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Non- official as co – accused can be prosecuted along with other official accused by Special court = Admittedly, 2G Scam case is triable by the Special Judge against the persons accused of offences punishable under the PC Act in view of sub­Section (1) of Section 4. The Special Judge alone can take the cognizance of the offence specified in sub­ Section (1) of Section 3 and conspiracy in relation to them. While trying any case, the Special Judge may also try an offence other than the offence specified in sub­Section (1) of Section 3, in view of sub­Section (3) of Section 4. A magistrate cannot take cognizance of offence as specified in Section 3(1) of the PC Act. In this background, as the petitioners have been shown as co­accused in second­ supplementary chargesheet filed in 2G Scam case, it is open to the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence under Section 120­B and Section 420 IPC.- the Special Judge while trying the co­ accused of an offence punishable under the provisions of the Act as also an offence punishable under Section 120­B read with Section 420 IPC has the jurisdiction to try the appellant also for the offence punishable under Section 120­B read with Section 420 IPC applying the principles incorporated in Section 223 of the Code.; In the present case there is nothing on the record to suggest that the petitioners will not get fair trial and may face miscarriage of justice. In absence of any such threat & miscarriage of justice, no interference is called for against the impugned order taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioners. On 11th April, 2001, when the 2G Scam Case was taken up by this Court, this Court, inter alia, observed as follows: “Acting on such basis, this Court has given directions for establishing a separate Special Court to try this case and pursuant to such direction, a Special Court has been constituted after following the due procedure. We also make it clear that any objection about appointment of Special Public Prosecutor or his assistant advocates or any prayer for staying or impeding the progress of the Trial can be made only before this Court and no other court shall entertain the same. The trial must proceed on a day­to­ day basis. All these directions are given by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution and in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case.” From the aforesaid order it is clear that this Court passed the order under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution, in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case. – In Rupa Asbhok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and another, (2002) 4 SCC 388, this Court held that a final judgment or order passed by this Court cannot be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution by an aggrieved person, whether he was a party to the case or not. For the said reason also, it is not open to the petitioner to indirectly assail the order passed by this Court in 2G Scam case. 30. We find no merit in these writ petitions, they are accordingly dismissed. The Special Court is expected to proceed with the trial on day­to­day basis to ensure early disposal of the trial. There shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40469 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (C) No. 57 OF 2012 ESSAR TELEHOLDINGS LTD. … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.  … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 59 OF 2012 LOOP TELECOM LTD.  … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.      … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 96 OF 2012 VIKASH SARAF … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.  … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Feeling   aggrieved   by   the   order   dated   21st December, 2011 passed by the Special Judge, Central 1Page 2 Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi taking cognizance against   the   petitioners,   they   … Continue reading

BENEFIT OF DOUBT – TWO WEAPONS , NO BLOOD STAINED CLOTHES, NO DISTURBED SCENE OF OFFENCE None of the prosecution witnesses including the Investigating Officer, stated anything as to how and wherefrom the said knife (Ex.2b) was recovered and kept with the boiler suit in the same cardboard box. This knife (Ex.2b) also bore human blood-stained matching ‘O’ group of the deceased. As per the post mortem report, stab wounds on the neck and chest of the deceased might be by the use of the said weapon Ex.2b. The said knife (Ex.2b) was not subjected to examination to find out the presence of fingerprints, if any, of the appellant. The said knife (Ex.2b) was also not shown to the doctor (PW-19) who conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the deceased, to seek his opinion if the same could have been possible weapon of offence. Even the opinion of the expert witness (PW-22) was not sought as to whether the cuts on the boiler suit could have been caused by that knife. One more important aspect which has not been taken note of by the trial court and the High Court is that as per the prosecution case, the appellant was the trouble maker and instigated other crew members not to steer the ship manually unless the officers give it in writing about fulfillment of their demand of payment of long overdue overtime. This vital piece of evidence regarding the enmity of the appellant with the higher officials and others has been suppressed: instead, the prosecution tried to show that there was no enmity towards the appellant. it can safely be concluded that the offence committed by the appellant has not been fully established beyond all reasonable doubts. The very fact that two blood-stained knives were found by the prosecution proves that the prosecution failed to give sufficient explanation as to who had assaulted the deceased by using another knife (Ex.2b). The High Court has committed grave error in holding that in view of the findings arrived at by the trial court that offence was committed by using the knife (Ex.P-3), the presence of another knife (Ex.2b) with blood-stains will not demolish the case of the prosecution. In our view, from the circumstances the conclusion of the guilt of the appellant herein has not been fully established beyond all shadow of doubt as the circumstances are not conclusive in nature — neither the chain of events is complete nor the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the offence was committed by the appellant and none else. Hence, the impugned judgment of the High Court affirming the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court cannot be sustained in law.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40463 Page 1 ‘REPORTABLE’ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1300 OF 2009 Majendran Langeswaran …..Appellant Versus State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. ….Respondents J U D G M E N T M.Y. EQBAL, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 25th … Continue reading

