of the said Act in case he had committed an offence, which, according to the petitioners, on a true interpretation of Section 2(p) of the Act, is required to be identified and distinguished to justifya separate course of action, namely, trial in a regular Court of Law as a specific offence under the Penal Code and in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The adjudication that the petitioners seek clearly has implications beyond the case of the first respondent and the proceedings in which he is or may be involved. = We are, therefore, of the view that it would be appropriate for us hold that the special leave petition does not suffer from the vice of absence of locus on the part of the petitioners so as to render the same not maintainable in law. We, therefore, will proceed to hear the special leave petition on merits and attempt to provide an answer to the several questions raised by the petitioners before us. 13. We, therefore, issue notice in this special leave petition and permit the respondents to bring their respective additional pleadings on record, if any. 14. By our order dated 31.7.2013 we had permitted the first petitioner to bring to the notice of the Board that the present special leave petition was to be heard by us on 14.8.2013. We are told at the Bar that in anticipation of our orders in the matter, the Board has deferred further consideration of the proceedings against the first respondent. In the light of the view taken by us that the questions raised by the petitioners require an answer which need not be specific qua the first respondent we make it clear that it is now open for the Board to proceed further in the matter and render such orders, in accordance with law, as may be considered just, adequate and proper.

 published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40679    REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1953 OF 2013 Dr. Subramanian Swamy and Ors. … Petitioner (s) Versus Raju, Through Member, Juvenile Justice Board And Anr. … Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T RANJAN GOGOI, J. 1. Should the … Continue reading

whether an authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for brevity ‘the Act’) without the company being arraigned as an accused. -apex court held No = “141. Offences by companies. – (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly; Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence: Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a Company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act, has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” 16. On a reading of the said provision, it is plain as day that if a person who commits offence under Section 138 of the Act is a company, the company as well as every person in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of offence is deemed to be guilty of the offence. The first proviso carves out under what circumstances the criminal liability would not be fastened. Sub-section (2) enlarges the criminal liability by incorporating the concepts of connivance, negligence and consent that engulfs many categories of officers. It is worth noting that in both the provisions, there is a ‘deemed’ concept of criminal liability.- Resultantly, the Criminal Appeal Nos. 838 of 2008 and 842 of 2008 are allowed and the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Act are quashed. 46. Presently, we shall advert to the other two appeals, i.e., Criminal Appeal Nos. 1483 of 2009 and 1484 of 2009 wherein the offence is under Section 67 read with Section 85 of the 2000 Act. In Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2009, the director of the company is the appellant and in Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 2009, the company. Both of them have called in question the legal substantiality of the same order passed by the High Court. In the said case, the High Court followed the decision in Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) and, while dealing with the application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the instance of Avnish Bajaj, the Managing Director of the company, quashed the charges under Sections 292 and 294 of the Indian Penal Code and directed the offences under Section 67 read with Section 85 of the 2000 Act to continue. It is apt to note that the learned single Judge has observed that a prima facie case for the offence under Sections 292(2)(a) and 292(2)(b) of the Indian Penal Code is also made out against the company. 47. Section 85 of the 2000 Act is as under: – “85. Offences by companies – (1) Where a person committing a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder is a company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company as well as the company, shall be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to punishment if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made there under has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contravention has taken place with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” 48. Keeping in view the anatomy of the aforesaid provision, our analysis pertaining to Section 141 of the Act would squarely apply to the 2000 enactment. Thus adjudged, the director could not have been held liable for the offence under Section 85 of the 2000 Act. Resultantly, the Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2009 is allowed and the proceeding against the appellant is quashed. As far as the company is concerned, it was not arraigned as an accused. Ergo, the proceeding as initiated in the existing incarnation is not maintainable either against the company or against the director. As a logical sequeter, the appeals are allowed and the proceedings initiated against Avnish Bajaj as well as the company in the present form are quashed. 49. Before we part with the case, we must record our uninhibited and unreserved appreciation for the able assistance rendered by the learned counsel for the parties and the learned amicus curiae. 50. In the ultimate analysis, all the appeals are allowed.

   published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=39265 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 838 OF 2008   Aneeta Hada …..……..Appellant Versus M/s. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. ………Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 842 OF 2008 Anil Hada …………Appellant Versus M/s. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. ………Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. … Continue reading

The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 & the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short ‘the 2000 Act’) = whether or not the appellant, who was admittedly not a juvenile within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short ‘the 1986 Act’) when offences were committed but had not completed 18 years of age, on that date, will be governed by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short ‘the 2000 Act’) and be declared as a juvenile in relation to the offences alleged to have been committed by him. = the age of the appellant as on the date of the commission of the offence i.e. 06.05.1995 was 17 years, 11 months and 5 days and hence less than 18 years, and hence when we apply provisions of the 2000 Act, the appellant has to be treated as a juvenile, being less than 18 years of age on the date of the crime and hence entitled to get the benefit of the provisions of the 2000 Act read with Rules. 8. We are therefore inclined to affirm the order of conviction, however, the sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is sent to the concerned Juvenile Justice Court for imposing adequate sentence. Appeal is allowed as above.