BUT NOT BY ACCUSED – NO VALUE ON FACTS OF THE CASE = the deceased has been fired at by Samar Singh from his service revolver. = On a perusal of the evidence and the FSL report relating to the country-made pistol, Ext. F-1, seized from the accused, it is manifest that the fire arm country-made pistol .303 bore was designed to fire a standard .303 cartridge and that the pistol was in working order. Its test fire was also successfully conducted and the empty cartridge of .303 bore, Ext. C- 1, found in the chamber of the country-made pistol was the empty cartridge fired from the country made pistol.-Therefore, to say that no shot was fired from the country-made pistol is belied and the prosecution version that it was the country-made pistol which was fired by the accused that caused injuries to the deceased deserves acceptance. – From the post-mortem report, it is clear that the bullet injury was from front to back. It is not in dispute that the deceased and the accused were grappling. The version of the prosecution in that all of a sudden, the accused brought out his desi katta and fired from a close range. This has been clearly established by the evidence. Learned counsel would submit that while grappling the position changed and the bullet fired from the service revolver of Samar Singh hit the deceased. In our considered opinion, such a submission cannot be given any acceptance as the desi katta was seized from the accused and the weapon, as opined in the FSL report, is the desi katta and further there is no material to prove that gun shot was fired from the weapon of Samar Singh. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is clear as crystal that the shot was fired from the country-made pistol seized from the custody of the accused-appellant. Hence, the plea that there was a gun shot from the revolver of Samar Singh while the accused-appellant was grappling with the deceased being absolutely mercurial in nature is rejected. 14. In view of the aforesaid premised reasons, the appeals, being sans substance, stand dismissed.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40454 Page 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 562-563 OF 2010 Pramod Kumar … Appellant Versus State (GNCT) of Delhi …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. On 19.3.1999, SI Prahlad Singh along Ct. Baljit Singh went to Village Gittorni where Inspector Mohd. … Continue reading

MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE – JURISDICTION- LIMITAION – LOCUS STANDI OF THIRD PARTY TO CONTINUE AFTER THE DEATH OF COMPLAINANT= initially complaint was filed before Delhi Forum and subsequently, complaint was filed before Mumbai Forum. But, both fora had no territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint. Late Ms.Mohsena in her complaint has stated that she had undergone Ayurvedic treatment in the year 2001, at Calicut, Kerala. Further, as per Ms.Mohsena’s case, she did not get desire relief for treatment, hence, she came to Mumbai and had undergone some treatment. Thereafter, she shifted to Delhi for further treatment. The mere fact that Ms. Mohsena after getting her initial treatment at Calicut, got further treatment at Mumbai and Delhi will not give these two fora any territorial jurisdiction. Hence, on this short point alone, consumer complaint ought to have been rejected. 15. The second question for consideration is as to whether petitioner has any locus standi to file the present revision petition. It is an admitted case that it was late Ms.Mohsena, who initially had under gone medical treatment provided by Taj Residency at Calicut. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner is the legal heir of Ms.Mohsena, as per Hindu Succession Act. Moreover, it has nowhere been stated by the petitioner as to when parents of Ms.Mohsena died, nor their death certificates have been filed. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that petitioner is not the legal heir of Ms.Mohsena and as such she does not fall within the definition of “Consumer” as defined in the Act. 16. Next question to be seen is as to whether complaint was filed within the period of limitation. 17. As observed hereinabove, Ms.Mohsena got her initial treatment in Taj Residency, Calicut, in the year 2001. However, complaint was filed only in the year 2008 before the Mumbai forum. Thus, the complaint was hopelessly barred by limitation. = Petitioner who was having no locus standi to file the complaint has been pursuing this meritless litigation from day one, just to harass eight respondents out of whom seven are doctors. During last ten years, petitioner has taken the respondents to different consumer fora by filing one petition or the other, just to cause harassment to them. 22. Under these circumstances, present revision petition is liable to be dismissed with punitive cost. Accordingly, we dismiss the present revision petition with punitive cost of Rs.40,000 (Rupees Forty thousand only).