 reported in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40582    Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 556 OF 2004 Ketankumar Gopalbhai Tandel Appellant Versus State of Gujarat Respondent   J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. The question that falls for consideration in this appeal is whether or not the … Continue reading

the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (in short ‘the Act’),= occupation of government accommodation by members of all the three branches of the State, viz., the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary beyond the period for which the same were allotted. The occupation of such government houses/quarters beyond the period prescribed causes difficulty in accommodating other persons waiting for allotment and, therefore, the Government is at a loss on the one hand in not being able to accommodate those persons who are in need and on the other is unable to effectively deal with the persons who continue to occupy unauthorisedly beyond the period prescribed.= The following suggestions would precisely address the grievances of the Centre and the State governments in regard to the unauthorized occupants: Suggestions: (i) As a precautionary measure, a notice should be sent to the allottee/officer/employee concerned under Section 4 of the PP Act three months prior to the date of his/her retirement giving advance intimation to vacate the premises. (ii) The Department concerned from where the government servant is going to retire must be made liable for fulfilling the above-mentioned formalities as well as follow up actions so that rest of the provisions of the Act can be effectively utilized. (iii) The principles of natural justice have to be followed while serving the notice. (iv) After following the procedure as mentioned in SR 317-B-11(2) and 317- B-22 proviso 1 and 2, within 7 working days, send a show cause notice to the person concerned in view of the advance intimation sent three months before the retirement. (v) Date of appearance before the Estate Officer or for personal hearing as mentioned in the Act after show cause notice should not be more than 7 working days. (vi) Order of eviction should be passed as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 15 days. (vii) If, as per the Estate Officer, the occupant’s case is genuine in terms of Section 5 of the Act then, in the first instance, an extension of not more than 30 days should be granted. (viii) The responsibility for issuance of the genuineness certificate should be on the Department concerned from where the government servant has retired for the occupation of the premises for next 15 days and further. Giving additional responsibility to the department concerned will help in speedy vacation of such premises. Baseless or frivolous applications for extensions have to be rejected within seven days. (ix) If as per the Estate Officer the occupant’s case is not genuine, not more than 15 days’ time should be granted and thereafter, reasonable force as per Section 5(2) of the Act may be used. (x) There must be a time frame within how much time the Estate Officer has to decide about the quantum of rent to be paid. (xi) The same procedure must be followed for damages. (xii) The arrears/damages should be collected as arrears of land revenue as mentioned in Section 14 of the Act. (xiii) There must be a provision for compound interest, instead of simple interest as per Section 7. (xiv) To make it more stringent, there must be some provision for stoppage or reduction in the monthly pension till the date of vacation of the premises. (xv) Under Section 9 (2), an appeal shall lie from an order of eviction and of rent/damages within 12 days from the day of publication or on which the order is communicated respectively. (xvi) Under Section 9(4), disposal of the appeals must be preferably within a period of 30 days in order to eliminate unnecessary delay in disposal of such cases. (xvii) The liberty of the appellate officer to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 9 of the Act should be exercised very reluctantly and it should be an exceptional practice and not a general rule. (xviii) Since allotment of government accommodation is a privilege given to the Ministers and Members of Parliament, the matter of unauthorized retention should be intimated to the Speaker/Chairman of the House and action should be initiated by the House Committee for the breach of the privileges which a Member/Minister enjoys and the appropriate Committee should recommend to the Speaker/Chairman for taking appropriate action/eviction within a time bound period. (xix) Judges of any forum shall vacate the official residence within a period of one month from the date of superannuation/retirement. However, after recording sufficient reason(s), the time may be extended by another one month. (xx) Henceforth, no memorials should be allowed in future in any Government houses earmarked for residential accommodation. It is unfortunate that the employees, officers, representatives of people and other high dignitaries continue to stay in the residential accommodation provided by the Government of India though they are no longer entitled to such accommodation. Many of such persons continue to occupy residential accommodation commensurate with the office(s) held by them earlier and which are beyond their present entitlement. The unauthorized occupants must recollect that rights and duties are correlative as the rights of one person entail the duties of another person similarly the duty of one person entails the rights of another person. Observing this, the unauthorized occupants must appreciate that their act of overstaying in the premise directly infringes the right of another. No law or directions can entirely control this act of disobedience but for the self realization among the unauthorized occupants. The matter is disposed of with the above terms and no order is required in I.As for impleadment and intervention.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40526 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4064 OF 2004   S.D. Bandi …. Appellant(s) Versus Divisional Traffic Officer, KSRTC & Ors. …. Respondent(s)   2   J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam, J. 1) The instant case relates to the occupation of … Continue reading

MERE ABSENCE OF EXTERNAL INJURIES ON BODY OF VICTIM – IT CAN NOT BE SAID AS CONSENT PARTY TO SEX = In the absence of pleading in defence , no court can presume the same wrongly = We are of the considered opinion that as the appellant had not taken any defence of consent of PW-5, the trial court was not correct in recording the finding that there was consent of PW-5 to the sexual intercourse committed by the appellant ;When benifit of doubt arose = The settled position of law is that the prosecution is required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by adducing evidence. Hence, if the prosecution in a given case adduces evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court cannot acquit the accused on the ground that there are some defects in the investigation, but if the defects in the investigation are such as to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case, then of course the accused is entitled to acquittal because of such doubt. In the present case, as we have seen, the evidence of PW-5 as corroborated by the evidence of PW-2 and the FIR establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has committed rape on PW-5 and thus the appellant is not entitled to acquittal. 16. In the result, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of the guilt recorded by the High Court against the appellant as well as the minimum sentence of 7 years imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 IPC imposed by the High Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40522 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1118 of 2004 Ganga Singh …… Appellant Versus State of Madhya Pradesh ….. Respondent J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 of … Continue reading

offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304-B, 406 and 34 of IPC= whether the trial Court was justified in framing a charge under Section 302 of the IPC against the appellants and whether the High Court was justified in affirming that order of the trial Court and dismissing the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners against the same. where this Court has recognized the principle that in cases where the trial Court upon a consideration of broad probabilities of the case based upon total effect of the evidence and documents produced, is satisfied that any addition or alteration of the charge is necessary, it is free to do so. In any such fresh exercise which the trial Court may undertake, it shall remain uninfluenced by the observations made by the High Court on merits of the case including those touching the probative value of the autopsy surgeon’s opinion. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and that passed by the trial Court framing the charge under Section 302 IPC and remit the matter back to the trial Court for a fresh order keeping in view the observations made above. No costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40504 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 819 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) No.8738 of 2011) Jasvinder Saini & Ors. …Appellants Versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) …Respondent J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

service matter – selections to police constable = whether the candidature of the respondents who had made a clean breast of their involvement in a criminal case by mentioning this fact in their application/attestation form while applying for a post of constable in Delhi Police; who were provisionally selected subject to verification of their antecedents and who were subsequently acquitted/discharged in the criminal case, could be cancelled by the Screening Committee of the Delhi Police on the ground that they are not found suitable for appointment to the post of constable. = The Screening Committee did not find his reply to be convincing. In his order dated 22/3/2011, the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), New Delhi stated that the Screening Committee has, inter alia, observed that the actions of respondent – Mehar Singh depicted his violent nature and that he had no respect for the law of the land and on considering the totality of the circumstances, the Screening Committee held that he was not suitable for appointment to the post of constable.= whether a person against whom a criminal case was registered and who was later acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by the Screening Committee created for that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee’s decision is not mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. = In the ultimate analysis, we are of the view that the opinion formed by the Screening Committee in both these cases which is endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), Delhi, that both the respondents are not suitable for being appointed in the Delhi Police Force does not merit any interference. It is legally sustainable. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the order of cancellation of the respondents’ candidature. In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed. The orders of the Delhi High Court impugned in both the appeals are set aside. The cancellation of candidature of the respondents – Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar is upheld.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40496 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4842 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.38886 of 2012) COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI & ANR. …Appellants Versus MEHAR SINGH …Respondent WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4965 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition … Continue reading

claimants are entitled to same compensation fixed already on relied judgement in the absence of negative grounds= in Balbir Singh’s case the value of the land was fixed to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha. We are, therefore, of the view that while every other reasoning of the Division Bench in adopting the value, which was fixed in Balbir Singh’s case was justified, there is no need to deduct any amount from the said value, in as much as the exemplar relied upon by the Division Bench in Balbir Singh’s case, were all sale deeds pertaining to the period 18.01.1982 to 22.07.1983 i.e., prior to the very first notification issued in respect of the present acquisition of all the four villages viz., 01.08.1983, which notification pertains to the lands belonging to the appellants which were situated in Sahibabad Daulatpur village. = The appeals stand partly allowed by enhancing the compensation from Rs.42,000/- per bigha as determined by the Division Bench of the High Court to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in respect of both categories of land. With the above modification in the rate of land value, the appeals stand partly allowed. Needless to add that appellants would be entitled for consequential benefits as per the law, if any.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40474 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.949 OF 2005 Premwati …. Appellant VERSUS Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO.2443 OF 2005 Rajinder Singh (D) by Lrs. …. Appellants VERSUS Delhi College of Engineering ….Respondent J U D G M E N T … Continue reading

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