PUBLISHED IN http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00130606113118111RP23492011.htm   NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION  PETITION NO.   2349   OF  2011 (Against the order dated   24.06.2010   in Appeal No. A/10/267 of the State Commission,   Maharashtra) Ms. Raika Bandukwalla D/o Abdeali 25, Colaba causeway Mumbai – 400039                                                       ……. Petitioner   Versus   Dr. Anuradha Nayyar Samaj Ayurvedic Centre 14, Kohinoor Road Dadar East Mumbai – 400014   Dr.G.R. Verma The Arya Vaidya Pharmacy (Cbe) Ltd. 8-A/42, W.E.A. Karol Bagh New Delhi-110005   Ayurvedic Trust & Research … Continue reading

DEPARTMENTAL INQUIRY =We have reconsidered the case within permissible limits. The case remained limited to the charge nos. 4 and 6 only as all other charges have lost the significance at one stage or the other, and we have to advert only to the said charges. = The charge sheet dated 23.3.2007 containing the following 8 charges was served upon the appellant under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 for his alleged misconducts during his tenure in BSF, North Bengal, on the following counts :- (i) Indulged in living with a lady by name Smt. Chandrakala, not being his legally wedded wife. (ii) Allowed unauthorized interference by Smt. Chandrakala in the official functioning of North Bengal Frontier causing premature release of four constables from the Quarter Guard. (iii) Complete disregard to the rules and without jurisdiction, reviewed punishment awarded and mitigated the sentence awarded to No. 86161306 Constable Prakash Singh by Frontier Headquarter, BSF South Bengal. (iv) Favoritism and manipulation in the selection of Headmaster, BSF Primary School Kadmatala even though the candidate did not possess essential qualification and was not eligible. (v) Assisted enrolment of a person in BSF from his native district, UP by fraudulent means. (vi) Misuse of official vehicle, arms and ammunition 8Page 9 and BSF personnel during the marriage of his son in Feb. 2006 at his native place in Balia, UP. (vii) Retaining of four BSF Constables for Personal work. (viii) Attachment of Shri Prakash Singh, constable with North Bengal Frontier despite contrary remarks of the PSO, North Bengal Frontier. = It is evident from the record that as per letter dated 4.4.2013 sent by the Government of India to the appellant through the Chief Secretary, Andhra Pradesh, the proposed punishment is as under: “A penalty of withholding two increments for one year without cumulative effect, be imposed on the appellant as a punishment under Rule 6 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969.”The proved charges remained only charge nos.4 and 6 and in both the cases the misconduct seems to be of an administrative nature rather than a misconduct of a serious nature. It was not the case of the department that the appellant had taken the escort vehicle with him. There was only one vehicle which was an official vehicle for his use and charge no.6 stood partly proved. In view thereof, the punishment of compulsory retirement shocks the conscience of the court and by no stretch of imagination can it be held to be proportionate or commensurate to the delinquency committed by and proved against the appellant. -The only punishment which could be held to be commensurate to the delinquency was as proposed by the Government of India to withhold two increments for one year without cumulative effect. It would have been appropriate to remand the case to the disciplinary authority to impose the appropriate punishment. However, considering the chequered history of the case and in view of the fact that the appellant had remained under suspension for 11 months, suffered the order of dismissal for 19 months and would retire after reaching the age of superannuation in December 2013, the facts of the case warrant that this court should substitute the punishment of compulsory retirement to the punishment proposed by the Union of India i.e. withholding of two increments for one year without having cumulative effect. In view thereof, we do not want to proceed with the contempt petitions. The appeals as well as the contempt petitions stand disposed of accordingly.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4715-4716 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) NOs.22263-22264 of 2012) S.R. Tewari … Appellant Versus Union of India & Anr. …Respondents With Contempt Petition (C) Nos.180-181 of 2013 S.R. Tewari … Petitioner Versus R.K. Singh & Anr. …Contemnors J U D … Continue reading

Section 376(2) (f) of the Indian Penal Code= the victim is an eight year old girl who possibly would be deprived of the dreams of “Spring of Life” and might be psychologically compelled to remain in the “Torment of Winter”. When she suffers, the collective at large also suffers. Such a singular crime creates an atmosphere of fear which is historically abhorred by the society. It demands just punishment from the court and to such a demand, the courts of law are bound to respond within legal parameters. It is a demand for justice and the award of punishment has to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the court. The mitigating factors put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant are meant to invite mercy but we are disposed to think that the factual matrix cannot allow the rainbow of mercy to magistrate. Our judicial discretion impels us to maintain the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life and, 22Page 23 hence, we sustain the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed by the High Court. 23. Ex consequenti, the appeal, being sans merit, stands dismissed.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1860 OF 2010 Shyam Narain …Appellant Versus The State of NCT of Delhi …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. The wanton lust, vicious appetite, depravity of senses, mortgage of mind to the inferior endowments of … Continue reading

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AGREEMENT OF SALE = Whether the agreement is barred by Section 4 of the Delhi Land (Restriction of Transfer) Act, 1972 and is void under section 23 of the Contract Act. (PO3 WS).= appellant had served a legal notice upon the respondents, in paras 5 and 6 whereof it was alleged against the respondents that they had suppressed from the appellant the fact that an award had been published with respect to the subject lands. Thereafter, in para 7 of the notice, it was asserted as under:- That apart from above, by virtue of Section 3 & 4 of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972, there is prohibition on transfer of such lands, which has been acquired by the Central Government under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise. Thus, you have also committed an offence u/s 3 & 4 of the said Act and you have made yourself liable to be prosecuted u/s 9 of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act 1972.” 5. It does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to now urge to the contrary.- The same is that it is not obligatory for a Court to decree specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property merely because it would be legally permissible to do so.

‘     ITEM NO.31 COURT NO.3 SECTION XIV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 4628/2013 (From the judgment and order dated 31.8.2012 in RFA No.75/2012 of the High Court of … Continue reading

a complaint against the respondents alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 of the IPC. Crime No.41/10 was accordingly registered in the Central Crime Branch, Chennai Suburban, St. Thomas Mount for the said offences against respondents 2, 3 and 4. Aggrieved, the respondents filed Criminal O.P. No.15917 of 2010 for quashing of the FIR as also investigation in connection therewith =suit based on two forged sale deeds = In Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court had authoritatively declared that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. was attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in any court and during the time the same was in custodia legis.= It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and long before its production in the Court, could also be treated as one affecting administration of justice merely because that document later reached the court records.- The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court.”- the bar contained in Section 195 against taking of cognizance was not attracted to the case at hand as the sale deeds relied upon by GWL for claiming title to the property in question had not been forged while they were in custodia legis.= In the light of the above, the High Court was wrong in quashing the FIR on the ground that the allegations did not constitute an offence even when the same were taken to be true in their entirety. It was also, in our view, wrong for the High Court to hold that the respondents were not the makers of the documents or that the filing of a civil suit based on the same would not constitute an offence. Whether or not the respondents had forged the documents and if so what offence was committed by the respondents was a matter for investigation which could not be prejudged or quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

  ‘ ITEM NO. Judgment Court No.10 SECTION IIA     S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. …. OF 2013 @ SLP(Crl.) No. 1962 of 2011   C.P.SUBHASH Appellant (s)   VERSUS   INSPECTOR OF … Continue reading

Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC for impleadment as defendants in a suit for specific performance of contract being Suit No. 3426 of 1991 filed by plaintiff-Respondent No.1.= The doctrine of lis pendens applies only where the lis is pending before a court. Further pending the suit, the transferee is not entitled as of right to be made a party to the suit, though the court has a discretion to make him a party. But the transferee pendente lite can be added as a proper party if his interest in the subject-matter of the suit is substantial and not just peripheral. A transferee pendente lite to the extent he has acquired interest from the Defendant is vitally interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of the entire interest of the Defendant; the latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude with the Plaintiff. Hence, though the Plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lis pendens transferee a party, under Order 22 Rule 10 an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party. As already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The Court has held that a transferee pendente lite of an interest in immovable property is a representative-in-interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in the suit or other proceedings where the transferee pendente lite is made a party to the litigation; he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case”= The appeal is allowed and the appellant added as party defendant to the suit in question, in terms of the signed judgment.

‘ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal NO. 1518 of 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 24159 of 2009) Thomson Press (India) Ltd. …..Appellant (s) Vs. Nanak Builders & Investors P.Ltd. & Ors. …..Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T M.Y. EQBAL, J. Leave granted. … Continue reading

An application for modification/clarification of a final order passed by this Court is not contemplated by the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 which specifically provides the remedy of review and also lays down the procedure governing the consideration of a review application by this Court. In fact, filing of such applications for modification has been deprecated by this Court in Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors. [(2000) 7 SCC 296] and A.P. SRTC & Ors. Vs. Abdul Kareem [(2007) 2 SCC 466].= the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiffs 1 (since deceased), 2 and 3 was decreed in the following terms :- “30….We are of the further view that the sale deed that will now have to be executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs will be for the market price of the suit property as on the date of the present order. As No material, whatsoever is available to enable us to make a correct assessment of the market value of the suit property as on date we request the learned trial judge of the High Court of Delhi to undertake the said exercise with such expedition as may be possible in the prevailing facts and circumstances.= they are ready and willing to offer an amount of Rs.6 crores for the property as against the sum of Rs.3.75 lakhs as mentioned in agreement dated 22.12.1970 has been specifically recorded.- It is the aforesaid “offer” made on behalf of the appellants/plaintiffs that had led to the direction in question inasmuch as no material was available to Court to find out as to whether the offered amount of Rs.6 crores was, in any way, indicative of the market value of the property. It is in such a situation that the direction to execute the sale deed at the market price and the request to the learned Trial Judge to determine the same came to be recorded in the judgment dated 3.12.2012. It is, therefore, clear that we did not intend to lay down any law of general application while issuing the direction for execution of the sale deed at the market price as on the date of the judgment i.e. 3.12.2012. The exercise by the learned Trial Judge in terms of our judgment dated 3.12.2012 is yet to be made. The aforesaid determination, naturally, will be made by the learned single Judge only after affording an opportunity to all the affected parties and after taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances. Furthermore, any party aggrieved by such determination will be entitled to avail of such remedies that may be open in law to such a party. In view of the above, we do not deem it to be necessary to cause any variation or modification in the aforesaid direction contained in our judgment dated 3.12.2012. 21. Accordingly, I.A. Nos. 12-13 of 2013 shall stand disposed of in the above terms.

Page 1 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION I.A. NOS. 3-5 & I.A. D.No. 37212 OF 2013 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8653 OF 2012 SATYA JAIN (D) & ORS. …Appellant(s) Versus ANIS AHMED RUSHDIE (D) TH. LRS. & ORS … Respondent(s) With I.A. NOS. 12-13 & 14-15 OF 2013 IN CIVIL APPEAL … Continue reading

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